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Preface
The “desire and commitment to build a people-centred,
inclusive and development-oriented Information Society”
was expressed by heads of state, ministers and other high-
level representatives of the governments of the world during
the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS),
convened by the United Nations in November 2005 in
Tunis.1  The Tunis Summit elaborated on the principles
agreed upon two years before in Geneva, where the
enormous potential of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) to benefit “millions of people in all
corners of the world” was recognised.2  But as we all know,
the reality, also recognised during the Summit, is that the
benefits of the information technology revolution are
unevenly distributed between countries and within societies.
The ambitious agreed goal of bridging the “digital divide”
while also respecting human rights, promoting education,
public access to information, women’s empowerment and
economic prosperity, can only be accomplished, according
to the Tunis Commitment, through the involvement,
cooperation and partnership of governments, the private
sector, civil society and international organisations.
As civil society organisations identified with those
principles, and with long experience in using the tools
provided by technology to empower communities, the
Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and the
Third World Institute (ITeM) have always been aware of the
“digital divide”. While we welcome the global commitment
to bridge the gap and accept the challenge to contribute to
these goals, we have also identified another gap: the gap
that still exists between good intentions and actual
achievements, between promises and realities, between high
sounding principles and concrete actions.
The experience of citizen involvement in public policy
advocacy around the world has shown that the status quo
tends to prevail unless political will to implement change is
strengthened by active citizen participation. A “Global
Information Society Watch” is needed to make governments
and international organisations accountable.
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We reaffirm our desire and commitment to build a people-cen-
tred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society,
premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, international law and multilateralism, and respect-
ing fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
so that people everywhere can create, access, utilize and share
information and knowledge, to achieve their full potential and to
attain the internationally agreed development goals and objec-
tives, including the Millennium Development Goals.
Paragraph 2, Tunis Commitment
World Summit on the Information Society, 2005
We reaffirm our resolution in the quest to ensure that everyone
can benefit from the opportunities that ICTs can offer, by recall-
ing that governments, as well as private sector, civil society and
the United Nations and other international organizations, should
work together to: improve access to information and communi-
cation infrastructure and technologies as well as to information
and knowledge; build capacity; increase confidence and security
in the use of ICTs; create an enabling environment at all levels;
develop and widen ICT applications; foster and respect cultural
diversity; recognize the role of the media; address the ethical di-
mensions of the Information Society; and encourage international
and regional cooperation. We confirm that these are the key prin-
ciples for building an inclusive Information Society, the elabora-
tion of which is found in the Geneva Declaration of Principles.
Paragraph 9, Tunis Commitment
World Summit on the Information Society 2005
1 Tunis Commitment. World Summit on the Information Society 2005. Available
from: <www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html>.
2 Geneva Declaration of Principles. World Summit on the Information Society 2003.
Available from: <www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html>.
This publication, the first in a series of reports covering the
state of the information society on an annual basis, focuses
on the theme of participation. The report has three
interrelated goals: surveying the state of the field of ICT
policy at the local and global levels; encouraging critical
debate; and strengthening networking and advocacy for a
just, inclusive information society. It discusses the WSIS
process and a range of international institutions, regulatory
agencies and monitoring instruments from the perspective
of civil society and stakeholders in the global South.
Alongside this discussion, we present a series of country
reports which examine issues of access and participation
within a variety of national contexts.
In compiling this publication, the APC and ITeM are
following up on their long-term interest in the impact of
civil society on governance processes and their efforts to
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8 enhance public participation in national and international
forums. The APC network has been involved in global,
regional and national ICT policy processes since 2000,
with a focus on human rights and social inclusion in the
information society and on addressing the “digital divide”.
ITeM has been active in researching and promoting the
use of ICTs to strengthen citizen involvement in decision-
making processes. It hosts international civil society
advocacy initiatives such as “Social Watch”, which
monitors social development and gender policies, and
“IFIwatchnet”, which monitors the activities of the
international financial institutions.
Both our organisations are independent from any
government, political party or corporate interest. While we
acknowledge the enormous importance and legitimacy of
multilateral governmental commitments, particularly those
negotiated under the umbrella of the United Nations, we
do not necessarily agree to all of their terms and
formulations. Thus, for example, the very concept of the
“information society”, which is so widely used and
features in the title of this publication, is not without
controversy, and we approach it with caution. It is a term
that tends to de-emphasise social inequality, power and
Anriette Esterhuysen
Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
Roberto Bissio
Third World Institute (ITeM)
access to resources. Similarly, we find that the concept of
the “digital divide” reduces structural differences in access
to power and decision-making to the level of “technology
haves and have-nots”.
Different degrees of access to technology and connectivity
mirror the social and economic divides within countries
and between countries. Increase in access to ICTs will not,
by itself, reduce poverty or secure freedoms on a
sustainable basis. But there is a real danger that lack of
access to ICTs, and to the spaces where decisions are made
about information and communications infrastructure,
content and services, can deepen existing social exclusion
and create new forms of exclusion.
It is in this context that we believe it is essential for civil
society networks to participate in and watch over ICT policy
processes at the global, regional and national levels.
a_GISW_Chapter1_b 4/19/07, 04=36 PM8
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11David Souter
The World Summit on the Information Society:
The end of an era or the start of something new?
1 Souter, D. (2007). Whose Information Society? [online]. Available from APC:
<www.apc.org>.
Introduction
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was the larg-
est single event in international debate on information and communi-
cations technologies (ICTs) during the past ten years. It absorbed a
great deal of the time and resources of international organisations,
governments, civil society organisations and businesses over a four-
year period (2001 to 2005). It produced four documents setting out
aspirations for the information society. It provided a framework for
international discussion of infrastructure finance and internet gov-
ernance. But it received only limited public attention and failed to bridge
the paradigm gap between the worlds of information technology and
international development. Sixteen months after it ended, its impact –
on all parties – seems to be receding as technology and policy debate
move on to meet new challenges.
What happened during the WSIS is the subject of a substantial
report published by APC in early 2007.1  This study is particularly con-
cerned with the participation of developing countries and civil soci-
ety, and with the question of whether the WSIS might have a lasting
impact on their involvement in other ICT decision-making forums. It
drew on four main sources of evidence:
• Participant observation of the WSIS process
• Desk research, in particular of documentation produced by de-
veloping countries and civil society
• Questionnaires and interviews with individual participants, in-
cluding 40 detailed interviews with key actors in the WSIS proc-
ess
• Case studies of experience in five developing countries: Bangla-
desh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya.
This introductory chapter of the Global Information Society Watch
report briefly recounts the WSIS process, discusses the findings of
this APC research, and sets the scene for the discussion of what has
happened since the WSIS in the remainder of the report.
The WSIS story
The origins of the WSIS lie in a decision taken at the International
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU’s) 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference
to propose a world summit on the information society. It is doubtful if
ITU delegates expected this to become a global summit of the kind
which the United Nations holds regularly on different issues, but their
resolution fed into earlier discussions within the UN system, where it
met with interest from other agencies, notably UNESCO, and eventu-
ally led to such an outcome.
Summits are highly complex processes. The summit meeting
itself is the last stage of a prolonged period of negotiation, and is
primarily an opportunity for heads of state and government to make
public statements and commit their countries to a formal declaration.
The real work takes place in complex discussions over the previous
year or two, in a series of regional meetings and preparatory commit-
tees (PrepComs). These are where what will become the final texts
are hammered out and disputes addressed. Meaningful participation
in summits means participation in this process as a whole, not at the
final summit sessions.
The WSIS differed from the standard summit model in two ways.
Firstly, it was organised in two phases: one two-year phase lead-
ing to the first Summit in Geneva in December 2003, another to the
second in Tunis in November 2005. This was justified as an opportu-
nity to devote separate discussions to (firstly) principles and (sec-
ondly) implementation – though the underlying reason to hold the
Summit in two phases was failure within the UN system to choose
between two willing hosts. The two-phase structure increased the
cost and complexity of participation but did not in practice achieve
the separation of discussions into principles and implementation that
was proposed. The second phase of the WSIS was very largely pre-
occupied with narrow issues of internet governance.
Secondly, the WSIS was organised by a technical agency of the
United Nations, the ITU, rather than by the UN’s central organisation.
This was controversial. The “information society” includes wide-rang-
ing cultural and developmental issues which fall more naturally into
the remit of agencies like UNESCO and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) rather than the technocratic ITU. An under-
lying tension between broader development goals and goals of the
ICT sector lasted throughout the WSIS. This was accompanied by
suspicions that some within the ITU were seeking to use the WSIS in
order to extend its authority over much wider “information society”
issues, in particular over the internet. The ITU’s lead role also affected
the nature of participation in national delegations (see below).
The first phase of the WSIS, up to the Geneva Summit in 2003,
developed two general texts: a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of
Action. These texts were agreed in negotiations between governments,
though other stakeholders sought to influence them with varying de-
grees of success. The Declaration sets out the Summit’s (consider-
able) aspirations for the role of ICTs in transforming social and eco-
nomic life. The Plan of Action brings together many different issues
and identifies possible areas for international action, including tar-
gets related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).2
A number of issues proved contentious during the first phase,
including the right of non-governmental stakeholders to take part in
WSIS negotiations, and issues concerning the relationship between
information, communication and wider human rights. Two issues
proved intractable and were referred to separate forums which met
between the first and second WSIS phases.
2 See: <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
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12 • The Task Force on Financing Mechanisms (TFFM) considered
ICT infrastructure finance following failure to agree at the first
Summit on a proposal to set up a “Digital Solidarity Fund”. It
worked along conventional UN task force lines, drawing on con-
sultant reports and discussion (mostly) among key governments
and intergovernmental players.
• The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was con-
cerned with the way the internet is managed – in particular, the
perception among many developing countries that critical re-
sources are ultimately controlled by the United States, or the
feeling that they should be managed by an intergovernmental
forum. The WGIG was more innovative than the TFFM, drawing
participants from a wider range of stakeholder groups.
The second phase of the WSIS was predominantly concerned
with these two deferred issues. In practice, agreement on infrastruc-
ture finance was reached quickly, and the final year of the WSIS proc-
ess was overwhelmingly concerned with internet governance.
The final outputs of the WSIS process were two further docu-
ments, the Tunis Commitment, reiterating the first Summit’s conclu-
sions, and the Tunis Agenda, which drew out the second Summit’s
conclusions on the two deferred issues and set out follow-up proce-
dures for implementation. A summary of the Agenda “commitments”
can be found in the following chapter on WSIS follow-up.
WSIS issues
Global summits are expensive ways of doing international business.
They require large investments in time and money, especially for the
governments of smaller countries and non-governmental actors, and
they raise high expectations. Although little voiced in public at the
time that plans for the WSIS were agreed, there was a good deal of
scepticism among international officials about the merits of a World
Summit on the Information Society and whether its outcomes would
justify the costs incurred.
The WSIS also meant different things to different people. Prima
facie, a World Summit on the Information Society might have been
expected to address issues of importance in many aspects of all soci-
eties. In practice, it focused on a much narrower range of issues: the
relationship between ICTs and fundamental rights, that between ICTs
and development, infrastructure finance, and internet governance. It
was more a summit on aspects of the information society rather than
on the information society per se. It paid little attention, in particular,
to issues concerning the impact of ICTs on relations between the citi-
zen and the state – which is likely to be significant if/as the organisa-
tion of society is increasingly based around the acquisition and use of
data which is digitally stored.
The WSIS did significantly raise awareness of ICT and ICD (in-
formation and communications for development) issues, particularly
within developing country governments. Most of those who took part
would agree that it also provided valuable opportunities for network-
ing and for sharing of experience, especially in informal contacts out-
side the main negotiating framework.
The WSIS did little, however, to move forward debates on ICT or
ICD, or to engage the ICT sector with mainstream development or
rights communities. It was, overwhelmingly, a meeting place for those
already involved in ICT or ICD. Nor did it engage significantly with the
main development policy initiatives with which it coincided, notably
the September 2005 Millennium Review Summit (which paid virtually
no attention to the role of ICTs in development and poverty reduc-
tion). Many development agencies are increasingly concerned about
the evident “paradigm gap” concerning ICTs between ICD professionals
and the mainstream development community. With hindsight, the
WSIS missed a major opportunity to bring together ICD enthusiasts
and sceptics to address this gap.
Since the WSIS ended, its outcome texts on development have
proved too vague and ill-defined in practice to act as guidelines for
either ICT or development agencies’ programme planning. The proc-
ess used to gather input for inclusion in the outcome documents made
it easier to construct lists of aspirations and desiderata than to analyse
the evidence and draw priorities. This is unhelpful when it comes to
deciding how to allocate resources. The low level of interest shown in
WSIS follow-up processes – with the exception of the Internet Gov-
ernance Forum – suggests that they will not have much impact in the
future.
There has been much debate about whether developing coun-
tries gained significantly in the two major issues debated within the
WSIS. Where infrastructure finance is concerned, the idea of estab-
lishing a separate Digital Solidarity Fund – promoted by President
Wade of Senegal and other African delegations – foundered in the
TFFM, and was not pursued by its proponents in the second phase.
However, debate on the issue did lead to some rethinking of infra-
structure needs by major donors including the World Bank and the
European Commission. Discussions on internet governance ended in
the kind of compromise that all sides could consider acceptable from
their point of view: the United States made no significant concessions
on its current status; new procedures and one new institution were
agreed which might gradually move internet governance forward over
time; and the multi-stakeholder principle was included in texts that
might otherwise have sought to extend governmental power over the
internet.
Developing country participation
Summits differ from conventional or permanent decision-making bod-
ies in many ways. They are concerned with broad principles rather
than with detail. Their conclusions are reached by consensus rather
than contested votes. Their decisions are not binding while those of
bodies like the ITU and ICANN set rules with which governments and
businesses have to comply.
Developing country participation in permanent ICT decision-
making bodies was assessed in the Louder Voices report, prepared in
2002 for the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force). This report
identified two main types of problem identified by developing country
participants in interviews (CTO/Panos, 2002). These were summa-
rised as follows:
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13A. Weaknesses in national policy processes:
I. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of government and
citizenship, of the potential role of ICTs in development.
II. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT issues, particu-
larly in respect of emerging technologies and new policy area.
III. Weaknesses in national and regional policy-making proc-
esses, which variously included weaknesses in political lead-
ership; absence of national ICT strategies; ineffective coor-
dination between different government departments and
agencies with ICT responsibilities; lack of private sector and
civil society participation in national decision-making; in-
adequate preparation for international meetings; and inef-
fective use of financial and human resources.
B. Weaknesses in international policy processes:
I. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access to information
about ICT-related issues, decision-making forums and proc-
esses.
II. Logistical problems, including the frequency and location
of international meetings and restrictions on participation
(for example, by private sector and civil society experts).
III. Ineffective use of financial resources available to support
participation.
Some differences to this distribution of problems were evident
in the WSIS. Because the WSIS dealt in generalities rather than detail,
less technical and policy expertise was necessary for participation.
Because its conclusions had less direct impact on future conduct –
because it did not change the way ICTs are actually governed – it was
taken less seriously, and attended at a less senior level, by industrial
than by developing countries. Indeed, for some of the former, partici-
pation was not so much about making sure that things got better as
making sure that things did not get worse from their perspective.
Developing country participation in the WSIS varied markedly in
scale. Some countries had large delegations – for example, Senegal
and South Africa – while some, particularly smaller countries, sent
only a few representatives, and some took no part in the process
whatsoever.
It is important to distinguish here between the impact of a few
developing countries and the impact of developing countries as a
whole. The internet governance debate provided a platform for some
larger developing countries to assert their influence and authority, in
a way comparable with new alignments in other international negotia-
tions. Smaller countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) were
more concerned with specific development questions, such as infra-
structure finance. There were some tensions between developing coun-
try delegations resulting from these different perspectives.
Across the WSIS overall, national delegations were largely made
up of diplomats and the “telecommunications establishment”, i.e.
telecoms ministries and regulators and fixed telecommunications
operators. This was, perhaps, inevitable given that the ITU had lead
responsibility for the WSIS: invitations to participate naturally went to
the government departments responsible for working with the ITU.
Mobile networks, the internet community and private sector opera-
tors were poorly represented, if at all, in most delegations, and there
were also few participants from mainstream development ministries
(finance, planning, health, education, etc.).
This had a significant effect on the scope and quality of debate.
Like the ITU, national telecommunications officials and fixed net-
work operators have little expertise in mainstream development is-
sues such as health and education, or in issues like human rights.
The weakness of the WSIS texts in these areas betrays the lack of
substantial input from such mainstream expertise. Instead, the WSIS
focused most strongly on issues of particular importance within the
telecoms debate that were natural to the ITU – infrastructure and
the management of technical resources. One can only speculate
whether different outcomes might have resulted had the WSIS been
led by an information or development organisation like UNESCO or
the UNDP rather than a communications technology agency like the
ITU.
A few countries included civil society representatives in their del-
egations, while others strongly opposed the presence of civil society
representatives, even as observers, in formal negotiations. Where civil
society representatives were included, however, they were usually
constrained by delegation policy and played little part in presenting
national policy positions.
Women were also under-represented in WSIS delegations. Just
19% of delegations at each of the main Summit events, in Geneva
and in Tunis, were women.
Five national case studies carried out for the APC research showed
considerable variation in the extent of consultation and participation
in WSIS discourse at a national level. In many countries, policy-mak-
ing remained largely within the narrow confines of government ICT
officialdom, though in some, such as Kenya, civil society and private
sector actors played a significant part. Media attention to the WSIS
was minimal in most cases. Where civil society organisations did seek
to get involved, in case study countries, their participation was often
reactive rather than central to the formulation of national policy. Much
the same could be said of local internet communities – again with the
exception of Kenya, where the formation of a lobbying alliance be-
tween private sector and civil society organisations did much to ex-
tend input in ways that may have a more lasting impact.
Civil society participation
Civil society involvement in UN summits has increased over the years,
sometimes including the holding of “alternative” summits alongside
the main event. No such alternative event was organised in the case
of the WSIS, and many participants feel that the Summit did repre-
sent a significant advance in civil society participation. The ITU’s lack
of experience with civil society may have fostered this, by giving more
autonomy and responsibility to a civil society bureau within the sec-
retariat, and creating more opportunities for civil society organisa-
tions to innovate within the summit framework.
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14 Civil society representatives were able to make presentations dur-
ing plenary sessions of the Summit. More importantly, they were able
to work informally with government delegates and other interest groups
to ensure the inclusion of a number of issues in the WSIS texts – nota-
bly on child protection and on internet governance, where much of the
mandate for the Internet Governance Forum derived from wording that
originated with civil society organisations. Importantly, too, many civil
society participants felt that they gained substantially from the network-
ing opportunities that the WSIS offered – both during the preparatory
process (in which organisations had to work together) and in the Sum-
mits themselves (when many organisations were able to present their
work in the associated exhibition and workshop spaces).
Civil society participation in PrepComs and, to a lesser extent,
the Geneva and Tunis Summits themselves, was, like that of govern-
ments, concentrated among those with particular ICT/ICD interests.
Few mainstream development or human rights NGOs attended any
part of the process, and this substantially weakened civil society’s
capacity to contribute to the development agenda in particular. Devel-
oping countries were also disproportionately under-represented in civil
society participation – partly because of a lack of resources, partly
because few civil society organisations in developing countries had
tracked information society issues in the past, and partly because
those which had were less likely to be included in their own national
discourse on WSIS issues.
There were important differences in civil society experience of
the two Summits. In the Geneva phase, civil society had a wider range
of issues to discuss. The whole character of the “information society”
seemed up for grabs, and there were points of principle to argue –
notably about human rights – on which civil society could coalesce.
The hostility of some government delegations also fostered a sense
of community and solidarity. The quality of civil society organisation
and sense of unity or purpose were weaker in the second phase, though
the Internet Governance Caucus provided a powerful instrument to
advance positions which civil society shared with the internet com-
munity. Sharing the experience of government hostility to their par-
ticipation during the early stages of the first Summit phase also built
a stronger sense of partnership between civil society and private sec-
tor representation than has been seen in many other summits, and
this helped both civil society and the private sector to pursue their
agendas through the Summit as a whole.
As in other summits, caucusing lay at the heart of civil society
participation. Caucuses have been used in a number of summits by
civil society organisations to formulate and promote common posi-
tions. Plenary caucuses in the WSIS were supplemented by those
concerned with particular issues under discussion. The caucus proc-
ess during the WSIS was more effective during the first phase – when
the rights of civil society to participate were threatened, and where
significant input was achieved into the Declaration of Principles (ITU,
2003a), though not the Action Plan (ITU, 2003b) – than during the
second (when the focus was much more on a single issue, and the
unity of civil society was disrupted by the participation of pro-govern-
ment Tunisian NGOs). Civil society caucusing also led to the publica-
tion of specific civil society viewpoints, published during the Geneva
meeting3 and a month after the conclusion of the Tunis Summit.4
The costs and benefits of participation in the WSIS are still de-
bated within civil society. The financial cost and opportunity cost in
personnel time were very considerable for those organisations that
took the WSIS seriously. Policy gains, in terms of WSIS outcomes,
were limited. Where gains were made was in extending organisations’
understanding of issues and in their building networks outside their
own regions and specialisms that would not otherwise have been avail-
able to them. The value of this should not be underestimated, though
it is questionable how well these networks can survive without the
focus that WSIS PrepComs provided for them.
The other potential area of “gain” lies in the acceptance, within
the WSIS, of multi-stakeholder principles for ICT decision-making.
“We recognise that building an inclusive Information Society requires
new forms of solidarity, partnership and cooperation among govern-
ments and other stakeholders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and
international organisations,” as the Geneva Plan of Action put it, pres-
aging multi-stakeholder engagement in the future (ITU, 2003b). This
principle, in a sense, seeks to extend the multipolar character of policy
development within most nation-states (where government authority
is divided between different levels of government, and where a variety
of government agencies share power with non-governmental actors)
into the international sphere (where governments see themselves as
representing national interests in their entirety).
A multi-stakeholder approach also characterised the Working
Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), whose diverse members acted
as individuals working towards a common goal rather than as repre-
sentatives of specific institutions. There has been a lot of discussion
about whether the WGIG offers a model for other decision-making
processes. The APC research notes that the issues facing the WGIG
differed from those in other ICT forums – in particular, that govern-
ments lacked authority over the internet and were therefore not con-
ceding ground to other stakeholders in accepting the WGIG format.
But the success which many felt the WGIG process represented may
encourage repetition of the experience in other issues which are tech-
nically complex and highly polarised. In any event, the multi-
stakeholder principle was extended by the Tunis agreements into WSIS’
follow-up, notably into the Internet Governance Forum.
After WSIS
Sixteen months on from the Tunis Summit, it is difficult to see that the
WSIS is having much lasting impact on the issues it discussed, with
the exception of internet governance. The quality of its development
texts was poor. Much more significant documents and initiatives on
3 Shaping information societies for human needs. Civil society declaration to the
World Summit on the Information Society. Available from: <www.itu.int/wsis/
docs/geneva/civil-society-declaration.pdf>.
4 Much more could have been achieved. WSIS civil society statement on WSIS.
Available from: <www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit-
statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf>.
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15ICT and ICD have been written and undertaken outside the WSIS frame-
work during the past five years than within it. The WSIS does seem to
have drawn more attention to the lack of evidence and critical evalua-
tion available concerning ICT’s impact on development, and to the
paradigm gap between ICT and development professionals. Some in-
ternational agencies are now seeking to address these. Many devel-
oping country governments were made more aware of ICT issues by
the WSIS, and ICT and ICD are being included in more national pov-
erty reduction strategies. There has also been a shift in thinking about
infrastructure finance, following the TFFM. However, these develop-
ments do not represent a revolution in thinking about the information
society of the kind that the WSIS’ advocates had hoped to see.
The structure of WSIS follow-up processes is described in the
next chapter. Insofar as wider civil society participation is concerned,
this can be divided into two main sections: the action line processes
intended to track the WSIS outcome text conclusions; and the Internet
Governance Forum (IGF). A few comments are worth making here on
each of these.
The first round of “action line” meetings held in May 2006 was
very poorly attended and produced little in the way of new initiatives.
Very little subsequent activity has taken place since then within the
action line structure, though there have been significant new devel-
opments outside. It is difficult to see the action line structure, which
has no independent resources, offering much of a framework for fu-
ture cooperation or any significant legacy for the WSIS. The second
round of action line meetings in May 2007 will probably establish
whether there is any further mileage in them.
The IGF is a different matter. Its first meeting – in Athens in No-
vember 2006 – was almost universally considered a success. Although
formally a UN meeting, it adopted procedures very much at odds with
UN traditions. Rather than giving exclusive rights to governments, or
even equivalence to stakeholder communities, it treated all partici-
pants – regardless of their origins – as equals. Plenary and workshop
sessions had a strongly multi-stakeholder character. Debates were
open and few people spoke in the kind of code that characterises
many international meetings. However, all of this was facilitated by
the fact that the IGF has no decision-making powers. Its value lies in
that it is a “talking shop”, not a negotiating forum. It is very doubtful
if it could have been successful as the latter. What it may illustrate is
that, far from being a waste of time, “talking shops” may be a very
necessary way of increasing understanding between stakeholder com-
munities of the different views that people hold and the reasons why
they hold them.
More interesting than the action lines, and as interesting as the
IGF, is the question of whether the experience of the WSIS is likely to
bring about any change in the way that permanent ICT decision-mak-
ing forums go about their business.
The WSIS was, ultimately, a one-off event, in which developing
country participation was more substantial and assertive than it is in
permanent ICT decision-making forums such as the ITU and WTO.
This was partly because summit dynamics make it easier for develop-
ing countries to manage their participation, and partly because indus-
trial countries did not see the WSIS as a priority. Few interviewees for
the APC research, however, felt that the WSIS had significantly changed
the balance of power in ongoing policy debates in permanent deci-
sion-making forums, in likely outcomes arising from them, or in their
arrangements for participation, except where internet governance is
concerned.
The ITU discussed some WSIS-related changes at its November
2006 Plenipotentiary Conference, but it is not yet clear how these –
and the ITU’s own identity - will develop. These discussions are con-
sidered in the ITU chapter of this report, but the ITU’s response has
been in fact quite cautious and it does not seem likely to significantly
extend its remit within the wider information society. WSIS debates
have also had some influence on thinking within ICANN about its fu-
ture. But it is hard to see any significant changes resulting in the way
that other ICT decision-makers – from the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to the regional
telecommunications agencies – expect to operate in future.
In practice, the report concludes that the institutional dynamics
of participation require much more substantial changes in both inter-
national institutions and national policy-making processes if they are
to enhance developing country participation – a conclusion very much
in line with that of the Louder Voices report. While the WSIS raised
awareness of ICT and ICD issues in many countries, at least among
government officials and some NGOs, it did not facilitate capacity-
building or change policy-making relationships at a national level. Un-
less those weaknesses are addressed, many developing countries will
find it as difficult to represent their priorities effectively in future in
specialist ICT decision-making forums as they did before the WSIS,
which might be considered another opportunity missed. The Louder
Voices conclusions, in short, would seem to stand. 
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Post-WSIS spaces for building a global information society
Introduction
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) took place in
two stages, one ending in Geneva in 2003 and the other ending in
Tunis in 2005. The Geneva Summit produced two outcome documents,
the Geneva Declaration of Principles (ITU, 2003a) and the Geneva
Plan of Action (ITU, 2003b). The Tunis Summit also produced two
outcome documents, the Tunis Commitment (ITU, 2005a) and the
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (ITU, 2005b).
These documents are the key reference points for the follow-up
and implementation of the WSIS outcomes.
The Tunis Agenda for the Information Society commits govern-
ments, international organisations, the private sector and civil soci-
ety to building a people-centred, inclusive, development-oriented and
non-discriminatory information society by implementing the follow-
ing activities:
• Mainstreaming and aligning national e-strategies with local and
national development priorities.
• Convening a meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) –
a new forum for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue on internet
governance.
• Developing public policy for the internet through a process to-
wards enhanced cooperation by governments in consultation with
all stakeholders, including the development of globally applica-
ble principles on public policy issues associated with the coordi-
nation and management of critical internet resources.
• Developing strategies for increasing affordable global connec-
tivity, thereby facilitating improved and equitable access for all,
by promoting internet transit and interconnection costs that are
commercially negotiated in a competitive environment and that
should be oriented towards objective, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory parameters and setting up regional high-speed
internet backbone networks and the creation of national, sub-
regional and regional internet exchange points (IXPs).
• Improving existing financing mechanisms for universal access
to ICTs for development, capacity building and bridging the dig-
ital divide.
• Welcoming the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF) established in Ge-
neva as an innovative financial mechanism of a voluntary nature
open to interested stakeholders by focusing mainly on specific
and urgent needs at the local level and seeking new voluntary
sources of “solidarity” finance.
• Developing and implementing enabling policies that reflect national
realities and that promote a supportive international environment,
foreign direct investment as well as the mobilisation of domestic
resources, in order to promote and foster entrepreneurship, par-
ticularly small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs).
• Building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use of ICTs by
all – including youth, older persons, women, indigenous peo-
ples, people with disabilities, and remote and rural communities
– through the improvement and delivery of relevant education
and training programmes and systems including lifelong and
distance learning.
• Implementing effective training and education, particularly in ICT
science and technology, that motivate and promote participation
and active involvement of girls and women in the decision-mak-
ing process of building the information society.
• Paying special attention to the formulation of universal design
concepts and the use of assistive technologies that promote ac-
cess for all persons, including those with disabilities.
• Promoting public policies aimed at providing affordable access
at all levels, including community-level, to hardware as well as
software and connectivity through an increasingly converging
technological environment, capacity building and local content.
• Improving access to the world’s health knowledge and telemedi-
cine services, in particular in areas such as global cooperation in
emergency response, access to and networking among health
professionals to help improve quality of life and environmental
conditions.
• Building ICT capacities to improve access and use of postal net-
works and services.
• Using ICTs to improve access to agricultural knowledge, combat
poverty, and support production of and access to locally relevant
agriculture-related content.
• Developing and implementing e-government applications based
on open standards in order to enhance the growth and interoper-
ability of e-government systems, at all levels, thereby furthering
access to government information and services, and contributing
to building ICT networks and developing services that are avail-
able anywhere and anytime, to anyone and on any device.
• Supporting educational, scientific, and cultural institutions, in-
cluding libraries, archives and museums, in their role of devel-
oping, providing equitable, open and affordable access to, and
preserving diverse and varied content, including in digital form,
to support informal and formal education, research and innova-
tion; and in particular supporting libraries in their public service
role of providing free and equitable access to information and of
improving ICT literacy and community connectivity, particularly
in underserved communities.
• Enhancing the capacity of communities in all regions to develop
content in local and/or indigenous languages.
• Strengthening the creation of quality e-content, on national, re-
gional and international levels.
• Promoting the use of traditional and new media in order to fos-
ter universal access to information, culture and knowledge for
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1 <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
2 For the list of facilitators, see: <www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/facilitators.html>.
all people, especially vulnerable populations and populations in
developing countries and using, inter alia, radio and television
as educational and learning tools.
• Reaffirming the independence, pluralism and diversity of media,
and freedom of information including through, as appropriate,
the development of domestic legislation.
• Strongly encouraging ICT enterprises and entrepreneurs to de-
velop and use environment-friendly production processes in or-
der to minimise the negative impacts of the use and manufac-
ture of ICTs and disposal of ICT waste on people and the envi-
ronment.
• Incorporating regulatory, self-regulatory, and other effective poli-
cies and frameworks to protect children and young people from
abuse and exploitation through ICTs into national plans of action
and e-strategies.
• Promoting the development of advanced research networks, at
national, regional and international levels, in order to improve
collaboration in science, technology and higher education.
• Promoting voluntary service, at the community level, to help
maximise the developmental impact of ICTs.
• Promoting the use of ICTs to enhance flexible ways of working,
including teleworking, leading to greater productivity and job
creation.
• Promoting disaster early warning systems by technical coopera-
tion and enhancing the capacity of countries, particularly devel-
oping countries, in utilising ICT tools for disaster early warning,
management and emergency communications, including dis-
semination of understandable warnings to those at risk.
• Making available child helplines, taking into account the need for
mobilisation of appropriate resources. For this purpose, easy-
to-remember numbers, accessible from all phones and free of
charge, should be made available.
• Digitising our historical data and cultural heritage for the benefit
of future generations.
How this is to be done is through post-WSIS follow-up and im-
plementation mechanisms, specified in the Tunis Agenda.
WSIS follow-up
The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was called on to over-
see the system-wide follow-up of the Geneva and Tunis outcomes of
WSIS. To this end, ECOSOC, at its substantive session of 2006, was
to review the mandate, agenda and composition of the Commission
on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD), including con-
sidering the strengthening of the Commission, taking into account
the multi-stakeholder approach.
WSIS implementation
The Tunis Agenda called on UN agencies and other intergovernmental
organisations, in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 57/270 B,
to facilitate activities among different stakeholders, including civil
society and the business sector, to help national governments in their
implementation efforts (UN, 2003). The Agenda further asked the UN
Secretary-General, in consultation with members of the UN System
Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), to establish within the
CEB a UN Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) consisting of
the relevant UN bodies and organisations, with the mandate to facili-
tate the implementation of WSIS outcomes. It was suggested that in
selecting the lead agency or agencies of this group, the experience of
and activities in the WSIS process undertaken by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) should be taken into consideration.
WSIS implementation and follow-up should be an integral part
of the UN integrated follow-up to major UN conferences and should
contribute to the achievement of internationally agreed development
goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).1  It should not require the creation of any new operational
bodies. International and regional organisations should assess and
report regularly on universal accessibility of nations to ICTs, with the
aim of creating equitable opportunities for the growth of ICT sectors
of developing countries.
Great importance is attached to multi-stakeholder implementa-
tion at the international level, which should be organised taking into
account the themes and action lines in the Geneva Plan of Action, and
moderated or facilitated by UN agencies when appropriate.
The experience of, and the activities undertaken by UN agencies
in the WSIS process – notably the ITU, UNESCO and the UNDP –
should continue to be used to their fullest extent. These three agen-
cies should play leading facilitating roles in the implementation of the
Geneva Plan of Action and organise a meeting of moderators/
facilitators of action lines. The coordination of multi-stakeholder im-
plementation activities would help to avoid duplication of activities.
This should include, inter alia, information exchange, creation of knowl-
edge, sharing of best practices, and assistance in developing multi-
stakeholder and public/private partnerships.
The United Nations General Assembly is to make an overall re-
view of the implementation of WSIS outcomes in 2015.
Monitoring and evaluation
Periodic evaluation, using an agreed methodology, of the implementa-
tion process should be undertaken by developing appropriate indica-
tors and benchmarking, including community connectivity indicators.
It should clarify the magnitude of the “digital divide”, in both its domes-
tic and international dimensions, and keep it under regular assessment,
and track global progress in the use of ICTs to achieve internationally
agreed development goals and objectives, including the MDGs.
WSIS follow-up and implementation activities in 2006
Action line implementation
A consultation meeting of WSIS action line facilitators/moderators
was convened in Geneva on 24 February 2006 by the ITU, the UNDP
and UNESCO in their role as lead facilitating agencies for the multi-
stakeholder implementation of the WSIS Plan of Action.
A number of different UN agencies and other organisations and
entities offered their services to facilitate, or co-facilitate, specific ac-
tion lines and themes, or stated their intention to do so. In addition, it
was agreed that each action line would nominate its own chair. In
order to launch activities under each action line and facilitate the ini-
tial contacts among facilitators and participants, it was agreed that
one agency should be provisionally appointed as the interim focal
point for each action line and theme.2
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A number of organisations commented on the draft terms of
reference for the facilitators of each action line and for the lead facili-
tating agencies (ITU, UNESCO and UNDP). The main changes made
were to ensure that the multi-stakeholder implementation process
remained as a bottom-up process and made full use of online tools to
ensure maximum inclusiveness (ITU, 2006a and 2006b).
It was agreed that where possible, WSIS-related meetings should
be clustered together, to make the best use of available resources and
to make it easier for those who need to travel.
The next step was the convening of a cluster of WSIS-related events
in Geneva from 9 to 19 May 2006. This included the renaming of World
Telecommunications Day to become World Information Society Day,
to be held annually on May 17. A first round of action line facilitation
meetings was held, convened by the following organisations:
• ITU for action line C2: Access to infrastructure and C5: Security.
For C2 it was the second meeting after a first meeting at the
World Telecommunications Development meeting in Doha in
March 2006.
• UNDP for action lines C4: Capacity building and C6: Enabling
environment
• UNESCO for C8: Cultural diversity
• UN-DESA for C1: The role of all stakeholders, C11: International
and regional cooperation and C7: ICT applications/E-government
• UNCTAD and ILO joint meeting for C7: ICT applications/E-busi-
ness and C7: ICT applications/E-employment.
During this first round of action line facilitation meetings, most
meetings focused on:
• A report on WSIS outcomes in the respective area of the respec-
tive action line
• Briefings by participants on their respective projects
• Presentations by stakeholders on possible priorities for action
and modalities for cooperation
• Exchange of views by participants on the objectives of the group.
Between 16 and 22 October 2006, UNESCO convened meetings of
action lines C3: Access to information and knowledge, C10: Ethical di-
mensions of the information society, C7: ICT applications/E-learning
and C9: Media in Paris, and of C7: ICT applications/E-science in Beijing.3
Table 1 shows the revised annex to the Tunis Agenda indicating
the provisional moderators/facilitators of each action line.
Commission on Science
and Technology for Development (CSTD)
At its ninth session held in Geneva on 15 to 19 May 2006, the Com-
mission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) held a
multi-stakeholder panel discussion on the role of the Commission in
United Nations system-wide follow-up to the outcomes of the WSIS.
The CSTD agreed that the substantive agenda item for the 2006-
2008 review and policy cycle will be “Promoting the building of a
people-centred, development-oriented and inclusive information so-
ciety, with a view to enhancing digital opportunities for all people,”4
with special emphasis on development dimensions of ICTs, including
risk-benefit analysis to bridge the “digital divide”.
A joint bureau meeting was held between ECOSOC and the Com-
mission on 16 May 2006. The president of ECOSOC briefed the bu-
reaux on the outcome of its open-ended consultation on the role of the
CSTD in the follow-up to the WSIS held the same day. The president
also observed that the new role of the CSTD should be reviewed by
ECOSOC, as mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/
252. It was noted that the point of departure at the ECOSOC 2006 sub-
stantive session in July should not be whether, but rather how the CSTD
should assist ECOSOC in the system-wide follow-up to the WSIS.5
ECOSOC passed a resolution (E/2006/L.37) on 28 July 2006 en-
titled “Follow-up to the WSIS and review of the Commission on Sci-
ence and Technology for Development”, where it indicated how it will
oversee the system-wide follow-up of the WSIS outcomes. ECOSOC
decided that the Commission will assist the Council as the focal point
in the system-wide follow-up of WSIS. This will involve:
• A strong development orientation
• Reviewing and assessing progress on the implementation of the
outcomes of WSIS, including the action lines at regional and
international levels
• Sharing best practices and lessons learned
• Promoting dialogue and fostering partnerships to contribute to
the attainment of the WSIS objectives and the implementation of
its outcomes
• Strengthening the CSTD by the addition of ten new members
from member states
• Enabling multi-stakeholder participation in the CSTD by relaxing
the rules of accreditation for the private sector and civil society.
UN Group on the Information Society (UNGIS)
The United Nations Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) was
launched at a meeting of high-level representatives of 22 UN agen-
cies on 14 July 2006 at ITU headquarters in Geneva.
UNGIS will serve as an interagency coordinating mechanism
within the UN system to implement the outcomes of WSIS. The Group
will enable synergies aimed at resolving substantive and policy is-
sues, avoiding redundancies and enhancing effectiveness of the sys-
tem while raising public awareness about the goals and objectives of
the global information society. UNGIS will also work to highlight the
importance of ICTs in meeting the MDGs.
To maximise its efficiency, the Group agreed on a work plan in
which it would concentrate its collective efforts each year on one or
two cross-cutting themes and on a few selected countries.
UNGIS will work to accomplish the following tasks:
• Monitor progress and key activities relating to the implementa-
tion of WSIS outcomes, based on input and reports from CEB
member organisations.
• Work with the UN Secretary-General to ensure that the imple-
mentation of the Geneva Plan of Action is closely linked to the
planning and implementation of the United Nations Development
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) at the country level.
3 See <www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/meetings.html> for reports on the
meetings.
4 See: <www.unctad.org/Templates/
Meeting.asp?intItemID=2068&lang=1&m=12233&year=2006&month=11>.
5 See <www.unctad.org/Templates/
meting.asp?intItemID=1942&lang=1&m=11157>.
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• Facilitate interagency information exchange and activities, includ-
ing sharing of experiences and lessons learned in particular with
regard to WSIS goals, by ensuring the coherence of the stock-
taking exercise.
• Work closely with the Partnership for the Measuring of ICT for
Development in order to streamline the approach of the UN sys-
tem to the development of appropriate indicators and
benchmarking.
• Promote effective communication and collaboration between the
UN system, intergovernmental organisations outside the UN sys-
tem, and civil society and private sector partners, including in
relation to the work of multi-stakeholder groups or networks.
• Identify key accomplishments and make recommendations on overall
policy and coordination as well as proposing effective reporting re-
quirements for the WSIS, for consideration by the UN system.
• Establish mechanisms to report regularly to other WSIS stake-
holders on its activities, in particular on preparation of any ana-
lytical reports on WSIS implementation to be delivered to ECOSOC
and the UN General Assembly.
• Disseminate information on the status of WSIS implementation
within the UN system as well as to the general public.
In the coming period, UNGIS will focus on bringing the efforts of
the UN system to bear on expanding access to communications, for
instance, through multimedia community centres, teleshops, etc.
Drawing on the respective competencies of the different members of
the Group, UNGIS will also focus on applications related to e-health
and e-tourism. At the same time, the Group will examine the e-readi-
ness strategies and policies of one or two countries, to be proposed
by the UNDP, to develop a comprehensive toolkit for bringing the ben-
efits of the information society to developing countries.
During the first year, UNGIS will be chaired by the ITU, with
UNESCO, the UNDP and WHO acting as vice-chairs (ITU, 2006c).6
Global Alliance for ICT and Development (GAID)
On 17 April 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan approved the launch
of a Global Alliance for ICT and Development (GAID).7  While not for-
mally mentioned in the Tunis Agenda as part of WSIS implementation,
GAID emerged from the UN ICT Task Force, whose mandate ended in
2005, and is part of a parallel but related process to the WSIS.
6 See: <www.ungis.org/dnngen>.
7 See: <www.un-gaid.org>.
Note: Additions proposed at the meeting of action line moderators/facilitators on 24 February are [underlined and in square brackets]. Civil society
entities are indicated in italics. Those agencies shown in bold would be the provisional focal point for each action line.
Table 1: Annex to Tunis Agenda (revised)
Action line Possible moderators/facilitators
C1. The role of public governance authorities and all stakeholders
in the promotion of ICTs for development ECOSOC/UN Regional Commissions/ITU/[UN DESA]
C2. Information and communication infrastructure ITU/[APC]
C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO/[FAO/UNIDO]
C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD/[UN DESA/FAO/UNIDO]
C5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs ITU
C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN Regional Commissions/UNCTAD/
[UN DESA/UNIDO/APC]
C7. ICT applications
• E-government [UN DESA]/UNDP/ITU
• E-business WTO/UNCTAD/ITU/UPU
• E-learning UNESCO/ITU/UNIDO
• E-health WHO/ITU
• E-employment ILO/ITU
• E-environment WHO/WMO/UNEP/UN-Habitat/ITU/ICAO
• E-agriculture FAO/ITU
• E-science UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD/[WHO]
C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content UNESCO
C9. Media UNESCO
C10. Ethical dimensions of the information society UNESCO/ECOSOC/[WHO/ECPAT Int’l]
C11. International and regional cooperation UN Regional Commissions/UNDP/ ITU/UNESCO/
ECOSOC/[UN DESA]
Source: ITU
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The mission of GAID will be to facilitate and promote the integra-
tion of ICT into development, including the MDGs, by providing a plat-
form for an open, inclusive, multi-stakeholder cross-sectoral policy dia-
logue on the role of ICT in development. It will thus contribute to linking
the outcomes of the WSIS with the broader UN development agenda.
The alliance will organise thematic events addressing core is-
sues related to the role of ICT in economic development, the eradica-
tion of poverty, and employment and enterprise in pro-poor growth
scenarios, with particular focus on health, education, gender, youth,
and disabled and disadvantaged segments of society.
GAID will function primarily as a decentralised network, open to
participation of all stakeholders, including governments, business,
civil society and international organisations. The Alliance will aim sig-
nificantly to expand the circle of participants in policy and partnership
debate beyond the traditional set of stakeholders, by actively engag-
ing constituencies that currently are not adequately involved, particu-
larly non-governmental participants from developing countries, me-
dia, academia, youth and women’s groups.
GAID was launched at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 19 to 20
June 2006.
The participants in the meeting agreed that:
• The multi-stakeholder approach should be a key principle of GAID
and of all ICT for development (ICT4D) programmes.
• The potential of ICT as a transformative development tool has
been recognised, but efforts should now be challenged to sup-
port effective and rapid implementation.
• ICT4D must be placed within a comprehensive development strat-
egy and programmes focused on social development and eco-
nomic growth using ICT with a systematic transformation proc-
ess of the socioeconomic structure towards the knowledge so-
ciety and economy.
• ICT4D programmes should be localised and community-driven
and not technology-driven.
• There is a need to realign and recalibrate existing policies and
strategies for development with a dimension on ICT as a stra-
tegic enabler for all development programmes nationally and
globally.
• The focus should be on key priority areas that are considered
most impactful: education, health, entrepreneurship and partici-
pation in policy debate and decision making (governance).
• GAID needs to “think big” and, to this end, address the issue of
sustainability, scalability and replicability upfront.
• GAID recognises the different needs and capacities of the target
communities in formulating and implementation of ICT4D.
• A total solutions orientation should be adopted to produce sus-
tained results and impact.
• Capacity building for ICT as an enabler for development should
be addressed in a holistic manner.
• Content development and applications should be addressed as
strategic challenges driven by grassroots and community-based
approaches.
• It is essential to measure, monitor, recognise and promote ini-
tiatives among stakeholders participating in GAID towards achiev-
ing MDGs.
• Large private sector companies, small and medium-scale enter-
prises and entrepreneurs should be actively engaged in ICT4D
policies and programmes.
• Major development banks and donor agencies should be encour-
aged to take an active role in the Alliance.
• The pivotal role of youth as creators, champions and implement-
ers of ICT4D initiatives and activities needs to strengthened.
• Gender mainstreaming is imperative for making ICT4D activities
relevant, effective and sustainable.
The following are some of the initiatives proposed at the GAID
inaugural meeting:
• To consider establishing a Cyber Development Corps (CyDevCorps)
under the umbrella of the UN, based on the multi-stakeholder ap-
proach and with a South-South collaborative dimension.
• To consider promoting the establishment of resource centres to
promote programmes to build human capital through multilat-
eral and multi-sectoral cooperation and to facilitate sharing of
best practices, information exchange and discourse for GAID.
• To consider setting up thematic and regional networks and work-
ing groups with a view to enhancing outreach and promoting
partnership for action.
GAID set up a structure of governing bodies:
• A Steering Committee to provide executive direction
• A Strategy Council comprising 60 members representing gov-
ernments and non-governmental stakeholders – civil society, the
private sector, international organisations, media, academia,
youth and women’s groups – to provide strategic guidance
• A group of High Level Advisors for policy and expert advice
• A Champions Network of activists, experts and practitioners to
build its activities.
In addition, GAID encouraged the formation of Communities of
Expertise to:
• Analyse existing projects, programmes and practices with a view
to identifying best practices and/or developing guidelines, stand-
ards or templates for discussion.
• Conduct research studies on cutting-edge, new or emerging is-
sues, identifying a technological or/and organisational solution
to tackling a barrier to development using ICT.
• Identify actors/opportunities for multi-stakeholder partnerships
and resource mobilisation for this purpose.
GAID subsequently held a global forum with the theme “Our
Common Humanity in the Information Age: Principles and Values for
Development” on 29 November 2006 at UN headquarters in New York.8
Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
The purpose of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is to provide a
space for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue on internet governance.
In accordance with paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda, the mandate of
the Forum is to:
8 See <www.un-gaid.org/commonhumanity>.
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• Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of internet
governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, se-
curity, stability and development of the internet.
• Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different cross-
cutting international public policies regarding the internet and
discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any existing
body.
• Interface with appropriate intergovernmental organisations and
other institutions on matters under their purview.
• Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and in
this regard make full use of the expertise of the academic, scien-
tific and technical communities.
• Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to acceler-
ate the availability and affordability of the internet in the develop-
ing world.
• Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in ex-
isting and/or future internet governance mechanisms, particu-
larly those from developing countries.
• Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the rel-
evant bodies and the general public, and, where appropriate, make
recommendations.
• Contribute to capacity building for internet governance in devel-
oping countries, drawing fully on local sources of knowledge
and expertise.
• Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of
WSIS principles in internet governance processes.
• Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical internet resources.
• Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and
misuse of the internet, of particular concern to everyday users.
• Publish its proceedings.
The IGF, in its working and function, is required to be multilat-
eral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent.
Consultations on the convening of the IGF were held in Geneva on
16 to 17 February 2006. Around 300 participants representing all
stakeholder groups attended the meeting. The participants addressed a
wide variety of issues, such as the IGF’s scope of work and substantive
priorities as well as aspects related to its structure and functioning. The
aim of the consultations was to develop a common understanding among
all stakeholders on the nature and character of the IGF.
On 17 May 2006, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established an
Advisory Group to assist him in convening the IGF. The Advisory Group
is made up of 47 members of government, the private sector and civil
society, including the academic and technical communities, represent-
ing all regions of the world. It is chaired by Nitin Desai, the Secretary-
General’s special adviser for the WSIS, assisted by Markus Kummer.
A second round of consultations on the convening of the IGF
was held in Geneva on 19 May 2006. The consultations were open to
all stakeholders and focused on the substantive preparation of the
inaugural meeting of the IGF.
The IGF Advisory Group held a meeting in Geneva on 22 to 23
May 2006. It agreed on recommendations for the agenda and the
programme as well as the structure and format of the first meeting in
Athens. The Advisory Group recommended that the overall theme of
the meeting be “Internet Governance for Development” with the fol-
lowing broad themes:
• Openness – Freedom of expression, free flow of information,
ideas and knowledge
• Security – Creating trust and confidence through collaboration
• Diversity – Promoting multilingualism and local content
• Access – Internet connectivity: policy and cost. 9
The IGF convened for its inaugural meeting in Athens from 30
October to 2 November 2006.10
A number of “dynamic coalitions”, based on multi-stakeholder
cooperation, emerged from the Athens meeting, including dynamic
coalitions on privacy, open standards, spam and an internet bill of
rights.11
The Government of Brazil will host the 2007 IGF meeting. It will
take place in Rio de Janeiro on 12 to 15 November 2007.
Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF)
The Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF)12  is an African initiative launched by
Senegalese President H.E. Abdoulaye Wade during the first phase of
the World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva 2003) and rec-
ognised as a voluntary fund during the second phase (Tunis 2005).13  It
was officially inaugurated on 14 March 2005 in Geneva, in the presence
of several heads of state, ministers and mayors. The DSF is supported
by 23 founding members consisting of fourteen nation states,14  eight
cities and regions15  and one international organisation16  and is gov-
erned by a tripartite Foundation Board composed of 24 members, rep-
resenting, in equal parts, public authorities, the private sector and civil
society of the various regions of the world.
The objectives of the DSF are to:
• Ensure affordable and fair access to information technologies
(IT) and their contents for everybody, especially marginalised
groups.
• Promote such access as a basic right in both the public and pri-
vate domains, irrespective of market fluctuations, growth and
profitability, with respect for an information society that is so-
cially, culturally, economically, financially and ecologically sus-
tainable.
• Guarantee access to information and knowledge to everybody,
contribute to the autonomy and healthy development of each
individual, and strengthen the commitment of local collectivities
at the social, political, economic and cultural levels.
9 See <intgovforum.org/meeting.htm>.
10 See <www.intgovforum.org/IIGF.htm> for transcripts of all the main sessions on
the four broad themes.
11 See: <www.intgovforum.org/Dynamic%20Coalitions.php>.
12 <www.dsf-fsn.org>.
13 See paragraph 28 of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society: <www.itu.int/
wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>.
14 Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic
of Burkina Faso, People’s Republic of China, Dominican Republic, Republic of
France, Republic of Ghana, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Kenya,
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Kingdom of Morocco, Federal Republic of Nigeria,
Republic of Senegal, Republic of Tanzania.
15 City of Dakar (Senegal), City of Geneva (Switzerland), City of Lyon (France), City
of Paris (France), City of Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), Rhône-Alpes
Region (France), Basque Country (Spain), Piedmont Region (Italy).
16 Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).
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• Reduce economic, social and cultural disparities by the mobili-
sation of fresh resources generated by innovative financial mecha-
nisms for development, in particular the “one percent for digital
solidarity” principle,17  a financing tool specifically devoted to “the
fight against the digital divide.”18
As a financial mechanism, the DSF is not involved in implement-
ing its own in-house projects. Since it does not want to finance large
ICT infrastructure, it concentrates on community-based projects with
a view to creating new activities, new jobs and, in the long term, new
markets.
At present, the DSF is funding a number of pilot projects in Africa
which provide ICT and internet access for communities engaged in the
fight against HIV/AIDS in Burkina Faso and Burundi. It has also pro-
vided IT equipment and capacity-building for the Town Hall of Banda
Aceh, Indonesia, which was destroyed by the December 2004 tsunami.
Conclusion
At this point, it is not clear how any of these post-WSIS follow-up and
implementation spaces will develop in the years ahead. This overview
of activities in 2006 shows that a beginning has been made on all the
follow-up and implementation processes specified in the Geneva Plan
of Action and the Tunis Agenda, except for one:
• Developing public policy for the internet through a process to-
wards enhanced cooperation by governments in consultation with
all stakeholders, including the development of globally applica-
ble principles on public policy issues associated with the coordi-
nation and management of critical internet resources.
The reasons for this omission have not been presented by the UN.
The jury is still out on the value of these various post-WSIS policy
spaces. Some of the critical success factors for WSIS implementa-
tion are whether the structures established will be able to:
• Attract the participation of a critical mass of all stakeholder
groups.
• Manage the power relations between stakeholder groups effec-
tively.
• Leverage existing financial resources and mobilise new financial
resources to support implementation activities.
• Rationalise and transform what looks like a cumbersome UN
machinery of implementation and monitoring.
• Focus on a limited number of key issues and themes where a
significant difference can be made.
Some of the risk factors include:
• Whether the new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon takes as
keen an interest in building a global information society as Kofi
Annan did.
• Whether multi-stakeholder partnerships can take hold meaning-
fully and translate into action.
• Whether there is a sufficient commitment to multilateral approaches
to global problems and challenges among stakeholders.
• Whether building a global information society is fully recognised
as a global public good, that is worth prioritising.
Of these spaces, the IGF has so far set the standard for creating
a space for successful policy dialogue on internet governance. It re-
mains to be seen whether the other post-WSIS spaces can match it in
terms of innovation, participation and effectiveness.
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This section offers a succinct assessment of how five international
institutions have performed in relation to information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) policy, including the outcomes of the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). A theme of special inter-
est is participation in policy-making, particularly the participation of
civil society, of women, and of actors from the South.
Our authors examine the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),
and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). The World
Trade Organisation (WTO), an important institution with extensive and
complex relationships to ICTs spread over a number of its agreements,
is notable for its absence here and will be included in the next edition
of this publication.
Each relates to ICTs differently. ICANN and ITU would normally
be considered as core ICT governance institutions, around internet
and telecommunication infrastructure respectively. UNESCO, on the
other hand, sees itself as a major contributor to content, in science,
culture and education: a full UNESCO sector is devoted to communi-
cation and information, and communication is at the heart of its mis-
sion. WIPO, concerned with intellectual property, might initially look
out of place. But copyright exerts strong influence on access to ICT
content, and WIPO is carving an important niche for itself in relation
to digital content, by policing internet domain names on behalf of
trademark holders and promoting new varieties of intellectual prop-
erty in broadcasting, webcasting and all kinds of internet audio and
video – all the while reinforcing and extending protection to owners.
UNDP’s interest is long standing and focuses on the ultimate applica-
tion of ICTs specifically as enablers of development. Thus between
them they cover ICT infrastructure, the generation and ownership of
knowledge shared over that infrastructure, and the final application of
ICTs to development.
So what do our authors conclude about them?
The WSIS process was unique. For the first time it brought to-
gether virtually all shades of ICT actors into intense debate, an oppor-
tunity to forge a shared view and plot the future together. But did this
actually happen? And what was the role of these institutions?
As discussed elsewhere in this publication, the WSIS certainly
did create a shared forum that, especially for the numerous partici-
pants arriving with highly specialised and sometimes narrow back-
grounds, constituted an intensive crash-course in every facet of ICTs.
Significant sharing and convergence in thinking did take place. Old
divergences, however, in the end dictated a meagre outcome in policy
terms. The limited engagement of non-ICT/telecoms policy-makers
and especially of those concerned with development, the absence of
any new funding, and the containment of proposals and commitments
within a narrow range favoured by corporate and Northern interests
meant that those institutions charged with moving forward after Tu-
nis in December 2005 are facing a very challenging task.
Three of these institutions – the ITU, UNDP and UNESCO – are
considered here. Eight of the ten WSIS action lines with individual
institutional moderation fell to these three. (Action line 7 on ICT appli-
cations is divided into eight sub-sections, two of which are covered
by UNESCO). Lacking new funding or specific national commitments
and programmes, and with the impetus generated from the Summit
process now gone, the multi-stakeholder action line groups subse-
quently formed can probably, at best, identify a few niche areas in
which their interests coincide sufficiently to warrant joint action.
To some extent, policy change will depend on the degree to which
each institution has internalised the WSIS outcomes or will do so in
the future. UNESCO appears to have done this most effectively, being
determined at an early stage to use the WSIS to guide future actions
under the theme of “Knowledge Societies”. Its current Medium-Term
Strategy and the upcoming one for 2007 to 2013 strongly reflect the
WSIS outcomes, led by its Communication and Information Sector.
The UNDP, at this point lacking a unit at headquarters concerned with
ICT, is realigning its activities in areas where ICTs have been
mainstreamed – poverty alleviation and better governance – to con-
form to WSIS outcomes, a useful but limited effort. The ITU’s Devel-
opment Sector at its Conference in March 2006 sought to position
itself as a key player in WSIS outcomes, but in practice merely cross-
referenced its programmes for the next four years with the action
lines and noted that “ITU-D functions may be reviewed taking into
account WSIS outcomes.” Nor is the United Nations Group on the
Information Society (UNGIS), the UN body responsible for coordinat-
ing WSIS implementation and chaired successively by the institutions
above, likely to come up with significant policy initiatives.
The ITU, of course, has a larger policy role in promoting the
WSIS outcomes through its member states’ governments. The Antalya
Plenipotentiary Conference in November 2006 was an opportune time
to make, or at least assess, progress. In the event, ITU members agreed
to incorporate the results of WSIS into their long-range plans and
ongoing work programmes, but stopped short of revising their or-
ganisational priorities or resource allocations. The new Strategy Plan
for the ITU makes only passing reference to the WSIS. (However, it is
worth noting that a coalition of developing countries determined the
election results of some key ITU posts and shaped some vital areas of
ITU strategy. This can in part at least be attributed to the process of
mutual interaction and collaboration arising from the WSIS process.)
WIPO and ICANN were more peripherally involved in the WSIS:
the former mainly to ensure that nothing occurred there that would
encroach on its bailiwick of intellectual property (its success was not
least because this coincided with the position of powerful govern-
ments and the private sector); the latter, though without any official
responsibilities, taking part in relevant discussions and actively in-
volved in the UN Working Group on Internet Governance that laid the
groundwork for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Of course, the
IGF and indirectly perhaps the Global Alliance for ICT and Develop-
ment (GAID) may be considered among the most significant outcomes
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28 of the WSIS. As the title “institution” is perhaps premature for these,
they are not given separate consideration here, but the analyses often
reach out in their direction.
All five institutions are also active in areas of ICT outside the WSIS,
but especially ICANN and WIPO. In terms of their policy-related activi-
ties, both come in for criticism. ICANN, a self-governing entity set up
only in 1998, has succeeded in some areas of its mandate, but failed in
others, notably relating to the delegation of new top-level domains reg-
istration. Criticism of WIPO is much more sweeping and severe. It stands
accused of policy-making and implementation, including in its arbitra-
tion activities, that systematically favour the interests of intellectual prop-
erty holders, from whom it gets its funding, and of ignoring its UN
commitment to a development mandate.
Criticisms in both cases, interestingly, are closely related to their
performance in facilitating broad participation, the theme of this re-
port. ICANN is accused of not fostering accountability to and repre-
sentation of the diversity of users, ultimately favouring the interests
of one industry sector – the “rule takers” – over internet users and
future businesses. WIPO is taken to task in no uncertain terms for a
host of ways in which the “one-country, one vote” UN principle is
subverted and the exercise of real power is skewed strongly in favour
of more powerful countries and intellectual property holders.
In general it is difficult to distinguish in any of these institutions
the issue of participation – of women, civil society or developing coun-
tries – in ICT policy processes from the participation of these sectors
in their wider institutional activities and structures.
UNESCO and UNDP both have strong institutional support for
gender-related issues, which is hardly surprising given the domains
in which they operate. The ITU has recently committed itself to “ac-
celerating gender mainstreaming.” ICANN has no specific commit-
ment relating to gender balance, but institutional changes have led to
a growing number of women in its decision-making positions. How-
ever, as far as can be ascertained, few if any specific initiatives relat-
ing to gender-balanced ICT policy making, including at the WSIS, were
taken by these institutions.
A somewhat similar picture emerges with regard to the partici-
pation of civil society. UNESCO and the UNDP, as core UN agencies,
have a long history of facilitating participation, although its effective-
ness is constantly a matter for debate. The ITU has only recently woken
up to the existence of civil society, and is slowly making moves to-
wards integrating civil society representatives into its activities, but is
yet a far cry from the promise of the WSIS for balanced multi-
stakeholder participation. WIPO also allows civil society accredita-
tion, though the modalities of participation are limited. ICANN ap-
pears to be going in reverse, and it has greatly reduced the influence
of civil society, “at-large members”, and hence the breadth of internet
users in its structures.
Southern participation is also varied. UN institutions do main-
tain the “one country, one vote” principle but as noted above this can
be subverted in a number of ways. Additionally, WIPO stands accused
of ignoring its UN development mandate. As a key UN development
agency, the UNDP takes most seriously its role in relation to Southern
representation and is structurally and institutionally sensitive to it.
UNESCO, although not a development agency per se, explicitly gears
its strategy and programmes towards the South. The ITU has its de-
velopment division, ITU-D, to focus on development issues and, as
noted, developing country members have recently asserted some
newfound confidence, partly arising from the WSIS. Participants from
developing country stakeholders in the structures of ICANN, which
does not have a national membership structure, are under-represented.
Beneath the formal level, it proved more difficult to assess the
efforts made to ensure broad participation. Part of the problem is that
information on the precise numbers of participants who are women
or representatives of civil society or the South is seldom recorded or
compiled, and specific actions are often isolated and unique. UNESCO,
however, can be credited with supporting systematic efforts to assist
civil society, including to some extent from the South, in the early
stages of the WSIS.
Each institutional assessment comes forward with a set of rec-
ommendations. Standing above all of these is the fact that we are
already seeing a shift away from the summit approach in future glo-
bal policy formulation. The relevance of getting everyone together
under a single roof and hammering out a common policy diminishes
as the UN system as we know it evolves towards more open models,
and as policy is more and more made by facts on the ground, estab-
lished in bilateral, multilateral and regional forums.
In this scenario, achieving some kind of consensus relies more
on the incorporation of all views into the processes of each institution
– the question of participation once again – and on improved and
innovative mechanisms for coordination and partnership building. 
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Introduction
Objectives and main activities
The overall objectives of the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) are to promote the development of telecommunication networks
and access to telecommunication services by fostering cooperation
among governments and a range of non-governmental actors that
includes network operators, service providers, equipment manufac-
turers, scientific and technical organisations, financial organisations
and development organisations.
The ITU’s main activities include:
• Standardising telecommunications technologies, services and
operations, including tariffs and numbering plans.
• Allocating radio frequency bands to different services and coor-
dinating and registering frequency assignments and satellite or-
bital positions so as to avoid harmful interference.
• Promoting the development of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture and services, regulatory institutions, and human resources
in developing countries.
• Providing information on global telecommunications trends and
developments.
Legal/constitutional composition
The ITU is founded on a set of treaties dating back to 1865 that have
binding force in international law – the ITU Constitution and Conven-
tion, the Radio Regulations, and the International Telecommunication
Regulations – as well as resolutions, recommendations and other non-
binding instruments adopted by its conferences.1
Although it is an intergovernmental organisation, a large number
of private sector entities and other non-governmental actors are mem-
bers of the ITU and participate in its work. This is a longstanding
arrangement that reflects the important role non-governmental ac-
tors have played since the days of the telegraph in developing tel-
ecommunications technologies, networks and services. The current
ITU Constitution provides for three distinct classes of membership –
member states, sector members, and associates – with differing rights
and obligations.
The ITU is organised into three sectors – Radiocommunication,
Telecommunication Standardisation and Telecommunication Devel-
opment – known respectively as ITU-R, ITU-T and ITU-D. Much of the
substantive work of the ITU is done by its members in sector meet-
ings with administrative support from the three sector bureaus: the
Radiocommunication Bureau (BR), Telecommunication Standardisa-
tion Bureau (TSB) and Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT).
Each bureau is headed by a director.
The ITU General Secretariat provides common services to sup-
port the activities of the sectors. It also organises world and regional
TELECOM exhibitions and forums as well as smaller scale seminars
and workshops, and publishes reports on trends, developments and
emerging issues. It is headed by a secretary-general who is responsi-
ble for the overall management of the ITU and is assisted by a deputy
secretary-general.
ITU activities are funded mainly through a “free choice” system in
which member states and sector members select the number of con-
tributory units they wish to pay from a sliding scale that ranges from 40
units at the top end to one sixteenth of a unit at the bottom. Because
they do not have the same rights as member states, most notably the
right to vote, the value of a sector member unit is only a fraction of the
value of a member state unit (currently one fifth). The fees paid by
associates in turn are fractions of the value of a sector member unit,
reflecting their more limited rights to participate in ITU activities.2
The monetary value of the contributory unit is adjusted every
two years as part of the ITU budget process. The values of member
state and sector member contributory units currently stand at CHF
318,000 (USD 260,627) and CHF 63,600 (USD 52,125) respectively.
The fees charged to associates range between CHF 1,987.50 (USD
1,628) and CHF 10,600 (USD 8,687), depending on the sector with
which they are associated and the countries from which they come.
In addition to membership fees, the ITU derives significant rev-
enues from the sale of publications and other cost recovery activities.
These activities currently account for about 15% of total revenues.
Key members/participants and decision-making structures
The ITU membership currently includes 191 member states that have
the right to take part in all activities, 643 sector members that have
the right to take part in all the activities of the sector(s) to which they
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
1 More information is available at the ITU web site.
WEBSITE: www.itu.int
HEADQUARTERS: Geneva, Switzerland
FOUNDED: 1865
UN STATUS: UN specialized agency since 1947
TYPE: Intergovernmental organisation (191 member states) with
non-governmental members (over 600 sector members and 130
associates)
Don MacLean
2 There are a number of restrictions built into the “free choice” system. For
member states, only least-developed countries (LDCs) can contribute at the one-
sixteenth unit level. Sector members of the Radiocommunication and
Telecommunication Standardisation sectors must contribute at least one half a
unit, while Telecommunication Development sector members can choose to
contribute at the one-quarter, one-eighth or one-sixteenth unit level. The fees for
associates also differ by sector, being one sixth of a sector member unit in the
Radiocommunication and Standardisation sectors, one twentieth in the
Development Sector, and one fortieth for LDCs. For further details see:
<www.itu.int/members/pdf/membsership.pdf>.
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30 belong, and 132 associates that have the right to take part in some
activities of the sector(s) with which they are associated (e.g. the
meetings of an individual study group).3
Overall governance is provided by the Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence, which meets every four years to amend the ITU Constitution
and Convention, approve strategic and financial plans, adopt policies
that may apply to the organisation as a whole or to one or more spe-
cific sectors, and elect the secretary-general, the deputy secretary-
general and the directors of the three bureaus. The Plenipotentiary
Conference also elects the twelve members of the Radio Regulations
Board, a part-time body that oversees the operations of the BR on
behalf of the member states.
In addition to these officials, the Plenipotentiary Conference elects
countries to serve on the ITU Council. This body meets annually and
is empowered to govern between Plenipotentiary Conferences. It is
composed of one quarter of the ITU state membership (currently 46
members) and elections are structured to ensure that the five ITU
administrative regions are fairly represented in terms of the number
of member states in each region.
Each ITU sector has its own governance structure composed of:
• Periodic assemblies (in ITU-R and ITU-T) or conferences (in ITU-
D) that provide overall direction to sectoral activities
• Advisory boards drawn from the membership that guide sectoral
activities in the period between conferences
• Study groups that examine issues and develop recommenda-
tions in specific subject areas.
The World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly and the
World Telecommunication Development Conference meet every four
years to plan sectoral work, as well as to elect advisory group and
study group chairs and vice-chairs.
The Radiocommunication Assembly, the equivalent body in ITU-
R, meets every three to four years in conjunction with the Radiocom-
munication Conference, a treaty-making event which has the power
to amend the Radio Regulations.
The ITU Constitution provides for one other governance struc-
ture: the World Conference on International Telecommunications
(WCIT), a treaty-making event that has the power to amend the Inter-
national Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs).4
Relations with other international institutions
and the multilateral system
The ITU has been a specialised agency of the United Nations since
1947. From an administrative point of view, it is part of the UN “com-
mon system” of administrative regulations, rules and procedures that
governs the terms and conditions of employment of ITU staff and
elected officials and also sets general policies and standards for fi-
nancial, human resources and information systems management.
The UN and other specialised agencies have the right to attend
ITU conferences as observers. Some UN agencies take an active in-
terest in the work of the ITU either because their constituencies are
major users of telecommunications – e.g. the International Civil Avia-
tion Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
– or because of a shared interest in development – e.g. the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
In addition to these links with the UN system, the ITU has close
relations with the 79 intergovernmental and non-governmental inter-
national and regional organisations, 11 regional intergovernmental
telecommunications organisations and 5 intergovernmental organi-
sations operating satellite systems that take part in its work as sector
members.
As a result of the important roles they have played in driving
telecommunications liberalisation over the past ten to fifteen years,
the ITU has attempted to develop strong relations with the World Bank
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Commitment to development
The 1984 report of the ITU Independent Commission for World Wide
Telecommunication Development, popularly known as the Maitland
Commission after its chairman, highlighted the “missing link” in de-
veloping countries and internationally between the development of
telecommunications and overall economic and social development
(ITU, 1984).
As a result of this report and as part of a comprehensive reform
effort that began in the late 1980s in response to changes that were
taking place in the telecommunications environment (i.e. privatisa-
tion, liberalisation, competition), the ITU upgraded its commitment to
development in 1992 when it established ITU-D.
About 25% of the ITU budget is allocated to ITU-D (vs. about
35% to ITU-R, 18% to ITU-T and 21% to the General Secretariat).
In addition, there is a constitutional obligation for the directors
of the radiocommunication and standardisation bureaus to provide
technical support to the development sector. This is typically done
through workshops and seminars to help build developing country
capacity in relation to ITU-R and ITU-T activities.
Commitment to gender equality
The 2002 Marrakech Plenipotentiary Conference adopted Resolution
70, “Gender Mainstreaming in ITU” (ITU, 2002), which called on mem-
ber states and sector members to promote gender equality in their
activities; resolved to improve socioeconomic conditions for women,
3 Membership information retrieved in October 2006. For lists of ITU members see:
<www.itu.int/GlobalDirectory>.
4 The ITRs were last amended in 1988, at a time when telecommunications was
beginning to be transformed by the privatisation of state-owned operators and
the introduction of competition in both domestic and international markets. These
trends have gathered strength in the past two decades, during which time the
internet and convergence have also helped transform telecommunications
worldwide, rendering the ITRs increasingly obsolete. ITU members have long
recognised that the ITRs no longer reflect the realities of international
telecommunications. However, successive reviews over the past dozen years have
been unable to achieve consensus on what action should be taken. The 2006
Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference agreed to launch a new review process to be
completed by the time of the next plenipotentiary conference in 2010, and to
convene a WCIT in 2012 to consider the results of this review.
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1particularly in developing countries, by mainstreaming the gender
perspective in telecoms development programmes; and to incorpo-
rate the gender perspective in the ITU strategic plan and the opera-
tional plans of the sectors.
The 2006 Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference updated this reso-
lution to take account of developments inside and outside the ITU
since 2002, particularly the results of the World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society (WSIS) and the 2006 Doha World Telecommunication
Development Conference.5  In renewing Resolution 70, the Antalya
Conference adopted the broader goal of “promoting gender equality
towards all-inclusive information societies” in addition to gender
mainstreaming in the ITU. The Conference also amended the ITU
Constitution and Convention to indicate that their language should
be considered as gender neutral.
The revised resolution tasks the Council with accelerating gen-
der mainstreaming activities. It instructs the secretary-general to
ensure that the gender perspective is incorporated in the work pro-
grammes, management approaches and human resource develop-
ment activities of the ITU, and to report annually to the Council on
progress made.
Southern actors and civil society participation
Virtually all developing countries are members of the ITU. Like devel-
oped countries, each of them is represented in the ITU by their tel-
ecommunication administration, i.e. the government department or
agency responsible for international telecommunication policy.
A significant number of non-governmental entities and organi-
sations from developing countries and regions are ITU sector mem-
bers. Some 548 of the ITU’s 643 sector members are national enti-
ties. Under the membership structure set out in the ITU Constitu-
tion and Convention, these entities are classed as recognised oper-
ating agencies (ROAs), scientific and industrial organisations (SIOs),
or financial and development institutions.
These 548 national entities come from 110 different countries.
Slightly more than half of them are from non-OECD countries. The
229 ITU sector members that come from these 90 developing coun-
tries include 48 sector members from South and East Asia, 46 from
sub-Saharan Africa, 39 from North Africa, 37 from the Near and
Middle East, 17 from Eastern Europe, 17 from South America, 11
from Central America and the Caribbean, and 6 from Central Asia.
Of the 229 developing country sector members, 126 are only
members of the development sector. The other 103 are members of
the radiocommunication and/or standardisation sectors as well. The
developing country members of these two sectors are drawn from
51 different non-OECD countries.
In addition to national entities, ITU sector membership includes
79 regional and other international organisations (REINTORGs), 11
regional telecommunications organisations (REGORGs), and five
intergovernmental organisations operating satellite systems
(SATORGs). Of these, 28 REGINTORGs, 9 REGORGs, and 3 SATORGs
represent regions that are exclusively or largely composed of devel-
oping countries.
There are currently 132 associate members of the ITU – 123
national entities, of which 7 are based in developing countries, and
9 regional and other international organisations, of which 2 are based
in largely developing regions.
Because the ITU membership structure does not include a class
of civil society entities and organisations6  – and in the absence of a
generally agreed definition of “civil society” – it is difficult to be pre-
cise about the extent to which civil society entities and organisations
participate in the work of the ITU, either as sector members or as
associates.
If civil society is broadly defined to include not-for-profit scien-
tific and technical organisations, as well as organisations represent-
ing non-business users of telecommunication services and/or com-
munities, a significant proportion of the ITU’s regional and other in-
ternational organisation membership could be considered to be part
of civil society. However, if not-for-profit scientific and technical or-
ganisations are excluded from the definition of civil society, there cur-
rently is very little civil society participation in the ITU.
Role and responsibilities in ICTs
General orientation
As a technical organisation, the ITU’s general orientation is to pro-
moting the development of telecommunications technologies and
access to networks and services. This involves it in a wide range of
issues related to scientific research, experimental development, equip-
ment manufacturing, software engineering, network planning, infra-
structure deployment, service provisioning, interconnection, charg-
ing and revenue sharing, information and network security, human
resource development, telecommunications industry financing, and
regulation.
Although there is a high degree of correlation between the devel-
opment of telecommunications and overall economic and social de-
velopment, the ITU’s primary orientation is to “the development of
telecommunications” – including infrastructure, services, applications
and regulatory arrangements – rather than to “telecommunications
for development”.
Responsibilities in relation to the WSIS
On the basis of a proposal from Tunisia, the 1998 ITU Minneapolis
Plenipotentiary Conference adopted a resolution that called on the
United Nations to hold a World Summit on the Information Society. It
instructed the ITU secretary-general to pursue the matter with the UN
5 More information about both the WSIS and the 2006 Doha Conference is
available from: <www.itu.int/wsis> and <www.itu.int/ITU-D/wtdc06>.
6 The ITU has never implemented ECOSOC Resolution 1296, adopted in May 1968
(or later revision), concerning recognition of NGOs, although there was an effort
by NGOs themselves to gain recognition about a decade ago. See:
<www.comunica.org/itu_ngo>.
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32 secretary-general and the executive heads of other UN agencies and
programmes, whose activities are coordinated through the body now
known as the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB).7
The proposal was enthusiastically received when it was presented
to this body in the spring of 1999. The secretary-general proceeded
to develop a plan that involved holding the summit in two phases –
the first in Geneva in 2003 and the second in Tunis in 2005. This plan
was approved by the ITU Council and subsequently endorsed by the
UN General Assembly in 2001. The General Assembly asked the ITU
secretary-general to take lead responsibility for managing the sum-
mit process in conjunction with other interested agencies.
The ITU secretary-general served as WSIS secretary-general and
chaired the High-Level Summit Organising Committee. Within the ITU,
the General Secretariat’s Strategic Planning and External Affairs Units
provided core support for the substantive and procedural aspects of
the WSIS process with assistance from the sectoral bureaus, particu-
larly the BDT. The ITU’s internal resources were augmented by contri-
butions from some ITU member states and sector members, as well
as the Canton of Geneva.
The Tunis Agenda for the Information Society included separate
follow-up frameworks for ICT financial mechanisms, internet govern-
ance, and the eleven action lines contained in the agenda.
With respect to the action lines, the Tunis Agenda asked the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to monitor implementation
on behalf of the General Assembly. It also asked the CEB to set up a
United Nations Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) to coordi-
nate the activities of UN departments and agencies. This group has
been established and is currently chaired by the ITU secretary-general.
The Tunis Agenda identified organisations to moderate and fa-
cilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships in relation to each one of the
eleven action lines. It tasked the ITU with this responsibility for action
line C2: Information and communication infrastructure, and action
line C5: Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs. In addi-
tion, it asked the ITU to lead in coordinating the facilitation process,
along with UNESCO and the UNDP.
Between the first and second phases of the Summit, the ITU
conducted a stocktaking exercise which resulted in an extensive in-
ventory of stakeholder activities related to the Geneva Plan of Action,
which is structurally similar to the Tunis Agenda. Following the sec-
ond phase of the Summit, the ITU updated this inventory, which now
includes more than 3,000 activities, and also compiled a Golden Book
of new commitments made at the Tunis phase.
Description and analysis of ICT activities
Activities in relation to the WSIS
The ITU undertook a number of activities specifically related to the
WSIS in 2006.
The ITU secretary-general has taken the lead within the UN sys-
tem in facilitating and coordinating WSIS follow-up activities. As men-
tioned above, the ITU secretary-general currently chairs the United Na-
tions Group on the Information Society. The ITU website is the reposi-
tory for the WSIS documents and for information regarding WSIS fol-
low-up. In addition, the secretary-general has launched a “Connect the
World” initiative – an ambitious effort involving partners from industry,
government, international organisations and civil society to bridge the
“digital divide” and connect the unconnected by creating an enabling
environment, developing infrastructure, and promoting applications.
The ITU-D World Telecommunication Development Conference
that took place in Doha, Qatar in March 2006 adopted the Doha Dec-
laration and the Doha Action Plan (ITU, 2006a) – documents that set
out the policy agenda and work programme for ITU-D for the next
four years.
These two documents seek to position ITU-D as a key player in
the implementation of the WSIS outcomes, particularly in areas that
fall within the “core competencies” of the ITU, which are identified as
including assistance in bridging the “digital divide”, international and
regional cooperation, radio spectrum management, standards devel-
opment, and dissemination of information. They enjoin ITU members
to engage in implementation of the WSIS outcomes, including the
eleven action lines set out in the Annex to the Tunis Agenda for the
Information Society, particularly those in which the ITU has been given
lead coordination and facilitation responsibilities.
More concretely, the Doha Action Plan sets out:
• Six programmes (regulatory reform, technologies and telecom-
munications network development, e-strategies and e-services/
applications, economics and finance, human capacity building,
and a special programme for the LDCs).
• Two activities (statistics and information on telecommunication,
partnerships and promotion).
• Special and regional initiatives.
The plan contains a table cross-referencing all of these pro-
grammes and activities to the eleven action lines in the Tunis Agenda.
However, it acknowledges that more than a simple cross-referencing
of activities may need to be done to strengthen the links between the
ITU’s efforts to develop telecommunications and the WSIS plan to
use telecommunications and other ICTs more effectively for develop-
ment. It notes that “ITU-D functions may be reviewed taking into ac-
count WSIS outcomes.”
In May 2006, in collaboration with the Korea Agency for Digital
Opportunity and Promotion (KADO)8  and the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),9  the ITU Strategy and
Policy Unit published the World Information Society Report 2006 (ITU,
2006b). The general purpose of this report is to measure worldwide
8 <www.kado.or.kr>.
9 <unctad.org>.
7 At the time, this body was known as the Administrative Committee on
Coordination.
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3progress towards the information society, and in particular to chart
progress towards the implementation of WSIS outcomes. To do this,
the report’s authors have developed a Digital Opportunity Index (DOI)10
– a composite index composed of eleven indicators that measure
opportunity (i.e. availability and cost of internet and ICT access net-
works), infrastructure (i.e. uptake of internet and ICT access tech-
nologies by households and individuals), and utilisation (i.e. the use
made of these technologies for internet and ICT access as a propor-
tion of total telecommunications use). The report uses the DOI to
compare progress towards the information society in different coun-
tries and regions, as well as to identify different strategies and policy
options.
In November 2006, the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference
adopted a resolution on “ITU’s role in implementing the outcomes of
the World Summit on the Information Society”. This resolution in-
structs the secretary-general to:
• Take all necessary measures for the ITU to play a leading facili-
tating role in the overall WSIS implementation process, along
with UNESCO and the UNDP.
• Lead in facilitating the implementation of the WSIS action lines
relating to infrastructure development (C2) and cybersecurity (C5).
• Participate in the implementation of other action lines that fall within
the ITU’s mandate (essentially all the other action lines except those
dealing with cultural and linguistic diversity, local content, media,
and the ethical dimensions of the information society).
• Ensure that all of this is done in cooperation with other bodies
involved in WSIS follow-up, in a coordinated fashion.
The resolution also instructs the directors of the three bureaus
to support WSIS follow-up activities.
The ITU Council will receive annual progress reports from the
Secretariat and will maintain the Working Group on the World Sum-
mit on the Information Society (WG-WSIS) that was set up during the
summit process to provide ongoing guidance to follow-up activities.
Other ICT-related activities
As well as adopting a general resolution on the ITU’s overall role in
WSIS implementation, the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference adopted
a number of resolutions that address aspects of internet governance
– one of the main topics of the Tunis phase of the Summit and a key
area of WSIS follow-up that is of particular concern to developing
countries and civil society.
• In recognition of the convergence that is taking place between
telecommunications and the internet, particularly through the
development of voice over internet protocol services (VoIP) and
next generation networks (NGNs), Resolution 101 on “Internet-
Protocol-based networks” resolves that the ITU shall clearly iden-
tify the range of internet-related issues that fall within its respon-
sibility, collaborate with other relevant organisations to maxim-
ise benefits of IP-based networks, and continue to study inter-
national internet connectivity as an urgent matter, as called for in
the Tunis Agenda.
• More specifically in relation to the results of the WSIS, Resolu-
tion 102 on “ITUs role with regard to international public policy
issues pertaining to the internet and the management of internet
resources, including domain names and addresses” instructs the
secretary-general to continue to take a significant role in interna-
tional discussions and initiatives related to the management of
internet names, addresses and other resources, and to take the
steps necessary for the ITU to continue to play a facilitating role
in the coordination of international public policy issues pertain-
ing to the internet, as expressed in the Tunis Agenda. The reso-
lution also instructs the directors of the standardisation and de-
velopment bureaus to support these actions.
• Resolution 133 on the “Role of administrations of Member States
in the management of internationalised (multilingual) domain
names” instructs the secretary-general and the directors of the
bureaus to take an active part in all international discussions,
initiatives and activities on the deployment and management of
internationalised domain names, in cooperation with relevant
organisations.
• The Antalya Conference also updated Resolution 130 on
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and secu-
rity in the use of information technologies” to reflect the priority
that the WSIS gave to this issue and the ITU’s leadership role in
the implementation of WSIS action line C5.
In addition to these resolutions on internet governance, the
Antalya Conference adopted a number of other resolutions on ICTs
and development, including resolutions on:
• Special measures for the least developed countries and small
island developing states
• Assistance and support to countries in special need for rebuild-
ing their telecommunications sector
• ICTs in the service of humanitarian assistance
• Support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD)
• Support for the Agenda for Connectivity in the Americas and Quito
Action Plan
• Next generation network deployment in developing countries.
Ten days after the close of the Antalya Conference, ITU TELECOM
WORLD 2006 opened in Hong Kong.11  ITU world and regional
TELECOM events combine exhibitions that showcase that latest ICT
technologies with forums that feature high-level speakers and panel-
lists from the private and public sectors. Under the overall theme of
11 <www.world2006.hk/en>.10 More information is available from: <www.itu.int/doi>.
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34 “Living in the Digital World”, the 2006 TELECOM world forum ex-
plored three domains: “digital lifestyle” (how current and future life-
styles are shaped by ICTs); “digital ecosystems” (how different kinds
of companies interlink, cooperate and compete); and “digital society”
(the challenges in maintaining a transparent regulatory environment
and building an information society for all).
Because they are market-oriented events, TELECOMs provide an
interesting point of comparison for other ITU activities, such as the
Doha World Telecommunication Development Conference and the
Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference, in terms of participants and pro-
grammes. Although there are echoes of WSIS in the TELECOM WORLD
2006 forum programme and some developing country speakers in
the digital society domain, the almost complete absence of develop-
ing country keynote speakers and panellists in the sessions on digital
ecosystems and digital lifestyles reflects the very great differences of
capacity that currently exist among countries and regions and the
magnitude of the ICTs-for-development challenge.
Stakeholder participation
Key areas in which participation of civil society,
Southern countries and women is an issue
In 2002, the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation and
Panos London published Louder Voices (MacLean et al, 2002), a study
of developing country participation in international ICT decision-mak-
ing. This study noted that it is important to distinguish between the
presence of developing countries, civil society, and women in inter-
national ICT decision-making forums on the one hand, and their ef-
fective participation on the other. The ITU, which was the subject of a
Louder Voices institutional study, is a case in point.
Developing countries are present at many ITU meetings. They
tend to be most strongly represented at the major conferences and
assemblies, including those of the radiocommunication and stand-
ardisation sectors, and are well represented in all the activities of the
development sector. However, presence does not equate to effective
participation, which – as Louder Voices pointed out – requires ca-
pacities to forecast issues, conduct research, set agendas, coordi-
nate action at national and regional levels, negotiate successfully be-
fore and during events, implement decisions, and evaluate results.
The situation regarding developing country participation is es-
pecially challenging in meetings dealing with technical matters. This
is particularly the case in the standardisation sector where, with the
exception of the study groups dealing with numbering and tariff ques-
tions, the work is done almost exclusively by representatives of sec-
tor members. Without the technical and financial capacities required
to contribute to this work, or at least follow its development, there is
little reason to be present. Many developing countries are therefore
effectively excluded from some of the ITU’s most important work. As
indicated in the section on Southern partners and civil society partici-
pation, at present there are no radiocommunication or standardisa-
tion sector members from 110 of the ITU’s 191 member states – and
all 110 are developing countries.12
Civil society faces three main issues in seeking to participate in
the work of the ITU: the ITU’s membership structure, which has been
described above; the cost of meeting attendance; and the ITU’s work-
ing methods, which require its members to have significant technical
capacities in order to contribute effectively to decision-making in many
areas of activity.
In principle, ITU sector membership is open to both national and
international civil society organisations. However, the requirement for
all national entities and some kinds of regional and international or-
ganisations seeking sector membership to be approved by the gov-
ernments of the countries where they are based, or alternatively by
the ITU Council, may pose obstacles in some cases. The requirement
to make financial contributions either as full sector members or as
associates is an additional obstacle. Finally, the cost of attending the
meetings where ITU members do their work and, in the case of the
radiocommunication and standardisation sectors, the technical ex-
pertise required to contribute meaningfully to the work of the ITU
may pose additional problems.
For civil society organisations, the work of the development sec-
tor is likely to be of most interest, and the one to which they can
contribute most effectively. Financial barriers to ITU-D participation
are also lower than in the other sectors.
In ITU-D, sector members can pay one eighth of a sector member
unit – CHF 7,950 (USD 6,515) at current values – while sector members
from LDCs are only obliged to contribute one sixteenth of a sector mem-
ber unit, or CHF 3,975 (USD 3,257). ITU-D associates pay one twentieth
of a sector member unit, CHF 3,180 (2,606), unless they are from LDCs,
in which case they pay one fortieth, or CHF 1,590 (USD 1,303).
In ITU-R and ITU-T on the other hand, sector members must
contribute at least one half a sector member unit as an annual mem-
bership fee – CHF 31,800 (USD 26,061) at current values. Associate
status in these sectors may be a more attractive option than full sec-
tor membership, although the cost, CHF 10,600 (USD 8,688) in an-
nual fees, may be prohibitive.
In addition to the cost of sector membership or associate status,
the cost of ITU publications and the restrictions the ITU places on online
access to some information resources, such as conference documents,
may also constitute significant barriers to civil society engagement with
ITU activities. Although ITU membership includes certain privileges,
such as a 15% discount on the price of hard copy publications, the
value of these benefits in relation to their cost is unlikely to stimulate
interest in sector membership or associate status among civil society
organisations, which would need to pay thousands of Swiss francs
annually in fees to save hundreds on the price of publications.
The WSIS process appears to have sensitised member states to
the advantages of involving civil society in the work of the ITU – or at
12 On the positive side, however, the fact that about 20% of the national members of
the radiocommunication and standardisation sectors come from non-OECD
countries may indicate that developing countries and regions that are in transition
and/or have begun to develop requisite technical capacities are becoming
increasingly engaged in the work of these sectors. A longitudinal study would be
required to confirm whether this is in fact the case.
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5least in activities related to WSIS follow-up. While recognising the
key role played by civil society entities and organisations in building
the global information society, ITU member states are also concerned
about the potential impact of greater civil society involvement on the
intergovernmental character of the ITU, its current membership struc-
ture, and its finances.
The level of participation by women in the work of the ITU gener-
ally reflects their participation in international telecommunications
policy-making in national governments, as well as their participation
in the non-governmental entities and organisations that do much of
the technical work of the ITU.
Although women from both developing and developed countries
have assumed important leadership roles in the work of the ITU in
recent years (e.g. as chairpersons of Council and Radiocommunica-
tion conferences), and although they are invariably present in at least
limited numbers on the delegations of governments and sector mem-
bers to ITU meetings, ITU events often have the appearance of being
meetings of an “old boys club”.
The current under-representation of women in the scientific and
engineering professions that do much of the technical work of the
ITU clearly limits the possibilities for greater gender balance in many
forums. The development sector may be more fertile ground for in-
creasing participation by women, particularly if it becomes less tech-
nical in its orientation and more closely attuned to the development
mainstream.
Actions taken to ensure effective participation
In order to promote greater developing country participation in
the technical work of the ITU, the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference
adopted Resolution 123 on “Bridging the standardisation gap between
developing and developed countries”. This resolution recognises that
developing countries require a certain level of technical capacity in
order to be able to apply ITU-R and ITU-T standards, quite apart from
the capacity required to contribute to their development. It invites
member states and sector members to contribute to a fund that would
help bridge the standardisation gap and to otherwise support actions
taken by the secretary-general and the directors to this end.
With respect to civil society participation, the Antalya Confer-
ence adopted a resolution concerning “Study of the participation of
all relevant stakeholders in the activities of the Union related to the
World Summit on the Information Society” (ITU, 2006c). This resolu-
tion instructs the Council to set up a working group, open to all ITU
member states, to undertake consultations and prepare a final report,
well in advance of the next plenipotentiary conference in 2010. The
terms of reference of this working group include:
• Establishing a set a criteria for defining which stakeholders are
relevant to participate in ITU activities related to the WSIS.
• Analysing the definitions of sector member and associate and
the related provisions of the legal instruments of the ITU and
how they could be amended as necessary and applied to en-
hance ITU membership.
• Reviewing existing mechanisms – such as partnerships, sym-
posiums, seminars, workshops, focus groups, policy forums and
experts – in order to consider how they could be used more
effectively and to identify possible new mechanisms to broaden
participation.
• Identifying efforts that may be needed to mobilise and ensure
the meaningful participation of all relevant stakeholders from
developing countries, as well as other stakeholders in the devel-
opment field.
• Drafting possible amendments to the ITU Constitution and Con-
vention in order to facilitate participation by relevant stakeholders.
• Identifying the spheres of competence that member states re-
serve for themselves with respect to WSIS stakeholders.
• Considering the financial obligations and consequences arising
from broader participation of relevant stakeholders in ITU’s WSIS-
related activities.
Nothing is included, however, on the need to bring ITU into line
with ECOSOC resolutions concerning the participation of NGOs, and
the modalities that apply across the UN system.
Insofar as participation by women is concerned, as mentioned
earlier, the Antalya Conference adopted Resolution 70 on “Gender
mainstreaming in ITU and promotion of gender equality towards all-
inclusive information societies”. As well as instructing the secretary-
general to pursue gender mainstreaming policies and practices within
the ITU Secretariat, this resolution encourages member states and
sector members to review their own policies and practices to ensure
that recruitment, employment, training and advancement of women
and men are undertaken on a fair and equitable basis, and to facilitate
the employment of women and men equally in the telecommunica-
tions field.
Conclusions and recommendations
General conclusions
The Louder Voices report made a number of recommendations con-
cerning the actions that international ICT decision-making bodies could
take to enhance participation by developing country stakeholders, in-
cluding governments, the private sector and civil society. These in-
cluded actions to increase:
• Awareness of issues
• Access to information
• Transparency of proceedings
• Participation by different stakeholders
• Capacity-building.
In the four years that have passed since Louder Voices was pub-
lished, and at least partly as a result of the WSIS, the ITU has im-
proved its performance in a number of these areas.
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36 The WSIS process, which was originated and spearheaded by
the ITU, succeeded in raising awareness among developing country
decision-makers of the links between ICTs and development, as well
as the importance of developing sound national ICT policies and par-
ticipating effectively in international ICT forums.
The ITU Secretariat – particularly the Strategy and Policy Unit
(SPU) in the secretary-general’s office and the BDT – has contributed
to raising awareness and to improving access to information on ICT
issues by publishing well-documented, readable reports on trends
and developments in technology and regulation that include assess-
ments of the implications of these trends for developing countries. In
addition, these two units have made good use of the internet to pro-
vide online access to these and other information resources.
However, unlike most other organisations – which provide free
access to the electronic versions of reports similar to the BDT’s World
Telecommunication Development Report and the SPU’s Internet Re-
ports and World Information Society Report – ITU policy still requires
the costs associated with these reports and other publications to be
recovered from purchasers, thereby creating potential barriers in ac-
cess to information in developing countries and civil society organi-
sations.
The ITU Council agreed at its April 2006 session to make an at
least temporary exception to this rule when it decided to make ITU-T
standards freely available online on an experimental basis for one
year, after which it will evaluate the results. Although ITU-T standards
are the ITU’s most valuable information product in terms of sales
revenues, the practice of charging for them is out of step with the
practice of many other standards organisations and potentially limits
their use, particularly by students and researchers, to the detriment
of the ITU.
The ITU has also made use of web-based tools to somewhat
improve the transparency of proceedings for its own members by
providing audiocasts and videocasts of some of its meetings, includ-
ing the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference. However, this is a limited
transparency since webcasts are password protected and not avail-
able to the general public.
In recent years the ITU has sought to widen the scope for partici-
pation by members representing different stakeholders by eliminat-
ing restrictions that prevented sector members from attending pleni-
potentiary and radiocommunication conferences in their own right as
observers, instead of as members of national delegations. The 2006
Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference furthered this process by consoli-
dating and harmonising the detailed rules governing attendance and
participation by observers at ITU meetings across the three sectors,
and by permitting sector members to attend meetings of the Council
and its committees and working groups as observers.
Capacity-building has long been one of the core activities of ITU
development programmes, and symposiums, workshops, seminars,
and training courses of varying durations are one of the principal ac-
tivities of the BDT today. In addition to the technical capacity-building
traditionally provided by the ITU, the BDT has for a number of years
sponsored an annual Global Symposium for Regulators and under-
taken other activities aimed at building regulatory capacity in devel-
oping countries, such as the ICT Regulation Toolkit it sponsors in
conjunction with the World Bank. As well, as mentioned above, the
Radiocommunication and Standardisation Bureaus also undertake
capacity-building activities related to their work programmes, while
the Strategic Planning Unit organises workshops and symposia un-
der the secretary-general’s New Initiatives Programme to provide in-
formation and analysis on emerging trends and issues.
To date, these improvements have benefited mainly those who
are already “members of the club” – ITU member states, sector mem-
bers and associates. They have been of less benefit to members of
the many other communities of interest that have come to see tel-
ecommunications as a very important part of the process of linking
ICTs with development, and who consequently would like to have easier
access to the ITU and to be included in its deliberative processes.
The WSIS process fuelled this interest and heightened expecta-
tions that the ITU would continue to build bridges between different stake-
holders following the summit’s successful conclusion. The past year,
2006, was the ITU’s first opportunity to respond. So how did it do?
Conclusions on performance
in relation to ICT roles and responsibilities
Taking a leadership role on behalf of the UN system in organising the
WSIS and implementing its results was a major step for the ITU – and
quite out of keeping with the organisation’s past practice, which has
been to concentrate on its core technical missions as much as possi-
ble while avoiding entanglement with contentious policy/political is-
sues of the kind that often preoccupy the United Nations, and which
were present to some degree in the WSIS process.
Having taken this risk and obtained a better result than many
expected, ITU member states were faced in 2006 with the question of
“what next” in terms of both the ITU’s role in building stronger link-
ages between ICTs and development through the WSIS follow-up proc-
ess and in reflecting the WSIS legacy of multi-stakeholder engage-
ment in its organisational structures and working methods.
Overall, the results of the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference as
expressed in its Final Acts appear to indicate that ITU member states
have agreed to incorporate the results of the WSIS in their long-range
plans and ongoing work programmes – but that they do not intend to
make major changes to organisational priorities or resource alloca-
tions because of it. In particular, it is striking that Resolution 71, “Stra-
tegic plan for the Union, 2008-11”, makes only passing reference to
the WSIS, even in the section on the development sector, and that
Decision 5, “Income and expenditure for the Union for the period 2008
to 2011”, indicates that no additional financial resources will be allo-
cated to WSIS outcomes.
It is also noteworthy that various proposals to the Conference to
expand the ITU’s mandate to include ICTs as a whole were referred to
the ITU Council for further study. Likewise, as will be discussed in the
following section, the Conference decided to take a cautious approach
to the question of enhancing civil society participation in ITU activi-
ties, in terms of both process and scope.
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7While the overall results of Antalya suggest a somewhat “busi-
ness as usual” approach in which the ITU intends to fit the results of
the WSIS into its activities to the extent possible – rather than using
these results to transform what it does and how it is structured or
operates – some of the decisions taken at the conference appear to
indicate a growing capacity of developing countries and regions to
pursue their agendas and advance their interests, at least with re-
spect to some issues.
Building on the results of the WSIS process, it appears that a
significant group of developing countries and regions was able to put
together and maintain a coalition that not only determined the results
of the elections for some of the key management posts, but also shaped
ITU strategy with respect to the potential impact of the internet on
international telecommunications policy and regulation, as expressed
in the resolutions discussed above.
Taken together, these internet-related resolutions appear to ex-
press a determination on the part of a significant number of mem-
ber states, primarily developing countries, to ensure that the ITU
and its member states play a larger role in a number of different
aspects of internet governance. The ultimate scope of these ambi-
tions may be evident when these internet-related resolutions are
read in conjunction with two other resolutions, which respectively
call for a World Telecommunications Policy Forum in 2009 to dis-
cuss the implications for international telecommunications policy
and regulation of convergence, the internet and NGNs, followed by
a World Conference on International Telecommunication in 2012 to
review the International Telecommunication Regulations in light of
these implications. At the same time, however, the way in which all
of these resolutions are drafted also gives plenty of scope for ITU
member states that are less enthusiastic about gaining a greater
role in internet governance or enlarging the scope of telecommuni-
cation regulations to pursue their agendas.
In sum, it appears that the debates that began during the WSIS
process about the ITU’s roles and responsibilities in relation to ICT
and internet governance are likely to continue for the next several
years.
Conclusions on performance
in relation to modalities and practices of participation
The ITU has made progress in recent years in increasing the total
number of non-governmental entities and organisations that partici-
pate in its work as sector members and associates, as well as the
number that come from developing countries and regions. In addi-
tion, as mentioned above, it has improved the transparency of its
proceedings, at least within the organisation, by enhancing the rights
of sector members to participate in conferences and meetings, and
by providing online access to some events.
As described earlier, the ITU Secretariat has taken significant steps
to make better information available on the technical, regulatory, and
policy issues facing the organisation and its members. It has done
this through reports such as the annual World Telecommunications
Development Report and the series of internet reports, as well as
through mechanisms such as the secretary-general’s New Initiatives
Programme, which sponsors workshops and seminars on emerging
issues. In many cases, these activities have been undertaken in part-
nership with entities, organisations and other sources of expertise
from outside the ITU. These actions and initiatives have helped raise
awareness of key issues within the organisation, provided members
with better information on matters requiring decisions, and contrib-
uted to capacity-building. Some of this information has also been made
available free of charge to non-ITU members.
In spite of this progress, as noted in previous sections the ITU
faces significant challenges in seeking to live up to the standards and
expectations for organisational transparency and multi-stakeholder
engagement created by the WSIS process – particularly with respect
to engagement with civil society.
As reported above, at the Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference ITU
member states recognised the benefits that such engagement could
bring and launched a process to study ways and means of enhancing
participation through amendments to the existing membership struc-
ture and increased use of informal mechanisms. While this may indi-
cate a new openness, it is important to note that this study will be
confined to WSIS-related activities, that it will be conducted by mem-
ber states, who will determine which stakeholders are relevant to these
activities and what spheres of competence will remain the exclusive
preserve of member states, and that the results will not be final until
2010.
Recommendations
The Antalya Plenipotentiary Conference clearly addressed the main
issues facing the ITU as a result of the WSIS, with respect both to its
roles and responsibilities in linking ICTs and the global development
agenda, and to the challenges it faces in engaging all relevant stake-
holders more fully and effectively in its work. However, it just as clearly
addressed these issues by thinking “inside the box”, i.e., by seeking
to accommodate these issues within its established structures, work-
ing methods and governance processes.
If the ITU’s experience over the past two decades in seeking to
adapt to “the changing telecommunications environment” is any guide,
the results of this approach are likely to be mixed at best. During this
period of time, the ITU has made significant progress in responding
to the technical challenges and opportunities that have arisen from
the transformation of the telecommunications sector into a competi-
tive global business characterised by rapid innovation and the con-
vergence of formerly distinct networks and services. For much of this
time, however, the ITU was much less successful in responding to
the development challenges and opportunities that arose from these
changes, and lost its policy leadership to other organisations that rep-
resented new approaches to linking ICTs and development that were
more in tune with the times.
By systematically introducing multi-stakeholder approaches in
all of the issue areas that came under its purview, the WSIS poten-
tially marks another turning point in the evolution of global ICT and
development policy. The ITU’s leadership role in the WSIS follow-up
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38 process gives it an opportunity to give real and continuing effect to
the new objective that was added to the ITU Constitution in 1992: “to
promote, at the international level, the adoption of a broader approach
to the issues of telecommunications in the global information economy
and society, by cooperating with other world and regional intergov-
ernmental organisations and those non-governmental organisations
concerned with telecommunications.” To do this, however, it will likely
have to think “outside the box” in relation to its organisational struc-
tures, working methods and governance processes to a much greater
degree than was evident in the results of the Antalya Conference
(McLean, 2003 and 2007 forthcoming).
As part of this process, ITU member states, sector members
and associates who support the goals of enhanced participation should
find ways of reaching out to stakeholders who are not currently ITU
members, and should include them through the various means avail-
able in the discussions and decision-making processes that will take
place during the next four years, for instance, through national con-
sultations or by including them in delegations to ITU meetings. For
their part, stakeholders with an interest in becoming involved in the
work of the ITU should consider taking the initiative of reaching out to
the administrations of member states that are likely to be sympa-
thetic to their cause, as well as to sector members and associates, to
offer their expertise and support to the ITU reform process. 
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Introduction
Objectives and main activities
ICANN is responsible, at the overall level, for the administration of
three sets of unique identifier systems for the internet: domain names,
numerical internet protocol (IP) addresses, and a third type that serves
to identify so-called port and parameter numbers.
The administration of the generic part of the domain name sys-
tem (DNS)1  forms the core of ICANN’s activities. Country code top-
level domains (ccTLDs) are predominantly managed at the national
level, while policies for the allocation of IP addresses are autono-
mously devised by the regional internet registries (RIRs).2
At the time of ICANN’s inception, the administration of the DNS
was regarded as primarily technical. More recently, however, ICANN
is seen as a regulatory body whose policies shape the market for the
registration of domain names and set the conditions for creating new
top-level domains (TLDs).3  Although technical and regulatory tasks
may overlap, regulatory bodies require a different type of policy proc-
ess and membership than do technical organisations.
Legal/constitutional composition
ICANN was founded in 1998 as a California-based not-for-profit cor-
poration. Its mandate derives from two short-term contracts with
the United States (US) government. The Internet Assigned Num-
bers Authority (IANA)4  oversees the global allocation of IP addresses,
the root zone management of the DNS, and the assignment of tech-
nical protocol parameters used in various internet protocols; IANA
can be likened to a global administrator of internet protocols. It is
operated by ICANN under a contract with the US government, the
“IANA contract” (NTIA, 2006). The other contract between the US
government and ICANN is a memorandum of understanding (MoU)
(NTIA, 1998) that specifies tasks for ICANN to accomplish as a pre-
condition for the privatisation of internet names and numbers ad-
ministration. Privatisation in this context means the transition of
currently public responsibilities to a private, not-for-profit entity.
Since 1997, the US government has claimed supervision authority
over the management of the DNS and IP address allocation. At
present it is unclear when and what part of its regulatory authority
the US government intends to privatise.
ICANN implements regulatory policies through contracts with
the “rule takers”, i.e. businesses providing services related to internet
names or number spaces. While all registries for generic TLDs (gTLDs)
and all large registrars have signed contracts, other organisations have
been more hesitant. Independent actors such as the RIRs and root
server5  operators, as well as many ccTLD registries, reject the idea of
delegating regional authority to a central entity which is ultimately
subject to California law and the authority of the US government. The
root server operators, in particular, have so far refused to enter con-
tractual agreements with ICANN. Others such as the RIRs were able
to negotiate a memorandum of understanding that preserves sub-
stantial policy responsibility with the Number Resource Organisation
(NRO),6  the organisation that represents the internet addressing com-
munity.7
Key members/participants and decision-making structures
The MoU between the US government and ICANN mandates a bot-
tom-up policy process that involves all stakeholders in the manage-
ment of the DNS and IP addresses, including users. Reflecting the
widespread anti-state spirit on the net during the 1990s, which was
even shared by parts of the Clinton administration (1993-2001), the
public interest was to be represented by individual users. Govern-
ments – with the significant exception of the US government – would
be involved only in an advisory capacity. Accordingly, ICANN’s origi-
nal bylaws stipulated that nearly half of the seats on the Board of
Directors would be filled through a process to represent individual
users. The other half would represent the emerging service industry
surrounding the DNS and IP address allocation. Supporting organi-
sations consisting of various stakeholder groups would be responsi-
ble for policy development. Individual users would form an At-Large
Membership.
In the course of an organisational reform in 2002, ICANN sus-
pended the model of a balanced representation of the private sector
and civil society. Individual users’ representation on the Board is now
reduced to a single non-voting liaison. Figure 1 describes the struc-
ture of ICANN and how the various entities are represented on the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN)
WEBSITE: www.icann.org
HEADQUARTERS: Marina del Rey (CA), United States of America
FOUNDED: 1998
UN STATUS: No formal status
TYPE: Non-profit private corporation
Jeanette Hofmann
1 More information is available from: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Domain_Name_System>
2 A comprehensive definition of RIRs is available from: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Regional_Internet_Registry>
3 TLDs are the domain names at the top of the DNS naming hierarchy. TLDs appear
in domain names as the string of letters following the last (rightmost) period. See
<www.pir.org/Glossary/Glossary.aspx> for a comprehensive definition of TLD,
gTLD and ccTLD.
4 <www.iana.org>.
5 See <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_servers>.
6 <www.nro.net>.
7 More information about the stages of the negotiation between NRO and ICANN is
available from: <www.nro.net/documents>.
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Fig. 1: ICANN structure
Source: Peake (2004)
Fig. 2: ICANN relations with other organisations
Source: London School of Economics (LSE) (2006)
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The diagram provides a general overview of the relationship between ICANN and key global bodies responsible for developing internet technical
standards. It is not an exhaustive representation of all organisations active in the technical standards community. The graphical dimensions given to each
entity in the diagram do not reflect size or status.
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Board of Directors. The Board consists of fifteen voting members,
eight of which are chosen by a Nominating Committee and six by the
supporting organisations. The number of non-voting liaison mem-
bers can vary.8
Relations with other international
institutions and the multilateral system
ICANN is a corporation subject to California law and reports to the US
government. There are no formal relations between ICANN and other
international organisations. However, some intergovernmental bod-
ies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) participate in the Gov-
ernmental Advisory Committee (GAC)9  of ICANN. The technical stand-
ard-setting bodies10  also appoint one liaison to the ICANN Board of
Directors. As a consequence of its participation in the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS), ICANN pays more attention to
international organisations and actively supports their work where it
touches upon ICANN’s ambit. However, ICANN forms an important
node in the network of organisations responsible for the development
and coordination of the internet infrastructure, as Figure 2 shows.
Commitment to development
ICANN, together with its supporting organisations, is involved in
national capacity-building regarding operational functions related
to IP addresses and the DNS. Examples are assistance in the opera-
tion of ccTLD registries and the establishment of LACNIC and AfriNIC,
the regional registries for allocating IP addresses in the African and
Latin American and Caribbean regions respectively.11  ICANN has
also established “regional presences” or liaisons in Africa, Asia, Latin
America and the Middle East to strengthen its outreach and educa-
tional activities.
Commitment to gender equality
ICANN bylaws contain provisions for regional balance but not for gen-
der balance. The term gender does not appear in its bylaws. However,
due to the establishment of ICANN’s Nominating Committee four years
ago, the number of women in decision-making positions has increased.
Southern actors and civil society participation
Developing countries are underrepresented in all of ICANN’s
stakeholder groups. ICANN meetings do not take place at UN loca-
tions, which makes them expensive to attend for governments from
developing countries. For civil society organisations, participation in
international meetings is generally difficult to finance. ICANN has no
budget for supporting participants from developing countries to at-
tend its meetings.12  Lack of capacity and competence is another rea-
son why developing countries may not participate in ICANN or attend
meetings even when they take place in their regions. From a develop-
ing-country perspective, there might also be more pressing issues to
attend to – such as access to the internet – than participating in ICANN.
Civil society participates in ICANN through the At-Large Advi-
sory Committee and the Non-Commercial User Constituency of the
Generic Names Supporting Organisation. All in all, civil society par-
ticipation in ICANN is rather low. Reasons for unsuccessful outreach
efforts may have to do with the very specific and not easily compre-
hensible mission of ICANN, and the low interest of most users in the
administration of the net’s infrastructure, but also with the disfran-
chisement of individual users. Individuals have no votes in any of
ICANN’s decision-making bodies. They can achieve policy goals in
ICANN only indirectly through the Nominating Committee or through
lobbying other constituencies and supporting organisations.
Role and responsibilities in ICTs
General orientation and responsibilities
towards ICT policies and actions
ICANN’s communication services are based on addressing systems
that carry out two crucial functions. First, they provide users or their
communication devices with a unique identification; second, they pro-
vide information about the location of communication devices. The
allocation of such identifiers requires global coordination to ensure
that addresses are assigned only once and also in an efficient man-
ner. The internet has two such identifier systems: IP addresses and
domain names. ICANN is responsible for the overall coordination of
these identifier systems. The term “coordination” refers to the fact
that the actual assignment of numbers and the delegation of names is
carried out by registries which are linked to ICANN through contracts.
ICANN’s mission specifies three types of coordination related to
internet names and number spaces. ICANN:
1. Coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of
unique identifiers for the internet, which are
a. domain names (forming a system referred to as the DNS);
b. internet protocol (IP) addresses and autonomous sys-
tem (AS) numbers; and
c. protocol port and parameter numbers.
2. Coordinates the operation and evolution of the DNS root name
server system.
3. Coordinates policy development reasonably and appropriately
related to these technical functions (ICANN, 2006a).
ICANN’s responsibilities and orientation in the overall field of ICT
policies were defined in the late 1990s and thus reflect a specific pe-
riod in the evolution of the internet following the privatisation of the
backbone, the central network that linked all the parts of the internet
together, and its opening to the general public in the mid 1990s.13
The engineers who developed the DNS conceived domain names
as arbitrary strings of characters without any direct relationship to
names or marks in the real world. Domain names were meant to be
“NOT natural language expressions” as Vint Cerf (2006) emphasised
again at the first Internet Governance Forum in Athens in 2006. As
Jon Postel (1994) put it in a memo that explains the DNS: “Concerns
about ‘rights’ and ‘ownership’ of domains are inappropriate. It is ap-
propriate to be concerned about ‘responsibilities’ and ‘service’ to the
community.” However, with the growth of the World Wide Web in
8 The present composition of the ICANN Board of Directors is available from:
<www.icann.org/general>.
9 <server.gac.icann.org/web>.
10 ITU, European Telecommunications Standards Institute, World Wide Web
Consortium and Internet Architecture Board.
11 More information is available from: <www.iana.org/reports>.
12 Travel expenses are only borne for members of the Board of Directors and for
members of councils who have been appointed by the Nominating Committee.
13 For a comprehensive account of the regulation of the internet infrastructure see
Mueller, 2002.
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1992, domain names became very popular and quickly turned into
tradable goods. Equivalents to famous names and protected marks in
the name space became subject to escalating speculation and prop-
erty rights conflicts. An informal market for domain names was emerg-
ing in the second half of the 1990s but there was no authority nor any
rules to govern this new trade. The founding of ICANN in 1998 was
the response to this lack of regulation.
The MoU specified the following tasks for ICANN to accomplish
in collaboration with the US government:
• Develop policies for the allocation of internet addresses (IP num-
bers) and the assignment of other technical parameters
• Develop a plan for the introduction of competition in domain name
registration services including an accrediting system for registrars
• Develop standards for the operation of generic TLDs
• Develop policies for the operation of root servers
• Develop a consensual mechanism for the delegation of new TLDs
• Establish a uniform procedure for the resolution of property rights
conflicts over domain names
• Develop a review process that allows members of the internet
community to appeal decisions by ICANN
• Develop a process for affected parties to participate in the for-
mulation of policies regarding the technical management of the
internet
• Develop membership mechanisms that “foster accountability to
and representation of the global and functional diversity of the
internet and its users” (NTIA, 1998).
Competition, “private bottom-up coordination” and international
representation were some of the founding principles issued by the
US government that have shaped ICANN’s coordination tasks.
Throughout its founding years, ICANN stressed the operational
or technical nature of its functions. More recently, its policy-making
activities have become so predominantly visible that they can no longer
be denied. For at least the “generic” part of the DNS, ICANN has evolved
into a regulatory agency with price-setting and service-related stand-
ards defining responsibilities. While the ccTLDs are typically admin-
istrated and regulated at the national level, ICANN sets contract-based
policies for gTLDs such as “.com”, “.org” or “.net”.14
However, ICANN’s self-governance approach differs in several
respects from traditional regulatory mandates in the telecommunica-
tion area. Most importantly, ICANN is not independent of either its
“regulatees” or its supervisory agency. The regulated organisations –
registrars and registries – not only participate in ICANN’s policy-set-
ting efforts as members of ICANN’s constituencies, they also contrib-
ute significantly to ICANN’s budget.15  As a regulatory agency, ICANN
is thus interwoven with and accountable to several actors with di-
verse or even antagonistic interests, the most influential of which are
arguably the US government and the DNS service industry.
Specific responsibilities in relation to the WSIS
ICANN participated in the WSIS, though without any specific respon-
sibilities. However, internet governance and the private self-regula-
tory approach that ICANN represents evolved into one of the major
controversies in the first phase of the Summit. For this reason, ICANN
attended the preparatory conferences, explaining its role, mission,
guiding principles and organisational structure. ICANN also partici-
pated in the UN Working Group on Internet Governance and supported
it financially. In its own ambit, ICANN launched a temporary working
group on WSIS and organised several WSIS-related workshops at
ICANN meetings.
Description and analysis of ICT activities
WSIS-related activities since the Tunis Summit
ICANN’s post-WSIS activities have focused on the Internet Govern-
ance Forum. ICANN has participated in and allocated money in its
budget to financially support the Advisory Group that assisted the UN
secretary general in launching the first Forum meeting.16  ICANN also
co-organised several workshops at the first Forum meeting, which
dealt with building capacity for participation in internet coordination
and with multilingualism on the internet.
WSIS has clear repercussions for ICANN’s further orientation.
Its strategic plan for 2006 to 2009 reflects the outcome of WSIS both
in terminology and concrete goals. It describes as future “challenges
and opportunities” the development of appropriate structures and
processes for a “post-WSIS ICANN” as well as “an appropriate role”
for ICANN “in the broad group of international entities involved in
internet functions” (ICANN, 2006c). As a result of WSIS, ICANN takes
more notice of other international organisations related to informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) policies and may thus
become more responsive to policy concerns outside its own mission.
The same might be said of other organisations, so that regulatory
competencies affecting the internet may in future interact on a more
regular basis.
On a concrete level, ICANN plans in the near future to:
• Increase international participation in ICANN processes and of-
fer translation into other languages
• Support regional capacity-building in the field of internet address-
ing and the DNS
• Improve and monitor ICANN’s overall operational performance
and that of its supporting organisations
• Audit its own openness, transparency and inclusiveness
• Deal in a systematic way with “end user issues” (complaint han-
dling regarding registration of domain names)
• Pursue the deployment of internationalised domain names (also
on the top level), and facilitate the introduction of new TLDs and
a consensual WHOIS policy (see below).
14 The allocation of domain names on the second level of ccTLDs is subject to
national regulation. However, the US government claims final authority over the
DNS root zone file and thus over what appears in the root (Peake, 2004).
15 Registries operate the database of top level domains. Registrars are responsible
for the registration of domain names. About USD 20 million of ICANN’s USD 34
million budget for the fiscal year 2006-2007 is expected to come from accredited
registrars. Registries for gTLDs are budgeted for roughly USD 15 million. The
address registries contribute USD 800,000, and the registries for ccTLDs account
for USD 1.5 million (ICANN, 2006b).
16 With USD 200,000 according to the annual operating plan for the fiscal year
2006-07.
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Other ICT-related activities
ICANN’s regulatory activities centre on the provision of services par-
ticularly in the generic but also partly in the country-code domain
name space. Examples of the regulation of existing services are the
Uniform Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)17  and the WHOIS policy.18
The UDRP was introduced in 1999. It consists of an interna-
tional online arbitration process for settling conflicting claims to do-
main names without resorting to national courts. The goal is to pro-
vide conflicting parties with a quick and low-cost resolution proce-
dure. The scope of the UDRP is limited to domain names under gTLDs
and a few ccTLDs. Furthermore, the UDRP only applies to claims made
by trademark owners to domain names which have been registered
and used in bad faith. Evaluations of the UDRP arbitration process
(Froomkin, 2002; Geist, 2002) point out a systemic bias towards the
complainants and thus a privileging of trademark-based claims over
other rights.
The WHOIS policy pertains to a database that contains contact
information of domain name registrants. For several years ICANN has
struggled to consensually define mandatory rules regarding essential
registrant data elements that must be made publicly available by reg-
istrars. Intellectual property organisations and some public authori-
ties wish unrestricted access to the WHOIS database. However, the
publication of WHOIS information potentially conflicts with data pro-
tection laws, which vary widely across countries. A report by the Lon-
don School of Economics (LSE) estimates that volunteers in ICANN
have spent approximately 39,000 hours on this issue since the first
task force was initiated in 2001 (LSE, 2006, p. 66).
Examples of regulatory policies aimed at expanding or creating
new markets are the delegation of new TLDs and the introduction of
internationalised domain names (IDN). The 1998 MoU between the
US government and ICANN already specified one of ICANN’s tasks as
the consideration of a process for the introduction of new gTLDs. In
various pilots and trials that took place in 2000, 2004 and 2005, ICANN
has to date delegated twelve new TLDs. However, there is still no
established standard procedure for the future introduction of new
gTLDs. The delegation of new TLDs has been a controversial issue for
more than a decade, with some stakeholders arguing vigorously in
favour of increasing the number of TLDs up to a technically feasible
figure per year, and other stakeholders more or less against any addi-
tional TLDs. The supporting organisation for generic DNS issues in
ICANN, the Generic Names Supporting Organisation (GNSO),19  has
now completed another policy development process, which endorses
the introduction of additional TLDs and recommends policy princi-
ples for their selection and allocation (GNSO, 2006).
The DNS is based on the ASCII character set, which supports
only Latin alphabet domain names.20  In order to enable international
use of the DNS, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)21  has de-
veloped a converting mechanism that allows for a translation of non-
ASCII character domain names into ASCII-based names. Based on
the technical specifications defined by the IETF (2003), ICANN de-
vised guidelines for the use of those standards at the registry level.
All operators of an ICANN-accredited TLD (i.e. .com, .net, .org, .info,
.biz, etc.) are required to comply with those guidelines in order to
obtain approval for the registration of internationalised domain names.
Tests for introducing internationalised TLDs are expected to be com-
pleted by the end of 2007.
Stakeholder participation
Key areas in which participation of civil society,
Southern countries and women is an issue
Diversity in participation is especially important in the area of name
space regulation. DNS policy issues such as the introduction of inter-
nationalised domain names (IDN) or decisions on data protection di-
rectly affect users’ interests. Key decision-making bodies for DNS
policy are currently the GNSO and the ICANN Board of Directors.
Another relevant area is the evolving structure of ICANN itself.
ICANN is a prime example of new forms of multi-stakeholder or-
ganisation, but also of the various problems inherent in these new
types of consensus-building entities. As the continuous changes in
ICANN’s sub-structures and procedures show, the goal of fair rep-
resentation and legitimate decision-making is very difficult to achieve
once the traditional UN principle of “one state, one vote” is dis-
carded as a model.
Actions taken to ensure effective participation of all stakeholders
A key element of ICANN’s governance model is the principle of bot-
tom-up consensus building.
Stakeholders relevant to the field of DNS and IP address man-
agement are involved in ICANN through supporting organisations.
The ICANN bylaws identify the roles and responsibilities of the three
supporting organisations: the Address Supporting Organisation, Coun-
try Code Names Supporting Organisation (ccNSO) and GNSO. They
are each responsible for policy development in their respective areas.
The structure of the supporting organisations and their relationship
with ICANN differ considerably. The GNSO, responsible for gTLDs, is
the largest and has the most differentiated structure. As Figure 3
shows, the GNSO consists of six “constituencies”, which should rep-
resent the diversity of interests involved in or affected by the manage-
ment of the domain name space. As the chart also shows, ICANN’s
constituency structure over-represents business interests. The Non-
Commercial Users Constituency is the only group in the GNSO Coun-
cil that articulates civil society interests.
As a result of ICANN’s reform, a Policy Development Process
(PDP) that covers issues in the purview of the GNSO and the ccNSO
has been established. The PDP is part of the ICANN bylaws (Annex A
and B) and specifies in detail the roles and responsibilities of the Board
of Directors, the GNSO, the ccNSO and ICANN staff to ensure that
decision-making processes go forward within a given time, but also
that final decisions by the Board do indeed reflect the recommenda-
tions of the supporting organisations. In contrast to DNS policies,
policies regarding the allocation of IP addresses are more or less au-
tonomously developed by the Address Supporting Organisation.
Civil society groups have two channels in ICANN to influence the
policy process. The first channel is the At-Large Advisory Committee
(ALAC), which represents self-organising Regional At-Large Organi-
sations (RALOs). ALAC was originally designed for individual internet
users. In future it might represent both organisations and individuals.
The task of the At-Large Membership is to offer advice on ICANN’s
regulatory activities. Unlike the other stakeholder groups in ICANN,
17 See: <www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm>.
18 See: <www.spacereg.com/dc_eurid_whois_policy.pdf>.
19 See: <www.icann.org/committees>.
20 American standard code for information interchange (ASCII) is a code for
representing Latin characters as numbers, with each letter assigned a number
from 0 to 127. Unicode is an extension of ASCII.
21 <www.ietf.org>.
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ALAC no longer has decision-making authority.22  It is represented on
the Board, as well in the GNSO, through non-voting liaisons.
The second channel of civil society participation is the Non-Com-
mercial Users Constituency (NCUC),23  one of the six constituencies
that together form the GNSO. NCUC constitutes a minority on the GNSO
Council, the organisation’s decision-making body. The fact that the GNSO
Council uses a weighted voting system, which favours the registrars
and registries by giving their Council members two votes instead of
one, further marginalises civil society perspectives in the GNSO.
ICANN’s bylaws (Article VI: Sections 3-5) include “diversity provi-
sions” for international representation. To ensure diversity, ICANN’s by-
laws specify five geographic regions,24  all of which must be represented
by at least one member of the Board, the various councils, and the Nomi-
nating Committee. There are no equivalent provisions to ensure gender
diversity. For the At-Large Membership, geographic representation will
be achieved through the five RALOs, which are intended to be umbrella
entities for non-commercial organisations (“At-Large Structures”) and
individuals who take an interest and want to participate in ICANN. At
present, all five RALOs are in the process of constituting themselves
and negotiating a memorandum of understanding with ICANN.25
After WSIS, ICANN has strengthened its efforts to internationalise
participation. To facilitate multilingual communication, relevant docu-
ments are to be translated into other languages. There are also plans to
offer simultaneous interpretation at ICANN meetings. In addition, ICANN
has initiated outreach programmes designed to contribute to regional
capacity-building in the area of DNS and IP address management and
to increase participation from under-represented regions.
Among the post-WSIS regional outreach activities are the newly
established regional liaisons for each of ICANN’s five world regions,
the task of each being to form networks with and across all stake-
holders, including national governments. The goal is to promote par-
ticipation in ICANN but also to foster the emergence of regional DNS
service industries and of user groups. In addition, ICANN created the
position of a general manager for public participation to foster active
participation by the various stakeholder groups.
22 ICANN’s original bylaws from 1998 provided that the At-Large Membership would
select roughly half of ICANN’s Board seats. This provision was changed in 2002,
in the course of the reform of ICANN.
23 <gnso.icann.org/non-commercial>.
24 Europe; Asia/Australia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean islands; Africa; and North
America (Art. 6, Sect. 5).
25 In December 2006, LAC RALO, the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional At-
Large Organisation, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN.
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Until 2003, decision-making positions in ICANN were predomi-
nantly filled by the ICANN supporting organisations and their con-
stituencies. In 2003, ICANN created a Nominating Committee, which
selects eight members of ICANN’s fifteen-member Board of Direc-
tors, as well as a “portion” of the GNSO and ccNSO Councils and the
Interim ALAC. The purpose of the Nominating Committee is to broaden
the existing mix of geography, culture, skills, experience, and per-
spective as derived from ICANN’s supporting organisations. Due to
the work of the Nominating Committee, the share of “ICANN outsid-
ers” in decision-making positions has significantly increased and
ICANN’s Board and councils show a slightly increased participation of
women, not least from developing countries.26  Civil society has a
strong voice in the Nominating Committee, with five of its members
being selected by ALAC. Together with the representative of the Non-
Commercial Users Constituency, civil society constitutes roughly a
third of the voting members.
Effectiveness of efforts to increase stakeholder participation
ICANN’s diversity provisions do ensure a degree of regional variety in
decision-making positions. Its travel reimbursement policy for Board
members and Nominating Committee appointees enables participa-
tion from developing countries and from civil society organisations.
However, on the level of general participation without decision-mak-
ing responsibility, both regional and sectoral diversity is much more
limited. The majority of attendees at ICANN meetings are from OECD
countries and related to the internet industry. ICANN does offer all
stakeholders opportunities to participate, but the actual influence on
the policy process varies significantly among the different groups. In
particular, individuals and non-commercial internet users lack an ef-
fective voice in policy matters.
Fair representation and balance of interests is an issue espe-
cially in ICANN’s most important supporting organisation, the GNSO.
The representativeness, transparency and effectiveness of GNSO op-
erations have recently been subject to an extensive evaluation con-
ducted by the LSE. The LSE review comes to the conclusion that the
current GNSO structure reflects a “snapshot of the interest groupings
most active on generic names issues in the founding stages of ICANN
in the late 1990s” (LSE, 2006, p. 423). Its constituency structure lacks
the flexibility required to incorporate new stakeholders, and the indi-
vidual constituencies are not easy for newcomers to find and to join.
The report also notes that the majority of constituencies suffer from
low participation and a lack of representativeness. Of the altogether
231 members of the GNSO, only a small fraction regularly participate.
This means that policy recommendations on vital issues such as the
conditions of use of domain names in gTLDs are developed by quite a
small number of people.
The review recommends among many other things:
• Establishing a more flexible structure that is open and attractive
to new stakeholder groups by reducing the number of GNSO
constituencies from six to three (registration, business, and civil
society including the now separate At-Large Membership).
• The creation of a primary, fee-based membership in ICANN so
that it becomes actually possible to join the organisation and
choose a constituency according to individual preferences.
• The strengthening of incentives for reaching consensus across
the various interest groups through abolishing weighted voting
and raising the threshold for consensus on the GNSO Council
from 66% to 75%.
While a restructuring of the GNSO into three groups could well
be a step forward to overcoming the antagonistic constellation in the
GNSO, it bears the risk of codifying once again the minority position
of civil society. By the same token, a membership fee might discrimi-
nate non-commercial users, particularly from developing countries.
It is thus important that any new consensus-fostering mechanism
gives adequate weight to civil society groups so that all views and
interests are reflected in policy recommendations.
The WSIS Declaration calls for a multilateral, transparent and demo-
cratic management of the internet, with the full involvement of govern-
ments, the private sector, civil society and international organisations.
The WSIS documents offer no further specification, however, about what
is meant by “democratic management of the internet”. ICANN has never
described its processes as democratic, choosing instead to speak of
“bottom-up consensus”. Considering that democracy is still primarily a
national form of organisation, some core elements of which cannot eas-
ily be implemented in transnational environments, it seems understand-
able that ICANN avoids this term. However, the implementation of and,
even more so, the compliance with bottom-up decision-making proc-
esses turn out to be fairly ambitious goals, too. ICANN’s policy decisions
over the past years reveal several examples where the Board of Directors
acted despite a lack of consensus in the GNSO or other parts of its con-
stituency.27  However, violations of constitutional decision-making pro-
cedures eventually undermine the legitimacy of an organisation. Another
problem concerns the unequal distribution of power among ICANN’s
stakeholder groups. A full involvement of civil society in ICANN would
require a restructuring of its bottom-up consensus-building process.
Conclusions and recommendations
General conclusions
ICANN is one of the prominent examples of multi-stakeholder coordi-
nation or “self-governance” in ICT. Eight years after its inception, a
number of insights can be drawn from this new type of regulation.
Firstly, self-governance does not mean that governments disap-
pear. Even if the US government lives up to its promise and eventually
privatises DNS regulation, government(s) will still keep some control
over the policy outcome. Private agencies cannot step outside the
“shadow of hierarchy”. They must comply with national laws, but they
may also have to cope with political pressure, as ICANN had to in the
battle over “triple X”, the proposed TLD that would have created a
virtual “red light district” on the internet. Despite political pressure
that brought the contract negotiations to a halt in May 2006, in Janu-
ary 2007 ICANN published a new draft contract.28
26 Three of the four female Board members were chosen by the Nominating
Committee. The Nominating Committee has so far chosen eight Board members.
27 A current example concerns the renewal of contracts with the registries of gTLDs.
A pro-competition, presumably user-friendly option would be to offer the registry
services for re-bids. While the GNSO is working on a policy recommendation, the
ICANN Board has indicated that it might decide on this matter beforehand.
28 After the ICANN Board had principally approved of the application for “.xxx” in
2005, the Board voted in 2006 against the agreement with the ICM registry.
Following pressure from religious groups, governments intervened in the
negotiation process and asked to suspend it. Parts of the discussion on “.xxx”
within the U.S. Department of Commerce are publicly available from:
<www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/xxx-foiapage.pdf>.
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The current public-private arrangement is problematic for two
reasons. The first concerns the US government’s unilateral control
over the DNS infrastructure and ICANN’s activities. From a normative
point of view, unilateral control over vital internet infrastructure re-
sources is without a doubt less legitimate than an intergovernmental
regime. However, as debates throughout the WSIS have shown, it is
unclear how political responsibility for a global infrastructure can be
distributed in a more equitable manner without resorting to the UN
system. The much criticised unilateral control over the DNS may thus
persist because governments cannot agree on an alternative and more
legitimate solution.
A second problem pertains to accountability. Multi-stakeholder
arrangements under public supervision tend to blur the responsibility
for policy decisions. Again, “.xxx” provides a good example. If the
division of labour between the government and the private agency is
not clear-cut, it is difficult for affected parties to determine who can
be held accountable for policies. On the other hand, there are limits to
the capacity of self-regulation. In the event of a privatisation of ICANN,
it will be vital to install reliable checks and balances to minimise the
risk of abuses of regulatory authority.
A weak point of private multi-stakeholder organisations concerns
issues of membership and representation. While national and inter-
national organisations aggregate opinions and interests by means of
representation, ICANN has been struggling for years to develop its
own approach to inclusiveness and fair representation. The most con-
troversial issue has been the role of individual users. No doubt, ICANN
intends to be inclusive and does recognise the legitimacy that derives
from openness and broad participation. But ICANN equally fears nega-
tive consequences from weak organisational boundaries such as “cap-
ture” or manipulation and a loss of control over the process of policy
development.
Thus ICANN still has an ambivalent stance on civil society par-
ticipation. This is demonstrated by the disenfranchisement of the At-
Large Membership after 2002 on the one hand and the substantial
organisational and financial support for the newly founded ALAC on
the other. ICANN supports the development of a complex civil society
structure in ICANN but at the same time denies civil society direct
influence on the policy process. Like other multi-stakeholder organi-
sations, ICANN faces the challenge of balancing potentially conflict-
ing values such as inclusiveness, consensus-orientation and effec-
tiveness without having at their disposal the means and procedures
of governmental institutions.
Compared to national or intergovernmental organisations, ICANN
is a remarkably open and transparent organisation. Debates about
controversial issues such as the WHOIS database can be observed
on the internet. The meetings of most councils and task forces are
open, and recordings or minutes are released on the internet. Even
the ICANN Board of Directors has made efforts to become more trans-
parent. Detailed minutes of Board meetings are published on the
internet, and in the case of critical decisions, the individual votes of
Board members are now published. Some directors even offer per-
sonal explanations for their votes.
Thanks to this high degree of transparency, the pros and cons of
policy options in question are easier to understand and observers
have the opportunity to develop informed opinions. What is more,
transparency enables some degree of public control over the organi-
sation’s performance. ICANN’s actions are closely monitored by a
number of news services and blogs on the internet. Controversial
policy decisions thus need to be justified. Because it enables public
deliberation and some degree of accountability, transparency is at
present regarded as a major source of legitimacy for private govern-
ance bodies. However, transparency can also turn into a source of de-
legitimation. In the case of ICANN, transparency has led to a strong
public awareness of its shortcomings.
Conclusions on performance
in relation  to ICT role and responsibilities
In 1998, when the first MoU between the US government and ICANN
was agreed upon, the general expectation was that ICANN would ac-
complish its tasks within two years. However, the road towards priva-
tisation of DNS management has turned out to be more difficult to
navigate than expected. While some of the tasks were indeed imple-
mented quickly, others are still on ICANN’s “to-do list”. In September
2006, the US government therefore amended the MoU for a seventh
time.29
In 1999, ICANN introduced competition for the registration of
domain names under gTLDs, established the Uniform Dispute Reso-
lution Policy to deal with the “cybersquatting” of domain names of
well-known organisations or products, and developed a participatory
structure for the internet industry (supporting organisations). In 2000,
ICANN approved several new TLDs and began setting standards for
the operation of gTLDs. But since then, ICANN has failed to develop a
general rules-based mechanism for the delegation of new TLDs. ICANN
has also failed to create a membership organisation that fosters “ac-
countability to and representation of” the diversity of internet users.
ICANN’s self-governance structure proved able to create a new
market for registration services, but it lacks the power to act against
vested interests in this market and its own organisation. There is as
yet only marginal competition between TLDs, and the existing regis-
tries have successfully delayed the creation of a process for the regu-
lar introduction of TLDs.
ICANN’s overall acceptance depends on its problem-solving ca-
pacity, its inclusiveness and its ability to adequately reflect in its policy
decisions the existing diversity of opinions. However, ICANN oper-
ates under severe restrictions, and the room for altering its structure
and performance may therefore be limited. The self-governance ap-
proach implies that policies need the consent of the “rule takers”. In
some cases, this leads to non-transparent decision-making processes
and biased results at the expense of users’ interests.30
ICANN’s current structure privileges the interests of one indus-
try sector over the interests of users and future businesses. The pri-
vatisation of DNS regulation would require as a minimum a more
balanced representation, a more efficient policy development proc-
ess and stronger mechanisms of accountability.
Conclusions on the adequacy
of modalities and practices of participation
Under ICANN’s current structure, voting or decision-making rights
are unequally distributed. Some stakeholder groups such as the indi-
vidual users but also governments (though by their own choice) lack
voting rights. Constituencies that have contractual relationships with
29 More information is available from: <www.icann.org/general/agreements.htm>.
30 A recent example concerns the renewal of the contract for the TLD “.com”. The
draft contract as negotiated between ICANN and VeriSign evoked criticism from
other stakeholders and was subsequently amended by the US government. More
information is available from: <www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
agreements/amend30_11292006.pdf> and <www.theregister.co.uk/2006/12/01/
usg_approves_dotcom_contract>.
In
st
itu
tio
na
l o
ve
rv
ie
w
s 
/ 4
7
ICANN (registries and registrars) have more votes than those that do
not. The method of differentiating political influence and allocating
voting rights according to a stakeholder’s share of the budget or simi-
lar criteria violates basic democratic principles and thus weakens the
legitimacy of ICANN. All stakeholders participating in the policy-mak-
ing process should be granted voting rights, and power asymmetries
between constituencies should be avoided. Equal participation rights
for individual users, as originally intended, would create an incentive
for broader participation by civil society.
Concrete recommendations
for improving the modalities of participation
• Non-commercial and individual user-related bodies in ICANN
(NCUC, ALAC) should be merged into one civil society member-
ship organisation. Regional chapters should be encouraged but
not made mandatory. Hierarchical layers in the civil society body,
both regional or functional, should be avoided.
• The GNSO should be restructured along the lines of the recom-
mendations of the GNSO evaluation. However, incentives for con-
sensus-building across the GNSO constituencies must include
civil society as a third stakeholder.
• The ICANN Board and ICANN management must ensure that
policy recommendations made by supporting organisations and
councils are followed when explicitly required under the bylaws.
In general, the ICANN Board and staff should respond more se-
riously to the public comments it invites on its policy proposals.
• In order to become more inclusive and attract new people across
all regions and stakeholder groups, ICANN should produce policy
briefs on relevant but complex and controversial issues that ex-
plain to newcomers the problem at hand and the various solu-
tions under discussion. This would also be helpful for new mem-
bers of the Board and councils.
Specific recommendations for improving performance
ICANN is still an emerging organisation, as is reflected in the regular
modifications of its bylaws. In order to increase trust in the organisa-
tion’s processes, it is vital to establish an equivalent to the rule of law.
ICANN’s formal rules and principles need to become more self-binding
so that the organisation’s decisions will be more predictable and par-
ticipating stakeholders can rely on the organisation’s actions. Another
crucial component of the rule of law is a non-discriminatory and effec-
tive means to appeal against potential violations of the bylaws.
A possible and desirable side effect of a stronger “constitution-
alisation” of ICANN would be a change in the balance of power be-
tween ICANN staff and the constituencies and councils working on a
voluntary basis.
ICANN’s decisions on the delegation of new TLDs, the renewal of
contracts for TLDs, and its accreditation policies for registrars have
allocation effects. So far, ICANN’s policies indirectly favour a small
number of mostly US-based registry businesses and large, globally-
acting registrars, none of which are located in developing countries.
Regional effects of accreditation policies or the selection of new TLDs
should play a more important role in ICANN’s decisions.31  
31 To give one obvious example: the new type of regional TLDs such “.cat”, which
serve a local community, should be allowed to work with local registrars who
cannot afford an ICANN accreditation.
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Introduction
Objectives and main activities
According to its Constitution, the purpose of UNESCO1  is:
…to contribute to peace and security by promoting collabora-
tion among nations through education, science and culture in
order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law
and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are
affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of
race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United
Nations (UNESCO, 2004).
More informally, its website describes its functions as a labo-
ratory of ideas and a standard setter to forge agreements on emerg-
ing ethical issues, and as a clearinghouse for the dissemination and
sharing of information and knowledge; it helps member states to
build human and institutional capacities, and promotes international
cooperation among its members in the fields of education, science,
culture and communication.
UNESCO’s main activities comprise prospective studies; trans-
fer and sharing of knowledge; standards setting, including interna-
tional and statutory instruments (declarations, conventions and rec-
ommendations); the provision of expertise to member states; and
the exchange of specialised information.
Unlike some UN agencies, UNESCO did not emerge from a prag-
matic need on the part of governments to coordinate their relations
in a specific domain (such as the common management of the seas,
or the coordination of post and of telecommunication). Rather, in
the aftermath of the Second World War (1939-1945), it was founded
on a broader idealist philosophy that “since wars begin in the minds
of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be
constructed.” Such a remit has sometimes led it into highly politi-
cised territory which, in the absence of a strong imperative on gov-
ernments to continue engagement, can lead to some institutional
fragility, a case in point being the withdrawal from UNESCO of the
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) during the 1980s
(both have since rejoined, as will be discussed below).
Legal/constitutional composition
UNESCO was founded in November 1945 as a specialised UN agency
(under Articles 104, 105 of the UN Charter, agreed a few months
earlier), and is guided by its Constitution.
Key members/participants and decision-making structures
UNESCO currently has 192 member states and 6 associate mem-
bers. UN membership automatically confers the right to member-
ship of UNESCO.2
The UNESCO General Conference comprises representatives
from member states. It meets every two years to determine the poli-
cies and main lines of work of the organisation and is attended by
member states and associate members, together with observers for
non-member states, intergovernmental organisations, and non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs). Each country has one vote, irre-
spective of its size or the extent of its contribution to the budget.
The General Conference sets out the programmes and the
budget of UNESCO, elects members of the Executive Board and ap-
points, every four years, the director-general.
The Executive Board, comprising 58 elected members, meets
twice a year and in effect manages UNESCO, implementing the tasks
assigned by the General Conference every two years. Other Board
functions stem from agreements concluded between UNESCO and
the UN, the specialised agencies, and other intergovernmental or-
ganisations.
The director-general is the executive head of the organisation.
Relations with other international
institutions and the multilateral system
As a specialised UN agency, its formal links are generally estab-
lished through the UN system, and in particular the Economic and
Social Committee (ECOSOC).3  Members of other UN agencies have
a right to attend UNESCO conferences and other events.
Its remit regularly brings it into collaboration with other spe-
cialised agencies and UN programmes, and such collaboration is
frequent and often over an extended period, for instance, with the
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP).
2 The list of UNESCO member states is available from: <erc.unesco.org/cp/
MSList_alpha.asp?lg=E>.
3 <www.un.org/docs/ecosoc>.
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9Commitment to development
The UNESCO Constitution and later legal instruments do not specifi-
cally refer to a commitment to development, and indeed development
per se is not among its key goals. However, many of its declarations,
conventions and recommendations do have implicit and explicit de-
velopmental components, and developing countries are often singled
out for special support.
Its programmes prioritise least-developed countries (LDCs) and
poverty reduction. The Medium-Term Strategy for 2002-2007 includes
a cross-cutting theme on “Eradication of poverty, especially extreme
poverty”, and a specific commitment to prioritise LDCs across all its
programmes (UNESCO, 2002a).
Programme V on Communication and Information, for instance,
gives priority attention to the needs of LDCs and Africa “in such areas
as capacity-building, ICT applications in community development in-
cluding water management and ICT literacy, to sustain UNESCO’s
contribution to NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’s Development]”
(UNESCO, 2006a).
UNESCO also frequently facilitates the participation of actors from
developing countries in its meetings and events, by supporting travel
and subsistence and by organising global and regional events in de-
veloping countries.
Commitment to gender equality
Similarly, UNESCO does not have a core legal instrument regarding
gender equality, but its gender mainstreaming policy is defined in the
organisation’s Medium-Term Strategy for 2002-2007. In addition,
UNESCO’s Gender Mainstreaming Implementation Framework (GMIF)
for 2002-2007 offers guidelines on how to implement the policy com-
mitment (UNESCO, 2002b).
The framework was developed by the Section for Women and
Gender Equality, with a staff of four and linked to designated gender
focal points in Paris and field offices. Its goal is the overall integration
of gender equality issues within UNESCO’s programmes, and it also
maintains a Mainstreaming Resource Centre directed towards sup-
porting policy-makers in this area.
Within the Communication and Information Programme, gender
concerns have been mainstreamed with special emphasis on “train-
ing, improving community access to information, knowledge and skills
and increasing the capacity of professionals to produce and dissemi-
nate development messages” (UNESCO, 2006a).
Southern actors and civil society participation
The UNESCO Constitution defines the basis for cooperation with NGOs.
UNESCO “may make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-
operation with non-governmental organisations concerned with mat-
ters within its competence, and may invite them to undertake specific
tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation
by representatives of such organisations on advisory committees set
up by the General Conference” (UNESCO, 2004, Article 11, para. 4).
Over the years, UNESCO has developed (and occasionally re-
viewed and amended) an elaborate system of NGO participation
– some say at times too elaborate – and General Conference Direc-
tives of 1995 and 2001 govern the current situation. Relations can be
of two kinds, formal or operational, depending on the role and struc-
ture of the NGO concerned and their record on cooperation.
At present UNESCO maintains official relations with 337 interna-
tional NGOs and 26 foundations. Of these, about 15% are based in
developing countries, just a handful in the least developed. Although
many are international associations with members globally, it is still a
small proportion.
A feature unique to UNESCO is the UNESCO Clubs and Associa-
tions established at the national level to informally engage a wide range
of actors on UNESCO issues; these actors may also participate in
UNESCO as NGOs. There are now 4,000 associations, centres and
clubs in about 100 countries, and at the international level, a World
Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and Associations (WFUCA).4
Official UNESCO Commissions also exist in all 192 member states
and can act as a means to extend outreach into civil society at the
national level. These are governed under a specific charter approved
by the General Conference in 1978, and their function is “to involve in
UNESCO’s activities the various ministerial departments, agencies,
institutions, organisations and individuals working for the advance-
ment of education, science, culture and information” (UNESCO,
2002c).
With regard to participation of Southern actors, UNESCO, as
noted, has no specific structural features but has a stated commit-
ment to support such actors and builds in participation through a
variety of modalities.
Role and responsibilities in ICTs
Legal and constitutional basis
Communication is the central instrument by which UNESCO achieves
its mission. Article 1 of the Constitution states that to realise this
purpose the organisation will “(a) Collaborate in the work of advanc-
ing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all
means of mass communication and to that end recommend such in-
ternational agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow
of ideas by word and image.”
ICT-related activities
Given such a general remit, it is not surprising that UNESCO has been
involved – and occasionally embroiled – in information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) and media issues throughout its evolution.
From the late 1960s, satellite broadcasting across borders was a
key political issue, and UNESCO responded in 1972 with the adoption
of the Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broad-
casting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and
Greater Cultural Exchange (UNESCO, 1972). Although promoting the
principle of free flow, it also affirmed the principle of national prior
4 More information available from: <portal.unesco.org/unesco/ev.php?URL_ID=
17389&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201&reload=1069844420>.
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50 consent. As a declaration it was not binding, but the list of seven
countries opposing it – they included the UK, the US, Australia, Ger-
many and Canada – suggests that a cold war fracture was already
opening. In 1974, along with WIPO, UNESCO oversaw a further con-
vention on satellites, the purpose of which was to protect copyright
owners of broadcast signals; the Convention Relating to the Distribu-
tion of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite came
into force in 1979. To some extent the contrast between these instru-
ments is indicative of a shift in concerns away from balancing sover-
eignty against free flow, towards an emphasis on property rights, a
move that was part of a wider global dynamic.
However, international differences in these instruments were
merely a prelude to UNESCO’s involvement in the New World Infor-
mation and Communication Order (NWICO) debate. This debate, ini-
tiated in the mid-1970s and led initially by the Non-Aligned Move-
ment,5  focused on the impact of Northern-dominated media on de-
velopment, though many other issues were involved at different stages.
UNESCO took it up in 1976, and in 1978 the General Conference agreed
a Declaration of Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution
of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Under-
standing, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Ra-
cialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War.
Despite this agreement, major divisions soon emerged and an
independent commission was established to come forward with rec-
ommendations. The result was a report called Many Voices, One World,
presented to the General Conference in 1980 (MacBride et al. 1980).
It considered media and communication in the widest sense and put
forward a series of proposals. Unfortunately, the debate became em-
broiled in cold war politics, and distorted by commercial and political
media interests, descending rapidly into fractious argument. Largely
as a result, the US pulled out of UNESCO in 1984, followed by the UK,
its strongest ally, the following year. Although NWICO continued on
the UNESCO agenda for some time, it was finally replaced, following
a vigorous debate at the 1989 General Conference, by the New Com-
munication Strategy. Neither UNESCO nor any other UN institution
has since hosted such a wide-ranging debate on media and commu-
nication.
In 1990, as a result of an internal restructuring exercise, UNESCO’s
Communication and Information Sector (CI) was established, consist-
ing of the Communications Development Division, the Division for
Freedom of Expression, Democracy and Peace, and the Information
Society Division.
The CI provides the secretariat for two intergovernmental pro-
grammes: the International Programme for the Development of Com-
munication (IPDC) and the Information for All Programme (IFAP).
The IPDC, established in 1980, was seen by many as a prag-
matic alternative to NWICO. In its first 25 years, it has dispensed USD
92 million to more than 1,100 media development projects, granting
just over USD 3 million to 120 national and regional projects globally
in the year 2004/2005. The IFAP was established in 2001 as a plat-
form for debate and action to help reduce the “digital divide” and to
promote universal access. It has so far generated almost USD 2 mil-
lion in funds, and approved 24 projects during 2005.
Each programme has a board consisting of a number of member
states (39 for IPDC and 26 for IFAP), elected by the General Conference.
Operationally, the CI implements a set of actions that include fund-
ing Chairs in Informatics, supporting electronic educational networks,
digitising public domain information, training in ICTs, offering advice on
developing information policies, and running, with the ITU, Regional
Symposiums on Telematics for Development. Some actions are under-
taken in conjunction with other entities, such as the ITU and UNDP,
where their remit overlaps. One example is the May 1995 study pub-
lished jointly with the ITU, The Right to Communicate: At What Price?
(UNESCO, 1995), which considered the economic constraints on the
effective use of telecommunication in education, science and culture.
The Community Multimedia Centre (CMC) programme is among
the CI flagships. Up to 90 centres have now been supported in Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia, as the programme
continues to expand elsewhere. Each centre provides rural and re-
mote communities with radio, internet and other ICT facilities for
knowledge sharing and development.
Other recent UNESCO intergovernmental actions are of at least
tangential relevance. In October 2003, the General Conference ap-
proved the Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of
Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace,6  covering is-
sues such as universal access to the internet, copyright and the pub-
lic domain, and the balance between the interests of rights-holders
and of the public. A recommendation, however, is not binding, and
the language used is relatively weak.
The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diver-
sity of Cultural Expressions was approved by the General Conference
in October 2005. It was in part promoted as a means to ensure that
cultural expressions, including audio and visual materials, could be
fully defended in the context of trade agreements, such as those agreed
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which many believe are un-
dermining their cultural value in the interests of trade and commercial
gain. The Convention was opposed primarily by the US.
UNESCO and the WSIS
The legal basis for UNESCO participation in the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS) was never in doubt, given the strong re-
mit in its Constitution and the existence of an Information Society
Division in the CI Sector.
It is worth recalling that some time before the ITU announced in
1998 its intention to organise the WSIS, UNESCO had been develop-
ing its own plans for a summit. In August 1996, instigated by the
director-general, the UNESCO Executive Board began planning a Con-
ference on Information and Communication for Development, to be
5 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organisation of states
– over 100 – not formally aligned with or against any power bloc.
6 Available from: <portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13475&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
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1held in 1998, the goal of which was to “focus on development issues to
which information and communication can make a meaningful contri-
bution and (…) provide a forum for all who wish to contribute to the
search for international consensus in these matters” (UNESCO, 1996a).
In November the Executive Board agreed that “The possibility of
co-organising the conference jointly with other bodies within the UN
system, such as ITU, would be actively explored” (UNESCO, 1996b).
Why UNESCO dropped the idea of the conference has never been
publicly explained, although some within UNESCO view it as the origin
of the idea of an intergovernmental event on the information society.
The internal consideration by UNESCO of such a conference enabled a
rapid and coherent response to the ITU initiative, and UNESCO was thus
a very early and active contributor to the WSIS preparatory process.
From the beginning, UNESCO’s goal was to broaden the agenda
of the WSIS, and to extend civil society participation. Although not
officially acknowledged, some in UNESCO shared the view of early
civil society participants that the ITU’s understanding of the informa-
tion society overemphasised infrastructure and technical aspects. Fur-
thermore, the ITU’s unique structure, which encourages active par-
ticipation from the private sector but refuses (in contravention of
ECOSOC agreements) to officially recognise NGOs, left it ill equipped
to negotiate the participation of civil society.7
The early stages of a summit routinely involve a process of
agenda-definition as the lead agency, in this case the ITU, brings in
and opens a dialogue with additional UN actors. UNESCO’s efforts in
this regard focused on delivering a consistent message in all its ac-
tivities under the theme “Towards Knowledge Societies” and four un-
derlying principles: freedom of expression, universal access to infor-
mation and knowledge, promotion of cultural diversity, and equal ac-
cess to quality education. In general the intention was to concentrate
on content and human-capacity issues associated with an informa-
tion society, and this was evident in almost all its actions. Further-
more, UNESCO, unlike for instance the UNDP, took the opportunity of
the WSIS to reinforce its ICT programmes.
In relation to supporting civil society, UNESCO participated ac-
tively in the first civil society event relating to the WSIS, held in No-
vember 2001 in Geneva, jointly organised by the Platform for Com-
munication Rights and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. UNESCO’S participa-
tion in this seminar – entitled “Communication as a Human Right in
the Information Society: Issues for the World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society” – signalled its support for a broad and participatory
approach to the Summit.
Soon after, UNESCO organised a round of consultations with NGOs
on the WSIS. The consultations were held in Paris over four separate
days in February 2002. Although the lack of funding for travel and
subsistence resulted in little participation from the South, the event
facilitated the process of civil society coalescing around the WSIS.
This was followed up in April with a two-day consultation, this time
offering some support for Southern participation in an event that of-
fered a platform for civil society to further develop their ideas. The
outcomes, in terms of both proposed modalities of civil society partici-
pation in the WSIS and the substantive issues to be included, had a
significant influence on civil society activities overall during the early
WSIS phase and formed the point of departure for discussions at the
first meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in July that year.
UNESCO went on to support an online discussion forum for civil soci-
ety from December 2002 until January 2003, although participation in
this case was relatively limited. By then, in any case, civil society was
well into the process of organising itself into various caucuses and
others groups, and was developing its own communication structures.
More generally, UNESCO took considerable pains to redirect and
refocus its programme activities to fit into the WSIS and its “Knowl-
edge Societies” agenda, especially through the design and refinement
of the CI component of the 2002-2007 Medium-Term Strategy.8  Some
required little more than relabelling of existing activities; others were
entirely new.
In the first WSIS preparatory phase, UNESCO published a series
of reports on different aspects of the information society; hosted a
Ministerial Round Table Meeting alongside its October 2003 General
Conference from which a communiqué, Towards Knowledge Socie-
ties, was issued; organised a High-Level Symposium on the eve of
the Geneva Summit meeting in December 2003 that brought together
40 ministers, most from the South; and sponsored seven side-events
at the Geneva Summit itself.9
During the second phase, significant UNESCO activities included
a series of thematic meetings in 2005, including two in Paris, one in
Mali and one in Russia; the publication of Towards Knowledge Socie-
ties: UNESCO World Report, also in 2005 (UNESCO, 2005); and a
further set of events at the Tunis Summit.
Description and analysis of ICT activities
UNESCO actions since the Tunis Summit
UNESCO’s new Medium-Term Strategy for the years 2007 to 2013 is
currently in advanced draft form, to be approved at the next General
Conference. Programme V on Information and Communication has,
according to senior staff, been structured to a very significant degree
around those areas of the WSIS Action Plan for which UNESCO is the
focal point.
Action lines
Under the Tunis Agenda and the subsequent consultation on Action
Plan moderators/ facilitators held on 24 February 2006, UNESCO was
assigned the role of interim focal point for four of the eleven full ac-
tion lines contained in the WSIS Plan of Action, along with two of the
eight ICT application areas grouped under action line C7. No other
agency was given such a numerically prominent role in relation to the
7 For documentation on an attempt to force ITU to open up to NGOs see:
<www.comunica.org/itu_ngo>.
8 For a complete list see: <www.unesco.org/wsisdirectory>.
9 More information is available from: <portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13013&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.
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52 action lines, underscoring again the extent to which the WSIS agenda
overlapped with that of UNESCO. These action lines are:
C3: Access to information and knowledge
C7: ICT applications (two areas: e-learning and e-science)
C8: Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local
content
C9: Media
C10: Ethical dimensions of the information society
Initial meetings were held during 2006 in all of these areas, be-
ginning with C8 on 12 May in Geneva; then C3, C10, C7 (e-learning)
and C9 in Paris on four consecutive days beginning on 16 October;
and finally C7 (e-science) on 22 October in Beijing, alongside a major
science and technology conference taking place there.
The purpose of the meetings was to constitute multi-stakeholder
teams to move forward with each of the action lines, including desig-
nating a facilitator and sub-group moderators, devising terms of ref-
erence, and deciding on the activities to be pursued. No specific re-
sources were available from UNESCO or other parties to facilitate the
working of the team, and the facilitator is explicitly expected to be
able to provide sufficient resources to cover the costs of his/her own
activities. In all cases, UNESCO was confirmed by acclamation in its
role as focal point for the specified action lines.
The WSIS action lines vary greatly in terms of their breadth of
scope and the precision of their focus. They also differ in the extent to
which the elements of the Action Plan are already underway and con-
tained in the plans of UNESCO and other organisations. These factors
were reflected in the meetings, as they will be in any eventual outcomes.
C3: Access to knowledge, for instance, is a key area with ten
distinct actions, most of which are quite precise and well within the
domain of UNESCO and other collaborating entities. Actions include:
a) Develop policy guidelines for the development and promotion of
public domain information and h) Support the creation and develop-
ment of a digital public library and archive services.
C9: Media, on the other hand, includes seven actions, most of
which are quite vague and/or general, such as a) Encourage the me-
dia to continue to play an important role in the information society
and c) Take appropriate measures – consistent with freedom of ex-
pression – to combat illegal and harmful content in media content.
Similarly, C10: Ethical dimensions has four actions including a) Take
steps to promote respect for peace and to uphold the fundamental
values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, shared responsibil-
ity, and respect for nature and b) All stakeholders should increase
their awareness of the ethical dimension of their use of ICTs. And C8:
Cultural diversity has a total of fifteen disparate actions covering hugely
different areas and qualitatively different in nature.
Indeed, most of the actions within each area are disconnected,
and often the implicit comprehension of the domains covered does
not reflect actual good practice on the ground.
Thus UNESCO and the multi-stakeholder teams face a signifi-
cant challenge in developing coherent sub-groups and focused ac-
tions. Meetings took different approaches. Some action lines broke
into sub-groups to develop more specific activities; others stayed in
plenary. Plenary discussion often opened out into general issues, and
lists of desirable actions, before being pulled in by the chair. For the
most part, they were conducted in a traditional and formal manner
with tight chairing and facilitation and considerable discretionary power
in the hands of the chair to continue or discontinue a subject and to
wrap up with a specific conclusion.
Each of the action lines did establish multi-stakeholder teams to
carry them forward, some with quite specific goals, though few if any
at this point comprise all key actors necessary to push forward their
domain of work. Civil society participation overall was relatively weak
as compared to the level seen during the WSIS itself, and the number
of participants from the South was limited, though they were vocal in
most meetings. The absence of specific funding to defray the cost of
participation may have contributed to the low numbers overall, espe-
cially of civil society and Southern representatives, but with a few
exceptions the level of enthusiasm was muted and it proved difficult
to establish an energetic consensus on moving forward.
UNESCO is organising an online platform for ongoing discus-
sion, and collaboration is also being organised to facilitate further
team development.
Prospects for implementation
UNESCO, in common with all participating organisations, faces a dif-
ficult task in implementing these action lines. Some obstacles, such
as lack of precision and a very general focus, may be overcome through
concerted effort on the part of the multi-stakeholder teams. Others,
however, pose more serious challenges.
Almost all action areas are already the subject of considerable
activity, unrelated to the WSIS, among academics, NGOs, the private
sector, intergovernmental bodies, national bodies and so forth, many
of whom would be almost entirely unaware of the WSIS. Given the
lack of new resources, the multi-stakeholder teams are not in a posi-
tion to influence their respective domains through the launch of ma-
jor new actions. And there already exist several bodies through which
actors cooperate and form partnerships, coordinate their activities,
exchange experiences, and so forth, such as the Global Knowledge
Partnership (GKP), the Global Alliance for ICT and Development
(GAID), and indeed the intergovernmental agencies themselves. How
can relatively small numbers of somewhat disparate multi-stakeholder
teams hope to bring some value-added to this field? What can they
offer that will make a difference?
The immediate outcomes of these meetings suggest that such
an impact may be possible, but only in relatively few and quite spe-
cific areas, in which key organisations and entities already have a
considerable stake, in which niche needs are not currently being ad-
dressed, and in which genuine collaborations can be nurtured with
clear goals and outcomes.
Such actions might be found under action lines 3, 7 and 8, and
probably less so under action lines 9 and 10. However, any positive
outcomes will depend largely on how actively and creatively the
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3multi-stakeholder teams approach the task, and the resources they
can mobilise.
The potential scale of outcomes, at least in these action lines,
emerging from a global process of several years’ duration that con-
sumed an enormous amount of time and funds, seems modest in the
extreme. Some in UNESCO believe that much of the WSIS’ impact
may be generated by less explicit and visible means, through the ex-
tensive networking that took place and will be reinforced on the ground,
regionally, nationally and even locally. However, it is difficult to pro-
duce evidence of this, especially given that there are already so many
other networking activities. Evidence is also scarce, at a higher level,
of a development impact of the WSIS through integration into the
wider development context, since the participation of core develop-
ment actors – such as the relevant government ministries, key donor
organisations and NGOs – in the overall WSIS preparatory process,
Summits and follow-up was, and remains, limited.
Other activities relating to the WSIS
UNESCO is a member of the UN Group on the Information Society
(UNGIS) established by the UN secretary-general. It is set up as a
mechanism to coordinate interagency implementation and to link the
WSIS to other development modalities such as the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. Its first meeting was held in Geneva on 14 July 2006,
chaired by the ITU secretary-general. UNESCO is one of three vice-
chairs, and will take the chair from July 2007, followed by the UNDP.10
UNESCO also participates in the work of the Internet Govern-
ance Forum, advocating an open, transparent and inclusive approach
to the issue. Specific topics of interest include ethical dimensions,
multilingualism on the internet and capacity building.
Finally, UNESCO continues with its work with the Partnership for
the Measuring of ICT for Development, focusing on indicators relat-
ing to its core concerns.
Other ICT-related activities
UNESCO has attempted, in the latter years of its 2001-2007 Medium-
Term Strategy and in the entirety of its forthcoming Strategy, to bring
its ICT-related activities within the general outcomes of the WSIS.
However, several major programmes began before the first Summit,
and are continuing thereafter. Recent developments in the most im-
portant of these are considered here.
Both the Information for All Programme (IFAP) and the Interna-
tional Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) have
recently been through evaluation processes. The former is not yet
completed but the outcome may bring it closer to the WSIS imple-
mentation activities.
IFAP at present faces a number of challenges, among them that it
has very limited ongoing funding, its focus is not altogether clear, and
there are questions concerning the strategic value of funding modest
and relatively isolated projects. The evaluation, to be completed in early
2007, considers whether the focus should be placed more firmly on
policy-related actions, marking a clear distinction from IPDC’s strong
project focus.
The structure of IFAP as a UN commission offers some possi-
bilities, since it has a mandate to form national committees. The IFAP
Bureau secretary also holds the post of Information Society director
within CI; and the IFAP Council advises UNESCO on information soci-
ety issues. Thus one option under consideration is to reposition IFAP
as the coordinating vehicle for implementing UNESCO’s role in the
WSIS. The national committees could play a key role in convening
national actors and multi-stakeholder teams under the action lines,
while at the institutional level, the Bureau could play a horizontal co-
ordinating role while bringing together government and international
non-governmental actors.
Indeed, its mandate lends itself so well to a coordinating role in
the information society that some see the failure to propose IFAP as
the follow-up mechanism for WSIS, a role that was given to the Com-
mission on Science and Technology for Development, as an opportu-
nity lost.
In the case of IPDC, reforms initiated in 2002 included a higher
priority for projects promoting press freedom and media pluralism,
community media, professional capacity and partnerships; the IPDC
Council will now meet bi-annually instead of annually; the Bureau fully
takes over selecting and financing projects; and field office advisers
will assume greater responsibilities. The evaluators (Ronning and
Orgeret, 2006, p. 8) concluded that “significant and impressive changes
have taken place within IPDC since the [earlier] 2002 evaluation.”
The Community Multimedia Centre (CMC) programme, a major
programme of UNESCO’s Communication and Information Sector (CI),
has also recently been evaluated. Launched five years ago, it is moving
towards a second phase with a scale-up in some countries, and
mainstreamed support. Generally, the evaluation is positive: “The CMCs
are accepted by and fully integrated into the communities and can in
many cases be sustained beyond the pilot phase without core operat-
ing grants... Longer term benefits are already being realised within in-
dividual communities, such as the gradual removal of barriers to social
inclusion, the stimulation of poverty alleviation through access to knowl-
edge of better health, resource management and agriculture practices,
through the establishment of listeners clubs as self help groups... and
the creation of new livelihoods opportunities” (UNESCO, 2006b).
Shortcomings were identified, among them: Strong and consist-
ent field support from UNESCO regional offices for the initiative, with
one exception, is missing; efforts to achieve financial sustainability
may be forcing CMC managers to target services at those who can
pay, limiting access for the poor; there is a heavy reliance on volun-
teers; and the strategic timeframe for the initiative is unclear, as are
benchmarks to assess the value of the initiative to UNESCO itself.
Perhaps relating to this last, some within UNESCO appear to
question whether it is appropriate to be involved in scale-up (a foot-
note in the evaluation report notes that the sector denies this), and
there is some confusion as to long-term objectives for the CMCs.
This latter is interesting, and possibly arises from the unique nature
10 For more information see: <www.itu.int/council/wsis/wsis_WG.html> and
<www.ungis.org>.
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54 of this programme and the considerable resources that it consumes.
The report recommends the devolution of scale-up to the regional
offices, and more support there, and that the head office should pro-
vide tools, training, exchanges and a global focus, and accelerate ef-
forts with member states to create an enabling policy environment.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that UNESCO still faces a consid-
erable task in coming years to persuade many more member states,
against opposition from the US, to ratify the Convention on Cultural
Diversity. In December 2006 a total of 35 had ratified it, lifting the
number above the minimum requirement of 30, thus making it enter
into force in March 2007. The international campaign led by a group
of member countries and NGOs to obtain additional ratifications is
continuing, however, since the legitimacy and applicability of the Con-
vention will be proportional to the number of states that ratify, accept,
approve or adhere to it.
Stakeholder participation
At the institutional level, UNESCO has a strong commitment to gen-
der equality, in particular through the Section for Women and Gender
Equality and the actions to support mainstreaming across all UNESCO
programmes. Similarly, there is significant institutional support for
civil society participation within UNESCO, among the strongest and
most elaborate of the UN agencies, and it is legally underpinned by its
Constitution. Yet participation in these formal structures by Southern
NGOs and civil society organisations appears to be weak, accounting
for around 15% of the total. The actual level of Southern influence will
to some extent depend on whether the international associations and
NGOs, mostly based in OECD countries, have strong Southern mem-
bership and reflect their concerns through their UNESCO interactions.
No information is available on this matter.
Support for wider developing country participation in UNESCO
derives not from any specific legal or institutional form, but rather
permeates throughout the organisation’s strategy and programmes.
Ultimately, Southern participation is safeguarded by its democratic
membership and voting structures.
In the WSIS, UNESCO attempted, with some success, to open
its activities to and support the efforts of civil society participation
beyond its own NGO associates. UNESCO offered some limited direct
support for participation to civil society from the South (though in the
absence of figures it is not possible to assess whether this increased
the proportion of Southern participants beyond the 15% in formal
UNESCO NGO structures). While it was useful and did make a differ-
ence, UNESCO itself would agree that it was insufficient to redress
the balance. UNESCO also ran several of its WSIS events in the South,
including global events, in an effort to raise participation there and to
ensure a greater focus on these issues.
Overall, UNESCO was amongst the strongest supporters of civil
society in the WSIS process. Especially during the early stages,
UNESCO invested significantly in events and processes designed to
build civil society capacity, establish linkages and support effective
intervention within the WSIS. Later they followed through by ensur-
ing that their events were open to all stakeholders. They went to some
trouble to ensure that civil society organisations beyond NGOs ac-
credited to UNESCO were informed, welcomed and could participate.
In the WSIS follow-up, in accordance with paragraphs 108 to
109 of the Tunis Agenda, all meetings were open to all stakeholders,
and registration was provided online. There are, however, those who
believe UNESCO has begun the follow-up process with a somewhat
dirigiste tone, including several complaints from civil society partici-
pants that key decisions at the initial multi-stakeholder meetings, such
as the division into sub-themes, were announced at the start of the
meeting and only subsequently discussed.
Unfortunately, UNESCO does not compile systematic data on the
gender and national breakdown of participants in the various events
and other activities, or whether they belong to civil society organisa-
tions. A quantitative analysis of these issues was thus not possible.
Conclusions and recommendations
UNESCO is by Constitution and orientation well-disposed towards
communication and information issues, taking a broader view than
some others who have espoused the idea of an information society.
Since its experience of the 1980s with the NWICO it has adopted a
pragmatic, sometimes restrictive, view of the breadth of its remit in
relation to the free flow of information, generally steering clear of
antagonising Western and corporate interests. This is a pity since
many of the key concerns in that debate, such as concentration of
media ownership into a handful of Northern corporations, are of even
greater concern now than they were then. UNESCO remains the most
appropriate UN forum in which to debate the implications of this and
other trends. Nevertheless, UNESCO can be responsive to its majority
membership of Southern governments, and in certain core areas such
as cultural diversity, it pursues a relatively strong line.
UNESCO’s key legal instruments – declarations, conventions and
recommendations – rely strongly on their moral authority, having lim-
ited legal efficacy, but can be effective in bringing together protago-
nists and antagonists and developing areas of mutual understanding.
UNESCO came well prepared for the WSIS, having flirted a few
years earlier with the idea of its own intergovernmental event on in-
formation and communication for development. It engaged very early
on with the ITU and the WSIS process, enhancing the participation of
civil society, including to some extent those from the South, in the
overall process.
Its decision to focus on the theme “Towards Knowledge Socie-
ties” contributed to a broadening of the debate within the overall WSIS
process, which significantly enriched opportunities for interaction
among those involved on these issues, issues that would otherwise
have been marginalised.
Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, UNESCO’s impact on the
eventual WSIS outcome in substantive terms was limited, due largely
to limitations within the overall WSIS process itself. Some issues that
it promoted, such as universal access to information and quality edu-
cation, gained a relatively high profile, though less so in the case of
cultural diversity and certainly freedom of expression. Yet relatively
narrow government participation, confined mainly to technical and
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5infrastructure ministries, in combination with other factors finally
meant that even those issues with a high profile made little substan-
tive progress.
UNESCO has continued its commitment by taking responsibility
for a major role in the WSIS follow-up process. Yet for the reasons
mentioned above, significant outcomes are likely, at most, only in
some carefully targeted areas. The multi-stakeholder teams have a
hill to climb in terms of establishing their credibility with existing ac-
tors in their respective areas, and in identifying those areas in which
an impact is possible.
Having said this, the likelihood of success in narrow but signifi-
cant areas is reinforced by the successful progress of internal strategic
reorientation achieved by UNESCO as a result of the WSIS process. 
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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
WEBSITE: www.undp.org
HEADQUARTERS: New York, United States of America
FOUNDED: 1965
UN STATUS: UN programme reporting to the UN General Assembly
Seán Ó Siochrú
Introduction
Objectives and main activities
The UNDP1  describes itself as “the UN’s global development network,
an organisation advocating for change and connecting countries to
knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life.”
With a staff of almost 5,000, it has national offices in 166 countries.
The UNDP has dual role at the national level. On the one hand,
within the context of its mandate, it provides expert advice, training,
and grant support to developing countries to help achieve a range of
national and international goals, such as most notably the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).2  In this context, it is often regarded as
the largest single source of development funding and government
technical assistance within the UN system. On the other hand, it sup-
ports the coordination of UN activities at the national level through
the Resident Coordinator system, which it manages, working closely
with the government, agencies and other development partners.
The UNDP’s specific focus areas (also referred to as practices or
key results in various documents) are worked out in line with chang-
ing conditions and demands for programme support from countries.
They are then presented to the UNDP Executive Board for endorse-
ment in the context of three-year programme frameworks. First es-
tablished in 1999, the framework has since been referred to as the
Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYFF). In the context of the current
MYFF (2004-2007) the following are core goals:3
• Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty
• Fostering democratic governance
• Managing energy and environment for sustainable development
• Supporting crisis prevention and recovery
• Responding to HIV/AIDS.
How it can best respond to these focus areas may be refined in
the context of its new programme framework for 2008 to 2011, cur-
rently under development. In any case, within the context of the prior-
ity areas, the UNDP supports projects and programmes at all levels
(global, regional and national), in collaboration with numerous part-
ners, providing advice, building capacity, and co-funding or funding
innovative activities. Its annual Human Development Report is widely
used and considered authoritative.
Legal/constitutional composition
The UNDP was established in 1965 by the United Nations General
Assembly, and became operational in January 1966. In resolution
2029 (XX) of 22 November 1965, the General Assembly decided “to
combine the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the
Special Fund in a programme to be known as the United Nations
Development Programme” (UN General Assembly, 1965). Through
decision 94/14, the Executive Board of the UNDP decided that “the
overall mission of UNDP should be to assist programme countries
in their endeavour to realise sustainable human development, in line
with their national development programmes and priorities…” In
this context, through decision 95/22, the Board urged the UNDP to
concentrate on areas where it had a demonstrable comparative ad-
vantage – in particular, on capacity-building in the most needy re-
gions and countries, such as the least-developed countries and Af-
rica – to help them develop national capacity to achieve sustainable
human development, and giving overriding priority to eradicating
poverty and building equity.
Key members/participants and decision-making structures
The UNDP Executive Board, reporting to the UN General Assembly,
comprises representatives from 36 countries around the world serv-
ing on a rotating basis. Through its Bureau, which is elected from the
Executive Board and rotates annually among the five regional groups,
the Board oversees and supports the activities of the UNDP.4  The
Executive Board is led by an administrator appointed by the Board,
currently Mr. Kemal Dervis.
Relations with other international
institutions and the multilateral system
The UNDP’s formal relations with and participation in the multilateral
system are defined through the UN General Assembly. The UNDP co-
operates extensively with other international institutions at the na-
tional, regional and international levels.
At the country level, through the Resident Coordinator system, it
also serves to facilitate UN coordination.51 <www.undp.org>.
2 <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
3 To date these have also been the basis for the organisation of areas of work referred to
as practices. In turn each practice contains service lines, which are sub-areas of work.
Thirty distinct service lines were defined for the 2004-2007 MYFF, two of them focusing
on ICT for development: Making ICT Work for the Poor (SL 1.8) and E-governance and
Access to Information (SL 2.5). Country offices refer to the practices and service lines
to frame programmes and to report on results. In the context of its new programming
framework, currently under development and referred to as its Strategic Plan (2008-
2011), the focus will be on key results and outcomes rather than service lines.
4 See: <www.undp.org/execbrd/>.
5 For recent recommendations on strengthening this role to be considered by the
General Assembly, see Delivering as One, the report of the Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development,
Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment. Available from: <www.un.org/
events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf>.
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7Commitment to development
The UNDP is dedicated to development. As noted above, UNDP Ex-
ecutive Board decision 94/14 established that the overall mission of
the agency should be that of assisting countries in their efforts to
achieve sustainable human development. Other vital objectives for
the UNDP include the advancement of women, the regeneration of
the environment and the creation of sustainable livelihoods. Its mis-
sion statement, which outlines these objectives further, was endorsed
by the UNDP Executive Board through decision 96/29.6
Commitment to gender equality
Gender equality is a crosscutting theme in the UNDP, following a three-
pronged approach that aims to:
• Develop capacity, both in-country and in-house, to integrate gen-
der concerns across UNDP practice areas
• Provide policy advice that is both pro-poor and pro-women
• Support stand-alone operational interventions for gender equal-
ity in collaboration with the United Nations Development Fund
for Women (UNIFEM).
In the UNDP headquarters a Gender Programme Team is charged
with mainstreaming gender across UNDP areas. A Gender Thematic
Trust Fund (GTTF) was set up to support programme countries in
their efforts to mainstream gender throughout all of their programme
work. It is intended to enable institutional and cultural transformation
processes, including:
• Eliminating gender biases in development frameworks and para-
digms
• Incorporating gender awareness into policies, programmes and
institutional reforms
• Involving men to end gender inequality
• Developing gender-sensitive tools to monitor progress and en-
sure accountability.
The UNDP has also established a gender knowledge network which
currently has about 440 members. Its overall approach and activities
are summed up in the UNDP Practice Note on Gender Equality of 2002.
UNIFEM is an administered fund of the UNDP. Set up in 1976 by
the UN General Assembly, following the UN First World Conference
on Women in 1975, it has fifteen regional offices around the world.
According to its website it “provides financial and technical assist-
ance to innovative programmes and strategies to foster women’s em-
powerment and gender equality.” UNIFEM’s efforts are centred on the
advancement of women’s human rights, and it focuses its activities
on four strategic areas: (1) reducing feminised poverty, (2) ending
violence against women, (3) reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among
women and girls, and (4) achieving gender equality in democratic
governance in times of peace as well as war.7
In addition, the UNDP is strongly committed to enhancing gen-
der balance in the implementation of its human resource policies
(UNDP, 2005).
Southern actors and civil society participation
The UNDP’s relation to civil society encompasses various dimensions
and is operative at the global, national and sub-national levels. It also
maintains a CSO (Civil Society Organisation) Division, part of the Bu-
reau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships, responsible for
strengthening UNDP policy and methods for CSO collaboration at every
level, including advising and supporting the UNDP country offices.
According to its website:
UNDP, as the UN global development network, engages with civil
society organisations (CSOs) at all levels to promote the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) and support people in their
efforts to build a better life. Substantive partnership with CSOs
is of greater strategic importance than ever given the integral
role of civil society actors in development. There is growing rec-
ognition that engagement with CSOs is critical to national own-
ership, accountability, good governance, decentralisation, democ-
ratisation of development cooperation, and the quality and rel-
evance of official development programmes.8
A CSO Advisory Committee comprising fourteen CSO leaders
offers an opportunity for debate, feedback and cooperation, including
structured dialogues between the Committee and the Executive Board.
CSOs can access certain UNDP funding mechanisms, including the
Thematic Trust Funds, the Partnership Facility, and a Small Grants
Programme. They can also participate in a number of UNDP special
programmes such as Capacity 2015 (a follow-up to Capacity 21) and
the Africa 2000 Plus Network.
In practice, the UNDP at the national level strongly encourages
governments – including reluctant governments – to build broad-based
national ownership and to include the participation of civil society in
its programmes. It promotes multi-stakeholder dialogue on key policy
and development objectives such as the MDGs, an approach also evi-
dent in global and regional level programmes.
Regarding Southern actors, the UNDP’s regionalised manage-
ment structure and rotation ensure ongoing participation of Southern
countries at the global level. Almost all country offices are located in
Southern countries, and the great majority of funding is spent there.
Although the UNDP headquarters is in New York, 85% of UNDP staff
work in Southern countries.
Further, in 1974, UN General Assembly resolution 3251 (XXIX)
created a Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing
Countries (SU/TCDC) within the UNDP (UN General Assembly, 1974).6 The UNDP’s mission statement includes numerous and significant references to
development. See: <72.14.209.104/
search?q=cache:32Xzh_3FVdUJ:www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/
9628205e.pdf+decision+96/29+the+Executive+Board+of+The UNDP/
UNFPA&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3>.
7 <www.unifem.org/about>.
8 See: <www.undp.org/partners/cso>.
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58 The focus of current activities is on “regional and interregional initia-
tives aimed at engaging a large number of countries to work together
to formulate policies, share information, agree on priorities and trans-
late ideas into programmes.” The strategic aim of the Special Unit is
“to make developing countries effective partners with all other actors
in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and targets set by
the G-77 Havana Programme of Action, such as halving the incidence
of extreme poverty by 2015.”9
Role and responsibilities in ICTs
The UNDP’s foundation in 1965 does not refer specifically to a remit
in the area of information and communication technology (ICT). How-
ever, given its broad development focus, and the role that ICT can
play in enhancing development processes and outcomes, activity was
inevitably going to emerge in this area. Paragraph 70 of the second
Multi-Year Funding Framework, covering the years 2004 to 2007, spe-
cifically states: “Appropriate technology is an essential ingredient in
positioning UNDP as a truly knowledge-driven organisation. To this
end, the ICT strategy will focus on establishing an adequate platform
to facilitate the use of online collaborative tools, content and docu-
ment management, and the sharing of experiences and best prac-
tices” (UNDP/UNFPA, 2003).
The UNDP’s organisational approach to supporting ICT for de-
velopment (ICTD) has evolved over time. A number of ICTD pro-
grammes at the global, national and regional levels date back to the
early 1990s.
Early ICT Activities
The Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP),
launched from the 1992 Rio Summit as a support measure for Agenda
21, was the first major global effort, although even before that, early
forays into ICTs included the Alternex project, developed with UNDP
support by IBASE in the late 1980s and Brazil’s first and only inde-
pendent internet service provider (ISP) until 1994.
The SDNP could be viewed as the first systematic global ICTD
programme backed by a coherent rationale, and for some time was a
strong advocate of what later became known as ICTD within the UNDP.
The SDNP aimed to facilitate access to information for development
stakeholders and to encourage greater participation by all develop-
ment actors. Run by a small team from UNDP headquarters but with
the support of country offices, it collaborated with a range of actors
to create SDNP programmes in 44 countries. Its core funding was
about USD 9 million, disbursed between 1992 and 2002, but it
leveraged considerably more for national SDNP activities, certainly
over twice that figure. While not all programmes were successful,
many helped to influence ICTD policies through the SDNP’s multi-
stakeholder steering committees and through the capacity that it helped
to strengthen in what was then an emerging area. Further, quite a few
national SDNPs became their country’s first ISPs, even achieving
market dominance for some years, and many continue successfully
today. Networking local communities and stakeholders and facilitat-
ing internet access were usually a priority, with most resources de-
voted to knowledge generation and distribution, capacity building, train-
ing and the provision of a range of ICT-based services. Overall, the
programmes were pioneering in terms of applying ICTs to issues of
development and sustainability, and significantly influenced subsequent
UNDP regional activities such as the Internet Initiative for Africa (IIA)
and the Asia Pacific Development Internet Programme (APDIP).
During the 1990s, the UNDP began to support individual projects
and initiatives based on ICTs or with a significant ICT component at
the country level, building up a considerable portfolio over the years.
In addition to dedicated ICTD programme/project managers/focal
points for some of the larger country programmes, the UNDP coun-
try offices were also assisted by ICTD policy advisors based in the
UNDP’s Sub-Regional Resource Facilities (SURFs) or Regional Serv-
ice Centres where its regional programmes are housed and/or by policy
advisors at the global level (housed in the Poverty Reduction and
Democratic Governance groups in the Bureau for Development Policy).
At present these key regional ICTD programmes comprise:
• ICT for Development in the Arab Region (ICTDAR)10
• Asia-Pacific Development Information Programme (APDIP)11
• ICTD component of a larger democratic governance programme
for Europe and CIS12
• E-governance and support to ICT for the MDGs, Regional Serv-
ice Centre in Dakar, Senegal.13
Between 2000 and 2003, the UNDP had a dedicated ICTD “special
initiative” – essentially a new focus area or practice – within its Bureau
for Development Policy (BDP) to support country offices in the devel-
opment of national e-strategies and interventions and to identify emerg-
ing strategic areas for effective deployment of ICT for development.14
BDP/ICTD staff was based in New York, with out-posted policy advi-
sors in most regions (Latin America, Africa, Europe and CIS and the
Arab States). This initiative is discussed in further detail below.
In late 2003, in the context of developing a new MYFF for 2004-
2007 and with a view to ensuring a closer integration of ICTD with its
main areas of work, the UNDP realigned its approach to focus par-
ticularly on the deployment of ICT for poverty reduction (Service Line
1.8: Making ICT Work for the Poor) and the promotion of democratic
9 See: <tcdc.undp.org/faq.asp#SU/TCDC>.
10 www.sdnp.undp.org/it4dev/docs/yp/regional_ictdar.html
11 APDIP seeks to assist national and regional institutions in Asia-Pacific to improve
access, knowledge-sharing, networking and management, and the application of
ICTs for social and economic development. APDIP also helps to target and focus
regional ICT initiatives to achieve relevant development goals by making ICT an
integral part of development cooperation and solutions, so that developing
countries and their partners in the Asia-Pacific region can work to address
economic, social and digital divides in more innovative and effective ways. See:
<www.apdip.net>.
12 <europeandcis.undp.org/?menu=p_practice&FocusAreaId=14>.
13 <www.undp.org/surf-wa/ICTPOVMDGs/index.htm>.
14 See: <sdnhq.undp.org/it4dev/docs/about_undp.html>.
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9governance (Service Line 2.5: E-governance and Access to Informa-
tion) (UNDP/UNFPA, 2003). In the case of the MYFF or strategic plan
for 2008-2011, there appears to be a shift away from specific service
lines more generally towards key results and outcomes. In this con-
text, ICTD will more likely be visible as a mechanism to achieve se-
lected development outcomes.
Issues regarding the evolution of ICTD within the UNDP
The UNDP’s experience in ICTD highlights some key challenges and
opportunities facing international development organisations lacking
an a priori focus on ICTD: i.e. whether to maintain a separate unit or to
mainstream ICTD expertise and programming across its existing areas.
With the arrival in 1999 of a new UNDP administrator, Mark Malloch
Brown, “moving upstream” became the motto, meaning that the UNDP
would seek to focus more on providing assistance to develop strategy,
policies and institutions at national level with a view to scaling up activi-
ties, and would focus less on direct support to individual programmes
and projects. In relation to ICTD, this meant that support moved to-
wards “helping to achieve a policy environment that encourages do-
mestic and international provision of information technology and other
services and away from the actual delivery of those services, which is
what we are currently doing” (Brown, n.d., p. 7).
Project level activity continued, but “the greatest impact of UNDP
on poverty eradication is upstream, at the level of policies and institu-
tions, rather than in the stand-alone projects, which are often rela-
tively expensive and reach only a limited number of beneficiaries.”
The implications of this approach were “a much greater emphasis on
partnerships, and the adoption of a catalytic, brokering role” (Brown,
n.d., p. 8).
In 2000, during the period of the first MYFF for 2000-2003, ICTD
was supported, as mentioned above, by the launch of a dedicated
ICTD initiative which in effect created a sixth global focus area (UNDP/
UNFPA, 1999). In line with the other practices, in October 2001, a
Thematic ICTD Trust Fund – an instrument to provide catalytic fund-
ing, support innovation, and attract donor money – was launched
with an initial commitment of USD 5 million from the Government of
Japan. This was later topped up with a further USD 2 million from the
Government of Japan and contributions from other selected donors,
most recently the Government of Spain.
At the time, the UNDP was not just moving ICTD up to policy
level; it was promoting a new approach to policy. The UNDP argued
the need to go beyond conceiving of ICTs as a specific sectoral issue,
a position that had characterised the major global thrust during the
1990s to liberalise telecoms markets and open developing countries
to foreign ownership. Now the UNDP was seeking to draw a clear
distinction between ICT policy geared towards creating an advanced
ICT sector and services, and an ICTD policy aiming to maximise the
positive overall impact of ICTs on development.
This shift from ICT as sector to ICT as horizontal development
enabler was strategically outlined in the Digital Opportunity Initiative
(DOI), developed by the UNDP in collaboration with Accenture and
the Markle Foundation. Launched in July 2001 with the publication of
the report Creating a Development Dynamic, it offered a coherent ge-
neric approach at country level to designing and implementing an ICT
strategy aimed specifically at contributing to development and to so-
cial as well as economic goals. It underlined the need to involve the
“full range of stakeholders in international development – govern-
ments, both industrialised and developing, the business and non-profit
sectors, multilateral agencies, and community organisations on the
ground” (DOI, 2001). Based on the analytical framework and lessons
culled from research and specific case studies of national e-strate-
gies, the report also explored the potential for offering catalytic sup-
port in selected countries such as South Africa, Romania, Mozambique
and Bolivia through the initiative. In addition, the DOI framework also
formed the corporate framework for the UNDP’s own support to coun-
tries in developing their national strategies and programmes.
This belief in partnerships and in stakeholder participation was
reflected in subsequent initiatives in which the UNDP is involved at
the global level. The Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force), whose
secretariat was co-hosted by the World Bank and the UNDP, was cre-
ated at the G8 meeting in July 2000 in Okinawa.15  It was one of the
first multi-stakeholder global ICT task forces, bringing together gov-
ernment, industry and civil society from G8 countries, and govern-
ment representatives from selected developing countries, to design
an action plan, delivered in June 2002, to expand the use of ICT and
universalise its benefits.
The UN ICT Task Force was launched by the UN secretary-gen-
eral in November 2001, with the UNDP playing a key role in its found-
ing. With broad representation, it was a “cooperative effort to identify
ways in which the digital revolution can benefit all the world’s people”
(UNDP, 2004a). This eventually evolved into the Global Alliance for
ICT for Development (GAID).
Other international collaborations were undertaken with a more
programmatic focus and modest UNDP input. With CISCO Systems
and United Nations Volunteers, for example, a partnership was formed
to set up training academies for internet skills in least-developed coun-
tries. The UNDP was also a partner in NetAid, and with a cash grant
from the Coca Cola Foundation also supports e-learning activities in
Malaysia (2000) and Bolivia (2002).
The UNDP has been an active member of the Global Knowledge
Partnership (GKP), participating in its major events and networking ac-
tivities, and has been involved in establishing partnership initiatives with
civil society and the private sector at the regional and national levels as
well. More recent regional public-private collaborations include the joint
research initiative undertaken by UNDP-APDIP, the International Open
Source Network (IOSN), IBM and Oracle to help Asia-Pacific countries
share and create strategies, blueprints and policies for adopting the right
blend of open standards and technology services.
15 The G8 Summit in Okinawa agreed the Okinawa Charter on Global Information
Society, in which the leaders agreed to establish the DOT Force. It was actually
formed and first met in November 2000. Its key strategy document was Digital
Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge, presented and approved at the G8
meeting in Genoa in July 2001. See: <www.dotforce.org>.
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60 The designation of ICTD as a UNDP focus or practice area from
2000 until 2003 helped raise the profile of ICTD, and awareness of its
development potential was strengthened at the national level. The years
following 2000 saw a significant increase in UNDP projects supported
at the national level. However, the timing of the stronger move into
ICTD proved, in one respect, to be unfortunate: the “dotcom” bubble
had just burst and the telecommunications crash was impending.
These events strengthened a perception in some quarters that the
development potential of ICT had been over-emphasised, which tended
to weaken the potential of the ICTD practice area just as it had begun
to assist a number of countries in laying the foundations for more
development-oriented ICT policies. At the same time, they negatively
affected the capacity to attract funding for ICTD programmes in a
variety of institutions – including the UNDP Thematic ICTD Trust Fund
– as both the private sector and governments decided to cut back on
investment in the area.
As indicated earlier, in late 2003, in the context of the develop-
ment of the new MYFF for 2004-2007, a decision was taken to main-
stream ICTs back into the other focus areas, specifically poverty re-
duction and democratic governance. This in itself was not a bad thing
– indeed it could be seen as a natural progression – since ICTD itself
is a cross-cutting issue, and such mainstreaming allows a closer en-
gagement with and integration within governance and poverty poli-
cies and programmes, two key areas in which ICT can have a signifi-
cant development impact. In the short term, however, the shift had a
negative impact and the number of UNDP country offices reporting
ICTD activities fell significantly. Furthermore, it resulted in a reduc-
tion of the resources available to ICTD at the headquarters level.
WSIS-related activities
UNDP involvement in the first phase of the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS)16  was relatively modest coming as it did
in the wake of organisational changes in ICTD practice at the global
level. The goal of the UNDP’s initial support was to enhance the focus
on inclusiveness and strengthen the development focus in the Sum-
mit. It participated in informal planning meetings convened by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and organised
roundtables, Institute@WSIS peer-to-peer training sessions, and pub-
lications. It offered fellowships for developing country participation,
and some support to strengthen civil society participation and inputs
to the Summit. It also provided support at the national level for multi-
stakeholder processes and at regional meetings. At the Summit itself,
the UNDP supported or co-organised a number of events around the
MDGs, knowledge for development, the “digital divide”, and national
ICT strategy development.
However, its first major role came with the creation of a Task Force
on Financing Mechanisms (TFFM). The Geneva Summit in December
2003 recommended the creation of the task force to the UN secretary-
general, following disagreement on the issue of the setting up a Digital
Solidarity Fund to finance the bridging of the “digital divide”.
At the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the TFFM was coordi-
nated by the UNDP, in cooperation with the World Bank and OECD. It
completed its work in December 2004 with the publication of a report
entitled Financing ICTD: A review of trends and an analysis of gaps
and promising practices (ITU, 2004).
Much was at stake for developing countries, which had always
looked towards the WSIS as an opportunity to come up with ways to
address the huge gaps in ICT availability and accessibility. The report
itself was a disappointment to many, its analysis on the whole empha-
sising the role of market-driven private investment in ICT infrastructure
with insufficient consideration of its limitations. Inadequacies in vari-
ous existing financing mechanisms and gaps in financing were noted
and revisions suggested, yet no new financing mechanisms were seen
as being required or were suggested. The politically sensitive issue of
the Digital Solidarity Fund, set up and supported by a number of South-
ern countries and local governments of developed countries, was not
addressed, although its innovation in leveraging local-government-to-
local-government and peer-to-peer support was noted. The rationale
offered for its exclusion was based on a narrow interpretation of the
TFFM remit – i.e. that only existing mechanisms were to be included –
and was unsatisfactory to many (Ó Siochrú, 2005).
Having said this, the report is wide ranging, and in what might
be described as a “minority report within the report”, it provides broad
support to many innovative ideas such as the “open access” approach
to providing infrastructure, ICTs as a public good, and community-
driven ICT enterprises. Some of these have been taken up in subse-
quent UNDP activities in the post-WSIS space, especially in collabo-
ration with civil society actors and networks.
The TFFM was also criticised for the limited opportunities it gave
for participation, in terms of both the composition of the task force
and its modus operandi. Its selection process was conventional in an
environment in which innovation was expected or at least hoped for.
Members were selected without wide consultation, comprising two
civil society organisations (a number of other non-governmental and
Southern actors accepted but ultimately could not participate), four
intergovernmental agencies (the UNDP, ITU, OECD and World Bank)
and six governments.17 The two civil society/multi-stakeholder organi-
sations were selected for their strong networks and contributions made
on the financing question. While there was outreach and engagement
through online and actual consultations,18 on the whole its delibera-
tions were considered to be less than optimal.
The TFFM is sometimes compared unfavourably against the
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which took up the
other major issue to emerge from the Geneva Summit – internet gov-
ernance – and has been credited with pioneering a broad multi-
stakeholder process encompassing a broad interpretation of its re-
mit. Such comparisons may be legitimate, but there were some miti-
gating factors. The timescale for the TFFM was far more taxing than
16 <www.wsis-online.net>.
17 For the composition at the time of its launch see: <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
2004/pi1616.doc.htm>.
18 See: <www.itu.int/wsis/tffm>.
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1that of the WGIG. The instruction from the December 2003 Summit
was to complete the report for December 2004 in time to permit review
and discussion at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) from 17 to 25 February 2005, a relatively short time to form
the task force, undertake the research and deliver the report, and seven
months less than the time available to the WGIG.19  Furthermore, the
level of civil society organisation and understanding around internet
governance was considerably higher than that around financing mecha-
nisms, making it easier to integrate their participation.
In Phase 2 of the Summit, the UNDP again supported various
events and activities in partnership with the Global Knowledge Part-
nership (GKP) and the UN Industrial Development Organisation
(UNIDO) in the context of the Sharing the Future initiative and pavil-
ion.20  Support was also provided to civil society and developing coun-
try participants, in particular through the Sharing the Future initiative
led by UNDP-Tunis and UNIDO.
Description and analysis of ICT activities
WSIS action line facilitation
Under the Tunis Agenda adopted in December 2005 and the subse-
quent consultation in February 2006, the UNDP was designated as
the moderator for two key action lines from the WSIS Plan of Action,
namely C4: Capacity building, and C6: Enabling environment. (The
UNDP was also suggested for a secondary facilitating role in action
line C7: E-government and in action line C11: International and re-
gional cooperation, both facilitated by UNDESA, the UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs.) Although the UNDP had not actively
sought such a prominent role, it is likely that its selection was fa-
voured by some developing countries and actors given its develop-
ment focus, its operational presence on the ground in each country,
and its global networks. A concern at the UNDP was that, unlike
UNESCO and the ITU, it lacked (since 2003) a dedicated ICT unit at
the headquarters level capable of overseeing the global implementa-
tion of action lines. At the meeting confirming the action lines and
moderators/facilitators in February 2006, the UNDP representative
declared: “For our part, UNDP stands ready to assume the role of a
facilitator, but we would like to propose that we focus on a cluster of
activities for which we are best suited so that we can contribute effec-
tively to furthering action on selected priority themes within those
areas and not find ourselves spread too thin” (Sorgho-Moulinier, 2006).
The UNDP convened follow-up meetings of the two action-line
groups for which it was responsible on 11 May 2006, each for half a
day. They were among the first of the action-line group meetings,
with an open agenda.21  Attendance was reasonable at 45 to 60 people
given that these were the first of the action-line meetings to be held
over a two-week “information society week” (9-19 May 2006) organ-
ised in Geneva. Civil society groups actively participated, as did rep-
resentatives from the Geneva missions of other UN agencies (e.g.
ILO, ITU, UNCTAD, UNESCO), although private sector participation
was relatively low.
The question of what could be achieved through the action-line
groups was an issue for both the facilitators and stakeholders. There
were no new resources and no clear follow-up process to which these
could contribute. Prior to the action-line meetings, feedback on how
to use the space most effectively had been solicited through the WSIS-
implementation website. The caution expressed by the UNDP in Feb-
ruary was echoed in some of the inputs to the virtual consultation
process and to the outcome of the meetings themselves. Given the
lack of additional resources for facilitators to support follow-up ac-
tivities, and the diffuseness of the action line mandates and their coun-
try-based networks, the UNDP’s efforts are focused on exploring tar-
geted opportunities, working with the most active participants in or-
der to achieve the greatest impact.
Two possible strands of follow-up are under consideration:
Action line network and activities: Sustaining the action-line
teams, and working on common projects virtually and in real time
with partners, was identified as a possible way forward. While the ITU
has created a web platform for this, to date this strand of networked
activity has proved difficult to launch. The UNDP has expressed its
willingness to undertake this as a partnership activity, building link-
ages where feasible with communities of practice established under
the Global Alliance for ICT and Development (GAID) – for example, in
capacity building, with a community on public and private entrepre-
neurship led by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
and other partners – and with the development dimensions of Internet
Governance Forum activities.22
Selected project ideas and work at the country level: The UNDP
is proposing to identify selected themes from WSIS for mainstream-
ing into their existing work agenda in a partnership format, with ac-
tive participation from action-line teams, rather than establishing a
separate stand-alone WSIS activity. While these themes are being
selected, the UNDP is supporting some innovative approaches and
mechanisms identified in the TFFM report and in the first action-line
meetings, in particular:
• The production of policy briefs on open access policy and ca-
pacity dimensions of local ICT access and community-driven
network type approaches
• Support to advocacy at the national level by way of mainstream-
ing ICT into poverty reduction strategies.23
19 For the timing of the preparatory process see: <www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory2/
index.html>.
20 See: <www.globalknowledge.org/wsis2005/index.cfm?menuid=44&parentid=33>
and for region specific foci see: <europeandcis.undp.org/?wspc=practice-
14_h_19> and <www.apdip.net/news/apdipatwsis>.
21 For a complete list see: <www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/meetings.html>.
22 For UNDP-APDIP support to regional consultations and synthesising of key
development-related concerns relating to internet governance through the Open
Regional Dialogue on Internet Governance (ORDIG) initiative see: <igov.apdip.net>.
23 This is also in line with a priority area of focus for UNGIS, and through
partnership activity with key agencies, it could be linked to UN reform at the
national level.
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62 The UNDP is currently supporting project work in these areas,
targeted at specific countries and regions, working with civil society
organisations and other partners in developing countries.
The next round of action-line group meetings, to be held during
2007, is in the process of being scheduled, and members can interact on
the ITU Web Platform.24  The UNDP recognises that sustaining the inter-
est and enthusiasm of these action-line groups represents a challenge.
Separately, various parts of the UNDP have also been involved in
supporting WSIS follow-up and stakeholder engagement. For example:
• Its East and Central Europe governance programmes, its Arab
States programme (ICTDAR) and its Asia Pacific Development
Information Programme (APDIP) all have had activities focusing
on gender and ICT, often in partnership with other UN agencies
and civil society/foundations. APDIP, for instance, recently pub-
lished a collection of thirteen papers developed for a pre-WSIS
seminar, in partnership with UNIFEM and IT for Change.25
• APDIP has also been involved in supporting regional consulta-
tions, advocacy and partnerships around internet governance and
free and open source software (FOSS).
Other WSIS outcomes and activities
Impact of the WSIS within the UNDP
Given the absence of a separate ICT unit at UNDP headquarters, it
comes as little surprise that the impact of the WSIS on the internal
organisation and appreciation of ICTs in the UNDP, overall, is slight.
During much of the WSIS period, the position of ICTs within the
organisational structure in the UNDP was in flux, and with the arrival
of a new administrator in August 2005, UN reform processes, and the
development of a new four-year programming framework, the struc-
tures and modus operandi of UNDP support has been affected.
However, the WSIS has enabled those dedicated to ICTs within
the UNDP to identify priorities not previously on the agenda, as well
as new partners in civil society and in developing countries, and to
channel them into the internal process of mainstreaming the broader
organisational change underway. Issues around financing mechanisms
(e.g. assessing policy-supported finance for community-driven mod-
els for access and service delivery; deployment of ICT to enhance
access to financing mechanisms to address gaps), exploring options
on regional bandwidth development, and bottom-up approaches to
network development have emerged as follow-up to the TFFM report,
and are now a focus of selected UNDP activities. E-governance and
support to participatory processes, into which ICT is a mainstreamed
activity, are also being supported at the headquarters and regional
levels. Current UNDP efforts to relate ICT policy to the MDGs may
also be viewed as follow-up to both the Millennium Summit and WSIS
processes.
UN Group on the Information Society
The UNDP is active in the UN Group on the Information Society
(UNGIS),26  established in February 2006 by the UN secretary-general
to help mainstream WSIS outcomes into the relevant UN bodies and
organisations. The UNDP will chair UNGIS during 2008, following the
ITU in the first year and UNESCO in 2007. Other UNDP commitments
in this regard are:
• To strengthen the integration of ICT in policy/programme instru-
ments – such as the UN Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF) and poverty reduction strategies – and in country pro-
grammes, with a view to improving effectiveness and contribut-
ing to the MDGs.
• To commission work on how to support this integration process
(e.g. the role of ICT in poverty reduction strategies) and how
some of the challenges, such as the “paradigm gap” between
development decision-makers and ICT sector policy-makers, can
be addressed.
• To undertake high-level advocacy in the context of various glo-
bal development forums on the role that ICT can play in catalys-
ing economic investment, transparency and accountability, so-
cial inclusion and service delivery to more effectively deliver on
the MDGs – an objective stressed throughout the WSIS texts.
However, little progress has been recorded in these areas.
Stakeholder participation
As discussed earlier, the UNDP has established various mechanisms
and bodies at the institutional level to ensure due consideration to
gender issues (the Gender Programme Team, the Gender Thematic
Trust Fund, the gender knowledge network and UNIFEM); to South-
ern participation (its regionalised management structure and rota-
tion, its network of country offices employing 85% of its staff, and its
Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries);
and to civil society participation (its CSO Division and CSO Advisory
Committee, access to funding mechanisms, and national-level focus
on multi-stakeholder partnerships). Although it is beyond the scope
of this report to assess their ultimate effectiveness, few agencies can
boast such a wide-ranging, multi-level set of approaches and depth
of commitment.
In relation specifically to ICT, and since it does not comprise one
of the UNDP’s core areas of activity, the focus on participation com-
prises a set of operational activities facilitated ultimately by the over-
all framework above. Examples include the following:
• Multi-stakeholder engagement in national ICT policy development.
While national e-strategies and policies are viewed as a priority
in many countries, their participatory development and imple-
mentation are not. In a number of countries and regions, the
UNDP supports multi-stakeholder engagement and contribution
24 See sites for C4 and C6 indicated at <www.itu.int/wsis/implementation>.
25 See: <www.apdip.net/projects/gender>. 26 <www.ungis.org>.
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3to the development of national ICT policy. In a selected few, it is
also exploring support to civil society/multi-stakeholder-led ad-
vocacy efforts to promote pro-poor development options.
• Community-based actors in implementation. Under-served area
licenses and universal access funds do not typically allow com-
munity actors to access financing for implementation. Nor is
there much support for civil society/non-governmental organi-
sation (NGO) inclusion in implementation when it comes to
strategies focusing on roll-out of initiatives to increase access
and service delivery to under-served areas. With only a few
exceptions, roll-out policy and financing typically exclude or
make it difficult for local communities, CSOs and NGOs to be
part of the solution. The UNDP is supporting action-oriented
research and undertaking advocacy into such options and look-
ing to partnerships and working with governments to poten-
tially pilot such approaches.
• Global governance of the internet and ensuring that there is a
strong developing country and stakeholder voice. Some of the
consultative and research activity that UNDP-APDIP is involved
in can be viewed as contributing to this outcome.
• Gender mainstreaming in ICTs. The UNDP’s Regional Bureau for
Europe and the CIS has published, in collaboration with UNIFEM,
a report on Bridging the Gender Digital Divide as part of a larger
ICTD mainstreaming project (UNDP, 2004b).
The UNDP’s focus at the global level has been to bring regional
and national consultation processes to bear in those arenas in which
it is involved. Within the context of pro-poor ICT policy and imple-
mentation support, the goal is to involve civil society as key partners
in research and to support a focused inclusion in policy processes as
well as in implementation where possible.
Conclusions and recommendations
The UNDP is at a transitional moment in relation to ICT and how it is
organisationally integrated within the agency. The mainstreaming
of ICT within poverty eradication and democratic governance has
distinct advantages and, in principle, can help situate the UNDP in a
key position in relation to ICT for development in these critical ar-
eas. To be effective, mainstreaming takes time and dialogue, as well
as strategic support to ensure that country offices and partners re-
ceive appropriate signals and support for the transition. In prac-
tice, ICT for development has yet to receive the kind of strategic
level support and resources needed to realise the potential of main-
streaming, and this is a significant factor in relation to recent UNDP
performance.
Coming from the WSIS, the UNDP agreed to facilitate two major
action lines, was assigned a key role in the newly formed UNGIS, and
committed itself to following up and mainstreaming ICT into national
development strategies and policies.
Given the organisational mainstreaming of ICT and the paucity
of resources available centrally to date, the third area is where the
UNDP can probably have the greatest impact. In the context of ICT for
poverty reduction and democratic governance, UNDP activities are
framed less as a follow-up to WSIS per se – although its activities are
supportive of many WSIS action items – than as directly realising a
broader set of UN Summit goals, particularly the MDGs, and help-
ing countries and local communities to identify ways in which ICT
can be mainstreamed in response to national development impera-
tives and programme challenges. The focus is thus more on the
country level with the global engagement linked to that, rather than
on an autonomous global consensus-building activity.
The UNDP’s global level approach to action line facilitation, of
working with partners to develop some key products rather than build-
ing a broad network in the absence of resources to sustain such ac-
tivity, should be seen in this light. But it might require few resources,
in collaboration with the other partners, to improve the potential for
coordination across action lines and the participation, for instance, of
civil society actors who lack the resources to follow multiple proc-
esses. Improved coordination of the several online platforms, and
clustering all action-line group meetings around a single period and
venue – the idea of an “information society week” – are examples.
This requires some commitment and coordination from the key agen-
cies involved, including the ITU, UNESCO, the UNDP and UNDESA.
Looking beyond the WSIS, the relatively low level of broad-based
participation by the larger development community in the context of
ICT for development, globally but also at the national level, is a critical
concern. Advocacy and mechanisms for dialogue are needed to build
bridges and facilitate progressive enabling and foundational policy
foci regarding such issues as rights, privacy, service delivery, access
to information, and participation in democratic decision-making. This
may open an opportunity for the UNDP and other actors to identify
the post-WSIS spaces at the global, regional and national levels in
which these issues can be raised and debated, and to develop appro-
priate means by which the action lines can fit into these, especially as
multi-stakeholder mechanisms capable of incorporating civil society
participation and perspectives.
Notwithstanding the limitations to date of ICT resources at the
strategic headquarters level, the UNDP is well placed, even beyond
the ITU, to take up leading strategic and operational roles in relation
to encouraging ICTD integration within the larger development com-
munity, and in a manner that facilitates the widest participation. Its
core commitment to development, its resident coordination role at
national level, its unrivalled network of country offices, and its ap-
proach to encouraging broad participation all stand in its favour. Fur-
thermore, the resource issue may soon be eased as a result of recent
and significant member state commitments to the ICT Fund.
UNGIS offers a forum for this within the WSIS process. How-
ever, the UNDP could also play a part in bringing it to a higher level
within the UN system, beyond the WSIS itself.
An opportunity might arise in the context of the report of the
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coher-
ence, which was delivered in November 2006 (UN, 2006). The re-
port has yet to be debated by the UN General Assembly, but in-
cludes a call for enhanced coordination. Pilot countries have been
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27 The UNDP administrator indicated some awareness of the issues in a press
briefing the day after he took up office: “Of course, the other major revolution we
are all experiencing, a tremendous breakthrough in communications technology,
again opens a lot of doors to a much more effective global development. People
can be connected more easily, can market their products, and can access
information much more easily. So, if we are able to put all these things together,
we really might have a chance to really make poverty history, as this beautiful
sentence goes. So to be at the heart of this struggle with colleagues, of course,
from all over the world at this moment is terribly exciting.” UNDP. Press Briefing
with Kemal Dervis, 16 August 2005. Available from: <vis-20050816.en”
content.undp.org/go/newsroom/august-2005/press-briefing-dervis-
20050816.en>.
proposed to identify challenges and opportunities. As this process
advances, UNGIS in the context of the UN Chief Executives Board and
the UNDP, through the Resident Coordinator system at the national
level, could take on the task of exploring how to move this process
forward in the area of mainstreaming ICT for development.
Adopting such a strategic position for ICT for development would
demand significant resource and mainstreaming commitments from
the UNDP. The UNDP’s new programming framework is under devel-
opment. It would be useful to see a clear and renewed focus on ICT
for development.27  Without it, an opportunity would be lost. 
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World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
WEBSITE: www.wipo.int
HEADQUARTERS: Geneva, Switzerland
FOUNDED: 1967
UN STATUS: UN specialised agency since 1974
TYPE: Intergovernmental organisation (184 member states)
Robin Gross
Introduction
Objectives and main activities
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)1  is the United
Nations specialised agency that coordinates international treaties re-
garding intellectual property rights. Its 184 member states comprise
over 90% of the countries of the world, who participate in WIPO to
negotiate treaties and set policy on intellectual property matters such
as patents, copyrights and trademarks.
WIPO was established in 1967 by the WIPO Convention, which
states that WIPO’s objective was “to promote the protection of intel-
lectual property throughout the world…” (WIPO, 1967, Article 3).
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO currently administers
24 treaties and facilitates the negotiation of several proposed treaties
covering copyrights, patents and trademarks.
Although WIPO was originally established explicitly to promote
the protection of intellectual property, when it joined the UN family in
1974 its objective had to be redefined as a public-interest or humanitar-
ian goal. Article 1 of the key agreement establishing WIPO’s relation-
ship to the UN restates WIPO’s purpose as: “for promoting creative
intellectual activity and for facilitating the transfer of technology related
to industrial property to the developing countries in order to accelerate
economic, social and cultural development…” (WIPO, 1974).
The five strategic goals laid out by WIPO in its 2005-2006 pro-
gramme and budget are:
• To promote an extensive intellectual property culture
• To integrate intellectual property into national development poli-
cies and programmes
• To develop international intellectual property laws and standards
(partially defined as promoting laws forbidding the circumven-
tion of technological restrictions)
• To deliver quality services in global intellectual property protec-
tion systems
• To increase the efficiency of WIPO’s management and support
processes.
WIPO is unique among UN organisations in that its activities are
largely self-funded. Approximately 90% of WIPO’s 2006-2007 budget
of CHF 531 million (USD 440 million) comes from the fees its earns
for international trademark registrations and patent applications. The
remaining 10% of WIPO’s budget is earned from fees for its arbitra-
tion and mediation services, publications, and from small contribu-
tions from member states.
Key members/participants and decision-making structures
WIPO is made up of 184 member states and operates on a “one coun-
try, one vote” basis. It is governed by a General Assembly, which
convenes each autumn and oversees the activities of the organisa-
tion, including its budget, while a number of issue-specific commit-
tees work on the substantive issues. The revenues generated from
patent and trademark fees enable WIPO to support a staff of approxi-
mately 1,000 people, which is rather large by UN standards.
The agency operates through individual member states meeting
in committees, assemblies, and working groups, which are coordi-
nated by the WIPO Secretariat. Most member states appoint career
civil servants from their capitals to participate in meetings and nego-
tiations. WIPO committees work according to a consensus-based
decision-making structure, which generally means no action is taken
unless all member states agree.
In theory, WIPO’s strategic direction and activities are decided
by the member states, but in practice, the WIPO Secretariat, based in
Geneva, is given enormous power to influence and direct the work
and objectives of the organisation under the WIPO Convention.
Furthermore, on any particular issue, not only top WIPO staff but
also the chair of the relevant WIPO committee wield the power to drive
the organisation’s agenda through the framing of the debate in that
committee. The election of the chair is the first item on the agenda of
meetings. Member state delegates, including the chair, participate at
WIPO with the costs paid by the member state. Committee chairs de-
cide which proposals become text for a treaty and which proposals are
deleted from draft treaty texts; they decide how the proposals are framed,
and whether or not civil society may speak at WIPO meetings.
Civil society or non-governmental organisation (NGO) participa-
tion is allowed at WIPO through an accreditation process that takes
place once a year to obtain official “observer” status. Besides govern-
ments and civil society, WIPO also allows for intergovernmental or-
ganisation (IGO) participation in its meetings. While WIPO boasts that
over 250 NGOs and IGOs currently have official observer status at
WIPO, the vast majority of these NGOs are trade industry organisa-
tions from wealthy countries participating for the purpose of maxim-
ising private gain. Participation at the 2005-2006 WIPO Development
Agenda meetings is illustrative of this fact.
1 <www.wipo.int>.
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Relations with other international
institutions and the multilateral system
WTO-TRIPS
Although WIPO administers 24 treaties that deal with intellectual prop-
erty rights, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) administers what is
arguably the most important treaty on the subject, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agree-
ment). Unlike WIPO treaties, the TRIPS Agreement includes powerful
enforcement mechanisms such as trade sanctions and litigation be-
fore the World Court2  that force countries into compliance with the
provisions in the agreement.
The WTO’s TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1994, and states in
its preamble the desire to “establish a mutually supportive relation-
ship between the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organisa-
tion” (WTO, 1994). In 1996 the WTO and WIPO signed a cooperation
agreement to facilitate the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
The 1996 WTO-WIPO cooperation agreement provides for co-
operation in three main areas, specifically the notification of, access
to and translation of national intellectual property rights laws; imple-
mentation of procedures for the protection of national emblems; and
technical cooperation. Since the 1996 agreement, the WTO and WIPO
have launched two additional technical cooperation agreements in 1998
and 2001 to spur developing nations into conforming with the TRIPS
requirements in their national laws.
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
WIPO also maintains a close relationship with the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).3  In 1999 ICANN in-
stituted a regime for trademark dispute resolutions that was origi-
nally proposed by WIPO, the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Reso-
lution Policy (UDRP). Under the UDRP most ICANN-accredited ge-
neric top-level domain name (gTLD) registrars – and the country code
top-level domain name (ccTLD) registration authorities that have
adopted the policy4  – are contractually bound to submit to arbitration
through WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Centre. The UDRP allows
anyone to challenge the registration and ownership of domain names
based on the claim that the domain name infringes a trademark, and
the actual dispute resolution process is handled by independent serv-
ice providers accredited through the Centre (ICANN, 1999).
A WIPO press release in October 2006 announced that its Arbi-
tration and Mediation Centre, which accredits the dispute resolution
service providers, had decided its 25,000th case, ordering the trans-
fer of the domain name to the trademark owner.
Besides the UDRP, WIPO and ICANN have also implemented poli-
cies dealing with the introduction of new gTLDs that give trademark
holders special rights to preemptively register and challenge registra-
tions of new gTLDs. Under these so-called “sunrise” provisions, trade-
mark holders are given the right to pre-register their name before any-
one else can. Although trademark law does not grant trademark holders
Balance in the WIPO Development Agenda?
Hardly. Of the 193 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) eligible to attend WIPO’s Development Agenda summit, only 24 work
explicitly on improving conditions in developing countries. So when WIPO holds a meeting about intellectual property in the
developing world, the groups that actually work there will be outnumbered 7 to 1.
2 Formally known as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations’
highest court, based in The Hague.
3 <www.icann.org>.
4 More information is available from: <www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains>.
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7the special rights that ICANN’s policies for domain name registrations
give them, the policies were instituted at the suggestion of WIPO to
privilege trademark owners in cyberspace.
Another ICANN policy that was recommended by WIPO is the con-
troversial policy on ICANN’s WHOIS database and its publication of
private information on the internet. Under ICANN’s WHOIS policy, the
personal contact information – including home address and telephone
number – of everyone who has ever registered a domain name is put
into a free online database available to anyone for any reason. As a
result of ICANN’s policy (which originated from WIPO), the WHOIS da-
tabase is one of the largest sources of data for engaging in consumer
abuses such as identity theft, fraud, and other privacy violations.5
In 1998 WIPO issued a report in response to the creation of ICANN
insisting that publicly available databases for the complete and accu-
rate contact information of all domain name registrants should be made
available, regardless of privacy concerns. WIPO’s report proposed that
providing any inaccurate registration data should be grounds for for-
feiting the domain name, regardless of whether there has been any
violation of intellectual property rights or of any other kind.
Although ICANN’s Generic Names Supporting Organisation
(GNSO) Policy Council voted in April 2006 that the purpose of the
WHOIS database is narrow and only technical, large intellectual prop-
erty holders continue to argue that the database of personal informa-
tion must remain open to all in order to protect intellectual property
interests.
Commitment to development, equality and openness
As noted above, Article 1 of the 1974 agreement between WIPO and
the UN redefined WIPO’s mission as: “to accelerate economic, so-
cial and cultural development” in alignment with the UN’s humani-
tarian objectives (WIPO, 1974). But despite its obligation to the UN,
WIPO officials still point to the 1967 WIPO Convention to state
WIPO’s purpose as: “to promote the protection of intellectual prop-
erty” (WIPO, 1967).
In response to this attitude, a global civil society movement be-
gan coalescing in 2004 around the Geneva Declaration on the Future
of WIPO,6  which is aimed at reforming WIPO’s policies and practices
to address the needs of developing countries and the objective of
promoting access to knowledge. In addition, a number of member
states themselves have also risen to the call for change at WIPO by
working for the adoption of a “Development Agenda”. WIPO has re-
sponded by “circling the wagons” and obstructing the attempts for
reform. Both efforts are discussed more thoroughly below.
In leadership positions, WIPO remains heavily dominated by
males consistently filling the top posts. As of January 2007, WIPO’s
director general and all four deputy director general posts were all
filled by men, as are the top posts of assistant director general, legal
counsel, and senior counsellor. There are a number of women work-
ing at WIPO, but they are not in top leadership positions.7  The top
officials at WIPO on each of the substantive issues of copyrights,
patents, and trademarks are all men.
However, a growing number of member states send women to
participate at WIPO as part of their delegations, and many of these
women provide leadership in an unofficial but remarkably successful
fashion. Women delegates from developing countries in particular,
such as Argentina and India, have proven instrumental in building
consensus and promoting the Development Agenda at WIPO. But a
woman has yet to be elected the chairperson of the copyright com-
mittee or Development Agenda negotiations.
As noted above, NGOs may participate in WIPO deliberations as
observers, upon completion of a prescribed process. But there is no
distinction between public-interest and private-interest NGOs at WIPO,
and consequently, private industry NGOs largely outnumber public-
interest NGOs. However, these numbers are constantly in flux and
public-interest participation has grown significantly since 2004. Until
recently, there were few voices at WIPO to challenge industry groups
such as the international pharmaceutical manufacturers who claimed
to be a “public-interest NGO” at the 2005 Development Agenda talks
and were quickly taken to task by a number of library groups. But by
and large, only NGOs who can afford to regularly send representa-
tives to Geneva or maintain an office there can participate at WIPO
and this represents an enormous barrier for developing country NGOs
in particular.
Role and responsibilities in ICTs
WIPO “Internet Treaties”
Before the 1990s WIPO played a minimal role in setting rules in the
area of information and communications technologies (ICTs). This
has much to do with the evolving role of intellectual property rights in
general. In the past, intellectual property rules did not apply to per-
sonal communication technologies, since they mainly concerned large
publishing houses or major companies. But with the development of
personal communication technologies, particularly computers and the
internet, intellectual property rules have become one of the most im-
portant determinants in setting ICT policy and regulation. Because
digital technology inherently requires making copies of data, copy-
right rules are automatically triggered in the digital environment. And
because the internet provides a new forum for infringement of copy-
right and trademark, intellectual property rules have been catapulted
into prominence. Patents and trade secrets are increasingly used in
technical standards, so such rules are similarly growing in impor-
tance in setting ICT policy. As intellectual property rules in general
become more relevant in regulating communication, WIPO’s role has
also increased.
5 More information about WHOIS is available from: <gnso.icann.org/issues/whois-
privacy>.
6 Available from: <www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf>.
7 In 2001 the WIPO post of deputy director general for copyrights was filled by Rita
Hayes, a female appointee from the administration of then US President Bill
Clinton, but Ms. Hayes was replaced by a male from the George W. Bush
administration in 2006.
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68 In 1996 WIPO passed two treaties collectively known as the
“Internet Treaties” in response to the demands of intellectual prop-
erty holders worried about infringement in cyberspace. The passage
of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (WIPO, 1996a) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (WIPO, 1996b) marked
an important change for WIPO’s involvement in setting ICT regulation
(and for copyright law).
Among other ambitions, the WCT and WPPT gave copyright
owners the unprecedented right to use technological restrictions to
control the use of digital media by making it illegal to bypass those
restrictions. Specifically, the WCT/WPPT require member states to
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
the circumvention of technological restrictions used to protect a copy-
righted work.
These WIPO treaties have been implemented in the US in the
form the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and in Eu-
rope through the EU Copyright Directive (EUCD) and the various na-
tional legislations that outlaw circumvention of technological restric-
tions. However, the DMCA and EUCD actually outlaw much more ac-
tivity and technology than the WIPO Internet Treaties require. The
DMCA, in particular, is often referenced at WIPO and by large intellec-
tual property rights holders as the “model” for implementing these
treaties, despite its extremity. The DMCA is very controversial in the
US since its overbroad anti-circumvention provisions have been in-
voked to prevent competition in markets unrelated to copyright, stifle
criticism about technical weaknesses, and force consumers to pay
extra to engage in otherwise lawful uses of digital media.
The WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996 were only the beginning for
WIPO’s involvement in ICT policy-making. Increasing the rights of
broadcasting companies in the digital environment has been on the
agenda of WIPO’s copyright committee since the late 1990s. In 2005,
after seven years of negotiation at WIPO over a treaty to create new
rights for broadcasting companies, the US proposed that the scope
of the proposed broadcasting treaty be widened to include the regula-
tion of webcasting or “internet transmissions of media” as well. The
US was virtually alone in the desire to include webcasting in the broad-
casting treaty, but was initially unwilling to change its position.
However, at the May 2006 meeting of the WIPO Standing Com-
mittee on Copyright and Related Rights, the backers of the proposed
broadcasting treaty feared it was in danger of outright rejection if the
US insisted on extending it to the unpopular webcasting rights. Conse-
quently, a deal was reached that removed the US webcasting provi-
sions in exchange for a promise to bring them back in 2007 in the form
of a much larger and more encompassing treaty to deal with internet
transmissions of media. Thus WIPO announced that it intends to em-
bark on a whole new “Internet Treaty” to regulate webcasting and the
transmission of audio and video programming over the internet.
Even with the removal of webcasting provisions from the text of
the proposed broadcasting treaty, the draft treaty still regulates all
internet retransmissions of broadcast programming. WIPO is defi-
nitely seizing the moment to regulate ICT policies to a much greater
extent than it has in the past.
Internet governance
WIPO has also begun to play a role in the more general “internet
governance” debates. As described above, WIPO has worked closely
with ICANN to set its UDRP policy to deal with infringement claims
over domain names and to institute provisions that privilege trade-
mark holders with early registration and cancellation rights for new
domain names.
WIPO also participated in the UN World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society (WSIS), which took place from 2003 to 2005 in Geneva
and Tunis,8  although it did not play a significant role there. WIPO’s
main goal at WSIS appeared to be to prevent any serious discussion
about the appropriate balance of intellectual property rights in
cyberspace. WSIS organisers similarly deemed intellectual property
rights “too controversial” for serious discussion at WSIS.
However, WIPO did hold an Online Forum on Intellectual Prop-
erty in the Information Society in June 2005 to “encourage debate on
the topic of intellectual property in the information society and in fur-
therance of the goals of WSIS.”9  The conclusions of the Online Fo-
rum became a significant part of WIPO’s contribution to WSIS. WIPO
was given a speaking slot during the plenary session at the 2003
Geneva Summit and the 2005 Tunis Summit, but did not significantly
contribute to the overall WSIS debate, apart from keeping serious
international property rights (IPR) discussions “off the table”.
In 2005 WIPO was given a seat on the UN Working Group on
Internet Governance (WGIG), a WSIS initiative. However, the WGIG
deemed its sub-committee’s paper on IPR issues too controversial to
become part of the WGIG final report. WIPO has not made any signifi-
cant contributions to the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF), either.
WIPO did not participate in the May 2006 IGF Open Consultations;
nor did WIPO attend the meeting of the IGF Advisory Group, though it
was entitled to as a UN specialised agency. Indeed issues about the
appropriate balance for intellectual property rights in cyberspace were
prominently on the agenda at the inaugural IGF meeting in Athens in
November 2006, although WIPO officials did not play a large role in
those discussions. The IGF is a discussion forum, not a treaty-mak-
ing body, so participation in the IGF may be less of a priority for WIPO.
Description and analysis of ICT activities
In recent years WIPO has attracted controversy in a number of areas
where its mandate and activities apparently diverge from the UN’s
humanitarian goals.
Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO
In September 2004, many prominent legal scholars, scientists, activ-
ists, public-interest NGOs, a 2002 Nobel Prize winner for physiology, a
former French prime minister, and several thousand other concerned
global citizens published the Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO.10
8 <www.wsis-online.net>.
9 WIPO’s Online Forum on Intellectual Property in the Information Society:
<www.wipo.int/ipisforum/en>.
10 <www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf>.
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9The Geneva Declaration called upon WIPO to reform its “culture
of creating and expanding monopoly privileges, often without regard
to the consequences.” The declaration said that WIPO’s “continuous
expansion of these privileges and their enforcement mechanisms has
led to grave social and economic costs, and has hampered and threat-
ened other important systems of creativity and innovation.”
The Declaration called upon WIPO to:
...enable its members to understand the real economic and so-
cial consequences of excessive intellectual property protections,
and the importance of striking a balance between the public do-
main and competition on the one hand, and the realm of prop-
erty rights on the other.
The Declaration also requested that WIPO undertake a Develop-
ment Agenda and new approaches to supporting innovation and crea-
tivity. It asked WIPO to take into account the different developmental
needs of member states in setting IPR policies:
A “one size fits all” approach that embraces the highest levels of
intellectual property protection for everyone leads to unjust and
burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet
the most basic needs of their citizens.
While the well-publicised Declaration did not itself have legal sig-
nificance or power to reform WIPO, it served well as a “shot heard
around the world” that highlighted WIPO’s poor record on protecting
the public interest and the need for reform.
Development Agenda
The timing of the Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO in Sep-
tember 2004 coincided with a proposal from member states Brazil
and Argentina before the WIPO General Assembly for the establish-
ment of a Development Agenda for WIPO (WIPO, 2004). The 2004
WIPO General Assembly adopted the resolution for the establishment
of a Development Agenda to reform WIPO’s practice of blindly in-
creasing intellectual property rights:
Intellectual property protection cannot be seen as an end in it-
self, nor can the harmonisation of intellectual property laws lead-
ing to higher protection standards in all countries, irrespective
of their levels of development.
The role of intellectual property and its impact on development
must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. Intellectual
property protection is a policy instrument the operation of which
may, in actual practice, produce benefits as well as costs, which
may vary in accordance with a country’s level of development.
Action is therefore needed to ensure, in all countries, that the costs
do not outweigh the benefits of intellectual property protection.
In April 2005 Brazil and Argentina were joined by twelve other
developing countries, collectively called the Group of Friends of De-
velopment (FoD), to elaborate on the goals of the Development Agenda
at WIPO. The FoD proposal calls for a fundamental review of WIPO’s
overall mandate and governance structure. It asks WIPO to adopt pro-
development norm-setting standards. The FoD proposal suggests
principles and guidelines for WIPO’s technical assistance programme,
as well as guidelines for technology transfer and competition policy
work at WIPO. The FoD proposal also calls on WIPO to live up to its
role as a UN specialised agency by promoting the public interest and
development concerns in all WIPO activities.
WIPO held three intersessional meetings in April, June and July
2005 to debate the various proposals for a Development Agenda. Glo-
bal public support for the FoD proposal swelled. Over 138 public-
interest NGOs from all corners of the globe signed a statement in
support of the FoD proposal for reform at WIPO and a rebalancing of
global intellectual property rules.11  But in the final intersessional meet-
ing in July 2005, the US and Japan refused to agree to any of the
proposals for a Development Agenda and were able to prevent a con-
sensus from being reached. As a result of two hold-outs and lack of
consensus, no substantive recommendations could be made to the
2005 General Assembly for a Development Agenda at WIPO.
Member states at the 2005 WIPO General Assembly once again
voted to endorse a Development Agenda and to continue and com-
plete discussions through intersessional meetings in 2006.
Intersessional meetings were held in February and June 2006 to again
discuss proposals related to a Development Agenda at WIPO. FoD
proposed a set of draft recommendations at the June meeting for
specific concrete reform to present to the 2006 General Assembly.
But the so-called Group B countries – i.e. the wealthiest member states,
including the United States and Europe – refused to endorse any of
the proposals, again preventing consensus and any progress on a
Development Agenda. The meeting’s chair, Paraguayan Ambassador
Rigoberto Gauto Vielman, put forth an alternative proposal for rec-
ommendations that contained mostly suggestions from the wealthy
countries, but that proposal gained even less support.
Despite the lack of concrete recommendations for a second
year in a row, the WIPO General Assembly in 2006 voted for the
third time to hold discussion of proposals for a Development Agenda
at WIPO. The General Assembly agreed to hold two week-long ses-
sions in 2007 to discuss the 111 proposals made thus far. The first
meeting would address the 40 controversial proposals identified by
Chairman Gauto Vielman, and the second would address the re-
maining 71 proposals that are mostly from developing countries. If
member states reach a consensus, recommendations will be made
to the 2007 WIPO General Assembly for action on proposals with
agreement and a framework to move forward with the remaining
proposals. Without support from the wealthy member states, re-
form at WIPO is almost impossible.
Proposed WIPO broadcasting treaty
As noted above, the controversial proposal to create unprecedented
new rights for broadcasting companies represents another opportunity
for WIPO to regulate ICTs. More than seven years into discussions,
even the most basic provisions of the proposed WIPO broadcasting
11 See: <www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/NGO_Statement.shtml>.
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70 treaty have not been agreed upon by member states. Whether the
treaty will create entirely new intellectual property rights (as proposed
by Europe) or take a traditional “signal theft” approach to protecting
broadcasts is still up in the air. The extent to which the treaty will
regulate internet retransmissions of broadcast programming remains
contentious. The inclusion of the unpopular anti-circumvention rights
for broadcasting companies in the treaty text is disputed by most
member states. Limitations and exceptions to the new rights created
for broadcasting companies are yet to be determined, and key terms
such “signal” have yet to be defined in the treaty.
Nonetheless, in September 2006, the chair of the Standing Com-
mittee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), Jukka Liedes, called
for “silent approval” of his proposal for the Committee to recommend
to the 2006 General Assembly that a diplomatic conference be con-
vened to conclude final treaty drafting. A number of member states
expressed disapproval of Liedes’ push to conclude the treaty, includ-
ing India, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Iran and South Africa. Even
the US dropped its support for the proposal at the September 2006
SCCR meeting after the US technology industry began to complain
about the draft’s harmful impact on technological innovation.
At the 2006 WIPO General Assembly, member states rejected
the controversial recommendation of SCCR Chairman Liedes to con-
vene a diplomatic conference and instead called for two additional
meetings in 2007 to try to reach agreement on the many points of
contention. The autumn 2006 General Assembly voted to convene a
diplomatic conference on the broadcasting treaty only if agreement
could be reached before the 2007 General Assembly.
This was not the first instance in which Chairman Liedes ignored
the WIPO principle of consensus-based decision-making. In Novem-
ber 2004 Liedes had called for moving the discussions on the broad-
casting treaty to regional consultations in 2005. Many member state
delegates claim that Liedes’ move was illegal since a number of coun-
tries openly objected to his proposal for regional consultations.
Developing countries, including Brazil, India, Egypt, and Argen-
tina, requested intersessional meetings in Geneva with all member
states present to discuss the proposed treaty’s provisions. Because
this would offer both developed and developing countries an oppor-
tunity to discuss their differences together, and allow for the input of
public-interest organisations in the debate, intersessional meetings
seemed the appropriate next step.
But Chairman Liedes recommended instead to send debate on
the proposed broadcasting treaty to secretive regional meetings, where
it is easier to pressure individual countries into accepting the treaty
through a “divide and conquer” strategy. WIPO regional meetings take
place completely outside of the public eye, and accredited NGOs are
not permitted to attend or participate in regional meetings without a
special invitation from WIPO. In the past, however, the US and the EU
have been allowed to participate in other region’s meetings, such as
the African Group’s regional meetings, to help convince African coun-
tries to pass certain WIPO treaties.
In November 2006 WIPO convened a secret meeting in Geneva
to persuade key member states to accept the proposal on broadcast-
ing. WIPO officials, Chairman Liedes, and representatives of Europe,
the US, Japan, Brazil, India, and South Africa attended the secret
meeting, but no agreement could be reached. Liedes and European
officials continue to push for an “exclusive rights” approach even
though the 2006 General Assembly voted that treaty discussions
should take a “signal theft” approach.
Debate over the proposed broadcasting treaty continues in 2007
with discussions at WIPO scheduled for January and June, and pos-
sibly a diplomatic conference in November 2007, if differences can be
eliminated.
Stakeholder participation
In many respects WIPO has been slow to accept its revised role as an
entity accountable to the global public interest and unfortunately con-
tinues to view its main objective as promoting intellectual property
rights and the interests of major intellectual property holders. In part,
this tendency is reinforced by WIPO’s main funding source: fees from
trademark and patent applications and registrations for large compa-
nies. WIPO, like any organisation, operates in the interest of its funders.
While WIPO’s financial autonomy is in some senses an asset, there
can be unintended negative consequences. Without financial account-
ability to the values of the UN, WIPO is further divorced from pursu-
ing a public-interest mission and work plan.
IPR “maximalist” culture in WIPO power structures
One of the main barriers to balanced policy-making at WIPO is the
strong culture of promoting intellectual property rights within its
staff and personnel. WIPO tends to hire and work with people who
hold the viewpoint of industry and who therefore tend to be IPR
“maximalists” in their training and perspective. This is particularly
true at WIPO’s highest levels, and the culture easily permeates on
down throughout the entire organisation. Countries such as the US
appear to be guaranteed key posts at WIPO in order to direct global
IPR policy in the interest of the US more effectively.
WIPO’s Secretariat, or International Bureau, draws staff from over
90 countries, but leadership positions and policy-making roles tend
to be dominated by representatives from wealthy countries with a
particular legal tradition and perspective on intellectual property rules.
Indeed three of the four deputy director general positions at WIPO are
held by officials from Group B member states – the world’s wealthiest
nations – and they tend to be united in their approach.
Top WIPO posts, such as the deputy director general for copy-
rights, are successively held by representatives of the US govern-
ment. In 2006, the US government replaced Rita Hayes, a US Demo-
cratic Party supporter, with Mike Kepplinger, a US Republican Party
supporter, in the WIPO post of deputy director general for copy-
rights. A number of member states complained about the apparent
presumption that the top position for setting global copyright rules
would be once again filled by a representative of the US govern-
ment. Under the WIPO Convention, the director general appoints
the deputy directors general after their approval by a Coordination
Committee.
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1The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
WIPO’s UDRP, which adjudicates trademark infringement disputes for
domain names, has also come under growing criticism.
WIPO announced in October 2006 that since the inception of the
UDRP, 84% of the panels had awarded the domain names to the claim-
ants (i.e. the trademark holders), ruling in favour of the original regis-
trant in only 16% of cases.
The one-sided decisions of WIPO panels can be partially explained
by the procedural bias in favour of complainants that is built right into
the UDRP. The procedure allows the complainant to choose the dis-
pute resolution service provider, and since the arbitrators are all com-
peting for business, there are obvious incentives to find in favour of
claimants. Over the years, most “independent” WIPO arbitrators have
obtained the reputation for being favourable to trademark holders in
their decisions; and those arbitrators who find in favour of the origi-
nal registrant are not hired to settle disputes for long and eventually
leave the business. Besides being inherently favourable to trademark
holders by permitting “forum shopping”, the UDRP also provides in-
adequate time for registrants to react to a claim of trademark infringe-
ment in order to defend a registration.
Further issues arise over WIPO’s technical assistance pro-
grammes, which tend to reflect the viewpoint of large intellectual prop-
erty holders in the US and EU. Developing countries are not fully in-
formed about their rights and obligations by the WIPO technical as-
sistance programmes. For example, the right under international law
that member states have to enact limitations and exceptions to exclu-
sive rights is inadequately addressed. WIPO tends to favour funding
innovation via traditional IPR business models over innovative new
models for rewarding creativity.
Consensus-based decisions problematic
Because WIPO decisions are taken according to consensus, meaning
that no action can be taken unless all member states agree, reform at
WIPO will be difficult to achieve. A striking and important example is
the proposal for a Development Agenda at WIPO, where the overwhelm-
ing majority of member states have been calling for specific reforms for
three General Assemblies in a row, yet no action has been taken be-
cause the US along with Japan or Europe are able to block any reform.
Another example is the proposed broadcasting treaty, where a
WIPO committee chair is willing to ignore the explicit objections of
member states and claim he has “silent approval”, thus attempting to
circumvent WIPO’s consensus-based decision-making structure. In
this case, however, it should be noted that the 2006 WIPO General
Assembly refused to allow the SCCR chair action by ultimately reject-
ing his recommendation.
Too much power in hands of WIPO Secretariat
The WIPO Secretariat is given a great deal of power to set agendas for
meetings and prepare drafts of texts for consideration.
In the SCCR, for example, it is the chair who prepares all the
draft proposals for a broadcasting treaty. The chair has consistently
refused to remove unpopular provisions from the draft, such as the
anti-circumvention rights, even though the overwhelming majority of
member states have requested the removal of the controversial pro-
visions. Committee chairs decide where there is agreement and which
proposals to include or not include in the treaty drafts. Some, as noted,
even claim to have “silent approval” as they bang the gavel to close
the meeting, even after a number of explicit objections are raised.
Member state delegates also complain about the one-on-one
“arm-twisting” sessions they have to endure from WIPO officials on
policy matters. This issue raises the question of why WIPO is trying
to tell member states what their laws will be. It is astonishing to ob-
serve member state delegates having to argue with a chair regarding
what to include in a treaty proposal. Is it not WIPO’s role merely to
facilitate the wishes of the member states?
At some level, however, it is the member states who must take
responsibility for allowing the WIPO Secretariat and chairs to get away
with so much. Member states elect the chair for each meeting and they
have voluntarily chosen to re-elect chairs who ignore their concerns.
SCCR Chairman Jukka Liedes has been re-elected as chair for ten years
in succession, although some delegates argue WIPO rules do not allow
the same person to serve as chair in back-to-back sessions, a point
which sparked controversy at the November 2004 SCCR meeting.
The committee chairs and the WIPO Secretariat also have much
leeway in regulating the way in which civil society is allowed to par-
ticipate in the meetings. At several recent SCCR meetings on the broad-
casting treaty, Chairman Liedes announced that civil society would
not be allowed to take the floor during the meeting. At the January
2007 SCCR meeting, Liedes announced that NGOs would have to leave
the meeting at which the substantive discussion was to occur, be-
cause he decided the substantive debate would be called “informal
discussions”, something NGOs are not allowed to participate in at
WIPO. In fact, despite WIPO’s claim of open participation, NGOs have
not been allowed to speak for several SCCR meetings. More infor-
mally, the SCCR Secretariat has reduced (or eliminated in some cases)
the coffee breaks between formal consultations, which is particularly
important because that is often the only time for civil society repre-
sentatives to talk with delegates about the issues. And the “overflow”
room at WIPO which seats additional civil society representatives is
no longer available during meetings.
These attempts to silence NGO voices are nothing new. At the
November 2004 SCCR meeting, delegate briefing papers from public-
interest NGOs were stolen from the floor table and later found in the
lavatory rubbish bin. When civil society representatives asked WIPO
officials for assistance over the stolen documents, WIPO Deputy Di-
rector General Rita Hayes said security would not be provided be-
cause she was unhappy about civil society publishing reports about
the meetings on the internet.
General challenges for effective participation
Another obstacle confronts poorer countries in their attempts to par-
ticipate effectively at a highly technical and legalistic agency such as
WIPO: the inherent imbalance between the capacity of wealthy and
poor countries to participate.
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72 Large and wealthy countries such as the US send teams of del-
egates from the US Patent and Trademark Office, the US Department
of Commerce, and the US Copyright Office. They consist of special-
ists in trade negotiation and international intellectual property rights,
and are trained to represent the perspective of industry. Wealthy coun-
tries can maintain a constant presence at their permanent missions in
Geneva with delegates who are able to focus their efforts exclusively
on WIPO.
But the less wealthy countries cannot afford to send large del-
egations to Geneva, and instead send a single person who might be
responsible for covering all the activities of WIPO, WHO, UNESCO,
the ILO, and other UN agencies. These representatives are less likely
to be specialists in intellectual property rights and less likely to be
aware of a diversity of viewpoints on issues. And representatives from
the poorest nations remain in their capital city and rely on communi-
cations with Geneva to try to keep on top of what is happening at
WIPO. However, official final committee reports and meeting notes
can take from six to nine months to be published by WIPO and are
therefore always out of date with the actual negotiations.
Conclusions and recommendations
WIPO’s problems
Undemocratic
While WIPO can claim some degree of equality among member states
because each country has one vote, the reality is rather different. It is
often the wealthy countries and blocs, particularly the US and Eu-
rope, whose opinions matter and who drive the agenda at WIPO. WIPO
could be more accurately described as a forum in which the loudest
or most insistent voices from the wealthy countries prevail. It is also
a forum in which the Secretariat and chairs are given a great deal of
power to circumvent the wishes of the member states.
Private interests trump public interest
Intellectual property rights have become an “end” in and of them-
selves at WIPO. WIPO officials are the first to claim that WIPO’s mis-
sion is to promote intellectual property rights at a global level. Since
intellectual property rights are ultimately private rights, their promo-
tion is the promotion of private interests, mainly those of major record
labels, movie studios, publishing houses, and large pharmaceutical
companies. The UN, and WIPO as its agent, have a primary obligation
to promote the global public interest, an obligation that appears to be
in jeopardy here.
Lack of transparency
Many decisions at WIPO are taken behind closed doors and are not
part of the official record. Deals are often brokered during informal
consultations, although this is not unusual for international treaty
negotiations. However, the lack of transparency over WIPO’s techni-
cal assistance programmes is a real problem. Much of the technical
assistance materials are not available on the internet for journalists,
legal experts, and others to read and comment on. And WIPO’s prac-
tice of sending controversial discussions such as the proposed broad-
casting treaty to secretive regional consultations, where civil society
cannot attend, reflects poorly on WIPO’s record on transparency.
Too “diplomatic”
Geneva-based member state delegates tend to be career diplomats,
working in Geneva only for a few years on IPR issues and then mov-
ing on to other issues. Because the delegates are career diplomats,
they tend to be very “diplomatic” and rarely wish to offend or openly
disagree with anyone. This “Geneva culture”, while having its ben-
efits, particularly in dealing with delicate international negotiations,
can also have its drawbacks. The situation becomes particularly prob-
lematic for delegates in voting for a new committee chair, since they
do not wish to offend. The diplomatic Geneva culture helps WIPO to
stay away from controversial issues and maintain control of leader-
ship. For the most part, delegates have no personal interest in “rock-
ing the boat.” Only the more powerful countries like the US and the
EU can afford to take controversial and unpopular positions. Often,
the US and the EU agree upon who should fill a post at WIPO, putting
other member states in the position of having to dissent with a pow-
erful trade partner in an undiplomatic fashion.
Recommendations for improving WIPO
Development Agenda and A2K Treaty
WIPO should pay attention to the message of the member states at
the last three General Assemblies and incorporate a Development
Agenda into WIPO’s core policies and practices. WIPO should update
its mission to more explicitly align itself with the UN and its humani-
tarian objectives. WIPO’s mission and activities should explicitly rec-
ognise that countries in different stages of development have differ-
ent needs and responsibilities. WIPO should pass an Access to Knowl-
edge (A2K) Treaty12  that encourages the use of technology to pro-
mote education and individual empowerment.
New leadership in key WIPO positions
WIPO needs to incorporate people who hold a diversity of viewpoints
into its leadership, particularly in top policy-making positions. Devel-
oped-country officials hold three of the four deputy director general
positions, even though these countries tend to speak with a united
voice at WIPO. It is time that an Argentine, Indian, Brazilian or other
developing-country delegate served as chairperson of the SCCR or
filled the post of deputy director general for copyrights at WIPO. This
is something that member states must do themselves through sus-
tained organisation and coalition-building. WIPO will not change un-
less member states force it to change, so there is no escaping the
responsibility of member states to take control of WIPO.
12 For more information see: <www.access2knowledge.org/cs/>.
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3Encouragement of more diverse views
WIPO should do more to encourage input and participation from a
diversity of viewpoints. Rather than allow a single nation to dominate
global policy on a given subject by successively filling WIPO’s top
post on that issue, WIPO should rotate according to geographic re-
gion and in an unbiased way which government fills top WIPO posts.
Public-interest NGOs, particularly those from developing countries,
should be allowed to speak at the meetings and make their papers
available, and more WIPO seminars and technical assistance pro-
grammes should include speakers from public-interest NGOs and de-
veloping nations. The concerns of librarians, civil liberties groups, open
source software developers and teachers, and especially those from
developing countries, need to be given voice in WIPO’s corridors.
IPR “agnosticism”
WIPO should become “IPR agnostic” and not insist on blindly pro-
moting intellectual property rights out of a simple belief that “more is
better.” WIPO should explore new models of rewarding creativity and
promote whatever models encourage the creation and dissemination
of knowledge and culture. Traditional business models that rely upon
copyrights and patents are not the only means of promoting creativ-
ity and rewarding innovation. New viral distribution marketing chan-
nels take advantage of the benefits of digital technology and work by
spreading information, as opposed to preventing access to informa-
tion. WIPO should not favour traditional business models over inno-
vative new models in its work programme, and it should refocus its
efforts on promoting creativity and innovation by whatever means
possible.
Greater oversight and accountability from the UN
If WIPO were more financially dependent upon the UN to carry out its
work programme, its work programme would be more closely aligned
with the UN’s humanitarian objectives. It is time that UN officials real-
ise what has been going on at WIPO in the UN’s good name for the
last fifteen years. The UN will also have to rein in WIPO and make it
more accountable to the global public interest for WIPO to gain any
legitimacy in international treaty-making. As long as WIPO’s budget
is entirely independent from the UN, the UN will have little means of
holding it accountable to the global public interest. As long as WIPO’s
funding continues to come from major intellectual property holders,
the objectives of those industries will continue to be promoted at WIPO.
The UN and its member states must together reform WIPO to more
accurately reflect the global public interest. 
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ICT indicators for advocacy
Introduction
During the course of the last fifteen years, information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) indicators have become increasingly popu-
larised and prominent in mainstream discourses. In the advocacy
arena, indicators provide the groundwork for effective lobbying and
policy-making at different levels of mobilisation. To address inequali-
ties in access to ICTs – what is commonly referred to as the “digital
divide” – it is essential to identify where there are inequalities, and
how exclusion is manifested, in order to specifically target solutions.
Some solutions may be purely technical, such as extending infrastruc-
ture to rural communities. However, indicators can also help policy
advocates and policy-makers to assess how likely different commu-
nities are to integrate ICT into their work and social trajectories –
what is commonly referred to as e-readiness. Indicators, while use-
ful, are not neutral. This chapter considers ICT indicators and seeks
to clarify practices around designing and using indicators for meas-
uring progress towards a global information society.
A robust set of indicators is difficult to achieve; you have to have
commitment across countries and stakeholders who agree that the
exercise is useful. There also needs to be agreement on the indicators
to be collected, which is a shifting terrain in terms of what is per-
ceived as useful information. Traditionally, telecom sector indicators
(and the collection of statistics used to construct them) have focused
on physical infrastructure. This made sense in the historical context
of monopoly provision of telecom services. There was only one serv-
ice provider to collect information from, and there were only two
classes of users (household consumers and business users). Com-
mon carriage guidelines meant that what was going over the “twisted
pairs” was not an object of analysis, which merely focused on traffic
data. The only experiential data of note were quality of service indica-
tors, which actually relate to technical service provision rather than
the personal level effectiveness of the call.
However, as is becoming increasingly evident, it is not terribly
meaningful to study telecoms as stand-alone infrastructure. Communi-
cation technologies are very much intertwined with human capabilities
and motivations. This becomes apparent with surprises in uptake such
as occurred with mobile, prepaid and short message service (SMS),
and more recently with wireless communications and internet diffu-
sion. These examples illustrate the dependence of ICT infrastructure on
social relations, as well as the need for ICT indicator projects to extend
their inquiry beyond access to encompass usage and adoption, and
also impact of the new technologies. Historically, and even today, ICT
indicators overwhelmingly focus on infrastructure and connectivity –
in other words, how many phones are in use, rather than who is using
them for what. This chapter argues that we need to have a clearer pic-
ture of demand side conditions and use. Indicators that inquire into the
nature of use and usage conditions will provide equally important infor-
mation for informing policy decisions, and will certainly clarify the pic-
ture created by connectivity and technical components.
Finally, a word about divides and globalisation. Globalisation and
technological change have opened up new paths for communication
and information flows, but these are cut short by the dead-ends of
“digital divides”. Economic and social divides have always existed
and many argue that the prevalent technological divides of the early
21st century are predominantly an extension of already existing, his-
torical exclusion. Especially in the context of the information society,
divides are fundamental to our understanding and use of indicators.
In essence, divides are really what indicators are about: assessing
where there are people who have fewer opportunities to improve their
lives or their family (or community) livelihoods, and have a lower
quality of health, education and life than is deemed acceptable – as
defined in international treaties and conventions. If we are not as-
sessing how to bridge gaps, or to make even better bridges for such
gaps, then we are likely assessing the terrain for provision of service
strategies for those who already have access and are not marginalised.
This chapter is organised as follows: it begins with an overview
of indicator sources, followed by a brief discussion of what indicators
are, why we use them, and what they purport to represent. This in
turn is followed by a consideration of the data that is used to make up
indicators, and then a section which discusses indicators’ inherent
biases and unpacks some issues around their use. The chapter con-
cludes with a call for further cooperation around indicators across
the different stakeholder groups.
Key sources of ICT indicators
Most advocacy initiatives and research projects do not undertake the chal-
lenge of new data collection to devise their own ICT indicators. However,
for different advocacy moments, we still need statistical information from
legitimate and recognised sources. This section briefly identifies the or-
ganisations that currently have significant stocks of ICT indicators avail-
able to the public for free or at a nominal cost. Whether the entity collect-
ing data has the sufficient resources, legitimacy and mandate for such an
undertaking are also important to consider. There is no shortage of ICT
indicators sources, and there are also strong overlaps with measurement
of other sectors that are being transformed by the use of ICT – economic,
poverty and governance assessments, health, education, etc.
Many international organisations such as the World Economic
Forum and UNESCO’s Orbicom produce reports with indicator collec-
tions that are either devoted specifically to perspectives on the ICT
terrain at national and regional levels, or which use ICT indicators in
the context of a broader assessment, such as the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index.2  Historically, the
1 APC and ITeM gratefully acknowledge Comunica (<www.comunica.org>) and
LIRNE.NET (<www.lirne.net>) for this contribution.
2 The United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance (UNPAN)
has a page linking to major statistical databases across a range of different
themes. See: <www.unpan.org/statistical_database.asp>.
An important addition to collections of indicators is the UN Millennium
Development Goals database. See: <mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx>.
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International Telecommunication Union (ITU)3 housed the mother of
all ICT-related indicator collections and maintains some 80 sets of
ICT statistics, which it makes available in printed reports, at its website
and in databases. The ITU also figures prominently in high level initia-
tives to achieve consensus around which indicators should be col-
lected and how to build better indicators in order to better understand
ICTs and their impact on society and more effectively assess and
measure their diffusion and absorption across the world. The ITU’s
Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) draws upon eleven of these indica-
tors to provide a composite measure and ranking of nations’ ICT ca-
pability. The ITU served as the host secretariat for the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS). During the first phase of the Sum-
mit (2003) the theme of indicators was highlighted and the seeds
were planted for establishing the multi-stakeholder entity, Partner-
ship on Measuring ICT for Development, and for the DOI.
The World Bank4  collects hundreds of indicators across a number
of different sectors and maintains these in different databases avail-
able at their website. The ICT at a Glance pages offer 27 ICT-related
indicators, but other sectors such as health and education also have
ICT-related statistics. The Knowledge Assessment Methodology
(KAM),5  initiated by the World Bank Institute, works to resolve which
indicators are central to assessing the new economy and uses more
than 80 of them as the basis for the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI);
of these, 12 are specifically ICT-related indicators. A knowledge
economy will be characterised by an educated and skilled labour force,
an effective innovation system, adequate information infrastructure and
conducive endowments in terms of economic and institutional regimes.
The KAM illustrates some of the complexity in assessing the ICT terrain
and contributions to socioeconomic improvements at a national level
as elements of ICT adoption and access traverse these different do-
mains. It has been argued that in past years the World Bank, seeking to
demonstrate the effectiveness of Washington consensus policies, has
made choices that skew indicators in favour of this perception.6 As dis-
cussed below, all indicators have their respective biases.
In June 2004, during the 11th United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), an international, multi-stakeholder Part-
nership on Measuring ICT for Development was launched. The Meas-
uring ICT website housed by UNCTAD, and the WSIS thematic meet-
ings on different aspects of ICT indicators and measurement, are the
direct results of the WSIS emphasis on indicators, and are working
towards agreeing to a set of standardised ICT indicators to measure
the information society that would be collected across all countries
and allow for benchmarking and comparison:
As the information society gains momentum, reliable statistical
data and indicators regarding ICT readiness, use and impact are
increasingly and urgently needed. Reliable ICT statistical data
and indicators help policy makers to formulate policies and strat-
egies for ICT-driven economic growth, to measure their impact,
and to monitor and evaluate ICT-related developments.
ICT statistical data and indicators must also be comparable at
the international level, in order to allow developing countries to
benchmark their information economies with those of developed
countries and to take policy decisions to narrow the digital di-
vide (UNCTAD – Measuring ICT website).
The Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development has devel-
oped a text, Core ICT Indicators (UN, 2005), which identifies indica-
tors used to assess:
• ICT infrastructure and access
• Access to, and use of, ICT by households and individuals
• Use of ICT by businesses
• The ICT sector and trade in ICT goods
The text describes the intention of each indicator and proposes
model questions for obtaining an accurate response and hence accu-
rate data. This list of indicators does not claim to be complete and
identifies the process as continuous and subject to periodic review. In
the same vein, the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) website7
provides a metadata section listing the methodology and data used to
inform the MDG indicators.
These international agencies work with national level statistical
agencies to obtain data, and in the case of the Partnership on Measur-
ing ICT, to arrive at consensus on which indicators should be col-
lected and the methodology for their collection. An extensive (and
perhaps exhaustive) list of national statistical agencies is maintained
on the Measuring the Information Society website.8  Collecting and
maintaining (updating on a regular basis) a stock of indicators is an
intensive and costly undertaking for which some developing coun-
tries may not choose or be able to allocate resources. In this case,
regional associations such as the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and regional devel-
opment banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the
African Development Bank can be important sources for much statis-
tical information and analysis, as they monitor markets, economic
conditions, stability, regulatory and governance conditions – many of
which will intersect with the ICT terrain. Regional level research or-
ganisations such as Research ICT Africa have also been undertaking
household level data collection across a number of countries.
During the mid-1990s when privatisation and liberalisation of
telecom networks became pervasive around the world, independent
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) were established to oversee
the reforms. In order to effectively inform regulatory processes and
decision-making, NRAs collect information about the sector on many
different levels. Some regulators are proactive about making this in-
formation publicly available.9  Where NRAs are under-resourced, re-
gional regulatory associations have a role to better coordinate statis-
tical information about the ICT sector.
Finally, there are a number of research and market intelligence
groups that collect and maintain proprietary stocks of information
and analysis. These usually cost more than academic or grassroots
research budgets will permit. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is
7 <mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx>.
8 <measuring-ict.unctad.org/QuickPlace/measuring-ict/Main.nsf/h_Toc/
1F6843B23A7F136CC1257110005302AF/?OpenDocument>.
9 See the World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies website for tables
summarising regulatory resources for Africa (<www.regulateonline.org/content/
view/895/32>), Asia (<www.regulateonline.org/content/view/878/32>) and Latin
America and the Caribbean (<www.regulateonline.org/content/view/832/32>).
3 <www.itu.int>.
4 <www.worldbank.org>.
5 See the KAM Methodology webpage: <www.worldbank.org/kam>.
6 See for example George (2004) among other Transnational Institute publications
(www.tni.org). Pogge and Reddy (2006) have written extensively on the
methodology for the World Bank’s international poverty line (IPL) indicator which
in 2000 was revised by the Bank without, they argue, sufficient clarity or
transparency, resulting in dramatically altered poverty figures.
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an exception to this and makes available their yearly report on e-readi-
ness rankings of 65 countries.
What are indicators?
ICT indicators provide a snapshot summary of information about
projects, countries or regions. The vantage point of the snapshot pro-
vides an indication of who is taking the picture and what is being
identified as important – or not. By way of example, a security firm
could develop a risk indicator for retail stores taking into account such
factors as the number of entry points to the store, how many security
cameras there are, timer locks on the store safe, bars on windows,
and background check protocols for hiring staff. Such an indicator
would purport to advise on the likelihood of the store being targeted
for robbery and being successfully robbed.
The security indicator could then be used by insurance firms to
assess insurance risk; by security firms to assess where they need to
apply their efforts to reinforce the existing security system; and by
potential thieves to pinpoint security weak points. Conversely, for ex-
ample, the owner of the enterprise might also use the security indica-
tor (perhaps without divulging its constituent statistical elements) as
supportive evidence for claiming that the business is not risky to po-
tential investors. This would be a misleading use of the indicator, as
investors are looking for a different kind of security, or at least a broader
definition of security. The indicator does not provide any kind of evi-
dence on the likelihood of the owner using the store for laundering
money, or under-reporting earnings for the purpose of tax evasion.
This kind of issue also arises in using indicators for advocacy.
As will be discussed further below, indicators are not neutral and ex-
press different things. The fact that the providers of a particular set of
indicators are from a different side of the fence does not mean that
their data or methodology is necessarily corrupt, flawed or bad. We
can assume, nonetheless, that there are different reasons for devis-
ing indicators, which may have a different focus, and thus may come
at the data from a different perspective. Despite agreement on the
importance of ICTs there is no sweeping consensus on approaches or
conceptual models. What are the most salient aspects that will dem-
onstrate progress? And what kinds of progress? Do we measure sim-
ply the incidence of infrastructure and technology penetration? Or do
we go further to also include data to document economic progress
and social progress?
Indicators are an abbreviated language or device: they point, but
do not explain. So it is useful to know who is doing the pointing, as
Source Website
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) <www.itu.int/ict>
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Indicators <mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg>
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) <www.oecd.org/ict>
Research ICT Africa! (RIA!) <www.researchictafrica.net>
UNCTAD: Measuring the information society <measuring-ict.unctad.org>
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Human Development Report <hdr.undp.org/statistics>
World Bank (WB): Information & Communications for Development (IC4D) -
Global Trends and Policies <www.worldbank.org/ic4d>
World Bank (WB): World Development Indicators <www.worldbank.org/data>
Table 1: Key ICT indicator sources
Index Source
Table 2: Predominant ICT indicator indices
Digital Access Index (DAI) International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
E-Readiness Index Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
E-Readiness Index United Nations Division for Public Administration
and Development Management (UNPAN)
ICT Index World Bank
Index of ICT Diffusion United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)
Index of Knowledge Societies (IKS) World Bank (WB)
Infostates Orbicom
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) World Bank Institute
Networked Readiness Index (NRI) World Economic Forum
Technology Achievement Index (TAI) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Gl
ob
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
So
ci
et
y 
W
at
ch
 / 
80
well as their motivation for pointing in the first place, and the evi-
dence used to legitimise their authority to point convincingly. Often,
we accept the authority of many indicators without delving into their
methodologies. Overall, indicators must be understood as value-laden
and not neutral. They provide a snapshot of progress in the context of
the particular world view of their creators and contain their own in-
herent values.
Indicators can contribute to three main aspects of ICT policy
development:
• Needs assessment
• Monitoring progress in different economic and social sectors
• Providing evaluation and feedback for specific programmes and
initiatives.
Indicators are essential for setting policy priorities, measuring
progress towards targets, and benchmarking results. Thus, indica-
tors can also be viewed as having a definitional function in terms of
setting the parameters of the problem to be addressed. The decision
of which indicators are important to collect provides evidence of what
is being valued. The definition, design and measurement underlying
indicators must be effected in reference to how they are intended to
be used. Otherwise, indicators can be false and misleading meas-
ures. This underlines the importance of policy advocates being
proactive in defining which indicators are important.
One of the most obvious examples is that it is only recently that
statistics and indicators that are disaggregated by gender have been
viewed as essential in mainstream practices – although it has long been
known that women and girls typically do not have the same level of
access to training and technology as boys and men. Without this kind
of statistical information about access levels between the sexes, no real
targets can be set, and realistic strategies for achieving their success
cannot be devised. In addition to gender, there are also many instances
of the already marginalised not being counted in statistical indicators.
The excuse or claim is that they are difficult to include for a variety of
reasons. Advocacy groups working at the grassroots level are particu-
larly well situated to contribute to the stemming of this oversight where
it occurs, giving the marginalised a voice – or at least a number.
Indicators can serve an advocacy function in support of demands
around national level policy-making; to illustrate a basis for universal
service projects; to lobby for a particular change in regulation; and so
forth. There are international conventions for national level collection
of data to report on a variety of socio-demographic phenomena such
as population, health, educational attainment, and economic perform-
ance (among others). These data are used comparatively and across
time to inform policies, target programmes, and guide investment
decisions. Data about technology penetration and use are increas-
ingly being used to form part of this picture.
Data are used in collections to form indicators. Indicators are an
interpretation of the data and provide a snapshot of the assessed terrain
from the perspective of what we want to show. Thus, if we consider the
information society as mainly being concerned with access to technol-
ogy, we will build an indicator that balances data about population, pen-
etration of infrastructure and the cost of using it. The change in the
indicator over time will provide feedback on policy performance as illus-
trated in Figure 1. The next section considers the practical challenges of
moving along the spectrum from data collection to indicators.
Data collection issues
Data is raw information such as the numbers programmed in your
speed dial, the last ten numbers dialled on your mobile phone, the
number of times you lent your phone to a friend last week, how
many people use prepaid telephony and how many have postpaid
subscriptions, how much it costs to make a call, whether you have
email access via your phone, your home, your local telecentre or
not at all, the hours that telecentres are open for business, whether
your mother has ever made a long distance call, and so forth. Which
of these are interesting and useful will depend on what is being
measured. Which data will actually be used is contingent on a number
of factors.
Access to data
Data being out there does not necessarily mean that it is available or
accessible. As shown in Figure 1, there has to be a determination of
what kinds of illustration the data is intended to provide. If the policy
being assessed targets women or youth, then it is clear that infor-
mation from those groups will need to be pursued. As has often
been the case, women, for example, have not been specifically tar-
geted in policy, resulting in a lack of gender-disaggregated data.
This means that a baseline for assessing initiatives that do now tar-
get women does not exist, making it difficult to assess progress or
the success of such initiatives.
Data sources may have different reasons for withholding infor-
mation. A recent survey on small and medium enterprise (SME) use
of ICT (Esselaar et al, 2006) found that entrepreneurs provided inac-
curate information due to concerns around taxation and competition,
and also because of a lack of record-keeping.
Sample size and selection
To achieve a legitimate sample for an international level indicator
you actually need a lot of data. Data collection can be an expensive
proposition. By way of example, the 1990 US census cost USD 2.5
billion to undertake a 33-question census of a population of
248,718,301, which works out to USD 10.02 per person, or USD
75.5 million per question. In 2000, the 53-question census cost
USD 4.5 billion at USD 15.99 per person or USD 84.9 million per
question.10  These costs do not include the time taken by individuals to
self-administer the questions, and if you think in terms of a researcher
administering surveys taking about 15 minutes each, it is not difficult
to see the costs of achieving a representative sample, and even more
so for a sample adhering to standards for international comparability.
Secondary use of data sets
While internationally comparable indicators may have their use, in
many instances there may be more practical strategies for collecting
information that is more complete than what already exists and is
likely to be sufficiently accurate for project or policy development. An
example of this is using ministry of education records, or even the
local school boards, for obtaining information about ICT availability
and use at the school or classroom level, rather than through the
national statistical institutes.
Another important strategy is secondary use of data sets, using
existing data sets for different purposes and combining data sets for
reanalysis. There is a tendency to push for collection of data, with less
attention being given to creative approaches to secondary analysis which
10 See: <www.genealogybranches.com/censuscosts.html>.
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can be equally revealing. For developing countries in particular this
may be the fastest, best and cheapest way to shed initial light on a
number of key issues. But there is also the risk of inheriting and hence
perpetuating biases in the design of the collection model or other
data errors.
Survey design
Data collection methodology is a large area and we will not go into
detail here, but will only provide an illustration of this aspect’s com-
plexity. For example, if you want to devise a survey to assess afford-
ability of mobile telephony, as undertaken by LIRNEasia in their
Telecom Use on a Shoestring project,11  what kinds of evidence do
you collect and what questions do you ask to ascertain this? In terms
of affordability, are you concerned with the cost of services or the
cost of acquiring a new handset and subsequent use? Some ques-
tions for the former include how often people use their phone to make
calls (or conversely whether they only use it to receive calls); how
expensive they perceive using their phone to be; and whether the cost
of calls being reduced by X-percent would alter their usage of the
phone. Further questions to round out the picture include inquiry into
different modes of communication (fixed, mobile or public access),
what the respondents felt were the benefits of access, and the re-
spondent’s monthly communication expenditure.
Once the questions are determined, however, it is still a meth-
odological challenge to get accurate results. Just the last question of
monthly communication expenditure can be difficult to accurately re-
member, especially if prepaid cards are used.
Summing up…
Reliable indicators aim for transparency around data sampling and
collection procedures. This transparency is achieved through clarity
of definitional terms and their explication, a clear statement of meth-
odology and methodological issues including how conflicting data
are resolved, how often new data is collected, the size of the sample,
and the strategy for achieving a random and representative sample.
Because political motivations for collecting particular kinds of data
are of paramount importance, it is useful to have clarity around who
is responsible for data collection and under what conditions (e.g. of
remuneration).
Issues around indicators
Indicators are not value free, but because they are expressed in num-
bers, they appear to be objective answers to what may be straight-
forward questions, such as, how many people have access to a tel-
ephone? The Partnership on Measuring ICT has made significant
strides in some of the definitional problematics, for example, in ar-
riving at common definitions for terms such as access and method-
ologies for indicator collection. However, increasingly ICT indica-
tors (or indices) attempt to demonstrate more complex questions,
such as a nation’s e-readiness or the link between ICT and growth.
This section seeks to identify ways in which indicators can be mis-
used or misinterpreted.
Harmonising definitions and indicators
How many people have access to a telephone? There are now different
ways to connect to telecom networks and there are different kinds of ICT
services and applications to allow people to communicate with others.
Accordingly, there has been a shift from a focus on universal service –
signalling aspirations for a fixed line to every home to provide affordable
basic telephone service – to universal access – recognising the possibil-
ity of providing reasonably affordable access to communication services
across communities by different access channels. Universal access ter-
minology recognises that having access to a telephone does not neces-
sarily imply ownership of either a fixed telephone or a mobile handset.
However, beyond ownership there are the further categories of subscriber,
user or percentage of the population within range of a signal. The defini-
tion for user varies widely from someone who has used a telephone some-
time during the last year, in the last three months, in the last month, a
certain number of times per given timeframe, etc. It is easy to see how
users and subscribers might be inadvertently used interchangeably, thus
creating inaccurate perceptions. In the same vein, the percentage of the
population (or number of inhabitants) with access to a signal does not
actually tell us how many are able to avail themselves of productive use
of the signal.
If we consider the community access points identified in the coun-
try case studies in this report, we find that there are telecentres, kiosks,
public internet access points, community technology centres, public serv-
ice stations, coin-operated public phones, etc. It is difficult to compare
these across countries, not because they have different names, but be-
cause the different names refer to different entities. Some are stand-alone
public telephones, others are telephone resell points (and just these two
examples have very different business models and service implications);
others provide internet services, which may include voice over internet
protocol (VoIP) telephony, others may be service centres which provide
support services in addition to technology access, and so forth.
Harmonisation of terminology and methods for assessing and as-
signing values also needs to occur at other levels, such as tariffs (per-
minute, per-second or per-pulse charges or flat rates); affordability, which
involves regional differences; accessibility, in terms of distance; broadband
services, for which there is some dispute between 3G and WiMax offer-
ings; and so forth. In order to illustrate the importance of such precision
around terminology, consider that lack of precision can result in claims
that an operator has fulfilled universal access requirements by installing
a single payphone in a village in a context in which providing universal
access fulfils licence conditions for exclusivity of service provision.
Indicators from supply and demand perspectives
Not surprisingly, there will often be a divergence between what op-
erators want to demonstrate (supply of services) and advocacy needs
Fig. 1: The ideal virtuous circle
Data Indicator Indices
Available resources
for data collection;
transparent access
to data; and data
collection
metodologies
Selection
and weighting
Benchmarking
assessment
Policy,
goals,
political will
Tools for
assessing
compliance,
enforcement,
and advocacy
11 <www.lirneasia.net/2006/04/teleuse-on-a-shoestring-expenditure-and-
perceptions-of-costs-amongst-the-financially-constrained>.
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that are made evident based on how ICTs and their applications and
services are used and made available across different socioeconomic
sectors of society. Clearly, supply- and demand-side concerns are
two sides of the same coin.
Supply-side indicators depict the ICT terrain from the service
providers’ perspective: how much of the terrain is serviced by a sig-
nal, how many fixed lines are available, how big the market is (for
different kinds of services), the conditions of offer (pricing). This kind
of data is captured in information that is required for reporting to
regulators and government authorities (such as for taxation and busi-
ness practices). In addition to the picture of the market that this infor-
mation presents, a key question is: Who has access to this informa-
tion? In many cases, operators retain such information for solely in-
Box 1: Bridges’ Real access / Real impact criteria
1 Physical access to technology
Is technology available and physically accessible?
2 Appropriateness of technology
What is the appropriate technology according to local
conditions, and how do people need and want to put
technology to use?
3 Affordability of technology and technology use
Is technology access affordable for people to use?
4 Human capacity and training
Do people understand how to use technology and its
potential uses?
5 Locally relevant content, applications and services
Is there locally relevant content, especially in terms of
language?
6 Integration into daily routines
Does the technology further burden people’s lives or does
it integrate into daily routines?
7 Socio-cultural factors
Are people limited in their use of technology based on
gender, race, or other socio-cultural factors?
8 Trust in technology
Do people have confidence in and understand the
implications of the technology they use, for instance in
terms of privacy, security, or cybercrime?
9 Local economic environment
Is there a local economy that can and will sustain
technology use?
10 Macro-economic environment
Is national economic policy conducive to widespread
technology use, for example, in terms of transparency,
deregulation, investment, and labour issues?
11 Legal and regulatory framework
How do laws and regulations affect technology use and
what changes are needed to create an environment that
fosters its use?
12 Political will and public support
Is there the necessary political will in government to
enable integration of technology throughout society?
Source: Bridges.org (<www.bridges.org/Real_Access>)
ternal use; and in some cases, regulators obtain operators’ indicators
but do not make them further available.
Demand-side indicators look to evidence about how services are
consumed: by whom (e.g. which members of the family), where services
are accessed, whether users would like to use services more than they
do – and why they are unable to do this (because the call centre is only
open when they are at work, because it costs too much, because they do
not know how to use particular service components, and so forth).
Qualitative vs. quantitative assessments
There are different ways of collecting and presenting information about
the ICT sector, as illustrated in the previous section. With a view to
international comparability and documenting progress by periodic
sampling, there is a logic to using numbers. A quantitative survey or
assessment counts things: how many phone lines exist, how many
homes and schools have computers, etc. However, as shown in terms
of different examples of indicator criteria (Boxes 1 and 2), measuring
the “digital divide” is complicated by qualitative factors: aspects that
are not easily counted, but which have a bearing on how effectively
ICTs are deployed.
An over-reliance on quantitative analysis will fail to capture the
quality of experience. For example, the introduction of computers into
schools may produce impressive statistics, but a qualitative analysis
Box 2: Orbicom’s assessment indicators
Infodensity
Networks
• Main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants
• Waiting lines/mainlines
• Digital lines/mainlines
• Cell phones per 100 inhabitants
• Cable TV subscribership per 100 households
• Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants
• Secure servers/Internet hosts
• International bandwidth (Kbs per inhabitant)
Skills
• Adult literacy rates
• Gross enrolment ratios
+  Primary education
+  Secondary education
+  Tertiary education
Info-use
Uptake
• TV equipped households per 100 households
• Residential phone lines per 100 households
• PCs per 100 inhabitants
• Internet users per 100 inhabitants
Intensity
• Broadband users/Internet users
• International outgoing telephone traffic minutes
per capita
• International incoming telephone traffic minutes
per capita
Source: Orbicom (<www.orbicom.ca>)
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will identify how well they are being used and what direction skill-
development initiatives should take. Interviews and case studies can
be used to collect this kind of qualitative information. The statistical
presence of ICT infrastructure does not guarantee access to the full
range of potential users. By way of another example, a teledensity
indicator does not show how telephones are used. The typically low
teledensity rates for developing countries must be understood in terms
of the practice of shared use of such technologies – which is very
much less the case for developed economies, and not made explicit
in the simple indicator.
One dollar a day and $100 laptops
By definition, indicators convey complex information in a concise for-
mat. Although more useful in some senses, reductive presentation of
complex realities may provide an image that rather than illuminating
a situation actually conceals it. By way of example, for those working
in the area of telecommunication, teledensity (the number of tel-
ephones per 100 people) has historically been a standard measure
identifying a given level of telecom infrastructure development. It is
acknowledged that a country’s teledensity denotes an average across
rural and urban areas, and that there may also be socioeconomic con-
straints on use or roll-out of infrastructure in certain areas.
However, ICT indicators are becoming popularised and increas-
ingly used by a wider set of actors from different backgrounds. Addi-
tionally, as ICTs have occupied an increasingly important space in
society and the economy, they are much more reported in the popular
media, which further simplifies presentation of indicators. An exam-
ple of this is the almost sloganistic reporting that there are more phones
in Manhattan than all of Africa. While this has limited use as an indi-
cator beyond a very basic level of consciousness raising, it nonethe-
less paints an evocative picture that people can use to grasp the enor-
mity of the “digital divide”.12  That this quasi indicator has not been
true for a long time is pretty much irrelevant to its continued use.13  In
the same vein, in the early 1990s, the number of times an encyclo-
paedia could circle the earth in a minute provided a visual image of
the speed of computers that people who were not familiar with com-
puters could relate to. Thus, ICT researchers, regulators and telecom
service providers are clear on how teledensity is used. But new users
of the terminology and indicator may not know to connect the indica-
tor with its underlying nuances and components – opening the door
to misinterpretation, misleading uses or fundamental misconceptions.
Another example of this is the international poverty indicator to
identify the number of people in the world living in extreme poverty.
This is the one dollar a day poverty line. Target 1 of the MDGs is to
“Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a
day.” This is a very strong and evocative image. Few people reading
this publication could subsist on one dollar per day.
But what does it mean to live on less than one dollar per day? In
simply asking this question it quickly becomes apparent that the image
is paramount but that the indicator has little to do with any kind of
purchasing power for people subsisting at this level (and perhaps even
little to do with an accurate assessment of real extreme poverty levels).
There are many different ways of measuring poverty and creating indi-
cators to assess poverty and progress on its alleviation. Beyond a vague
economic framing, the concept of one dollar per day provides very little
actual information about the different conditions of poverty.
The $100 laptop is a similar catch-phrase phenomenon – posit-
ing an economic and technical solution for the inability to provide
education to the world’s poorest children. The terminology “digital
divide” also posits a digital solution to divides that are entrenched in
historical socioeconomic exclusion and inequalities.14  Complex is-
sues are framed only in economic and technical terminology. For ICT
indicators, this issue also arises with the use of concepts such as e-
readiness and access to embody a range of meanings across techni-
cal infrastructure, social factors such as language and content, and
personal training and capacity attributes.
Different priorities, influences and results
Over the past decade and a half, there has been an increasing prolif-
eration of studies documenting the fact that ICTs are fundamental to
our economies and societies. And there has also been a growth in
indicator indices to assess and encapsulate different aspects of sec-
tor growth, ICT diffusion, links between ICTs and productivity, the
economy, educational attainment, and so forth. In short, there are a
range of different reasons for wanting to measure ICT. The Sibis re-
port (Technopolis, 2003) discusses the traditional approach of ICT
measurement across three fundamental views of access, use and
impact, with access being the easiest area to objectively document
and historically the predominant focus of ICT indicators.
Table 2 lists ICT indicators indices, which assess and rank coun-
tries on various aspects of ICT diffusion and absorption. While at a
glance they all appear to be concerned with a similar and common
outlook on a similar area of inquiry, they actually have a range of
different foci based on which element of access, use or impact is
most strongly stressed. These are generally the overarching catego-
ries for assessment, although each major ICT indicator index uses
varying terminology indicating the particular spin on their signature
ICT indicator index. For example:
• Digital Opportunity Index: opportunity, infrastructure, and utili-
zation.
• Orbicom Infostate Index: infodensity (the sum of all ICT stocks),
and info-use (consumption flows of ICTs/period), with infostate
being the aggregation of infodensity and info-use.
• Economist Intelligence Unit E-Readiness Index: connectivity and
infrastructure; business environment; consumer and business
adoption; legal and policy environment; social and cultural envi-
ronment; and supporting e-services.
• Networked Readiness Index (World Economic Forum): environ-
ment, readiness, and usage.
• Index of ICT Diffusion (UNCTAD): connectivity, access and policy.
A study on the gender “digital divide” in Francophone Africa, A
Harsh Reality, asserts that components for a gender “digital divide”
indicator should comprise: control, content relevance, capacities and
connectivity (Mottin-Sylla 2005, p. 34). A vantage point neglected in
the design of most ICT indicator and statistical collections is on gender
12 The term “digital divide” itself is also reductive, as it is a product of already
entrenched socioeconomic conditions.
13 A World Bank report looks into this, and hilariously finds that “A Google search
for ‘Manhattan more telephones Africa’ gets over 70,000 hits,” and further adds,
to debunk the myth, “Looking at just Sub-Saharan Africa, there are 10 million
fixed and 26 million mobile telephones, suggesting 7 telephones for each
Manhattanite and commuter” (WB, 2005, p. 9).
14 There are endless digital divide and $100 laptop discussions in different online
forums. The only argument being made here is that the solutions are implied in
the terminology used.
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differences in terms of access, use and impact. Use and impact issues
are often premised upon access indicators, and this is problematic.
Countries demonstrating increased infrastructure access may be oc-
cluding who is allowed to use the technology at a community or house-
hold level. While a gender-sensitive ICT indicator will collect informa-
tion on access, use and impact in a disaggregated gender format, the
gender “digital divide” indicator devised for the Francophone Africa
study is prescriptive, providing information with the intention of tar-
geting women’s additional unequal conditions for correction. The Real
Access/Real Impact criteria developed by Bridges and Orbicom’s as-
sessment categories (Boxes 1 and 2) further illustrate frameworks
extending beyond access to infrastructure.
Number of indicators related to infrastructure 3 6 10 8 2 3 4 12 4 6 5 11
Number included in infrastructure category 3 2 5 8 2 3 3 8 4 4 5 5
Internet penetration x o o x x x o o x x 10
Mobile penetration x x x o x x x x 8
Fixed penetration x x x x x x x 7
PCs per capita x x o x x x 6
Total telephone penetration x x x x 4
Internet host penetration x x x x 4
Internet affordability o o x o 4
Secure internet servers x x o 3
International internet bandwidth per inhabitant o x o 3
Broadband penetration o o x o 4
Electricity consumption x x 2
Proportion of households with fixed line x o 2
Proportion of households with a TV o x 2
Mobile tariffs o o 2
Proportion of households with internet x 1
Mobile internet subscribers x 1
Proportion of households with a PC x 1
Waiting lines/main lines x 1
Digital lines/mainlines x 1
Cable TV penetration x 1
Secure servers/internet hosts x 1
Technology exports x 1
TVs per capita x 1
Hotspot (WiFi) penetration x 1
Local call charge o 1
Fixed tariffs o 1
Mobile population coverage o 1
Source: Minges (2005)
Note: “X” means the indicator is found in an infrastructure category whereas “O” means that the indicator is included in the index but
located in another category.
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Table 3: What is ICT infrastructure?
Graph 1 shows the lack of consistency across the different indi-
ces. The country results for different indices are shown here as a
percentage of their ranking at the Latin American and Caribbean level.
Thus, if the findings were similar across the indices, there would be
incidence of parallel lines as there is for Argentina, Brazil and Colom-
bia for the UNPAN, WBICT and KEI indices – as shown at the top left
corner of the figure. This, however, is the only point of parallel find-
ings – with otherwise widely divergent results. Kauffman and Kumar
(2005) attribute this to the fact that there are three overarching per-
spectives for single item composite ICT indices, such as shown here.
These are ICT readiness, ICT intensity, and indices attempting to
measure impacts of ICTs. Minges’ (2005) work further illustrates the
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trade-offs or different strategies of assessments. This is shown par-
ticularly well by Table 3, a table he uses to depict the different choices
for ICT infrastructure within indices.
Small differences in choices of indicators can result in dramati-
cally different rankings across countries. One example highlighted is
the different results achieved for two indexes measuring countries’
technical capabilities. The UNDP’s Technology Achievement Index (TAI)
counted internet hosts, whereas the Arhibugi and Coco (ArCo) as-
sessment counted internet users. Minges (2005, p. 22) comments:
“Because a host can be located anywhere, it is not really a good meas-
ure of the intensity of internet usage in a country.” In the same vein,
Goswami (2006) argues that the Networked Readiness Index (NRI)
has too many components:
[S]tate of cluster development, number of utility patents, subsi-
dies for R&D, administrative burden, efficiency of tax system, over-
all infrastructure quality, extent of staff training are factors com-
mon to a number of industries and have little connection with ICT
environment, readiness or usage per se. However, they have the
same weight as other more directly related ICT indicators.
Indicators should be explicit with regards to their respective meth-
odologies. It is often the case that methodological statements remain
unread; indeed, many users of indicators lack the necessary background
in quantitative methods necessary to understand the complex statistics
or do not have the time to consider the raw data. Nonetheless, complex
calculations (by experts!) bundled into a single index number that is
offered at face value is not best practice and does not leave open the
opportunity for subsequent analysis and scrutiny. The security indica-
tor example above illustrates how indicators can be used out of context
to misrepresent a given situation. The same can be done simply by not
clarifying the methodology behind the indicator. As shown in the exam-
ples around data collection, there are different ways for collected data
to be biased or inaccurate. The same can also be true for how the data
is subsequently treated to form the basis for an indicator.
Transparency questions are not all pernicious. Some are simply
questions of avoiding misinterpretation or imprecision because of lack
of clarity around methods. Graph 2 provides an example of this. The
Knowledge Economy Index offers the overall indicator in absolute
terms or as adjusted for population. As can be seen in the figure, this
results in a significant difference for Latin American economies with
large populations such as Brazil and Mexico, where there are likely to
be larger gaps between different socio-economic sectors and between
rural and urban inhabitants.
Gender
Despite repeated calls for inclusion of gendered indicators and statis-
tical information disaggregated by gender, there is still lack of progress
in this regard. Huyer et al (2003) discuss a number of important points
around why ICT indicators disaggregated by gender are so important.
The first goes to the issue of women being instrumental in the pov-
erty reduction targeted by the MDGs. Secondly, “ICTs are expected to
play a catalytic role as well” (Huyer et al, 2003). With studies showing
that for the financially constrained there is a generalised positive so-
cial impact of women’s access to ICT – particularly in terms of family
health, but also in terms of employment – it is imperative first to
mobilise advocacy around inclusion, and subsequently to monitor
womens’ and girls’ participation in the information society. This is of
course difficult to undertake if gender-disaggregated statistical infor-
mation is not made more routinely available.
Although it is often pointed out that the “digital divide” is a mani-
festation of other already existing (and entrenched) divides, Huyer et
al (2003, p. 145) provide evidence that the “relationship between the
gender divide and the overall digital divide is very tenuous and does
not support the argument that the two move in tandem.” Thus, work
to reduce a “digital divide” will not necessarily extend benefits to
women and girls – unless the programme is specifically targeted and
implemented with the intention of addressing their particular needs
within particular socioeconomic contexts.
Until 2003, the only sex-disaggregated ICT data collected by the
ITU was the percentage of female employees in telecom administra-
tions, and since 2003, it has added only two new sex-disaggregated
indicators: female internet users as a percentage of total users, and
female internet users as a percentage of females (Halfkin, 2006, pp.
52-53). Internet use indicators are important, but for developing coun-
try contexts, access to mobile telephony is also a very important indi-
cator, as mobile telephony is rapidly becoming the predominant means
for universal access. The Research ICT Africa household surveys15
specifically addressed mobile access by women and men – one of the
first large-scale ICT index studies to do so.
Graph 1: Countries’ % rank for LAC for different indices
Graph 2: Knowledge Economy Index (2005)
15 <www.researchictafrica.net>.
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Summing up…
We rely on indicators to inform advocacy processes and to assess the
progress of ICT in terms of contributing to social goals. Because of
some of their inherent biases, strategic use of indicators means being
cognisant of these biases, and further, explicit in our own proactive
biases around inclusion and empowerment. This means that demand-
side indicators are especially important to inform analysis across dif-
ferent social classes and marginalised sectors of the population. Quali-
tative approaches in particular can further inform quantitative assess-
ments. Household surveys and affordability studies are examples of
such contributions. The project to fill in the gaps of questions that are
not asked, sectors of the population who are not surveyed, and correct-
ing or adding to indicator methodologies, is not a project that should
happen on the sidelines of mainstream indicator communities.
Further, it may be useful to focus more on demand-side infor-
mation to better ascertain technological adoption and productive in-
tegration into different societal sectors.
[T]he shortening of technology product life cycles makes any
tracking measurement problematic. The problem is compounded
by the fact that user definitions and perceptions of technology
vary across countries. Therefore, over the medium and long term,
measuring experience, measuring consumers’ satisfaction lev-
els, insulates indicators from changing technology and its vary-
ing nomenclature (Technopolis, 2003, p. 15).
Because of the multiple paths to connectivity that now exist,
with new paths emerging, what will be most important to document
is the quality of access and subsequent impact on quality of life and
creation and opening up of opportunities, necessitating a more quali-
tative approach to devising indicators and more nuanced understand-
ing of impacts.
Indicators for advocacy – emerging frameworks
How we count things to assess our progress towards universal ac-
cess to ICT will continue to be challenging, especially for the future.
As noted in the Introduction, we are no longer only counting the
number of business and residential subscriptions to a monopoly serv-
ice to arrive at a snapshot of the sector. There are different kinds of
users and subscribers, and there are multiple access channels to a
wide and always increasing array of applications and services. Fur-
ther, we need to know much more about this dynamic terrain than
mere information about access to technology. And, as illustrated in
the previous sections, there are different perspectives and interests
involved in how ICT markets, use, adoption, etc., are depicted. This
concluding section focuses on ways that civil society can mobilise
indicators in service of its own advocacy agenda and also to measure
progress towards achieving this agenda.
The first way to contribute to the design of appropriate indica-
tors is to participate in mainstream processes, such as the Partner-
ship on Measuring ICT for Development, emerging from the WSIS
events. These are extremely important venues for voicing alternative
perspectives and agendas. The participation of civil society in inter-
national forums is increasingly necessary for the processes to be
viewed as legitimate.
Another good way to achieve an intrinsic understanding of indi-
cators is to use them. As with most good practices, it is useful to
begin at home. Implementing proper evaluation practices for projects
and programmes requires the same steps used for indicator design,
which are to identify 1) what needs to be known or made explicit; 2)
where that information resides; 3) a strategy for sampling the data or
collecting information; 4) establishing parameters for ongoing moni-
toring; and 5) a presentation method to effectively depict the needed
information. Much work has already been undertaken to help users
develop and apply evaluation practices that rely on developing evalu-
ation type indicators for advocacy activities. Resources such as the
Gender Evaluation Methodology (GEM)16  set out to explain and de-
mystify processes around how to collect data and use it effectively.
There are numerous guides on project evaluation, but because of the
lack of significant stocks of information from a gendered perspective,
it is perhaps useful as a general rule to begin with GEM and only
deviate from this if a clear case is made that a different approach is
more effective. Through establishing agendas in our own practices,
new norms are created for quality of data stocks and indicators.
To achieve clarity about our own use of data and indicators, agree-
ment on definitions and priorities must occur across the organisation
and/or network. Initiatives such as this publication require that priori-
ties for evaluation are agreed upon. Evidence allocated to these cat-
egories across different case study countries provides an opportunity
to work towards standardisation of findings and resources, and to
agree upon acceptable sources of indicators.
Drafting strategic documents – such as the Association for Pro-
gressive Communications (APC) Internet Rights Charter, or the APC
Recommendations to the WSIS on Internet Governance – require a
vision of how to measure progress. For the latter document, one of five
areas of concern is dedicated to the brief to ensure that internet access
is “universal and affordable” (APC, 2005 and 2006) We need indicators
to illustrate where to exert efforts and pressure, and a way of measur-
ing progress towards these goals. Asserting aspirations of affordable
and universal internet access implies that there are definitions of “af-
fordable” and “universal” in order to assess progress towards achiev-
ing these goals. Affordability in itself is a highly relative term, as illus-
trated by Milne’s (2006) Affordability Toolkit. Affordability is contingent
on willingness and ability to pay for services, access to currency, defi-
nitions of poverty and baskets of goods to assess disposable income,
and income, among other factors. Universal merely means ubiquitous,
but as discussed above, ubiquitous access to a signal is a very different
concept than meaningful integration of new ICT services and applica-
tions into everyday lives. Indeed, as we write our vision statements, we
must simultaneously be devising a vision of evidence that will be mar-
shalled for advocacy and to celebrate successes.
At the end of the day, it may simply be important to know how
many people have access to a telephone. This is an important ques-
tion – and even more so if we take the time to unpack it. 
16 Gender Evaluation Methodology (GEM) for Internet and ICT:
<www.apcwomen.org/gem>.
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ICT indices available online
i) Opportunity:
a. Percentage of population in areas covered by
mobile cellular telephony (not necessarily
subscribers)
b. Internet access tariffs as a percentage of per
capita income
c. Mobile cellular tariffs as a percentage of per capita
income
ii) Infrastructure:
a. Proportion of households with a fixed line
telephone
b. Proportion of households with a computer
Digital Opportunity Index (DOI)
1 <www.itu.int/doi>.
2 <www.itu.int/wisr>.
3 For information on the calculation of these indicators, see: ITU (2006). DOI: A  users’
guide [online]. Available from: <www.itu.int/osg/spu/statistics/DOI/doi-guide.pdf>.
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) / Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (KADO) - Digital Opportunity Platform.1
The DOI is compiled for 180 countries and published annually
in the World Information Society Report.2
The DOI is based on eleven core ICT indicators grouped
in three clusters:3
c. Proportion of households with internet access
at home
d. Mobile cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants
e. Mobile internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants
iii) Utilisation:
a. Proportion of individuals that used the internet
b. Ratio of fixed broadband subscribers to total
internet subscribers
c. Ratio of mobile broadband subscribers to total
mobile subscribers
The indicators are averaged within each category and
categories are averaged to obtain the DOI value.
The index ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 would be
“complete digital opportunity”.
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Digital Opportunity Index
Variation 2005-2006
Country Opportunity Infrastructure Utilisation DOI Rank
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Argentina 0.96 0.97 0.30 0.36 0.15 0.21 0.47 0.51 51 54
Brazil 0.87 0.92 0.24 0.27 0.16 0.24 0.42 0.48 71 65
Colombia 0.88 0.89 0.19 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.38 0.45 88 80
Ecuador 0.89 0.89 0.16 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.36 0.40 100 97
Mexico 0.93 0.94 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.25 0.43 0.47 66 66
Peru 0.86 0.82 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.39 0.40 85 96
Americas 0.86 0.87 0.23 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.40 0.45 78.9 78
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.93 0.95 0.27 0.36 0.05 0.14 0.42 0.48 75 64
Bulgaria 0.96 0.97 0.34 0.40 0.22 0.26 0.51 0.54 46 47
Croatia 0.97 0.98 0.44 0.47 0.10 0.14 0.51 0.53 45 48
Romania 0.93 0.96 0.26 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.52 53 50
Spain 0.99 0.99 0.54 0.59 0.30 0.39 0.61 0.65 25 21
Europe 0.97 0.97 0.46 0.50 0.22 0.28 0.55 0.58 38.4 39
Bangladesh 0.60 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.25 139 134
India 0.80 0.83 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.29 0.31 119 124
Pakistan 0.73 0.76 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.29 128 127
Philippines 0.93 0.93 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.36 0.38 94 102
Asia 0.81 0.82 0.23 0.26 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.40 88.6 92
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 0.46 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.08 150 176
Egypt 0.94 0.96 0.17 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.38 0.41 90 91
Ethiopia 0.26 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.10 173 172
Kenya 0.34 0.46 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.17 164 153
Nigeria 0.41 0.45 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.17 155 155
South Africa 0.90 0.94 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.38 0.42 91 86
Uganda 0.45 0.46 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.16 152 158
Africa 0.52 0.55 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.22 139 140
WORLD 0.77 0.79 0.23 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.37 0.40 90.5 91
Source: World Information Society Report (2006, 2007)
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4 <www.worldbank.org/wbi/knowledgefordevelopment>.
5 <info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2006>.
6 Two versions of the KEI have been developed: the default weighted version, in which the three innovation variables are weighted by population, and the unweighted version,
in which these variables are presented in terms of absolute values. For more information on the KEI variables and their sources, see: <web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/KFDLP/EXTUNIKAM/0,,contentMDK:20588132~menuPK:1453369~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1414721,00.html>.
ii) Education and human resources:
a. Adult literacy rate
b. Secondary enrolment
c. Tertiary enrolment
iii) The innovation system:
a. Researchers in R&D
b. Patent applications granted by the US Patent
and Trademark Office
c. Scientific and technical journal articles
iv) Information and communication technology:
a. Telephones per 1,000 people
b. Computers per 1,000 people
c. Internet users per 10,000 people
The KEI is compiled for a group of 128 countries which in-
cludes “most of the developed (OECD) economies and over
90 developing countries.”
The KEI is calculated based on the average of the nor-
malised (on a scale of 0 to 10) performance scores of a
country or region on all four pillars related to the knowledge
economy, as identified by the World Bank’s Knowledge As-
sessment Methodology (KAM).5  For the purposes of calcu-
lating the KEI, each pillar is represented by three key vari-
ables:6
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI)
Source: The World Bank - Knowledge for Development Programme.4
i) Economic incentive and institutional regime:
a. Tariff & non-tariff barriers
b. Regulatory quality
c. Rule of law
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Country7 Economic Innovation Education ICT KEI Rank
incentive regime
Argentina 3.19 6.15 6.71 5.59 5.41 51
Brazil 4.03 5.17 5.57 5.61 5.10 60
Colombia 3.55 3.31 4.48 4.64 4.00 79
Ecuador 1.91 2.27 3.63 4.13 2.98 92
Mexico 5.09 4.96 4.38 5.72 5.04 61
Peru 3.45 3.33 5.30 4.65 4.18 75
Latin America 4.43 4.66 4.25 5.29 4.66 -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.52 2.96 5.98 4.17 4.16 76
Bulgaria 4.79 6.12 7.41 6.21 6.13 41
Croatia 5.72 6.75 6.14 7.13 6.43 40
Romania 4.31 5.17 5.94 6.05 5.37 54
Europe and Central Asia 4.85 6.59 6.74 6.32 6.12 -
Spain 7.88 7.75 8.41 7.69 7.93 24
Western Europe 7.75 8.77 8.16 8.62 8.32 -
Bangladesh 0.76 1.63 1.57 0.83 1.20 122
India 3.11 3.64 2.11 2.00 2.71 97
Pakistan 1.60 2.10 1.04 1.30 1.51 115
South Asia 2.38 2.96 1.88 1.69 2.23 -
Philippines 4.66 2.38 5.05 4.02 4.03 78
East Asia 5.64 7.13 4.57 6.77 6.03 -
Egypt 3.14 4.30 4.35 3.31 3.77 83
Middle East and North Africa 4.12 6.57 3.68 5.89 5.06 -
Ethiopia 1.37 0.61 0.81 0.10 0.72 130
Kenya 2.21 4.18 1.83 2.28 2.62 102
Nigeria 0.45 2.51 1.82 1.48 1.57 113
South Africa 5.95 5.69 4.19 4.93 5.19 58
Uganda 4.00 1.90 1.11 0.87 1.97 108
Africa 2.58 3.03 1.39 2.51 2.38 -
WORLD 4.73 7.18 4.13 6.31 5.59 -
Source: 2005 Interactive Knowledge Assessment Methodology (Accessed April 2007)
Knowledge Economy Index
(innovation variables weighted by population)
7 Data not available for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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Source: Global Information Technology Report (2005-2006, 2006-2007)
The NRI covers 122 countries and is published annually in
the Global Information Technology Report.9
The NRI is composed of three component indexes which
assess: the environment for ICT offered by a given country
or community, the readiness of the community’s key stake-
holders – individuals, business and governments – and the
usage of ICT among these stakeholders.
These component indexes are, in turn, each obtained
from three subindexes:
i) Environment:
a. Market environment
b. Political and regulatory environment
c. Infrastructure environment
ii) Readiness:
a. Individual readiness
b. Business readiness
c. Government readiness
iii) Usage:
a. Individual usage
b. Business usage
c. Government usage
The NRI subindixes are composed of 67 different indi-
cators. In order to calculate the index, the data are first trans-
formed on a scale of 1 to 7. Next, each of the subindexes is
computed as the mathematical average of the variables com-
posing it. The same approach is used to calculate the com-
ponent indexes, averaging the subindexes. Finally, the NRI is
computed as an average of the three component indexes.10
The NRI uses a combination of survey, quantitative and
qualitative indicator data. Quantitative (“hard”) data is obtained
from international multilateral agencies (such as the World Bank
and the ITU), while qualitative (“soft”) indicators are subjec-
tive data gathered from opinion surveys conducted by the World
Economic Forum as part of their research for the Global Com-
petitiveness Report.
Networked Readiness Index (NRI)
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF).8
Networked Readiness Index – Rank variation 2005-2006
Country11 NRI 2006 Rank
2005-2006 2006-2007
Argentina 3.59 63 71
Bangladesh 2.55 118 110
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.2 89 97
Brazil 3.84 53 52
Bulgaria 3.53 72 64
Colombia 3.59 64 62
Croatia 4 46 57
Ecuador 3.05 97 107
Egypt 3.44 77 63
Ethiopia 2.55 119 115
India 4.06 44 40
Kenya 3.07 95 91
Mexico 3.91 49 55
Nigeria 3.23 88 90
Pakistan 3.31 84 67
Peru 3.43 78 85
Philippines 3.55 69 70
Romania 3.8 55 58
South Africa 4 47 37
Spain 4.35 32 31
Uganda 2.97 100 79
8 <www.weforum.org>.
9 <www.weforum.org/gitr>.
10 For an analysis of the 2005-2006 NRI indicators see: Goswami, D. (2006). A Review of the Network Readiness Index [online]. World Dialogue on Regulation. Available from:
<www.regulateonline.org/content/view/823/74/>. The author questions the credibility of the index based on “the non-transparent manner in which the authors report the
sources of the data and the methodology that was followed to collect the raw data. Since the raw data for a number of indicators are based on perception surveys that are
conducted by one of the partner organizations, it is difficult for any other entity to replicate the NRI.”
11 Data not available for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Note:
Due to methodological changes, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 NRI values are
not comparable.
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The Index of ICT Diffusion was compiled for 180 countries
and published in 2006 in the Digital Divide Report.
The Index of ICT Diffusion is designed to evaluate ICT
development using indicators of ICT diffusion across coun-
tries.13  It measures the average achievements in a country
in two dimensions: Connectivity, aimed at measuring infra-
structure development, and Access, aimed at describing the
opportunity to take advantage of being connected.
i) Connectivity:
a. Internet hosts per capita
b. PCs per capita
c. Telephone mainlines per capita
d. Mobile subscribers per capita
ii) Access:
a. Number of estimated internet users
b. Adult literacy rate
c. Cost of a local call
d. GDP per capita
An index score is calculated for each of these indicators
by applying the following formula: value achieved / maxi-
mum reference value. Connectivity and Access indices are
then calculated as an average of index scores of their re-
spective components and the Index of ICT Diffusion is itself
an average of these two dimensions.
Index of ICT Diffusion
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).12
Index of ICT Diffusion
12 <www.unctad.org>.
13 For information on these indicators and their sources, see: UNCTAD (2006). The Digital Divide Report: ICT Diffusion Index 2005 [online]. New York/Geneva: UN. Available
from: <www.unctad.org/TEMPLATES/webflyer.asp?docid=6994&intItemID=2529>.
14 Data not available for Croatia.
Source: The Digital Divide Report (2006)
Country14 Access Connectivity ICT Rank
Diffusion
Argentina 0.576 0.168 0.372 71
Bangladesh 0.336 0.010 0.173 171
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 0.525 0.172 0.373 70
Brazil 0.532 0.180 0.356 76
Bulgaria 0.607 0.248 0.428 52
Colombia 0.531 0.124 0.328 85
Dem. Rep.
of  the Congo 0.273 0.022 0.130 179
Ecuador 0.500 0.122 0.311 94
Egypt 0.402 0.070 0.236 134
Ethiopia 0.333 0.002 0.168 173
India 0.407 0.023 0.215 142
Kenya 0.440 0.022 0.231 136
Mexico 0.546 0.161 0.353 77
Nigeria 0.410 0.018 0.214 144
Pakistan 0.362 0.016 0.189 165
Peru 0.518 0.080 0.299 104
Philippines 0.509 0.107 0.308 97
Romania 0.582 0.184 0.383 66
South Africa 0.512 0.145 0.328 84
Spain 0.697 0.402 0.549 31
Uganda 0.416 0.010 0.213 147
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ii) Telecommunication Infrastructure Index
This is a composite weighted average index of six primary
indices based on basic infrastructural indicators, which
define a country’s ICT infrastructure capacity. These are:
a. PCs per 1,000 people
b. Internet users per 1,000 people
c. Telephone lines per 1,000 people
d. Online population
e. Mobile phones per 1,000 people
f. TVs per 1,000 people
iii) Human Capital Index
The data for this index rely on the UNDP’s Education In-
dex, which is a composite of the adult literacy rate and the
combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment
ratio with two thirds weight given to adult literacy and one
third to gross enrolment ratio.
The UN E-Government Readiness Index was compiled for 191
UN member countries and published in 2005 in the Global E-
Government Readiness Report.16
Along with an assessment of website development pat-
terns in a country for provision of information, products and
services, the E-Government Readiness Index incorporates ac-
cess characteristics, such as infrastructure and educational
levels, to reflect how a country is using information tech-
nologies to promote access and inclusion of its people.
The E-Government Readiness Index is a composite in-
dex comprising: the Web Measure Index, the Telecommuni-
cation Infrastructure Index and the Human Capital Index:17
i) Web Measure Index
This index is based on a five-stage model, which is as-
cending in nature, and builds upon the previous level of
sophistication of a state’s online presence. Assessments
are based on a questionnaire, which allows for only a
binary value to the indicator based on the presence/ab-
sence of specific electronic facilities/services available.
E-Government Readiness Index
Source: United Nations E-Government Readiness Knowledge Base (UNKB).15
Country Web Measure Human Capital Infrastructure E-Readiness Rank
Argentina 0.6577 0.96 0.1737 0.5971 34
Bangladesh 0.0731 0.45 0.0055 0.1762 162
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.2731 0.84 0.0926 0.4019 84
Brazil 0.75 0.88 0.1644 0.5981 33
Bulgaria 0.5192 0.91 0.2522 0.5605 45
Colombia 0.6154 0.84 0.111 0.5221 54
Croatia 0.4423 0.9 0.3018 0.548 47
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 0 0.51 0.0021 0.1707 180
Ecuador 0.25 0.85 0.0899 0.3966 92
Egypt 0.4462 0.62 0.0717 0.3793 99
Ethiopia 0.0154 0.39 0.0027 0.136 171
India 0.5827 0.59 0.0277 0.4001 87
Kenya 0.2308 0.74 0.0187 0.3298 122
Mexico 0.8192 0.85 0.1491 0.6061 31
Nigeria 0.2231 0.59 0.0143 0.2758 139
Pakistan 0.4269 0.4 0.0238 0.2836 136
Peru 0.5577 0.86 0.1091 0.5089 56
Philippines 0.7423 0.89 0.084 0.5721 41
Romania 0.6423 0.88 0.1889 0.5704 44
South Africa 0.5692 0.83 0.1234 0.5075 58
Spain 0.3923 0.97 0.3919 0.5847 39
Uganda 0.2154 0.7 0.009 0.3081 125
Source: Global E-Government Readiness Report (2005)
15 <www.unpan.org/egovkb>.
16 <www.unpan.org/egovkb/global_reports/05report.htm>.
17 For information on these indicators and their sources, see: UN (2005). UN Global E-government Readiness Report 2005: From E-government to E-inclusion [online].
New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Available from: <unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021888.pdf>.
E-Government Readiness Index
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iiii) Consumer and business adoption (weight: 20%)
The category criteria include: national spending on infor-
mation and communications technology as a proportion
of GDP, level of e-business development, degree of online
commerce, quality of logistics and delivery systems and
availability of corporate finance.
iv) Legal and policy environment (weight: 15%)
The category criteria include: overall political environment,
policy toward private property, government vision regard-
ing digital-age advances, government financial support of
internet infrastructure projects, effectiveness of traditional
legal framework, laws covering the internet, level of cen-
sorship and ease of registering a new business.
v) Social and cultural environment (weight: 15%)
The category criteria include: educational level, internet/
web literacy, degree of entrepreneurship, technical skills
of workforce and degree of innovation.
vi) Supporting e-services (weight: 5%)
The category criteria include: availability of e-business con-
sulting and technical support services, availability of back-
office support and industry-wide standards for platforms
and programming languages.
The EIU has published an annual e-readiness ranking since
2000. In 2006 the ranking – evaluating technological, eco-
nomic, political and social assets – was compiled for 68
countries.19
The EIU ranking model consists of nearly 100 separate
quantitative and qualitative criteria, which are scored and
organised into six primary categories. These are, in turn,
weighted according to their assumed importance as influ-
encing factors. The six categories (and their weight in the
model) and criteria are as follows:
i) Connectivity and technology infrastructure (weight:
25%)
The category criteria include: narrowband penetration,
broadband penetration, mobile-phone penetration,
internet penetration, PC penetration, WiFi hotspot pen-
etration, internet affordability and security of internet
infrastructure.
ii) Business environment (weight: 20%)
Includes 70 indicators, covering criteria such as the
strength of the economy, political stability, the regula-
tory environment, taxation, competition policy, the la-
bour market, the quality of infrastructure, and open-
ness to trade and investment.
E-Readiness Index
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).18
E-Readiness Index
18 <www.eiu.com>.
19 Available from: <graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/2006Ereadiness_Ranking_WP.pdf>.
20 Data not available for Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.
Argentina 3.00 5.95 5.30 6.49 5.20 6.00 5.05
Brazil 2.55 6.54 5.40 6.86 4.80 6.00 5.07
Bulgaria 3.60 6.44 3.30 5.47 4.80 5.75 4.68
Colombia 2.20 6.07 3.70 5.90 3.60 5.00 4.18
Ecuador 1.80 5.42 3.00 5.63 4.20 4.50 3.83
Egypt 2.20 5.48 3.65 4.74 4.00 4.25 3.90
India 1.40 6.29 4.25 4.86 4.40 6.50 4.17
Mexico 3.15 6.97 4.50 6.98 5.20 6.00 5.21
Nigeria 1.00 4.65 3.50 4.60 4.60 4.00 3.46
Pakistan 1.25 5.20 1.95 3.80 3.20 2.75 2.93
Peru 1.70 5.84 3.30 6.29 4.00 5.50 4.07
Philippines 2.15 6.51 2.90 4.50 4.80 4.25 4.03
Romania 2.65 6.25 2.25 5.44 4.80 5.75 4.19
South Africa 2.10 6.94 6.10 7.48 6.00 7.50 5.53
Spain 6.20 7.97 6.50 7.88 6.80 8.75 7.08
Country20 Connectivity Business Consumer and Legal and policy Social and cultural Supporting Overall
environment business adoption environment environment e-services score
Source: The EIU e-readiness rankings (2005)
Country reports
Alan Finlay
Introduction
The contrast between the countries covered by the 22 reports included
here is striking. No fewer than four regions are represented: Africa,
Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, with one report from a West-
ern European country. The countries are diverse linguistically (only six
have English as an official language; five of these reports were trans-
lated from Spanish, and one from Portuguese), geographically (Bra-
zil’s gargantuan 8.5 million square km compared to Bosnia
Herzegovina’s 51,000 square km) and demographically (Pakistan’s
population of 160 million versus South Africa’s 47 million). While coun-
tries like India can boast a rapidly developing information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) infrastructure, post-war countries such as
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Bosnia and Herzegovina
begin from a very low infrastructural base. As OneWorld South East
Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina) says, this “[affects] ordinary life.”
But these reports show that despite these differences, when it
comes to ICTs for development, there are some striking similarities
between the countries. Most immediately, and putting Spain aside,
they are “developing” countries, each showing obvious evidence of
the “digital divide” which impacts on the majority of the people nega-
tively. In India only parts of the country are benefiting from the per-
haps unprecedented growth in the country’s ICT sector. And, as RITS
puts it, the absence of a people-orientated policy framework in Brazil
runs the risk of “condemn[ing]” the vast majority of people to “eter-
nal disconnection.”
What all of these countries also have in common is their rapid
emergence into a global information society that is driven by myriad,
interconnected, and often competing factors. As Alternatives (DRC)
shows, even war-ravaged countries are potential markets for multi-
national corporations. Brazil, among other Latin American countries,
suggests that markets that are opened up to international competi-
tion (the “policy factor”) are not necessarily acting in the best inter-
ests of the country. Liberalisation, some of these reports contend,
can come at a cost; it is not simply a prima facie good.
The reports suggest several other commonalities between the
countries represented here that can perhaps be taken as typical of the
ICT policy-development environment in many developing countries.
The lack of a clear ICT vision
Many of the countries lack a clear ICT vision for their future. This can
play havoc with any attempt to forge a cogent approach to
infrastructural development (such as building a broadband backbone
in a country) or developing a coherent regulatory framework to gov-
ern markets effectively.
The absence of a clear vision impacts immediately on ICT issues
that are often perceived as the “soft” ICT issues – such as language,
gender, local content, citizens’ rights, and support for differently abled
people. These are issues that are, as Pangea (Spain) suggests, “diffi-
cult to measure,” but that should form an integral part of any long-
term ICT strategy in a country right from the start. For RITS, this does
not happen by accident, but begins with accepting that “public policy
expenditures in leveraging ICTs for human development are not costs,
but essential investments.”
A lack of capacity, skills and awareness
in government and civil society
One contributing factor to this lack of vision is a lack of institutional
capacity in a country (whether in civil society, the government or even
the private sector). While Nodo TAU (Argentina) finds that civil soci-
ety organisations have far greater awareness and know-how and a
more sophisticated perspective on ICTs than the government, they
lack the coordination necessary to have a meaningful impact on policy
development. For Bytes for All, Pakistan shows a “serious lack of ca-
pacity” in a range of fields that needs to be attended to in order to
impact on inequalities in access to ICTs. Alternatives found that the
recent (mis)management of ICANN requirements in the DRC shows a
clear lack of capacity in the government and the national operator to
cope effectively with important national ICT resources.
For some countries, such as South Africa, civil society participa-
tion in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was
erratic, often attributed to a lack of awareness among social advo-
cates of the importance of ICTs, and the ICT policy environment, to
their work. WOUGNET found that although the political will existed in
Uganda, there is also a lack of awareness of the advantages of ICTs,
coupled with a low level of skills. With the lack of skills, awareness
and capacity, the ability to act is hamstrung.
An unsettled legislative and regulatory environment
The lack of a coherent ICT vision for a country inevitably means a
haphazard ICT policy environment. The reports show that the devel-
opment of the legislative and policy environment can be steadied by
regional agreements. While some suggest that the WSIS acted as a
catalyst for a fresh interest in ICT policy development at the national
level (and spurred new interest from civil society), other regional agree-
ments, such as the Regional Action Plan for an Information Society in
Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC2007), have also had a posi-
tive impact on policy development.
However, the impact of these regional processes depends on the
level of buy-in from affected countries. While there is a sense that
some of the binding force behind the WSIS was the “moral” momen-
tum behind the Summit (governments that were not part of it joined
the process, those that did not initially include civil society came to
recognise the value in a multi-stakeholder approach, etc.), it can also
be said that a regional plan such as the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) lacks the comparable presence to guide and
direct ICT development in Africa. Certainly, in countries like Uganda,
civil society actors appear to have rallied behind the WSIS Action Plan,
and not behind NEPAD’s vision for ICT roll-out.
Conversely, for Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria, EU accession re-
quirements have been significantly more important than any commit-
ments made at the WSIS.
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A policy vacuum means fragmented implementation. Despite the
burgeoning ICT sector in the country, India has no independent agency
to address all areas of ICT policy. In Colombia there is little coopera-
tion between the ICT programmes in government departments, de-
spite attempts by the government to synergise its implementation
efforts. The Kenyan government has lacked political will and leader-
ship in the past, a status quo reflected in the absence of a national ICT
policy (until recently) and in the ineffective coordination between gov-
ernment departments.
When a policy framework has been developed, it often lacks a
developmental perspective. Colombia, for instance, lacks a telecom-
munications law that ensures access to the information society for all
citizens. Ecuador’s White Paper on the Information Society holds great
hope for civil society activists in that country. It has been, according
to the Association for Progressive Communications’ LAC Policy Moni-
tor, developed in an inclusive, democratic and transparent way, re-
flecting the diverse approaches in the different sectors in that coun-
try. Despite this, a “common strategic development perspective” is
still lacking, as are mechanisms to ensure that engagement happens
under “equal conditions.”
For LaNeta, ICT policies in Mexico offer a leg up for business –
and even help to strengthen monopolies – at the expense of the needs
of the country’s citizens. Instead of a people-centred approach, the
state “auctioned off the nation’s wealth without taking communities
into account.”
Brazil’s privatisation process did not take into account global shifts
in the ICT landscape, and may have increased monopolistic practices
in the country. Even ICTs directly related to national security are de-
pendent on commercial satellite connections operated by multina-
tionals.
These reports suggest that achieving universal access is a delib-
erate step that needs to be taken: it can rarely be left to market forces
alone. According to IT for Change, the ICT industry in India has not
improved the poor distribution of ICT resources across different so-
cial and linguistic groups, geographic regions and classes. The fail-
ure to develop policy which responds to these concerns has resulted
in a situation where some enjoy “first-world” ICT services, while most
“subsist” with little or no ICT access to speak of. Access for women
and differently abled people remains a problem.
The reports show that a change in government, while providing
an advocacy opportunity for some, can often contribute to a frag-
mented policy space. ZaMirNet (Croatia) puts it bluntly: “National strat-
egies are not well coordinated and strategic documents often get
tossed in the garbage bin with a change of government.”
Developing and sustaining a clear people-focused vision is not
always easy. While South Africa has a history of vibrant civil society
engagement in politics and social development, it is frequently chided
for its lack of policy coherence. As the Link Centre suggests, the clos-
est it comes to an overall national ICT policy framework is a now ten-
year-old document, the 1996 White Paper on Telecommunications
Policy.
An immature relationship between civil society,
business and the state
Pangea notes that a necessary condition for citizens to feel a part of
the “construction” of the information society is their “participation as
subjects” and not “merely as objects of development measures.” The
irony of launching an e-government initiative in order to bring the
people closer to the administration of the day, while not creating
mechanisms for proper civil society (or private sector) participation
in policy development or infrastructural roll-out, should not be lost.
While KICTANet (Kenya) shows an active and constructive relation-
ship between government, civil society and the private sector is possi-
ble, in many instances the relationship is imbalanced, or immature. In
both Romania and India, the lack of civil society participation means that
a technocratic or industry-driven policy perspective prevails. This comes
at a price. StrawberryNet (Romania) has found that issues such as gen-
der rights and free and open source software (FOSS) are absent from
public discourse on ICTs. And as ZaMirNet has found: “Most citizens are
reduced to mere consumers of telecommunication services.”
Colnodo (Colombia) suggests that a fragmented strategic vision
for ICTs, which leads to a “disconnect” between government depart-
ments, makes civil society engagement with the state difficult. At the
same time, transparency is lacking in a post-conflict country such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although it participated in the WSIS, the
outcomes remained “invisible” to the general population.
While the LAC Policy Monitor feels that the WSIS has played a
significant role in convincing the government in Ecuador of the po-
tential of multi-stakeholder participation in the policy environment,
this has not been true for all countries. Civil society and private sector
participation was absent in Pakistan’s participation in the WSIS, and
the results show: the country is described as a “graveyard of many
failed and unsuccessful projects” which the government “seems com-
mitted to implementing…on its own.”
ArabDev says Egypt lacks public consultation forums and mecha-
nisms that ensure public participation in ICT policy development. Ways
to contest regulatory decisions are unclear. While “important spaces”
have been opened up in Peru, these have yet to become inclusive, and
continue to relegate citizens to the role of “spectators and not pro-
tagonists.” Nigeria is described as “deprived…of much-needed ro-
bust consultation and discussions.” Only recently has civil society
begun to make its presence felt.
Alternative civil society spaces are being formed out of necessity.
In Bangladesh, “CSOs are networking and re-grouping among them-
selves to project a single voice to the decision-makers.” In Brazil it is
rare for civil society to be invited to participate in policy processes.
However, its National Digital Inclusion Workshop, held annually since
2002, is a forum where “human-centred” ICT policy can be articulated.
The responsibility of civil society
“We cannot content ourselves with the limitations of underdeveloped
countries,” writes RITS. “While we have different levels of resources
available to us compared to developed countries, our ability to do
much better is indisputable.”
Civil society, as the Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA, Phil-
ippines) reminds us, is opportunistic in the best sense of the word.
The WSIS has impacted positively on that country’s policy “ecosys-
tem”, and civil society organisations “took advantage” of the Sum-
mit’s processes, “advancing multi-stakeholder approaches locally.”
These reports show that key areas of concern for civil society
include FOSS and open standards, gender issues, rural access, intel-
lectual property, localisation, local content, and community access to
ICTs and media, among others. Each of these requires specific knowl-
edge, expertise and strategies for engagement, often with regional
implications. Experiences in Argentina and Kenya, among other coun-
tries, show that civil society needs clear goals and specific strategies
to impact on the policy process and, as Nodo TAU puts it, to “pro-
mote breakthrough legislation.”
Even when this breakthrough legislation is achieved, Colnodo
finds that important issues, such as promoting a gender perspective,
remain elusive. Colombia’s three ICT programmes do not have
affirmative action policies that favour vulnerable groups, such as
women, youth, the elderly or the country’s ethnic populations. These
are specific areas of intervention for civil society.
The LAC Policy Monitor feels that civil society can take on a re-
gional monitoring role, while improving its capacity for direct engage-
ment. It needs to advocate for policies independent of the government
of the day. These policies, as RITS puts it, should be “future proof”.
TIC.pe (Peru) poses several questions for non-governmental
actors: What, it asks, is our responsibility? And how can we move
from reflection to direct action? The information society is a global
resource. It calls for a “deepening political dialogue” so that it can be
safeguarded for future generations.
A tool for leveraging change
The 22 contributors to this year’s Global Information Society Watch
(GISW) report were encouraged to develop their reports in line with
their own advocacy work. While they were given guidelines, their ap-
proaches were often different. Bytes for All (Bangladesh), for exam-
ple, has created a “living and collaborative document”, even publish-
ing it as a wiki. IT for Change interviewed key civil society stakehold-
ers in order to offer a civil society “voice”. Pangea has elected to
interrogate the WSIS stocktaking database, and to ask: Does it say
anything useful? For the FMA, its report reflects the perspective of
“advocates-in-action”.
For some contributors this was the first opportunity they have
had to develop an overview of the ICT environment in their country –
and to articulate ways in which civil society can engage this environ-
ment. The process of writing the report opened new vistas for them.
For others, ICT policy advocacy has formed the mainstay of their civil
society activism.
Most contributions were informed by the awareness that the
GISW report will be an annual publication. Future reports will build on
and clarify what has been developed here.
These reports occur in the wake of important global processes
such as the WSIS, and the advent of others, such as the Internet
Governance Forum. We hope that they offer a perspective that many
working in the local, regional and global ICT policy arenas can begin
to call home, a way of deepening understanding and a tool for
leveraging change. 
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Escobar, Milena Romano and Laura Moya
ARGENTINA
Introduction
The concept of the information society is frequently included in the
initiatives of different Argentine government agencies. Nevertheless,
in Argentina there is no consistent and coherent public policy for the
development of the information society.
The national government has participated in both meetings of the
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The delegation to
the first summit was led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at-
tempted to bring together a working group that was to include civil so-
ciety organisations (CSOs). This group was short-lived. In the second
phase the representation of the country fell to the Ministry of Education.
Argentina is currently participating actively in the process of co-
ordinating the Regional Action Plan for an Information Society in Latin
America and the Caribbean (eLAC2007), and is responsible for three
working groups – Creative Industries, Telework, and Financing – with
different areas of the government attending to each.2
Research methodology
In writing this report we prioritised certain aspects of the wide field of
policies related to information and communication technologies (ICTs).
We begin with an analysis of statistical information regarding existing
infrastructure, an initial factor in the widening or closing of the digital
gap. Then we analyse the educational policies of the national govern-
ment. Finally, in addressing the involvement and participation of civil
society, we describe official e-government initiatives, as well as strat-
egies developed by social organisations in relation to access to public
information and the passing of a new broadcasting law.
Our primary sources of information have been the websites of
government institutions. For our analysis of these sources we have
identified indicators legitimated by the scientific community3  and also
relied on research and articles by journalists which enrich the analy-
sis of statistical and documentary sources. Information regarding
actions promoted by civil society is based on submissions by those
same organisations as well as media releases.
Country situation
National infrastructure
Statistics from the National Communications Commission reveal that
teledensity (the number of landlines per 100 inhabitants) did not vary
between 1999 and 2004 (SECOM, 2007). According to a 2005 report
by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), this indicates
coverage of 22.8% of the population of Argentina (ITU, 2005a).
In contrast, mobile phone density has grown at a very rapid pace.
Looking at a similar timeframe, in March 1999 there were 2.8 million
mobile phones, and in March 2006, there were approximately 23.9
million, an increase of 854%. In the last year alone another 12 million
mobile phones were added to the national totals. These statistics place
Argentina, in March 2005, as the country with the third highest mo-
bile phone density in Latin America after Brazil and Chile (CNC, 2005).
The World Economic Forum tries to measure ICT development
more broadly, using the Networked Readiness Index (NRI), which at-
tempts to measure how prepared a country is to benefit from better
use of ICTs. According to this indicator, in 2005 (latest available data),
Argentina was ranked 71st globally and 9th within Latin America. If
this index is disaggregated and we look specifically at infrastructure,
our country ranks 53rd globally (WEF, 2006).
Data regarding access to the internet is not available as far back
as 1999, but from the end of 2001 to the end of 2005, residential
access increased by 143.9%, for a figure of 2.2 million residences
with access in December 2005 (INDEC, 2006).
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Argentina is a
vast country, incorporating very different realities. Table 1 reflects
current disparities, and was developed based on official data from the
Secretariat of Communications and the National Statistics and Cen-
sus Institute (INDEC). Provinces with less teledensity generally cor-
respond to those with a larger proportion of the population living in
poverty and extreme poverty. It is also relevant to note the huge dif-
ference in lines per square kilometre reflected in the table.
Some consultants indicate that there are 2,250 towns with only
one telephone line that provides semi-public long-distance service,
and at least 500 towns or areas without a single telephone line
(Simonetti, 2006). The development of communications network in-
frastructure by the two large telephone companies in the country,
Telecom and Telefónica, is based on the criteria of developing only
profitable areas.
The situation in poorer areas would be more serious were it not
for telephone cooperatives which operate in small localities, and which
have developed networks to connect areas using criteria other than
mere profitability. In Argentina there are approximately 350 of these
cooperatives, which provide 10% of existing landline capacity. The
role of cooperatives is very important, because their presence guaran-
tees the employment of workers from the localities in which they oper-
ate and the development of national industries associated with them.
It is worth highlighting that the absence of fixed networks in poor
areas has meant that today a great many mobile phones are in the
hands of poor or extremely poor Argentines, as this is the only means
of communication available to them.
Government actions
In 2000, Decree 764 established the country’s “universal service” goals.
One of these is that the “inhabitants of the Republic of Argentina through-
out the national territory are able to access telecommunications serv-
ices, especially those who live in areas where access is difficult, or who
have physical limitations or special social needs” (CNC, 2000).
1 <www.tau.org.ar>.
2 The coordinator of the Argentine delegation to eLAC2007 is Olga Cavalli, adviser
to the Office of Technology Policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cavalli is
also coordinating the working group on Financing, while the Creative Industries
group is being coordinated by Pablo Recasens, the president’s press secretary,
and the Telework group by Viviana Laura Díaz of the Ministry of Labour.
3 European Statistics Laboratory (<esl.jrc.ec.europa.eu>), World Economic Forum
(<www.weforum.org>), ITU (<www.itu.int>).
Province Teledensity Inhabitants Area (sq. km) Lines/sq. km
Buenos Aires – Metropolitan area 37.00% 11,800,000 3,833 1,139.06
Tierra del Fuego 26.00% 100,960 21,263 1.23
Neuquén 23.00% 474,155 94,078 1.16
Santa Cruz 23.00% 196,958 243,943 0.19
Santa Fe 22.00% 3,000,701 133,007 4.96
La Pampa 22.00% 299,294 14,344 4.59
Córdoba 22.00% 3,066,801 165,321 4.08
Chubut 21.00% 413,237 224,686 0.39
Buenos Aires w/o Metropolitan area 21.00% 830,404 303,668 0.57
Río Negro 18.00% 552,822 203,013 0.49
Mendoza 17.00% 1,579,651 148,827 1.80
San Luis 16.00% 367,933 76,748 0.77
Entre Ríos 14.00% 1,158,147 78,781 2.06
San Juan 12.00% 620,023 89,651 0.83
Tucumán 11.00% 1,338,523 22,524 6.54
La Rioja 11.00% 289,983 89,680 0.36
Jujuy 11.00% 611,888 53,219 1.26
Catamarca 10.00% 332,390 102,602 0.32
Corrientes 9.00% 930,991 88,199 0.95
Salta 9.00% 1,079,051 155,488 0.62
Misiones 9.00% 965,522 29,801 2.92
Chaco 8.00% 984,446 99,633 0.79
Formosa 7.00% 486,559 72,066 0.47
Santiago del Estero 6.00% 804,457 136,351 0.35
Source: INDEC and the Secretariat of Communications (CNC).
The mechanism for the implementation of this goal was very
interesting. Telephone operators were to establish a fiduciary fund to
which they would contribute 1% of their turnover. This fund would be
used to develop the network in areas that were not profitable. If busi-
nesses did not want to contribute to the fund, they could opt to build
the necessary networks themselves. An audit would estimate the value
of the investment made and would consider it as a contribution to the
fund. Not only did the telephone companies not comply with this com-
mitment, but they also passed the costs on to their customers by
tacking on a 1% charge to support a fund which was never created.
Beginning in March 2006, the current government forced com-
panies to refund customers the 1% that they were spuriously charged.
Many mobile telephone companies that incorporated the 1% into their
billing were unable to return the full amount to their customers due to
the mobility of portfolios and changes of ownership that characterise
these companies.
On 14 August 2006, the national ombudsman filed a legal suit
asking the government to bring the fund into compliance (Clarín, 2006).
This is an excellent example of a development instrument that was
misappropriated through collusion between government actors and
private communications enterprises.
In 2004 an intention to foster the creation of a new telephone
company, with the support of the government, was announced. The
idea was to create an Argentine firm that could compete freely with
foreign private companies. The core of this business was to come
from an agreement between the two federations of cooperatives:
FECOTEL and FECOSUR.
This was not to be a state-owned enterprise: the capital was to
be private but of national origin, in keeping with the creation of a new
national middle class. Although the government was not to invest
capital, it promised to provide bandwidth that was vacant on the spec-
trum, which is necessary for mobile telephone services. This was a
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key strategic move that gave the new enterprise a clear tool for eco-
nomic development, given the difference in coverage rates between
landlines and mobile phones in our country.
The advantage of having a new private operator in the game was
that it would take power from the two international operators – it was
to be an operator financed with national capital and of cooperative
origins, which would align itself in better harmony with the communi-
cations policy that the government wanted to pursue.
According to various experts, this idea died in October 2004 when
Telefónica informed the government that it would move ahead with its
plans to invest EUR 800 million (over USD 1.03 billion). The coopera-
tives continue to wait for the promised part of the spectrum to be
awarded to them, but the government has now floated the proposal
that they will give that portion of the spefÈrum to FECOTEL and
FECOSUR separately, and other portions to other actors who want to
offer the service. Obviously, the cooperatives were not favoured in
this move.
Looming much closer is the movement that appears imminent on
two issues crucial to telecommunications: the supposed annulment of
the suit against the Argentine government by Telefónica before the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and
the merger of the two large cable operators in the country.
Using the 2001 Argentine economic crisis that ended the fixed
1-to-1 Argentine peso-US dollar parity as an excuse, Telefónica and
Telecom filed suits against the government in the ICSID courts. The
Telefónica suit is better known because it is for a larger amount: USD
2.384 billion. The annulment of the suit received media coverage on
several occasions but has never actually been put into effect.
In April 2006 a public hearing was held which resulted in a memo-
randum of understanding between the Argentine government and
Telefónica that contained, for example, a reduction in hours for re-
duced-price calling and the tripling of the cost of incoming interna-
tional calls. Both measures meant an increase in prices and, as was
denounced in the national House of Representatives, the memo did
not mention the collection of fines levied against the company nor the
commitments undertaken in relation to infrastructure development
(ARI, 2006).
The merger between Cablevisión and Multicanal – the two larg-
est cable television operators, which now monopolise the sector –
was officially announced on 28 September 2006. Together they make
up a network of broadband services with a strong competitive edge.
On that same day, the president of Telefónica International met with
the president of Argentina and, according to several media reports,
again emphasised the effort that Telefónica was making to suspend
its suit before the ICSID, and the company’s interest in the passing of
a new communications law that would allow telephone operators to
offer audiovisual services, thereby competing with cable television
companies (Premici, 2006).
Community Technology Centres
In 1999 the government put forward a digital inclusion programme
called “Argentin@Internet.todos” [Argentin@Internet.everyone]
which consisted of 1,350 Community Technology Centres (CTCs) in
social, educational or governmental organisations in less privileged
areas of Argentina.4  These organisations “hosted” the CTCs, and
committed to assigning coordinators, providing training, offering
community services and carrying out tasks which would facilitate
the appropriation of these tools. The CTCs were each equipped with
five networked computers, printers, a webcam, a digital camera and
software (licensed Windows and Microsoft learning tools) as well as
the necessary furniture. The programme also provided one-off train-
ing to the technical and training coordinators.
After the change in presidential administration in 2000, the ini-
tiative was renamed the Programme for an Information Society5  and
the original guidelines were dropped. In many cases connectivity was
not provided, and the cost of this service had to be paid for by the
organisations, along with the salaries of personnel and other costs.
Seven years later, not much is heard about the CTCs. Many were
converted into computer areas for internal use by the host organisa-
tion, others were returned due to the impossibility of sustaining them,
or were relocated with no better results.
In 2006 a group of approximately 50 coordinators from around
the country formed the National Network of CTCs, with two inaugural
meetings. The latter of these was funded by the Argentine government
with the first economic support it had provided since the installation of
the centres. The gathering was held in October in Nono, Córdoba, where
the process of legally registering the network was begun.
Educational policy
The fact that the Argentine delegation to the Tunis phase of WSIS was
led by Minister of Education Daniel Filmus is no small thing. Neither
is it insignificant that the person responsible for articulating the Ar-
gentine position was Tulio del Bono, the secretary of science, tech-
nology and innovative production from the same ministry. Also present
as noteworthy governmental authorities were the secretary of state
for communications, the chief of cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the Argentine ambassador to Tunisia.
“We are convinced that technology should be a tool for sustain-
able development, employability and social and economic inclusion”
was how the secretary of science began his speech, which also men-
tioned the Ministry of Education’s National Campaign for Digital Lit-
eracy and the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) programme, which Ar-
gentina had recently signed up to, as the most significant initiatives in
this field. He also alluded to the “creation of a Forum for Competitive-
ness in Software and IT Services which will give rise to various pro-
grammes that will stimulate national production, as will the passing
of a national law for the promotion of the software industry, offering
financial and tax advantages for businesses in the sector” (ITU, 2005b).
Statements like these demonstrate that political actors in the
educational sector approach the field of ICTs as an aspect of training,
oriented towards a productive model that aims to develop employ-
ment skills in the field of computing. We now turn to a description of
the most significant policies of this ministry.
Infrastructure in education
The Ministry of Education’s ICT-related efforts have focused primarily
on the National Campaign for Digital Literacy (undertaken during 2004
to 2006) (MECT, 2006a) The campaign is part of the Comprehensive
Programme for Educational Equality.6
The campaign consisted of two phases. In the first, which was
carried out in 2004, 10,200 computers were delivered to 706 schools,
300 technical education centres and 200 teacher-training institutes.
In the second phase, which began in May 2005, 20,394 computers
4 <www.ctc.gov.ar>.
5 <www.psi.gov.ar>.
6 <www.me.gov.ar/piie/>.
were distributed to 2,171 educational establishments and connectiv-
ity was provided to 5,000 establishments.7  The proposal did not in-
clude the necessary technical support, which led, on occasions, to
machines lying unused (PIIE, 2004).
Although the ministry gathers statistics on numbers of schools
and teachers nationally and by province, it does not include informa-
tion regarding technological infrastructure in each school, which makes
a statistical analysis difficult. INDEC also lacks up-to-date measure-
ments of these indicators.
Another aspect that has been questioned concerns the agree-
ments and ever closer relationship between the ministry and Microsoft.
CSOs that promote free and open source software have followed these
developments carefully and denounced negotiations on educational
initiatives that have private actors as protagonists (Busaniche, 2004).
Content and training
One action line that has united all other initiatives of the Ministry of
Education since the beginning of its current administration is the
strengthening of the educ.ar web portal,8  created during the presi-
dency of Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) with a donation of USD
11.2 million from the Varsavsky Foundation. At that time the project
gave rise to questioning due to poor implementation and the specula-
tive movement of funds.
The portal was created with the aim of introducing the internet
into schools and using the web as a tool for teacher training and the
development of content at different educational levels. Much of its
structure is based on blogs where content is developed with high
levels of participation.
The programme includes the production of multimedia content,
which is accessed through the portal or through thirteen CDs which
the ministry produces and distributes free of charge to teachers who
request them. There is no data as to the reach of this policy. There is,
however, wide recognition of the quality of materials developed on a
diversity of topics, such as an introduction to digital literacy, the in-
clusion of bilingual cultures in the classroom, free and open source
software in education, talking about AIDS in schools, etc.
For teacher training, the programme offers training sessions
through agreements with national universities. According to informa-
tion on the site, 600 courses have been offered, providing training to
15,000 teachers from schools that had received computers. The con-
tent covered includes the use of new technologies in the classroom,
basic PC concepts, internet and email, and educational resources on
the web.9  Another proposal for training is an “e-learning platform”10
that includes four courses: basic PC applications; the internet as a
resource for innovative teaching; communication, society and educa-
tion; and WebQuest and the management of information. This pro-
posal relies on the teachers’ own connectivity and computer resources,
as well as the time and finances they have available, since the Minis-
try of Education does not count the time devoted to these activities as
training hours.
New national education law
The national education law is currently under discussion. The minis-
try issued a draft bill which was discussed by involved actors (direc-
tors, teachers, unions, civil society) in educational institutions and on
a ministry web platform (MECT, 2006b).The teachers’ unions and social
coalitions question the purported openness of discussion, given that
the time periods for the debate turned out to be impossible to meet.11
Conceptually, the inclusion of the phrase “equity and educational
inclusion” stands out in the text of the draft legislation, as does the
elimination of the reference to education as a “service”, as it was
viewed in the previous law. As for the “policies for the promotion of
educational equality”, the legislation establishes that “the state shall
provide pedagogical, cultural, material, technological and economic
resources to students, families and schools in need of such,” widen-
ing its objectives from what they were under the previous law (MECT,
2006b, art. 85).
In relation to ICTs, the draft bill mentions the access to and spread
of new technologies as one of the objectives of national educational
policy (art. 13), in primary (chap. III, art. 27), secondary (chap. IV,
art. 31) and rural education (chap. X, art. 55). In defining the “quality
of education” (chap. II, art. 93) it establishes that “the access to and
mastery of information and communication technologies shall form
part of the curriculum content essential for inclusion in the knowl-
edge society.” The legislation recognises the educ.ar site and pro-
poses the creation of an educational channel called “Encuentro” [En-
counter], for the production and broadcast of educational television
and multimedia materials (MECT, 2006b).
One Laptop Per Child
Argentina is one of the countries that has been invited to participate in
the OLPC pilot project12  of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) along with Brazil, India, China, Nigeria, Thailand and Egypt. The
programme consists of the purchase by governments of “a machine
specially designed for children: the size of a book, with a colour screen,
that does not break if it falls, uses domestic electricity, and can con-
nect to the internet via wireless where there is no telephone service. It
has a system that allows the machines to connect to each other even
when there is no internet connection”.
Once governments decide to join the project, the machines will
be manufactured with donations from companies like Google, AMD,
Quanta, Red Hat and Nortel. According to official announcements each
one will cost USD 100 (although the latest estimates are that they will
cost USD 130).
Argentina will take in a million laptops, which is to say that it will
make a USD 100 million investment. The project is managed by
educ.ar, which will conduct technical evaluations of the prototype,
including hardware, software, connectivity, the educational resources
to be used, and the legal-economic framework that the contract im-
plies (Mancini, 2006).
The project has generated controversy from the moment it was
announced, with regard to such issues as the investment involved,
classroom implementation, methodological strategies to be used, and
how teachers will be trained. Another argument centres on the meas-
ure’s reach. In Argentina there are 10 million children in the school
system. The purchase of the laptops will only cover 10% of them,7 <www.educ.ar/educar/alfabetizacion_digital/equipamiento/nuevo.jsp>.
8 <www.educ.ar>.
9 <www.educ.ar/educar/alfabetizacion_digital/capacitacion>.
10 Distance learning platform at educ.ar Available at: <www.educ.ar/educar/
plataforma-elearning/index.jsp>.
11 Forum for debate of the new education law. Available at: <debate-
educacion.educ.ar/ley/foro>.
12 <www.laptop.org>.
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meaning that the project would have to be repeated annually for 10
years to be able to reach all of them, without taking into account the
850,000 who enter the educational system each year. The criteria for
distribution of the laptops are also a point of controversy.
Although the government looks upon it favourably and expert
voices applaud the initiative, nearly a year after the programme was
announced officials are proceeding very cautiously. At the end of 2006
it was announced that 500 machines were arriving in the country.
Participation
An analysis of the information society stakeholders in Argentina leads
to the following general findings:
• An information society is not yet an established topic on the public
agenda.
• The CSOs that specifically address topics related to ICT policies
are ahead of the government in dealing with these topics. Never-
theless, they have very rarely managed to coordinate the peti-
tions and demands that they put forward to the government.
• There is evidence of a more fluid relationship between govern-
ment and business than between government and citizens and
CSOs.
• The mass media, despite being relevant actors according to this
analysis, give the topic only superficial treatment.
• The academic and scientific fields are active in the development
of an analysis regarding the information society, though they have
little visibility in the community.
In Argentina there are a great number of social organisations,
associations and coalitions that acquired greater visibility after what
is called the “crisis of 2001”,13  in the face of the resulting economic
recession, social crisis and absence of political leadership. This real-
ity is not alien to the ICT policy arena, for it is these organisations that
began to bring visibility to the right to communication and access to
information technologies. Many of these organisations have closely
followed the WSIS process, and have even participated in it.
E-government
The evaluation of e-government policies takes on particular dimen-
sions in Latin American countries, due to the insufficient access to
technology and competencies necessary for its use, on the one hand,
and on the other, the bureaucratic and complex modes by which the
government relates to citizens. Advances can be seen along three
tracks: national decrees and programmes that declare the importance
of the development of an information society; legislation that regu-
lates administrative aspects of the interaction between the adminis-
tration and citizens; and particular initiatives by provincial and mu-
nicipal governments which offer services and are acquiring greater
technical complexity and use.
Up until 2004 the lack of outreach was pointed to as a drawback
to these policies, given that these services were accessible only to
those who were already ICT users (Finquelievi, 2004). Currently, how-
ever, there is wide outreach being carried out by government agen-
cies addressing the digitisation of their administration, although there
continues to be a lack of promotion of the competencies necessary
for citizens to appropriate them. The discourse that accompanies these
initiatives, which are often no more than showpieces, centres around
the themes of access to public information as a right of citizenship,
transparency in management, and the streamlining of procedures
through the digitisation of information.
National Plan
E-government, for the Argentine government, means the use of ICTs
to “redefine the relationship of government with citizens, improving
management and services, guaranteeing transparency and participa-
tion, facilitating access to public information, and supporting the in-
tegration and development of different sectors” (Government of Ar-
gentina, 2007).
On 27 April 2005, through Decree 378, the National Plan for Elec-
tronic Government was approved for the intensive use of ICTs in pub-
lic administration agencies (Government of Argentina, 2005).The Na-
tional Office for Information Technologies (ONTI) is the decision-mak-
ing body in this area, and functions under the Subsecretariat of Pub-
lic Management of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers. The ONTI’s
role is to “formulate policies for the implementation of processes for
technological development and innovation for the transformation and
modernisation of the State” and to “foster the integration of new tech-
nologies in the public sector, their compatibility, interoperability, and
the promotion of technological standardisation” (Government of Ar-
gentina, 2007).
Specific projects include digital signature infrastructure, in-
formation security, and technological standards for public admin-
istration. The ONTI was also charged with developing the National
Government Portal,14  which organises all of the sectors of the state
into a complex structure. It is a body of information that is of inter-
est to citizens, though of little practical value in interacting with the
government.
Legislation
Several regulatory proposals for e-government are circulating in both
of the legislative chambers of Argentina. This is the case with digital
signature legislation, regulated by Law 25.506 and modified by presi-
dential decree, which defines who is licensed to emit certificates. The
legislation defines the relationship between administrations and be-
tween the administration and citizens. The private sector is demand-
ing norms that include businesses in the regulation of the use of this
tool. There are also proposals to define the legal validity of digital
documents, and even the certification of the date and time of docu-
ments sent by internet (Government of Argentina, 2001).
Other aspects being considered include the protection of data
and private information, an issue which is only regulated in three Ar-
gentine provinces (Neuquén, Misiones and Mendoza) and the city of
Buenos Aires. Recently the House of Representatives approved a
modification to the Criminal Code establishing sentencing guidelines
for computer crimes, such as the violation of email, the theft of data
or the circulation of child pornography over the internet.
Participation and lobbying by civil society
There have been occasions when different CSOs have worked in co-
ordination around aspects of legislation that were under question or
non-existent. We include in this report two noteworthy cases that have13 A period of political instability, with large-scale outbreaks of corruption in
government and a severe economic crisis. Looting, strikes and popular protests
erupted throughout the country at the end of December 2001. President De la
Rúa responded by establishing a state of siege and fierce repression. 14 <www.argentina.gov.ar>.
brought together a wide range of organisations connected to the de-
mand for public policies regarding ICTs. Both initiatives have achieved
influence to varying degrees and have attained visibility in society.
Access to public information
The right to information is included in the “freedom of every indi-
vidual to seek, receive and impart information,” according to article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,15  and is guaranteed
in Argentina by article 75, section 22 of the National Constitution,
which gives constitutional hierarchy to international treaties.
Argentina does not yet have a national law which regulates the
exercise of the right to public information. Presidential Decree 1172
for the “Improvement of the Quality of Democracy and its Institu-
tions”, passed in 2003, “guarantees and regulates the right of all per-
sons to request, consult and receive information from the national
executive branch,” and is based on the premises of “the elaboration
of a solid foundation, simplicity and conceptual clarity, and respect
for international standards on the subject.” The government has con-
centrated its outreach efforts for this initiative on the “Mejor
democracia” [Better democracy] portal16  (Government of Argentina,
2003).
The decree establishes mechanisms such as public hearings,
publication of meetings held with interested parties, participatory de-
sign of norms, access to public information, open meetings with regu-
lators of public services and open and free internet access to the daily
edition of the Official Bulletin. Nevertheless, it has been criticised be-
cause its scope is restricted to the executive branch and it carries no
obligation for the legislative and judicial branches.
Parallel to this, some provincial administrations have adopted
specific legislation and a number of municipalities have passed by-
laws. In some cases there are laws in effect, in others legislation is
pending, while in others discussion of the issue has not yet begun.
The website accesoalainformacion.org [accesstoinformation.org] has
a map which illustrates this legal panorama and provides access to all
regulations and pending legislation.17
In 2001 the Anti-Corruption Office, which falls under the Minis-
try of Justice and Human Rights, brought together businesspeople,
academics, journalists, government officials, and members of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in a process called “participa-
tory norms design” to discuss a preliminary proposal to regulate the
right to access to public information.
In 2002 the executive branch sent to the House of Representa-
tives a proposal on which consensus had been reached, and which
was respectful of international standards and principles. The House
approved it in May 2003 and sent it to the Senate in December 2004,
but with a great number of amendments that altered the consensus
and principles agreed upon.
At that time a group of organisations published a document which
critiqued the amendments, arguing that they “do not guarantee that
any citizen has access to public information, they facilitate discretionality
and strip the law of its meaning, given that the definition of public
information is ambiguous, vague and confusing.” In February 2006
the legislation lost parliamentary status (INFOCIVICA, 2006).
These organisations issued an outline of the minimum require-
ments for any law regarding access to public information,18  and are
also working to mobilise civil society to take up the demand for this
right. In 2006, for the second year in a row, they promoted the cel-
ebration of 28 September as global Right to Know Day, a strategy
which reached the mass media and which has opened up an opportu-
nity to foster these discussions.
Broadcasting law
Television and radio in Argentina are regulated by Law 22.285, passed
in 1980 during the last military dictatorship (Government of Argen-
tina, 1980). The law is based on the National Security Doctrine, which
concentrated media ownership into a few hands, and has given rise
to practices associated with the commercialisation of information.
In 2003, 21 years after the return of democracy, a wide range of
organisations19  joined together to form the Coalition for Democratic
Broadcasting20  for the creation of norms to regulate the exercise of
communication in Argentina as a public good. In August 2004 the
coalition launched the Citizens’ Initiative for a Broadcasting Law for
Democracy, which put forward a proposal entitled “21 Basic Points
for the Right to Communication”. In summary, this proposal proclaims
the right to broadcast information and opinions by radio and televi-
sion and revindicates communication as a human right rather than a
commercial undertaking. It also stresses the need to promote plural-
ism and diversity, guarantee local productions, and regulate the allo-
cation of government advertising (Mancini, 2004).
An important achievement was gained in 2005, when the Su-
preme Court ruled that article 45 of Law 22.285 was unconstitutional,
which led to its modification through the issuance of Law 26.053. The
new law recognises non-commercial and non-profit entities as eligi-
ble for being licensed for broadcasting, thereby eliminating the re-
striction which limited this right to commercial entities (COMFER,
2005). In May 2006 the Federal Broadcasting Committee issued reso-
lution 753/2006 whereby 126 community radios in the country were
recognised and given legal title (COMFER, 2006).
There are currently several legislative proposals pending for a
new law to replace the current one which would, among other things,
treat advertising transmitted on cable and broadcast television com-
parably, guarantee a minimum of national, local and cultural content,
guarantee the incorporation of cooperatives, unions and associations
in the media arena, and bring up to date the regulation of technolo-
gies such as high definition radio, digital radio, and broadcast, satel-
lite and digital television.
Conclusions
Based on the statistics reviewed, we can conclude that in Argentina
there has been growth in infrastructure without a corresponding level
of planning by the government. Although there appears, in speeches
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available from: <www.unhchr.ch/udhr/
lang/eng.htm>.
16 <www.mejordemocracia.gov.ar>.
17 Dynamic map of the situation in each province and existing laws or proposed
legislation. Available from: <www.accesoalainformacion.org/mapa.php>.
18 Document by a group of social organisations regarding the minimum
requirements for a law on access to public information. See: <www.adc.org.ar/
home.php?iDOCUMENTO=466&iTIPODOCUMENTO=1&iCAMPOACCION=>.
19 Among them, the Argentine Community Radios Forum (FARCO), World
Association for Christian Communication (WACC), Argentine Labour Federation
(CTA), Federation of Communication Workers (FETRACOM), Centre for Legal and
Social Studies (CELS), Chamber of Cooperative Radio Stations, Union of
Journalists of Rosario and Institute for the Promotion of Cooperative Funds, as
well as persons who participated as individuals, such as Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, a
Nobel Peace Prize winner, and Aníbal Ford, a recognised Argentine communica-
tions intellectual.
20 <www.coalicion.org.ar>.
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and stated intentions, to be a concern with promoting universal ac-
cess, the population generally remains at the mercy of a business
mentality in an unregulated market that is basically an oligopoly.
In the first objective of the Regional Action Plan for an Informa-
tion Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC2007), point
1.3 proposes “fostering the creation of sustainable frameworks and
models for the penetration of ICT into the different countries in the
region, as well as the creation of local associations aimed at creating
better connectivity conditions, particularly in less privileged areas”
(ECLAC, 2007a). This topic was not discussed in the teleconference
for regional follow-through on eLAC2007, which was held in Ecuador
in June 2006 (ECLAC, 2007b). It is worth noting that Argentina ar-
gued for working on Objective 1 of the plan, but with an orientation
towards the development of regional infrastructure (as per points 1.1
and 1.2 of the objective), postponing consideration of the conditions
for connectivity at the national level.
Argentina also presided over the 16th Meeting of the Permanent
Executive Committee of the Inter-American Telecommunication Com-
mission (CITEL), where the 2006-2010 strategic plan was approved.
Objective 8 of the plan promotes the development of connectivity in
rural and less privileged areas.
For the time being, good intentions in the international arena
seem to fade before the pressure of the large communications opera-
tors who, as we have said, only understand the development of infra-
structure tied to profitability.
Bringing ICTs into the classroom has become a key concern in
educational policy in our country, leading the Ministry of Education to
launch the National Campaign for Digital Literacy and various teach-
ing and methodology proposals for teachers. Nevertheless, the min-
istry’s policies leave essential variables up to chance, particularly as
these relate to economically and culturally excluded sectors. Although
there is a concern for the distribution of infrastructure in relation to
the socioeconomic conditions of the sectors which benefit, this in-
tention continues to show evidence of discrimination in favour of those
closest to large urban centres. The same malaise afflicts the concern
for teachers, as it does not address the issue in its full socioeconomic
and organisational complexity, nor take into account work regimes
and hours, or the general working conditions of education workers.
As to e-government, there are several initiatives which are con-
sistent with the principles of increasing public access. Nevertheless,
in general terms they lack ambitious objectives and few actions be-
come reality. It should be highlighted that, between speeches and
actions, some steps have been taken that have also helped to raise
the awareness of civil society as to these possibilities.
Civil society’s experiences of coordination around and partici-
pation in ICT policies described in this report refer to legislative
processes that included instances of participation by social organi-
sations, but which suffered from legislative delays and amendments
and executive twists and turns which modified the original spirit of
the proposals, or ignored the demands of civil society. What these
examples make clear is that in these processes, those CSOs that
came together around clear goals and with specific strategies have
managed to have an impact, and promote breakthrough legislation
which respects the right to communication, access to information,
and digital inclusion. 
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0 Introduction
This report is an attempt to monitor information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) development in different sectors of Bangla-
desh and to compile civil society views and understandings of policy
intervention in those areas. We consulted different organisations to
identify issues of importance, to check the status of policy interven-
tion and to map the challenges and opportunities. Areas that we tried
to cover are: infrastructure and access; community radio; localisa-
tion; and open content development. The aim of the report is to focus
on areas that are relevant and pertinent to the ICT for development
community, and in which a large number of civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs) are involved.
The report has been developed by conducting desk research and
through conversations with relevant organisations, along with inter-
views and field-level data collection. This is a living and collaborative
document. Different chapters are written by different organisations
that are actively involved in the areas we cover. As lead organisation,
Bytes for All’s methodology has been to communicate with these or-
ganisations, to facilitate the collaborative process and to compile the
findings into a report. We also published the report as a wiki and
invited feedback, additional information and corrections.
Thanks to Ananya Raihan and Suporna Roy of the Development
Research Network (D-Net); Hakikur Rahman of the Sustainable De-
velopment Networking Programme (SDNP) Bangladesh; Munir Hasan
and Ragib Hasan of the Bangladesh Open Source Network (BdOSN)
and Bangla Wikipedia; and AHM Bazlur Rahman and Golam Nabi Jewel
of the Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication
(BNNRC) for writing different chapters of this report and initiating a
collective discussion on the topics.
Country situation
Access and infrastructure
Bangladesh remains at the bottom in South Asia in the UN’s ICT Dif-
fusion Index, with a rank of 164 in 1997 and 171 in 2001 and 2004
(UN, 2006). Nevertheless, the enactment of the National Telecommu-
nications Policy in March 1998 (UNPAN, 1998) and the Bangladesh
Telecommunications Act in 2001 (ITU, 2001); the establishment of
the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission in Janu-
ary 2002; the introduction of the National ICT Policy in October 2002
(MSICT, 2002) and the ICT Act in 2003; and the very recent legalisa-
tion of voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephony, are several mile-
stones the country can be proud of.
Development Research Network (D-Net)1 ; Bytes for All2 ; Sustainable Development Networking Programme (SDNP) Bangladesh3 ;
Bangladesh Open Source Network (BdOSN) 4 ; Bangla Wikipedia5 ; Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC)6
Ananya Raihan and Suporna Roy; Hakikur Rahman; Munir Hasan and Ragib Hasan; AHM Bazlur Rahman and Golam Nabi Jewel;
Partha Pratim Sarker; Monjur Mahmud
BANGLADESH
The country is progressing in terms of ICT penetration – espe-
cially as far as cellular penetration is concerned. Currently, five cellu-
lar phone operators have covered 61 districts out of 64 and over 90%
of the population, comprising a subscriber platform of more than 15
million.7
The Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph Board (BTTB), the lone
government-owned telecom provider, has provided conventional public
switched telephone network (PSTN) access to all 64 districts and to
465 upazilas (sub-districts); internet service provider (ISP) services
to all 64 district headquarters and 165 upazilas; and digital data net-
work (DDN) access to 41 districts through its own infrastructure. Over
150 ISPs have obtained licences from the Bangladesh Telecom Regu-
latory Commission (of which more than 80% are located in Dhaka
and Chittagong); 1,800 km of fibre under the Bangladesh Railway is
being utilised by private mobile telephone operators; and 468,000
MIU km8  of submarine cable has been linked to the landing station at
Cox’s Bazar as part of the South East Asia-Middle East-Western Eu-
rope (SEA-ME-WE4) submarine cable consortium project (with 64
STM-1 or 10 Gbps capacity).
Table 1 shows the country’s basic ICT indicators, while Table 2
shows the figures for main telephone lines in Bangladesh. Table 3
shows cellular subscriber growth in the country between 2002 and
2005, and Table 4 shows the information technology parameters be-
tween 2002 and 2004.
Community access points
The idea of common access points allowing rural communities to
access technology emerged from research conducted by the Devel-
opment Research Network (D-Net) in 2001, when D-Net was estab-
lished. The initial findings of its research showed that access to infor-
mation was an important dimension of access. While a lack of access
to information contributed to poverty, it was missing from current
discourse on poverty.
The Dhaka Ahsania Mission (DAM) launched the first commu-
nity learning centre, locally known as Gonokendra, in 1987. Now there
are more than 100 Gonokendras across the country. Each centre func-
tions as a community-based information centre, which includes local
government or non-governmental organisation (NGO) extension de-
partments. Primarily print media is distributed: DAM supports these
centres by supplying books, newspapers, newsletters, magazines,
booklets, posters, etc. However, five also offer access to ICTs.
D-Net conceived of the idea of Pallitathya (rural information) in
2001. As there was no tailor-made digital content for rural people, D-
Net started developing content in nine areas dealing with life skills
and livelihood. This content is now more than 30,000 pages long and,
packaged on CD as Jeeon-IKB, serves as an information and knowl-
edge base for the rural communities.1 <www.dnet-bangladesh.org>.
2 <www.bytesforall.org>.
3 <www.sdnbd.org>.
4 <www.bdosn.org>.
5 <bn.wikipedia.org>.
6 <www.bnnrc.net>.
7 For more information on the five operators see: <www.grameenphone.com>,
<www.banglalinkgsm.com>, <www.citycell.com>, <www.aktel.com>, and
<www.teletalk.com.bd>.
8 Minimum investment unit, which is equivalent to one STM-1 (synchronous
transfer mode at 155 Mbit/s).
Year Main telephone lines CAGR9 Main telephone lines CAGR
(000s) (%) (per 100 inhabitants) (%)
Table 2: Main telephone lines
2002 605.9 10.5 (1997-2002) 0.46 8.9 (1997-2002)
2003 742.0 12.5 (1998-2003) 0.55 10.8 (1998-2003)
2004 831.0 13.9 (1999-2004) 0.61 12.3 (1999-2004)
2005 831.0 14.0 (2000-2005) 0.61 12.4 (2000-2005)
Source: ITU
(000s) CAGR (%) Per 100 inhabitants As % of total telephone subscribers
Table 3: Cellular subscribers
2002 1,075.0 110.5 (1997-2002) 0.81 64.0
2003 1,365.0 78.7 (1998-2003) 1.01 64.8
2004 2,781.6 79.6 (1999-2004) 2.03 77.0
2005 9,000.0 100.3 (2000-2005) 6.35 91.5
Source: ITU
Year Cellular mobile subscribers
Hosts Users per 100 inhabitants
Table 4: Information technology parameters
2002 - 0.15 0.34
2003 - 0.18 0.78
2004 13 0.22 1.20
Source: ITU
Year Internet PC per 100 inhabitants
D-Net established four Pallitathya Kendra (Rural Information Cen-
tres) as pilot projects in 2005 in remote villages of Bangladesh: Nilphamari,
Netrokona, Noakhali and Bagerhat. Each of the Pallitathya Kendras have
three computers, two to three mobile phones, a digital camera, soil test
kits, a nebuliser that local doctors can rent, and a weighing machine. A
copy of Jeeon-IKB is also provided. The centres are connected to the
internet through Grameen Phone (the largest telecom operator in Bang-
ladesh) and EDGE technology.10  The cost of establishing the centres
ranges from BDT 77,000 to BDT 180,000 (USD 1,000 to USD 2,500).
The earnings from the centre cover more than 50% of operating costs.
Already more than 10,000 villagers have visited the Pallitathya Kendras.
Relief International’s Schools Online division initiated its Internet
Learning Centres (ILCs) programme in 2003. The programme was
launched in 2005. Currently 27 ILCs are in operation across Bangla-
desh, with the majority (sixteen) located in Chittagong.11  Each ILC is
equipped with five to ten computers, one scanner and one digital cam-
era. Connectivity varies from location to location. In some places ILCs
are equipped with broadband internet connectivity and others have
dial-up connectivity. The ILCs are located in upazila headquarters.
Young Power in Social Action (YPSA) launched a Community
Multimedia Centre in the Sitakund upazila of Chittagong district in
2005. The centre is well equipped with computers with CD-ROM, a
pocket PC, digital video camera, audio recorder, cassette player, cable
TV, cable radio and DVD players. It is connected to the internet via9 Compound annual growth rate, computed by the formula: [(Pv/P0) (1/n)]-1 where
Pv= Present value, P0= Beginning value and n= Number of periods.
10 Enhanced data rates for GSM evolution (EDGE) service is provided in Bangladesh
by Grameen Phone. It offers general packet radio service (GPRS) roaming
connectivity services that hook a user into the internet from remote locations.
11 There are four ILCs in Dhaka, three in Comilla, two in Jessore, and one each in
Khulna and Rajshahi.
Year Population density GDP per capita Total telephone subscribers
(per sq. km) (USD) (per 100 inhabitants)
Table 1: Basic ICT indicator
2002 925 346 1.26
2003 938 354 1.56
2004 952 382 2.63
2005 985 - 2.63
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
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dial-up. Innovatively, it uses loudspeakers to disseminate useful in-
formation to the community.
Rural ICT Centres (RICs) are run by the Digital Equity Network
(DEN) with support from KATALYST, a multi-donor consortium work-
ing in Bangladesh. An RIC is a physical infrastructure with basic ICT
facilities (each RIC is equipped with four computers, one colour printer,
one scanner and three digital cameras). Three RICs, located in Kahalu,
Panchbibi and Shibganj in Bogra district, were launched in 2006. All
three centres are located in upazila headquarters. RICs disseminate
business information for local businesses in selected sectors that are
dominant in the localities (e.g. information for fisheries, for potato or
poultry farmers, etc.). The centre also provides information on a range
of topics such as health and education, and offers government infor-
mation as well.
The Community Information Centre (CIC) model has been initi-
ated by Grameen Phone. The first sixteen CICs were launched as a
pilot project in different parts of the country in February 2006. Of
these, four were set up in each of the Sylhet, Rajshahi and Khulna
divisions,12  and two in each of the Dhaka and Chittagong divisions. In
May 2006, another ten CICs were established: seven in the division of
Chittagong, two in the division of Dhaka and one in the Rajshahi divi-
sion. The CICs are equipped with at least one computer, a printer, a
scanner, a web cam and an EDGE-enabled modem to access the
internet using EDGE connectivity. The CICs are fully owned by local
entrepreneurs with a minimum investment of BDT 80,000 (USD 1,100).
The CICs are run as a franchise of Grameen Phone.
The Amader Gram Learning Centre (AGLC) project established
a pilot of its version of a rural information centre in Bagerhat in April
2001. What amounts to a communication, information and learning
centre was designed to develop participatory monitoring and learn-
ing systems at the village level. Under the project’s roll-out, five
centres have been equipped with computers, printers and telephones,
among other tools. One of the centres, at Khulna City, has been set
up for overall coordination and monitoring. Ten group leaders (all
women) have been trained to act as information coordinators, dis-
seminating information on health, sanitation, education and liveli-
hood opportunities.
Community radio
The proposed draft of the Broadcasting Act 2003 aims “[t]o provide
for the regulation of broadcasting services, including terrestrial, sat-
ellite and cable broadcasting, and to make provision for the establish-
ment of an independent Authority for the purpose of overseeing broad-
casting regulation, with a view to promoting independent, pluralistic
broadcasting in the public interest” (MI, 2003). While the National
Parliament has not yet approved the Act, it has called for an inde-
pendent body – the Bangladesh Broadcasting Authority (BBA) – to be
created. The BBA would be answerable to the parliament.
The BBA will be responsible for:
• Developing and implementing a broadcasting frequency plan to
ensure orderly and optimal use of the broadcasting frequency
spectrum.
• Issuing licences for the provision of broadcasting services to the
public and ensuring that licence conditions are respected.
• Overseeing the development of an advertising and programme
code for content and the implementation of these codes.
The BBA will issue various types of broadcasting licences to in-
terested parties. These are classified by tier (public, private and com-
munity), type (radio, TV, terrestrial, satellite or cable), and scope (na-
tional, regional or local, or number of subscribers). It is also men-
tioned in the draft Broadcasting Act that “community broadcaster”
means a “broadcaster which is controlled by a non-profit entity and
operates on a non-profit basis, carries programming serving a par-
ticular community including by reflecting the special interests and
needs of that community, and is managed and operated primarily by
members of that community” (MI, 2003). By enacting the Broadcast-
ing Act, community broadcasting can formally come into existence
using radio, television or the internet.
The National Media Survey (NMS) 2005 is the fourth national
survey of its kind undertaken in Bangladesh. The first media survey
was conducted in 1995 and the second and third national surveys
were conducted in 1998 and 2002 respectively. Some of the findings
of this survey are:
• The ownership and reach of radio seems to be declining. Only
32% of people own radios. Among these, only 27.3% of the ra-
dios are in working order. This was perhaps because of the rapid
increase in the opportunity to watch TV and the failure of public
radio to attract listeners.
• 22.5% of people listen to radio. Radio listenership has declined
significantly in urban areas. As in the past, radio reach remains
higher among males (30%) compared to females (16%).
• Dhaka is the most popular radio station in the country, and has a
31.3% listenership.
There are at least four commercial FM radio stations now oper-
ating in Bangladesh, beside the government-owned Bangladesh
Betar. The BBC and Voice of America also operate FM stations. In
regulatory terms, Bangladesh Television (BTV) and Bangladesh Betar
are part of the Ministry of Information, from whom they get their
direction and funding, ensuring firm government control over their
operations.
There have been a number of experiments in community radio in
Bangladesh. The Centre for Development Communication (CDC), and
later, the Mass-Line Media Centre (MMC), have both established com-
munity radio stations. The Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and
Communication (BNNRC) is a national coordinating organisation dedi-
cated to promoting community radio and citizens’ band (CB) radio13
as a means of holistic development. The YPSA, a BNNRC member,
built a cable radio station14  in Sitakund, an upazila in the Chittagong
district. At present, they do not have a licence to operate a community
radio station, so they produce local content and “broadcast” it over
the cable network. SPEED Trust from Barisal, DUS from Noakhali,
COAST from Bhola, and Sankalpa from Barguna also produce local
content, but upload it onto the internet.
Localisation
Bangla is the primary language for the 130 million people of Bangla-
desh. However, organised efforts in software and content localisa-
tion are not very visible in the country. It is obvious that before any
12 Bangladesh is divided into six administrative divisions.
13 A system of short-distance radio communication between individuals. See:
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens’_band_radio>.
14 Where radio programmes are broadcasted via cable network.
content can be generated or any application developed, some basic
standards for encoding the language must be developed.15
The first attempt at localisation was made in the early 1980s
with Bangla font development in the Windows environment. These
efforts were led by commercial vendors. But an absence of planning
made the localisation process cumbersome, and the results were not
good. Many fonts were developed in a haphazard way resulting in
gross inoperability. In the late 1990s Unicode16  shed new light on the
issue, and the process of localisation began to take a new shape in
the country.
The open source movement has had the most significant impact
on localisation. In 1998, Tanim Ahmed, a software developer in Bangla-
desh, first solved the locale issue17 (bn.BD) and started a process of
localising Linux.18 Since then the major initiatives have been run by vol-
unteers, while institutional initiatives have recently started to emerge
on the scene. Government localisation initiatives have, however, been
absent (even while Bangla has been included on its official websites).
In the late 1990s, the voluntary group Ankur19  started localising
open source software like Linux, OpenOffice.org, Gaim, etc. Another
voluntary organisation, Ekushey, started developing open source
Unicode fonts and a Bangla input system (i.e. determining how Bangla
fonts can be arranged using the existing keyboard). In 2004, the Bang-
ladesh Computer Council (BCC), a government body, took the initia-
tive from the government side and came up with a national keyboard
mapping and a collation sequence.
Around this time, the country’s sole centre for localisation, the
Centre for Research on Bangla Language Processing (CRBLP) at BRAC
University, started conducting research projects that dealt with Bangla-
language processing. At present the research team is working on
Bangla information retrieval (e.g. Bangla spell-checking and a Bangla
search engine), morphological analysis,20  developing a digital lexicon
and an online dictionary, optical character recognition and Bangla
speech processing, among other tasks. The centre is supported in
part by a grant from the PAN Localisation Project of the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC).
In 2005, the Bangladesh Open Source Network (BdOSN) was
formed with local open source volunteers. BdOSN, again a voluntary
organisation, took Bangla localisation as one of its main issues. Open
source localisation has started to thrive as a result. Ankur (together
with volunteers) has already localised various open source software
programmes. These included Linux distributions like Fedora, Mandriva,
SUSE and Ubuntu; desktop environments like Gnome and KDE; and
applications like OpenOffice.org, Gaim, Firefox and Thunderbird. While
there still remains work to be done to achieve complete localisation in
these programmes, Ankur and BdOSN have also completed Bangla’s
first glossary of computer terms.
Open content development
The main open content project in Bangladesh has been the develop-
ment of the Bangla Wikipedia. Its development has been organised by
BdOSN and its sister organisation, Bangla Wiki. The project aims to
develop a free, open access encyclopaedia in the Bangla language.
Besides the Bangla Wikipedia,21 recent initiatives have focused on open
content in science, especially in mathematics.
Since its launch in late March 2006, the Bangla Wikipedia project
has been extremely successful. The project has been able to attract a
large number of editors. As of October 2006, the total registered editor
count was 865. The number of articles has grown from its initial rate of
800 articles per month, with occasional bursts of activity. The Bangla
Wikipedia crossed the 10,000 article mark in September 2006, becoming
the 50th Wikipedia, and the second language from South Asia, to achieve
this. It is ranked 44th among more than 200 Wikipedias in different lan-
guages. Besides articles, Bangla Wiki has also focused on creating a free
repository of images and other multimedia content. As of October 2006,
more than 400 images on various topics had been uploaded to Wikimedia
Commons under Creative Commons or GNU Free Documentation licences.
Participation
CSOs have attempted to influence policy in a number of ways, both
direct and indirect.
Access and infrastructure
ICTs have been recognised as a key sector through the formation of a
high-powered National ICT Task Force, with the prime minister as its
chairperson. However, many of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) and World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) commitments have not reached the grassroots. Government
agencies like the BTTB and the BCC, including relevant ministries,
such as the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and the Min-
istry of Science and Technology, are not working with sufficient mo-
mentum. Private entrepreneurs like the ISP Association of Bangla-
desh and the recently-evolved Bangladesh Cable Internet Operators
Association are working in unison in many areas of the Dhaka me-
tropolis to provide door-to-door internet access. Civil society is doing
what it can. Efforts are being made to promote community internet
access at the grassroots level by Amader Gram, the YPSA and the
Society for Economic and Basic Advancement (SEBA) in the south,
by KATALYST in the north, by Relief International’s Schools Online in
a number of locations, and by the SDNP in several strategic places.22
However, there is little coordination between them. Much has to be
discussed to unify these unique and novel efforts.
In August 2006 D-Net, together with the BNNRC and YPSA, held a
successful international workshop in Rangpur called Building a
Telecentre Family in Bangladesh: A Workshop for Social Entrepreneurs
and Practitioners. The international telecentre organisation telecentre.org
(an initiative by IDRC and Microsoft) and UNDP Bangladesh supported
the workshop. It brought 57 organisations under the same roof for
the first time. They shared experiences, were introduced to hands-on
15 These include character set encoding (ASCII/UNICODE), keyboard layout, keypad
layout (e.g. for mobile telephones), collation sequences (to enable applications
like databases), terminology translation and locale definition (to enable computer
interface in the local language).
16 Unicode is an industry standard designed to allow text and symbols from all of
the writing systems of the world to be consistently represented and manipulated
by computers. See: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unicode>.
17 Locale refers to the collection of information associated with a country or region.
This includes the language spoken in the region, date format, number format,
currency format, measurement units, scripts and local names for time zones.
Users can configure their system to pick up a locale that suits them.
18 <Banglalinux.org>.
19 <www.ankurbangla.org>.
20 Morphological analysis is a technique for exploring all the possible solutions to a
multi-dimensional, non-quantified problem complex. See: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Morphological_analysis>.
21 <bn.wikipedia.org>.
22 The authors may have excluded other reputable efforts in this sector, but
unwillingly.
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ideas about why and how to build telecentres, and talked about Mis-
sion 2011 – the goal of building a telecentre in every village by the
40th anniversary of Bangladesh’s independence.
A formal consultation, Towards Mission 2011: Building a Telecentre
Family in Bangladesh, was held in Dhaka in January 2007. A total of 20
organisations, including research institutions, NGOs, private sector
enterprises and other development partners, participated in the meet-
ing, and have now formed the Bangladesh Telecentre Network (BTN).
Community radio
There are a number of problems with the existing community broad-
casting situation. For instance, there is no participatory system through
which licensing conditions can be developed or applied. This means
that licensing processes are not transparent, and there are no clear
conditions for granting a licence.
All decisions in this area are made by the Ministry of Information
rather than an autonomous body. Licensing has been ad hoc, often
with licences being allocated on political grounds. This goes against
international standards, and threatens issues such as freedom of ex-
pression. It also deprives the decision-makers of an opportunity for
developing a regulatory regime in the best interests of the public.
In many countries, one of the criteria for assessing applications is
the contribution the proposed service would make in promoting local
content production and diversity. However, there is no clear way of pro-
moting these goals in the current regulatory environment in Bangladesh.
There is also no system for regulating content and, in particular,
for ensuring that it meets certain minimum standards in relation to
both regular programming and advertisements. There have already
been complaints of excessively sexual material on TV, as well as ma-
terial that degrades disabled people.
In March 2006, a roundtable on community radio was organised
jointly by the BNNRC, Voices for Interactive Choice and Empowerment
(VOICE), the MMC, FOCUS and the YPSA in association with UNESCO,
the UNDP and UNICEF, in Dhaka. Policy recommendations included:
• Greater awareness of the educational and developmental poten-
tial of community radio among policy-makers, regulators, non-
government and community service organisations is needed.
• Legislative reform should take account of the specific character-
istics of community radio and provide for its support within the
policy and regulatory framework.
• Assistance is needed to enable existing community radio sta-
tions to adapt to new digital production technologies and to in-
crease their access to the internet.
• Strategic links should be encouraged between community radio
and telecentres (or any other community access initiative) to clus-
ter community media resources.
• Online and technology-based learning centres should incorpo-
rate creative production facilities and access to local radio distri-
bution as well as the internet.
• Support for community radio development should be provided
through intermediary bodies at the national and regional level
through training, guidance and mentoring.
Localisation
The success of the localisation movement in Bangladesh is largely due
to it being volunteer-driven and spearheaded by the country’s open
source movement. The BdOSN and Ankur have arranged localisation
boot camps throughout the country since June 2006. These camps
have helped volunteer programmers get to know each other, and have
strengthened collaboration.23  These initiatives have attracted the atten-
tion of universities and the government. More researchers at universi-
ties are now showing interest in localisation (as mentioned above, BRAC
University now hosts the country’s main localisation centre) and the
government has decided to post Bangla content on its websites.
Open content development
The Bangla Wikipedia project is loosely organised using internet-based
mailing lists. Most of the participants in the Bangla Wikipedia are stu-
dents in Bangladesh and West Bengal, or expatriates living in North
America, Europe and Japan. Bangla Wiki has conducted several work-
shops to familiarise new users with techniques and skills related to the
project. To promote public awareness, it organised rallies during the
Bangla New Year, and also observed August as “Bangla Wiki Month”.
Bangla Wiki has set up an office in conjunction with the BdOSN for
people with limited internet connectivity. Here interested editors can
access the internet and contribute to the Wikipedia. In addition, people
from other regions of the country can send articles via postal mail,
which are later added to Bangla Wikipedia by Bangla Wiki volunteers.
Conclusions
This report aimed to provide an update on the ICT development situa-
tion in Bangladesh and to help civil society identify areas of policy inter-
vention. We identified only a number of areas, and policy interventions
in these areas are an ongoing process. In some cases, CSOs are net-
working and re-grouping among themselves to project a single voice to
the decision-makers; in others they are already in consultation with the
government. The greatest challenge is to get their policy recommenda-
tions approved and implemented by the government so that grassroots
communities can benefit. The national parliamentary election in Bang-
ladesh will be taking place soon. Change is therefore unlikely in the
short term. CSOs working in these areas are preparing themselves for a
fresh journey with renewed capacity and commitment. 
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Introduction
The war and the post-war environment left Bosnia and Herzegovina
far behind other countries in the Balkans. Damaged infrastructure and
a “knowledge and digital divide” are affecting ordinary life, as well as
the ability to compete in regional and global markets.
This report offers an overview of the current status of informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) development in the coun-
try. It highlights two areas of concern which are essential when speak-
ing about policy-making and the strategic development of ICTs.
On the one hand, two bodies are currently deadlocked in the
complex political environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Agency
for Information Society (AIS) and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Acad-
emy and Research Network (BIHARNET). Both are relevant in the de-
velopment of a legislative framework and strategic plan for channel-
ling resources and monitoring the implementation of ICTs.
The second important issue is that of access. This report fo-
cuses on primary and secondary schools and the status of broadband
provision. This is directly linked to the existing urban-rural “digital
divide” within the country, the divide between Bosnia and Herzegovina
and its neighbouring countries in South East Europe (SEE), and the
gap between the reality in the country and EU standards.
This report also provides an overview of participation in policy
processes. A list of key players in the ICT arena is provided. Despite
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS), the outcomes of the Summit have re-
mained largely invisible. While international organisations and the
Bosnia and Herzegovina government have promoted public-private
partnerships, public participation in the policy development process
has not been significant.
The methodology has included a review of relevant documenta-
tion and interviews with individuals in relevant associations, institu-
tions or organisations. ICT policy actors were identified through online
research using available public information.
Country situation
The second half of the 1990s had seen a general effort to cope with
and overcome the humanitarian disaster caused by the Bosnian War
(1992-1995). While the first phase focused on the reconstruction of
infrastructure, the return of displaced persons and the implementa-
tion of the Dayton Peace Agreement,2  2000 saw a new phase where
development approaches and issues, as well as their implementation,
became more visible and coherent. It is in this second phase that ICTs
were recognised as a cross-cutting and strategic issue for social and
economic development.
According to analysts, a key catalyst to the mainstreaming of
ICTs was a programme undertaken by the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina which aimed to
develop the capacity of government and civil society. The UNDP aligned
OneWorld Platform for Southeast Europe (OWPSEE)1
Valentina Pellizzer
BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA
its work with the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),
emphasising the importance of ICTs and a strategic approach to the
ICT sector. Key areas included governance reform, the delivery of basic
social services and education (Bakarsic et al, 2004, p. 43).
To help understand the way in which decision-making and con-
sensus are built in the country and the challenges that any relevant
process encounters, it is necessary to provide a short overview of
how the government is structured. The country of Bosnia and
Herzegovina encompasses two entities with their own governments
and parliaments: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska. There is also one internationally supervised dis-
trict, the Brcko District. This system of government was established
by the Dayton Agreement to guarantee the representation of the coun-
try’s three major groups (Muslim, Serb and Croat), with each having
a veto on anything that goes against what is defined as “the vital inter-
est of the constituent people”.3
The country or federal level of government comprises a tripartite
presidency, the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska
both have their own sets of ministries. In the Federation there is an
additional administrative level of ten cantons, while the municipal level
exists in both entities. Another peculiarity is the fact that a country
with less than four million people has four “official” cities.4
The presence of so many levels of government, which respond
more to the post-war situation and political interests than to adminis-
trative functionality, is specifically relevant whenever there is an at-
tempt to create state-independent and efficient bodies.
National strategies for information society development
At the beginning of 2002, the UNDP office in Bosnia and Herzegovina
launched the ICT Forum. The initiative lasted eighteen months, with
forum meetings held in Banja Luka, Mostar and Sarajevo. In the same
year the eSouthEastEurope (eSEE) Initiative5  under the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe6  umbrella was signed by all governments
of the SEE region. A secretariat was established in Sarajevo at the
UNDP office. These two factors played a crucial role in keeping the
1 <www.oneworldsee.org>.
2 The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in December 1995 and implemented in
2000.
3 More than 95% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to one of its
three constitutive ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The term
‘constitutive’ refers to the fact that these three ethnic groups are explicitly
mentioned in the constitution, and that none of them can be considered a
minority or immigrant. See: <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Constitutive_nations_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina> and <www.oefre.unibe.ch/
law/icl/bk00t___.html>.
4 Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Official” cities represent the
entity and ethnic levels.
5 See: <www.eseeinitiative.org>.
6 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted at a special meeting of
foreign ministers and representatives of international organisations, institutions
and regional initiatives in Cologne on 10 June 1999. The Pact establishes a
political commitment to a comprehensive coordinated and strategic approach to
the region. It is a forum for its members to identify measures and projects that
can contribute to the stability and development of the region. See:
<www.seerecon.org/region/sp/index.html>.
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ICT issue on the government’s agenda, and supported the efforts of
high-ranking officials in developing a strategic approach and secur-
ing federal government-level commitment.
While the eSEE Agenda lent credence to the policy process, with
support from the UNDP, an information society policy, strategy and
action plan were finalised in 2004. These three documents involved
expert teams from government ministries, the private sector and
academia. This momentum was maintained with a conference in Feb-
ruary 2005 on the information society, which also emphasised the re-
gional and eSEE dimensions (Ó Siochrù and Nath, 2005, annex 1, p. 3).
The Agency for Information Society (AIS)
The establishment of the AIS, a cabinet-level body, was expected to be
the most important outcome of the government’s strategic approach to
key development processes, and a concrete expression of the political
will to speed up transformation and extend benefits to all citizens.
The information society policy and action plan envisaged an in-
dependent agency that would report to the Council of Ministers on a
regular basis about its activities, and would be overseen by the Minis-
try of Communications and Transportation, except for activities re-
lated to protected documents (ID cards, driver licences, passports,
etc.). In the latter instances, the agency would report to the Ministry
of Civil Affairs.
However, the establishment of the AIS has been delayed. Most
recently, the Traffic and Communications Commission was supposed
to provide a final draft law for its establishment by the middle of Sep-
tember 2006, fifteen days before the general parliamentary election.
With the new government established at the beginning of February
2007, four months after the general elections, the draft law could
finally start its parliamentary process again and be put before parlia-
ment for discussion, amendment and approval.
In light of the internal dynamics of Bosnia and Herzegovina , the
reason behind the delay could be understood as an attempt to avoid
the creation of an agency as a body independent from the state. There
is also strong opposition to centralised functions at the federal or
country level. The Traffic and Communications Commission received
a series of amendments to the draft law from the Republika Srpska
government. It maintains that the AIS, the brainchild of the Ministry
of Telecommunications, contravenes the constitutions of both Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. It states that jurisdictions
are assigned to the joint institution that do not belong to it, but are
administrated at the level of the two entities, specifically in the fields
of administration, education and health. It also wants to keep the cur-
rent directorate for the implementation of the electronic database of
the Citizens Identification and Protection System (CIPS) – a project
which has developed a citizens registry available online from all 139
municipalities – within the Ministry of Civil Affairs, instead of merging
it with AIS responsibilities (CSS, 2006).
The information society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is uncertain.
While the action plan identifies 109 projects to be promoted, sup-
ported and financed, and has been approved by the Council of Minis-
ters, it is entangled in a complex political and administrative web,
involving all levels of government, from federal and entity ministries
to cantonal ministries and agencies.
There is also a risk that instead of the independent agency envis-
aged in the AIS, we will be faced with further delays or a diminished
agency, dependent on approval and permission. An even worse sce-
nario would entail the establishment of two complementary informa-
tion society agencies, which could put at risk the harmonised and
efficient development of the ICT sector in the country as a whole.
Already in 2005 the Republika Srpska tried to launch its own agency,
but postponed the move because of a lack of financial resources.
An indirect negative indicator of the situation can be found by
comparing the Global Information Technology Report published by
the World Economic Forum in the years 2005 and 2006. While Bosnia
and Herzegovina was ranked 89th out of 104 countries in the first,
one year later it had dropped to the 97th place out of 115. This clearly
shows the effect of the political stalemate which has paralysed key
processes crucial to the development of all sectors of the economy
and society.7
Education: primary and secondary school access to the internet
According to data provided by the World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina
spends about 2.7% of its GDP on basic education and 1.4% on sec-
ondary education. Almost 90% of this budget is spent on salaries for
teachers, which means that very few or no resources are available for
investing in development.
Throughout the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina there
are 596 primary and secondary schools in the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and 195 primary and secondary schools in the
Republika Srpska. These provide education to nearly half a million
pupils. There are also six universities in total.
Each entity has its own ministry of education (there is no educa-
tion ministry at the country level). The Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina also has ten cantonal ministries in charge of funds for
primary and secondary schools.
The country is undergoing a systemic change in its efforts to
harmonise with EU standards. While its current set of educational
laws include little related to ICTs, curricula in most primary and sec-
ondary schools are also not geared towards promoting the informa-
tion society.
The country’s eReadiness Assessment Report for 2005 (UNDP,
2006) shows that there is one computer for every 57 pupils in pri-
mary and secondary schools, and only one computer per 27 students
at the university level (the European average is one computer per 15
students). And while 64% of primary and secondary schools have a
Graph 1: Percentage of schools with internet access
Source: eReadiness Assessment Report (2005)
7 See: <www.weforum.org/gitr>.
computer lab, access to these labs has not been properly measured.
In primary and secondary schools, only 43% have internet access,
and the vast majority of schools are connected via dial-up.
Bosnia and Herzegovina Academic
and Research Network (BIHARNET)
BIHARNET was established by the University of Banja Luka, the Uni-
versity of Sarajevo, the University of Tuzla, Dzemal Bijedic University
in Mostar, and the University of Mostar. The Universities of East
Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are also members. While the
network became a legal body in 1998, money promised by the Minis-
try of Education of the Republic of Slovenia and the ministers of edu-
cation and science of both entities for running the network did not
materialise. As a result, the network exists primarily as a legal entity,
with some investment by the universities, or through joint projects
with other institutions.
Participation
The WSIS Declaration of Principles states: “Governments, as well as
private sector, civil society and the United Nations and other interna-
tional organizations have an important role and responsibility in the
development of the Information Society and, as appropriate, in deci-
sion-making processes. Building a people-centred Information Soci-
ety is a joint effort which requires cooperation and partnership among
all stakeholders” (ITU, 2003).
While the information society has received attention from high-
ranking officials at the country and entity government levels – largely
due to the UNDP – much of the momentum seen in 2004 has been
lost. Participation also did not involve all stakeholders equally.
The approach chosen by the UNDP focuses on public-private
partnerships. This envisages the involvement of civil society later on
in the process – and mainly in the role of support and dissemination
of ICTs. While academia was active in the ICT Forum and participated
in defining core policy documents, civil society organisations (CSOs)
working in the fields of local governance, transparency, advocacy,
human rights, environment and gender were notably absent during
the first round of the Forum held in 2003. Only eight non-governmen-
tal organisations had been included in the consultations and surveys
– and two of them were international agencies.
One of the reasons for this low degree of civil society participa-
tion is that many CSOs still do not see ICTs as being an important and
urgent issue. However, the situation is likely to change. Since 2006 a
number of organisations have started to address the issue of access
for primary and secondary schools.
During 2006, the Foundation for Creative Development, a com-
munity educator working in the field of ICTs and multimedia, and the
Youth Information Agency, an independent institute in the field of youth
policy development, ran local and national campaigns calling for the
issue of ICTs to become an organic part of youth policy, and for finan-
cial resources to be made available for ICT development.
 The National Gender Action Plan (GAP)8  included a chapter en-
titled “Information and Communication Technologies” which specifi-
cally addresses the issue of ICTs in connection with gender equality.
This could be used in the further development of the national ICT
policy processes.
If we break down the main actors at different levels that have
contributed or are willing to contribute to shaping the ICT policy land-
scape, we find at the international level: the ICT4D (ICT for Develop-
ment) department at the UNDP; the eSEE Secretariat; the Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad); the Austrian Develop-
ment Department; K-education; the Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency (CIDA); the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID); Cisco Systems; Oracle; and Hewlett Packard.
At the national level, key institutions that are important for infor-
mation society development and legislation enforcement are: the Coun-
cil of Ministers (country level); the entity governments themselves;
the Ministry of Transport and Communications (at the country level
and entity level); the Directorate for European Integration; the Minis-
try of Civil Affairs; the Ministries of Internal Affairs; the Ministries of
Finance; the Ministries of Law; the Central Bank; the Institute for Stand-
ards and Patents; and the Agency for Gender Equality in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, among others.
In the local private sector, key role players are: the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Association for Information Technologies (BAIT)9  which
has more than 50 IT companies as members, and the country’s internet
service providers (ISPs). There are currently more than 48 ISPs in
the country, some represented by the Bosnian ISP Association
(BaISPa).
Key civil society players include: the Youth Development Agency;
the Management and Information Technologies Centre, a unit of the
Faculty of Economics at the University of Sarajevo; the Linux Users
Group of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<www.linux.org.ba>); the Interna-
tional Association of Interactive and Open Schools (<www.ioskole.net>);
the Brcko District portal for primary and secondary schools
(<www.skole.bdcentral.net>); the International Forum Bosnia
(<www.ifbosna.org.ba>); the Foundation for Creative Development
(<www.fkr.edu.ba>); owpsee (<www.oneworldsee.org and www.ict-
policy.ba>); and the Sarajevo office of World University Service (WUS)
Austria (<www.wus-austria.org/sarajevo>).
The University Teleinformatic Centre (UTIC) deserves a special
mention. It was the first ISP provider in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
is responsible for the .ba country code top-level domain (ccTLD). It
also partnered with the OSCE in creating websites for primary and
secondary schools (151 schools now have their own websites).
Conclusions
While the ICT landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more dynamic
than a few years ago, there is a sense that the country is deadlocked,
and unable to act according to its declared plans and signed public
documents. While the AIS has yet to be properly established,
BIHARNET lacks the necessary power and independence. The fact
that the body is set up at the country level, while the ministries that
should provide finances are at the entity level, raises concerns about
its sustainability (the exception is the government of the Republika
Srpska, which has set up the network at the entity level).
In order to break the current trend, there is a need for two com-
plementary actions: pressure at the regional level from eSEE through
the eSEE Agenda+, as well as through its broadband taskforce
bSEE.10
8 The Gender Equality Agency has, in cooperation with each entity’s gender centre,
started constructing the Bosnia Herzegovina Gender Action Plan, the single most
important strategic document for the direct integration of gender equality in all
spheres of public and private life.
9 <www.bait.org.ba>.
10 Established by the eSEE governments together with Greece and Romania in
March 2006.
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While the bSEE parties are expected to establish or update their
national broadband strategies to include clear targets for connectivity
in education, health institutions and public administration (Govern-
ment of Serbia, 2006), the eSEE Agenda+ makes clear reference to
national policy that must include broadband targets as well as goals
to address gender imbalances. The eSEE Agenda+ can offer a wider
political framework to support advocacy and policy action coming
from CSOs.
Due to the status quo regarding the AIS, a specific role should
be created for the Communication Regulatory Agency (CRA).11  Part
of the mission of the CRA is to promote the development of an infor-
mation society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must also encourage the
development of a market-oriented and competitive communications
sector for the benefit of all citizens of the country, and protect the
interests of users and operators of telecommunication services in
terms of non-discriminatory access, quality and prices of services.
Even though the regulatory role of the CRA has had a significant im-
pact, it seems it could do much more within its mandate.
The local ICT business sector is growing and is willing to engage
through its association. A conference organised in November 2006
called for a more integrated and coherent approach towards local com-
panies that feel neglected or not supported enough in comparison to
multinationals (such as Cisco Systems and Microsoft).
Given the political environment, it is clear that the process will
require a long-term national strategy, as well as a regional strategy at
the institutional and civil society level – one of the few ways of dimin-
ishing the power of political veto too often played between the federal
and entity level.
At the national level there is an evident need for CSOs to develop
a joint strategy identifying common goals with local ICT companies
who, together with ISPs, are natural allies. It is good news that CSOs
have started to recognise the cross-cutting relevance of ICTs in rela-
tion to their core missions. Specifically, the partnership between the
Foundation for Creative Development and the Youth Development
Agency is an encouraging sign.
Two key events could further stimulate civil society’s role at the
policy advocacy level: the launch of the e-governance project, which
will channel the attention of CSOs active in the field of transparency,
access to information and active citizenship; and the National Gender
Action Plan, which can be effectively used by women organisations
that are working in the field of employment and life-long learning,
among other developmental concerns. 
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Introduction
One of the goals of the RITS Centre for Research, Study and Educa-
tion (NUPEF) is to help formulate public policy proposals on leveraging
information and communications technologies (ICTs) for human de-
velopment in Brazil. RITS is active in lobbying the federal government
on these policies, and has been active in the international scenario as
well, as a Southern participant of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS), including the Working Group on Internet Governance
(WGIG), and, more recently, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
This report is an initial effort to highlight several issues involved
in the complex Brazilian context. It contains a quick historical over-
view of recent processes (from the 1990s until today) which led to
the current situation in telecommunications, media and internet-re-
lated policies. A summarised review of governmental initiatives re-
lated to digital inclusion is then offered. The report then tries to estab-
lish the current shortcomings in the development of a national ICT
policy focused on human development. Finally, it proposes priority
objectives for an ICT policy framework.
Country situation
Recent history of infrastructure
Privatisation of the Telebrás system
Brazil has a fairly advanced (but poorly distributed) ICT infrastructure,
largely a result of the telecommunications privatisation process begun
in 1998. Until privatisation, the sector’s authority was centred in the
Ministry of Communications,3  the controlling agency of Telebrás (a state
“holding company” for all the telecommunications companies – te-
lephony and data transmission) and of the State Postal Company (EBCT).
In the last years of the Telebrás monopoly, the “holding com-
pany” became known not for its formal mission (extending public
telecommunications services to all Brazilians), but for its practical
activity: repressing demand.
One of the significant changes in the regulatory framework was
the creation in October 1997 of the National Telecommunications Agency
(ANATEL),4  the federal telecommunications regulatory body modelled
on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the US.
The deterioration of services, especially telephony services, com-
bined with the practical impossibility of improving services through
legal action by consumers – there was only one company providing
services, and it doubled up as the regulator – favoured pro-privatisa-
tion arguments in a context of an immense demand.5
ANATEL was established with the mission of enabling a new model
for Brazilian telecommunications, starting with the privatisation of the
Telebrás system. With privatisation, the main role of ANATEL became
that of regulation, concession and supervision of telecommunications
services in the country.
The privatisation process took place under the government of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), as part of the neoliberal
policy in which the touchstone was the withdrawal of the state from
any productive activity that might interest national or international
investors. The total estimated value of the privatisation of the sector
was USD 19.5 billion. However, payments were made in the local cur-
rency, the real. Most of these payments were made after a major de-
valuation of the real in relation to the dollar – a gift from the federal
government to the companies that were granted licences.
The original declared objective of privatisation was to ensure com-
petition in all markets, but the policy seriously failed on this point. In
practice, large consortia acquired Telebrás’ existing fixed telephony
structures in each of the three regions of coverage and became mo-
nopolies in those regions.
The possibility of having to face competition in regional markets
(reserved for a limited time), as well as the universal service obliga-
tions of the concession contracts, made the dominant companies in-
vest heavily in digital technology and in the construction of their own
backbones. While fixed telephony was effectively increased, the goals
of universal service embedded in the licence conditions, particularly
regarding poor areas, were not reached.
Privatised cellular telephony began with much more competition
(cellular telephony companies competing side by side in each region)
and services were extended in such a way that Brazil today has 100
million cellular telephones in operation (55% penetration in the total
population). However, concession contracts for cellular telephony do
not contain universal service clauses – another serious error in the
privatisation policy. Today more than 2,400 Brazilian municipalities
(43% of the total) have no local cellular telephone service (there are
no cellular network radio base stations in these municipalities). This
disparity particularly affects the poorer regions in the country (North-
East and North), but exists in all Brazilian states. For example, 29% of
municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul, one of the most economically
advanced states in the country, do not have the service.
Neither did the privatisation policy take into account the global
consolidation of telephony operators, together with the rapid rate of
technological convergence. There are four major cellular telephone
operators in Brazil, and two of them may merge as a result of agree-
ments between their global owners.6
Data transmission infrastructure
The development of the Brazilian fibre optic infrastructure began in
1993, with a link between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The Embratel
network exceeded 20,000 km of inter-urban fibre circuits by the end
1 <www.nupef.org.br>.
2 With contributions from NUPEF researcher Sonia Aguiar.
3 <www.mc.gov.br>.
4 <www.anatel.gov.br>.
5 In a certain way, this was a repeat of the situation that occurred when telephony
was in the hands of foreign operators or small private companies – only on a
much larger scale. Some of the arguments that were used for nationalisation from
1962 onwards were now used for the re-privatisation of services.
6 Vivo is owned by Telefónica de España, and Oi by Telemar. Mexican capital
controls Claro and the main operator of the country’s backbones and satellite
services, Embratel. TIM is controlled by Telecom Italia.
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of 1998. Today, there are fibre optic networks in the main cities, oper-
ated by various private companies, and even by local governments
(Niterói, Porto Alegre), as well as fibre circuits between these cities.
All telephone companies build their own fibre networks, and the
new regulations allow companies from other sectors, such as electric-
ity providers, to make use of their own infrastructure and build fibre
networks too. An example is Eletronet’s fibre network, with 16,000 km
interconnecting the main cities of eighteen Brazilian states, mounted
on electricity transmission pylons. When Eletronet hit financial difficul-
ties, the federal government considered nationalising the company, and
using its fibre network to service government needs and possibly for
digital inclusion projects. However, this did not happen.
Brazil has various international fibre connections with the US
and Europe (and also with Uruguay and Argentina), all operated by
companies controlled by foreign capital. The privatisation of telecom-
munications in Brazil often emphasises a single objective: to get rid of
productive, profitable state-owned companies to the detriment of other
considerations. As a consequence, the privatisation of Embratel re-
sulted in the sale to foreigners of the main satellite service provider in
the country. Even communications services directly related to national
security (government data traffic, including that of the armed forces)
currently use commercial satellite connections operated by foreign
companies. The entire Amazon protection network (known as SIVAM)
is interconnected via these commercial circuits. Today, Brazil (in con-
trast to countries of a similar size, such as Russia and India) does not
have a single communications satellite operated by its own depart-
ment of defence.
Despite having a sophisticated infrastructure with various data
transmission backbones and internet exchange/peering points in the
main cities, the distribution of PoPs (points-of-presence or points of
high-speed direct connection to a backbone) is extremely precarious.
Municipalities that have no local cellular telephone service in general
also have no local internet access services. The distribution of
broadband access (via ADSL, cable TV or digital radio network) reaches
a small percentage of urban areas. Even in the two main cities of the
country (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) there are entire districts –
including middle-class districts – with no access to this service.
According to prevailing legislation, recommended by the Brazil-
ian Internet Management Committee (CGI)7  and regulated by ANATEL,
a cable TV licensee or telephone operator that offers ADSL may con-
nect its users to the internet, but access authentication must be done
by an internet service provider (ISP). This is a result of legislation
adopted in the country that separates the physical and logistical infra-
structure (data transmission methods) from the service layers, and
prevents monopolies from developing.
In practice, however, with the consolidation of companies and
the convergence of technology, this rule has been systematically bro-
ken by cable TV operators and companies. Telefônica claims to oper-
ate ADSL services in over 900 municipalities in São Paulo, and is the
owner of the service and content provider Internet Terra Networks;
the cable TV quasi-monopoly Net Serviços, belonging to Organizações
Globo and Telmex, offers internet services and content via its subsidi-
ary Globo.com. It is not mandatory to take out a contract for connec-
tion and services from the same company, but it is obvious that these
companies have many advantages when it comes to attracting users
towards a single contract that encompasses all services (connection,
email, access to information, etc.). This process has led to a consoli-
dation in the provision of services and content, with the rapid disap-
pearance of small-scale service providers.
Brazilian Digital TV System (SBTVD)
Digital TV has been legislated by Decree 4901/03. The objective is to
contribute to digital inclusion. However, in the current context it should
only be thought of as a complementary, though important, means for
digital inclusion: the cost of a set-top box, as well as the subscription to
an access network, are major limiting factors for most of the population.
The SBTVD incorporates open standard middleware, developed
in Brazil, known as GINGA. This is used in set-top boxes. In June
2006, Brazil officially opted for the Japanese ISDB-T standard8  – an
option viewed by sectors of civil society as being inclined to favour
the existing large TV companies, in particular the dominant company
(Organizações Globo). Another criticism made by these sectors is that
the decision-making process was not pluralistic, and the allocation of
the radio frequency spectrum favours concentration of broadcasting
in the hands of the current multimedia oligopoly.
However, specialists working in SBTVD development consider
this to have been the best choice. The Japanese standard is the only
one ready for transmission to portable receivers (such as car receiv-
ers) and mobile receivers (such as cellular telephones).
From the time of the establishment of digital TV, broadcasters
will have ten years to adapt. During this time, programmes may be
transmitted simultaneously via digital and analogue signals. After ten
years, however, the concession for the analogue channel will be sus-
pended, and transmission will become exclusively digital.
ICTs for human development – government policies
and digital inclusion initiatives
Fund for the Universalisation of Telecommunications Services
After taking three years to be passed by Congress, Law 9998 was
approved in August 2000, establishing the Fund for the Universalisa-
tion of Telecommunications Services (FUST), regulated by Decree 3624
of October of the same year (Senado Federal, 2000). In summary, the
fund is made up of 1% of the gross operating revenue of fixed-line
telephone operators (equivalent to approximately USD 400 million
annually). Collection began in 2001, and by the beginning of 2007 the
FUST had accumulated approximately USD 2.8 billion.
The initial proposal for the use of FUST resources, developed in
2001, stipulated that 45% should be used to connect public schools,
35% to connect health units, and 20% for other purposes. However,
regulatory difficulties, and the fact that the contributions are held by the
Federal Treasury, have hindered the proper use of the funds up to now.
Even if used, FUST is hostage to regulations that prioritise the
acquisition of connectivity services from the telecommunications
operators who actually contribute towards the fund.
The GESAC programme
The Electronic Government – Citizens’ Support Service (GESAC) Pro-
gramme was created under the Cardoso government to maintain in-
dividual points of access to e-government services via the internet
(connected by satellite). Under the Lula9  government, the programme
moved on to connecting schools, telecentres and security services.
Today, GESAC has approximately 3,200 PoPs (VSAT stations with re-
7 <www.cgi.br>.
8 See: Decreto 5.820, 29 June 2006. Available from: <www.indecs.org.br/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=85&Itemid=46>.
9 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
ception bandwidth of up to 2 mbps), active in approximately 37% of
Brazilian municipalities in all states. Approximately 400 PoPs connect
Ministry of Defence services.
GESAC’s choice of locations for the installation of PoPs must
comply with the following criteria: localities with a low Municipal Hu-
man Development Index (MHDI); localities where telecommunications
networks do not offer internet access; and communities that have
already developed cultural community activities that are supported
(or could be supported) by ICTs. However, the MHDI criterion was not
applied in a systematic manner.
Public primary and secondary schools – including those in in-
digenous villages and rural settlements – make up 72% of the 3,240
PoPs installed as of September 2006. This totals 2,355 schools, of
which 1,800 were selected by the Ministry of Education on the condi-
tion that they already had a computer laboratory with at least five
computers in a local network, but without internet access. The other
555 schools were selected by the Ministry of Communications, the
Ministry of Social Development10  and the Fight Against Hunger and
state education secretariats. However, the criteria for choosing PoPs
in education were also partly spoilt by political patronage.
Twelve indigenous communities received PoPs from the pro-
gramme in September 2006. Only two quilombola communities (made
up of African descendents from the period of slavery) were benefici-
aries: one in São Paulo, and the other in Rio Grande do Norte. Rural
and fishing communities were major GESAC beneficiaries, thanks to
the organisation of rural workers (e.g. through unions) and small ag-
ricultural producers, on the one hand, and on the other, the Maré
project of the Special Secretariat of Aquiculture and Fisheries (SEAP).
GESAC has been used for voice over internet protocol (VoIP)
telephony in an attempt to provide telecommunications services to
poorer areas, which the fixed telephone companies should serve as
part of their licensing conditions. At the beginning of November 2006,
the programme announced that voice transmission via the internet
using PoP terminals increased from 2,131 to 66,865 minutes between
December 2005 and October 2006, which is more than a thirty-fold
increase. However, the service is still limited (at least officially) to a
little less than 500 PoPs.
From the perspective of democratisation of broadband access,
GESAC has serious limitations. Firstly, it is a relatively expensive
broadband technology. Secondly, connections via satellite are more
expensive than surface connections and will not be able to beat fibre
optic technology, unless there is an enormous leap in on-board en-
ergy and digital radio transmission technology. Technically, the fibre
technology is “future-proof” – the transmission capacity of already-
installed fibre depends only on updating the transceivers at their end-
points. Technological leaps have been promising, multiplying many
times over the transmission capacity of recent years (from gigabits
per second to terabits per second in a single fibre).
Access to equipment
One computer per student? Brazilian public schools have approxi-
mately 33 million children in primary schools and 10 million in second-
ary schools, in a total of about 160,000 schools. On this scale, it is
surprising that the government is considering approving projects such
as the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project. Without considering all the
support costs, as well as those related to increasing the capacity of the
network and its adaptation (the project involves connecting computers
to the internet), and supposing that the Negroponte11  “gadget” costs at
least USD 100, the gross cost for Brazil would be over USD 3.3 billion.
It is clear that this would be an impossible and impractical expense:
there are no available budget lines for this, and the same amount of
money would make it possible to carry out alternative digital inclusion
projects in schools with much wider reach and impact. It is also clear
that it does not make sense to implement the programme for only 3-
4% of Brazilian children. It is an expensive game for a country that is far
from attaining the required digital inclusion levels.
Computers For All:12  This is a programme of the Presidency of
the Republic, together with the Ministry of Development,13  the Minis-
try of Science and Technology14  and the federal data processing com-
pany, Serpro. Those who will benefit are low-income families above
the poverty line. It consists of subsidising lines of credit for the pur-
chase of computers with a minimum specification, at a value of up to
BRL 1,400 (USD 650). Repayments may be made in 24 instalments
of BRL 70 (USD 33) each. For computers of up to BRL 2,500 (USD
1,160), there are some tax exemptions. Up to May 2006, the Ministry
of Science and Technology registered 23 manufacturing companies
interested in selling equipment within the programme. Since its launch,
a single company has marketed 77,000 machines as part of the project.
Computer refurbishment: This is a project of the federal govern-
ment (Ministries of Planning, Education and Labour) that seeks to
establish refurbishment centres for second-hand computers donated
by public and private entities. The computers will be refurbished by
low-income youths who will be trained to do the work. They will then
be distributed to telecentres, schools and libraries. The project was
inspired by a similar initiative by the Canadian government, which
today refurbishes over 100,000 computers a year in 50 centres, sup-
plying 25% of the computer needs in the country’s public education
network. The first centre in Brazil is a pilot centre, in operation in
Porto Alegre since April 2006.
Telecentres and kiosks
Citizens’ kiosks:15  This involves a Ministry of National Integration
project to establish access points for e-government services. It started
as an experiment in municipal public libraries in poor communities
around the country’s capital in 2003. By October 2006 the project had
already extended to various low Human Development Index (HDI) mu-
nicipalities of the states of Goiás, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul
and Mato Grosso.
Digital Station Programme:16  This is an initiative of the Banco do
Brasil Foundation (Fundação Banco do Brasil), with the support of
local partners. It seeks to bring computers closer to the lives of stu-
dents, housewives and workers, “saving time and money, creating
new perspectives and improving the quality of life of the population.”17
Since 2004, 166 units have been established throughout Brazil, ap-
proximately 90% of them in the north-eastern and central-western
states. These have a capacity to serve 500 to 1,000 persons a month.
10 <www.mds.gov.br>.
11 Nicholas Negroponte is founder and chairman of the One Laptop Per Child non-
profit association.
12 <www.computadorparatodos.gov.br>.
13 <www.desenvolvimento.gov.br>.
14 <www.mct.gov.br>.
15 <www.integracao.gov.br>.
16 <www.fundacaobancodobrasil.org.br/estacaodigital>.
17 See: Portal Inclusão Digital. <www.inclusaodigital.gov.br>.
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Information and Business Telecentres:18  This is a programme of
the Ministries of Industry and Trade and Social Development. It in-
volves establishing telecentres focused on the digital inclusion of the
small entrepreneur, with the aim of expanding business and work
opportunities that will lead to economic growth and employment. The
telecentres are established in business associations, mayor’s offices
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Besides facilitating hard-
ware donations to the telecentres, the programme offers content ori-
ented towards entrepreneurs by means of a web portal. However,
telecentre hosts must sort out the installation of equipment, as well
as the management and administration of the telecentre on their own.
The network has 1,616 units installed across all Brazilian states.
Banco do Brasil Telecentres:19  This is a digital inclusion pro-
gramme that is part of the corporate social responsibility policy of the
Banco do Brasil. The initiative resulted from the modernisation of the
bank’s technological network. Old equipment was donated to poor
communities so that community telecentres could be established. The
programme looks to train the telecentre monitors and develop part-
nerships to support the telecentres. The Banco do Brasil says over
1,600 telecentres and computer rooms have been established (con-
sisting of 17,000 computers and attracting four million users).
Digital Inclusion Telecentres: This is a project that integrates the
Petrobras Zero Hunger Programme, developed in partnership with
the National Information Technology Institute (ITI) and RITS. To date,
the project has established 50 units in low HDI areas. Approximately
1,000 people a day use the telecentres. Among the more than 15,000
persons registered to participate in the project, women are in the
majority (55.48%), and 70% of users are under 30 years of age.
Chief of Staff’s Office – Casa Brasil:20  The National Coordination
of the Casa Brasil programme was established by presidential decree
on 11 March 2005.The programme looks to establish cultural centres
in poor communities with facilities for internet use and multimedia
production (audio and video). It is being developed with the participa-
tion of various ministries, secretariats and federal government com-
panies. In August 2006, 44 units were in operation, serving an aver-
age of 50,000 people, and another 89 units were in the implementa-
tion phase in low HDI communities in the larger cities of the five re-
gions of Brazil.
Culture Points:21  This is a project of the Living Culture Programme
of the Ministry of Culture, the objective of which is to support local
cultural initiatives, called Culture Points, through funding of up to
BRL 185,000 (USD 88,500). It has resources for training local agents
in the production and exchange of digital multimedia (video, audio,
digital photography) with the use of free and open source software
(FOSS). The Culture Points are connected to the internet via satellite
(GESAC). As of June 2006, 485 Culture Points had been set up by the
programme, and another 80 are awaiting approval.
Serpro Citizens Space:22  This is a digital inclusion programme by
Serpro, which aims to support the installation of community telecentres
and promote the digital inclusion of communities neighbouring the com-
pany’s regional offices. The programme also supports the Open School
Programme, in partnership with the Ministry of Education.
Technological Vocational Centres (CVTs):23  This is a project by
the Ministry of Science and Technology. CVTs are oriented towards
the technological empowerment of the population. They offer train-
ing, a location for scientific experimentation, contextual enquiry, and
the provision of specialised services, taking into account the vocation
of the local region and encouraging the improvement of processes.
The project began in 2003 and by the end of 2006 153 CVTs had been
created.
Maré Fisheries Telecentres:24  This is a programme by the Spe-
cial Secretariat of Aquiculture and Fisheries of the Presidency of the
Republic (SEAP). It looks to establish telecentres in fishing commu-
nities. The objectives are to offer access to computer resources and
the internet; strengthen participative citizenship; and build capacity.
By the end of 2006, five telecentres had been established, and an-
other fifteen are under implementation. The Banco do Brasil supplied
the computers, and the GESAC programme is providing satellite con-
nections.
Ministry of Communications Telecentres: In another initiative,
the federal government decided at the end of 2006 to provide a
telecentre to each municipality – a total of 5,400 telecentres. The Min-
istry of Communications, in partnership with the Ministry of Social
Development, carried out a tender process to acquire 54,000 com-
puters (10 per telecentre) and 5,400 servers (one for each telecentre).
The purchase also includes printers and UPSs (voltage regulators),
as well as televisions, projectors and DVD players for each telecentre.
Community Telecentres in São Paulo: Covering an area of 1,522
km2, the city of São Paulo is the largest in the country and has almost
11 million inhabitants. The inauguration of the first of the 130 com-
munity telecentres in the city’s poor areas took place on 18 June 2001,
the result of a joint initiative between the city mayor’s office, RITS,
and local organisations. Using a thin-client architecture (each telecentre
has a server and 20 workstations) running GNU/Linux, all of the
telecentres represent a major localised national digital inclusion ini-
tiative. The majority of them use FOSS exclusively. By the end of the
term of Mayor Marta Suplicy in 2004, the telecentres were serving
approximately half a million people, and continued to function under
the new municipal administration from 2005.
Public schools
Brazil has approximately 160,000 public schools, 16,570 of which
are secondary schools. Of the primary schools, 89,000 are in rural
areas and 25,000 have no electricity. Table 1 shows the current number
of schools with at least one computer, irrespective of its connectivity
status. In the short term, the federal government plans to distribute
approximately 76,000 computers25  by mid 2007 to secondary schools
– an average of 10 computers per school. This will significantly scale
up access in secondary education.
If percentages are low (only 15.64% of public schools have com-
puters), the connectivity situation is much worse: fewer than 6% of
public schools have a permanent internet connection, and most of
them use GESAC. A study suggests that schools near to the PoPs of
the National Network for Education and Research (RNP), which has a
high-speed network present in all of the country’s major cities,26  may
18 <www.telecentros.desenvolvimento.gov.br>.
19 <www.bb.com.br/appbb/portal/bb/id/index.jsp>.
20 <www.brasil.gov.br/casabrasil>.
21 <www.cultura.gov.br/programas_e_acoes>.
22 <www.serpro.gov.br/cidadao>.
23 <www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/11471.html>.
24 <tuna.seap.gov.br/seap/telecentro>.
25 In many instances, refurbished computers are used.
26 RNP connects 250 university and research centres.
be connected to it via wi-fi (or something similar) at a much lower
cost than that of satellite. Schools outside of the large centres will
have to wait for the roll-out of the backbones, or rely on connectivity
via satellite.
The Ministry of Education expects to equip 12,000 rural schools
by 2008 and another 45,000 rural schools by 2011. Only 1.2% of
schools have computer laboratories in rural areas.
Community networks
As is the case in various other countries, Brazilian cities are seeking
alternatives to solutions offered by the market, so that network re-
sources can be optimised and internet access democratised. Despite
the fact that successful projects have been implemented in only a few
cities to date, there is much interest on the part of many mayoral
offices, and especially local civic entities, in seeking alternatives. Fre-
quently cited examples are the cities of Piraí (in the state of Rio de
Janeiro) and Sud Mennucci (in the state of São Paulo), which created
their own municipal networks in partnership with the community. These
had two central aims: to optimise network resources for the use of
the public administration, and to extend the internet to poor commu-
nities (through telecentres), schools and public health centres.
Another project still in the pilot phase is the community network
of the riverside communities of the Tapajós and Arapiuns Rivers. An
initiative of the Health and Happiness Project (PSA) and RITS, the
project intends to connect more than 140 communities (each with 50
to 150 families) over a stretch of more than 150 km, using a combi-
nation of fibre optic, wireless and satellite connections. Currently, it
serves five communities with two GESAC satellite connections and a
long-range wi-fi network.
Participation
Government interventions in ICTs for human development in Brazil
reveal a common thread: it is rare for civil society to be invited to
participate in the formulation of public digital inclusion policies.
On the other hand, despite the federal government having cre-
ated sectoral committees to handle a common national strategy, this
has not been developed, and what is seen is a long list of parallel
initiatives by ministries and state enterprises.
Cases in which there has been an opportunity for the effective
participation of civic entities (such as the São Paulo Mayor’s Office
telecentre project, among others) have resulted in successful projects
– which should motivate further partnerships between government
and civil society. This is not happening, and the signs with regard to
the Lula government’s second term of office are not encouraging:
budgetary allocations that directly relate to digital inclusion pro-
grammes were reduced between 2006 and 2007.
Civil society has sought to actively participate in policy propos-
als. One of the most relevant forums is that of the National Digital
Inclusion Workshop, held annually since 2002. The 5th Workshop,
held in Porto Alegre, produced a document – The Declaration of Porto
Alegre – listing the main points of a national ICT policy for human
development (RITS, 2006).
Conclusions
We start with the observation that Brazil is a big country, both geo-
graphically (8.5 million square km) and demographically (180 million
inhabitants). We also start with the obvious hypothesis that public
policy expenditures in leveraging ICTs for human development are
not costs, but essential investments. We do not need to discuss how
important ICT access is for economic and social (and also cultural)
development, significantly contributing towards leaps in local devel-
opment possibilities and participation in the whole national economy.
We also recall that there are many initiatives, originating from
governments, NGOs, the private sector, and even from academia, that
serve as examples of good practice for a comprehensive strategy.
The following may be cited, among others: telecentres in the most
needy communities; subsidised connectivity via satellite (GESAC) for
schools, public services and telecentres; exemplary municipal digital
initiatives (Sud Mennucci, Piraí and others); electrification programmes
for rural schools;27  consolidation of an extensive and advanced na-
tional education and research network (RNP); the implementation of
a government policy that prioritises open standards and FOSS; e-gov-
ernment actions at federal and state level, including online services,
standardisation and system interoperability (e-PING architecture); and
a national internet governance system that is transparent and consid-
ered worldwide as a point of reference for efficiency and quality.
However, even though various national initiatives in the ICT field
are among the best in the world, we are still lacking a unifying strategy
that will deepen and democratise the benefits of new technologies. Some
points that show the urgent need for a government strategy:
• More than 2,400 municipalities are being ignored by private tel-
ecommunications and internet service companies. These mu-
nicipalities only have fixed telephone services (because univer-
sal service obligations demanded it). In these municipalities, with
more than 22 million people, and representing over 44% of our
5,562 municipalities, there is no local cellular service, nor local
access to the internet. These municipalities are precisely those
that most require economic and social support. They are in all
states, but especially in the north and north-east, and are con-
demned by telecommunications operators to eternal disconnec-
tion.
• Zero, or very unstable connectivity in nearly all of our rural ar-
eas. Whoever lacks the economic resources for a satellite con-
nection is also condemned to eternal disconnection. Satellite
connectivity is expensive, and not “future-proof”. We know that
it is limited and, in the way that it is distributed (point to point),
very expensive in relation to the bandwidth offered. At the same
time the quality of service is susceptible to bad weather (espe-
cially in the Ku band).
• Thousands of districts in larger cities, where there is no
broadband service, have also been abandoned by the operators
for market reasons. In these districts, like in all other municipali-
ties and in our poorest districts in Brazil, it is essential to estab-
lish community internet access centres, as there is no way to
connect a local digital inclusion project except via satellite.
Table 1: Computers in schools
Schools Total % With at least %
one computer
Primary 143,000 89.6 16,792 11.74
Secondary 16,570 10.4 8,172 49.32
Total 159,570 100.0 24,964 15.64
Source: Ministry of Education (January 2007)
27 Using photovoltaic panels.
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These districts (or satellite cities) are present in all Brazilian cit-
ies, including those that are the most advanced in terms of internet
services, like Rio de Janeiro, Brasília and São Paulo.
• Brazil has over 33 million primary school children, and approxi-
mately 10 million in secondary schools, in about 160,000 public
schools across the country. In nearly all of these schools, there
is no internet access (or even the equipment to enable access
when it does exist). It is ridiculous, especially for a country with
over USD 3 billion accumulated in a universal access fund, to
have connectivity in less than 6% of its public schools. At the
other extreme, in South Korea over 65% of six-year-old children
are on the internet, and practically all public schools have
broadband connections.
• Approximately 53% of our families live on less than two mini-
mum wages per month. Over 30% of our families are not in a
position to acquire a computer, unless it is at a nominal price, or
100% subsidised. But, even so, the additional expenses (in ac-
cess costs and power consumption) for a family owning a com-
puter that will inevitably be connected to the internet means that
the device can create more problems than solutions for the poor-
est households.
Topics for a comprehensive strategy
We cannot content ourselves with the limitations of underdeveloped
countries. While we have different levels of resources available to us
compared to developed countries, our ability to do much better is
indisputable. However, our strategic planning, at least in the area of
ICTs, appears to be that of an impoverished country; especially when
we see instances when the government operates in a closed manner,
without dialogue with civil society, and is affected by internal disa-
greements.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that we have conflicting
legal and institutional structures that hinder or impede the invest-
ment of public resources into concrete actions – frequently leading to
the impossibility of trying to implement public policies without public
resources. To give just one example: the FUST is in practice ham-
strung by the General Telecommunications Law and other regulations.
A comprehensive and unifying strategy for leveraging ICTs for
human development throughout the country must work with a set of
central objectives determined by wide consensus. Below, I describe
what I consider to be the priority objectives for this strategy.
• Guarantee that, in each municipality, there is a national high-
speed fibre optic PoP, or a direct extension of a PoP, adequate to
ensure quality connectivity for the use of multimedia in all areas
of the municipality.
Municipal networks, developed by local initiatives and with the
support of a unified national strategy, could offer connectivity to all
areas or institutions in the municipality (urban districts, rural areas,
health centres, hospitals, schools, telecentres, public libraries, gov-
ernment administration centres, etc.). They could also provide con-
nectivity to individual users and legal entities. In this way, local com-
munity networks would be combined with a national high-speed net-
work guaranteeing the best benefit/cost for each user, and uniform
connection quality throughout the country.
To do this a national implementation programme that optimises
the distribution of PoPs is essential. In many municipalities today
there is still no justification for a fibre extension with high-speed equip-
ment. However, this technical project would define PoPs that are ap-
propriately located, from which nearby municipalities will be covered
by one or more high-speed digital radio link (200 mbps can be achieved
in each link in current commercial digital radio standards) or even
local fibre branches at initially lower speeds.
It is crucial to guarantee enough bandwidth for the use of vari-
ous internet services, including the effective use of multimedia, in all
municipalities, and not to simply adopt a standard today that will be
obsolete tomorrow. A national “future-proof” programme is essen-
tial, and not only a “national broadband plan” whose range, efficacy
and longevity are in doubt.
• Prioritise support on the ground (at municipal level) for compre-
hensive digital inclusion initiatives that integrate separate initia-
tives and local needs in a common network, optimising connec-
tivity costs and improving the quality of service of access.
The national strategy will support the development of digital mu-
nicipalities – comprehensive community networks connecting public
services, schools, telecentres and health centres, in urban and rural
areas. The networks will also be available for private use. These initia-
tives, benefiting from thousands of similar, already well-known expe-
riences in the country and in the world, not only reduce connectivity
and communication costs, but greatly improve the quality of service.
Owing to the major asymmetry in the distribution of connectivity
resources in the country, special priority must be guaranteed in the
national strategy to the more than 2,400 municipalities that currently
have no access to a local backbone PoP.
Ideally, the strategic result of this plan would see the high-speed
municipal networks forming the backbone of the country’s internet
infrastructure.
• Guarantee at least shared access (via local community telecentre
initiatives supported by a national policy) in all lower-resourced
urban areas. Seek ways of extending the reach of community
networks to the rural population.
If this objective is achieved it could mean the installation of ap-
proximately 10,000 community telecentres, in partnership with local
governments and communities. It should be noted that Bolivia’s cur-
rent digital inclusion plan stipulates the establishment of 2,000
telecentres for a population of around 11 million. If this scale was
repeated in Brazil, we would be talking about more than 30,000
telecentres. This document reveals many government community
telecentre initiatives – all of them operating in parallel, without a com-
mon strategy.
• Avoid, with appropriate legislation, telecommunications cartels
that satisfy only the market.
Telecommunications cartels are today fighting for the market of
those who are already connected and able to pay relatively high monthly
fees (much more expensive than in Europe or the US) in order to have
access to broadband connections.
In this scenario, all other users will be condemned by the market
to eternal disconnection, and the country condemned to the acceler-
ated deepening of the “digital divide”. There should be a guarantee
that local or regional entrepreneurs offer connectivity proposals that
support public roll-out policies (such as a municipal network).
• Guarantee that in the shortest time possible, all public schools
will be well (and permanently!) connected to the internet.
This was one of the central priorities for FUST resources. But the
policy ended up not being implemented. It is not enough to define a
national plan of democratising high-speed access and the installation
of community networks. It is also necessary to guarantee that Brazil-
ian public schools will have access to the internet.
Our distance from countries such as South Korea is massive,
and is rapidly increasing – but it is also increasing in relation to less
developed countries.
• Guarantee connectivity to all public health, security and munici-
pal administration services.
This was another of the central priorities for FUST resources that
ended up being abandoned. As in the case of the schools, these serv-
ices cannot expect the ideal network to arrive on their doorstep. Means
of connecting them (even if only in a limited way) have to be found,
until a more efficient alternative arrives.
• Ensure the use of open systems and standards, in order to re-
duce the dependency on proprietary systems and software or
software with interoperability problems.
Brazil is already globally recognised as one of the countries to
have made a widespread attempt to adopt FOSS and open standards
in the public federal sphere. The reasons for this policy are valid for
all spheres of government, and a national ICT policy could not ignore
this priority. However, the initiative still requires more careful coordi-
nation, and there are still federal e-government services operating
with proprietary systems in cases where a FOSS alternative clearly
exists, of the same or better quality.
• Expand e-government systems and services to all instances of
public administration, taking into account the “digital divide”,
interoperability criteria, open standards, transparency and effi-
ciency.
The federal government and some states (as well as some mu-
nicipalities) have been recognised as examples of this policy. It is
important that this practice, combined with the effective universalisa-
tion of internet access, be expanded with quality and efficiency.
• Establish a national empowerment strategy so that, on all levels,
individuals and institutions with access can use it efficiently.
One of the mistakes frequently made in social and educational
ICT programmes in the country is to start (and often end) a project
with the acquisition and donation of equipment. Apart from access to
connectivity and equipment, it is essential that there be a dissemina-
tion of skills to make better use of this access.
• Promote changes to FUST laws and regulations in the short term,
and create a multi-stakeholder governance mechanism for the fund.
It is indisputable that Brazil, even taking its size into account,
has already accumulated an exceptional amount of financial resources
to promote and leverage ICTs for human development. However, le-
gal support and a government attitude that relegates the relevance of
digital inclusion to second place have hindered the use of these re-
sources. It is essential that the decision-making process for the use
of the fund be pluralistic, transparent and democratic. It is also fun-
damental that priority in the use of these resources be guaranteed to
innovative projects originating from communities, or with commu-
nity participation. The national ICT strategy must, finally, combine
optimal use of fund resources with other resource sources. 
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6 Introduction
This report focuses on access and internet penetration as prerequi-
sites for information society advancement. It attempts to depict the
national situation in information and communications technology (ICT)
development in Bulgaria in 2006 and to sketch the context in which
Bulgarian ICT policy is being made. It shows that ICT penetration in
Bulgaria has improved, but that it still lags behind other EU member
states. Policy development and legislative processes in Bulgaria have
followed changes necessary for the country to fulfill its EU member-
ship requirements, and have less to do with more general and volun-
tary agreements, such as commitments made at the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS). Bridging the digital gap in under-
serviced areas is often dependent on international donors. Civil soci-
ety participation in decision-making processes has not been a formal
stipulation. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have
paved their way to the policy process through a number of tactics,
such as holding meetings with institutional working groups, drafting
proposals for the attention of parliamentary commissions, and ap-
pealing decisions in court.
The report was compiled from public information sources (e.g.
research studies, surveys, media publications, online resources), and
interviews with a representative of the state institution responsible
for ICT policy development and with civil society observers. It has
been prepared by the BlueLink Information Network, with a signifi-
cant contribution from Nelly Stoyanova from the Bulgarian State
Agency for Information Technology and Communications, Dessislava
Pefeva from Internet Society-Bulgaria, and Goritza Belogusheva from
ABC Design and Communications, co-author of the book The First
Ones in Bulgarian Internet (Belogusheva and Toms, 2003).
A special mention needs to be made of the recently published an-
nual report e-Bulgaria 2006 (ARC Fund, 2006) developed by the Ap-
plied Research and Communications (ARC) Fund. It provided useful
data on Bulgaria’s progress in ICTs, and on ICT policy development.
BlueLink’s work on the Bulgarian ICT Policy Monitor – part of the Asso-
ciation for Progressive Communications (APC) members’ network of
policy sites – proved equally useful in compiling this report.
Country situation
Access and e-penetration
Bulgaria’s communication infrastructure is improving, but is still in-
sufficient to offer equal access to all. The ICT market is unregulated,
but thriving. Despite a positive trend in ICT penetration in recent years
and a rapid increase in investment, overall investment remains low.
Bulgaria’s research and development expenditures are feeble, and most
new innovation is imported. Infrastructure development is hampered
by a lack of funds in both the private and public sector.
The main constraints in the sector are a lack of development and
infrastructure programmes; poor development of state administra-
tive infrastructure; a low number of successful public-private part-
BlueLink Information Network1
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nerships; and a lack of sufficient public funding for national research.
An absence of training in the use of ICTs and the low purchasing power
of Bulgarian households are also impacting negatively on the sector.
Bulgaria has a high density of fixed telephone lines (73.4% ac-
cording to the e-Bulgaria 2006 report), but compared to the EU-25,2
the country has a far lower density of digital fixed lines. According to
the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company (BTC),3 the level of
digitalisation had reached 46% as of April 2006. Despite the fact that
there has been a recent and dramatic increase in mobile phone den-
sity, access levels still lag behind the EU-25.
In general, internet penetration is progressing, but also lags be-
hind the European community that Bulgaria recently joined. Internet
use in Bulgarian households is considerably less than that of the EU-
25. The share of internet users in the country reached 26% of the
population aged fifteen and over in 2006. Projections suggest that as
of 2007 some 34% of the population will be using the internet. A key
challenge for policy-makers remains the “digital divide” among dis-
advantaged groups and ethnic minorities. The data suggests that
internet penetration rates among ethnic groups are three to five times
lower than the average figures for the country.
Broadband internet access improved in 2004 with the introduc-
tion of ADSL4  services. In 2005, 4% of internet users had broadband
compared to 10.6% for the EU-25 (although the BTC predicts this will
rise to 14% by 2008).
The penetration of new ICTs in the business sector seems to be
approaching a level of saturation. Around 27% of employees have
access to the internet at their workplaces. In 2006, 90% of businesses
had at least one computer, and 75% to 80% had access to the internet.
Currently, 24% of enterprises have websites, and 11% of them allow
online orders to be placed. The major barriers are technical infra-
structure, technical skills and the price of access.
There is a significant effort underway to improve internet acces-
sibility to under-serviced parts of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian State Agency
for Information Technology and Communications (SAITC), working
together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
has made good progress in making internet connectivity available to
schools, research institutions and the general public.
Their work attempts to address the following goals:
• Getting computers into schools and networking schools
• Establishing distance-learning platforms and standards
• Establishing a national network of public internet access points
(telecentres, libraries etc.)
• The provision of high-speed national and international internet
connectivity to universities and research institutes in Bulgaria
1 <www.bluelink.net>.
2 The 25 member states of the European Union before the accession of Bulgaria
and Romania on 1 January 2007 raised the total membership to 27.
3 <www.btc.bg/en>.
4 Asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) allows data transmission over existing
copper telephone lines.
• The integration of the Bulgarian scientific research and develop-
ment community into the European Research Area (ERA).5
In the last two years the Telecentres Project has built a network
of about 95 public telecentres which provide internet services to us-
ers in small and economically underdeveloped areas. In addition to
telecentres, the project has created technical training facilities and a
training programme for instructors and civil servants. The SAITC and
the UNDP are implementing the project in partnership with the Minis-
try of State Administration and Administrative Reform (MSAAR), and
the Institute of Public Administration and European Integration (IPAEI).
While 1,000 schools have been connected to broadband internet,
the process has not gone smoothly. The public procurement for the
communication network was brought to court by a consortium that
lost the bid. The result was a major delay in the project. Recently the
SAITC announced that the dispute was resolved and that soon the
number of schools with internet in Bulgaria will be 3,200.
If the solution succeeds, the Bulgarian government will carry out
its WSIS promise. In a statement at the Summit, Bulgarian repre-
sentatives declared that the country must emphasise ICTs in educa-
tion by investing in computer and communication infrastructure in
schools around the country, thus giving virtually all students access
to computers and the internet.
Accessibility to institutional websites for visually impaired peo-
ple is still receiving little attention, and has been criticised by organi-
sations. Only the Ministry of Transport’s website is adapted for disad-
vantaged groups, and it has already drawn a lot of interest. Currently
500 visually impaired people use Bulgarian language screen-reading
software (SpeechLab), distributed by the Bulgarian Association for
Computational Linguistics.
For 25.4% of internet users, language is also a barrier. A recent
poll among users indicates that 87.2% use the internet mainly for
information enquiries and 34.5% would like better Bulgarian language
search engines.
ICT policy and legislation
At international forums, such as the WSIS, the Bulgarian government
has declared that its information society development activities are
carried out in line with world trends, EU policies and specific national
conditions. “Our main challenges are related to the full implementa-
tion of the EU electronic communications regulatory framework, the
i2010 initiative6  and, more specifically, the development of network
and electronic services, adoption of ICT by businesses, strengthen-
ing competitiveness, and the inclusion and development of public elec-
tronic services,” stated SAITC chairman Plamen Vatchkov (SAITC,
2005).
The most powerful influence that has shaped Bulgaria’s ICT policy
is the country’s accession into the EU on 1 January 2007. The devel-
opment of Bulgarian ICT legislation benefited significantly from its
synchronisation with the respective regulatory acts in the EU. The
annual monitoring reports of the European Commission were a pri-
mary incentive to ICT legislative progress in the country.
Bulgaria is now generally meeting the commitments and require-
ments arising from the accession negotiations. However, the Euro-
pean Commission noted several weak points regarding its legislative
and administrative ICT tasks. For example, the Commission said that
the national regulatory authority needed more capacity and independ-
ence, better coordination and proper resources. The new Electronic
Communications Law also needed to be implemented.7
At home the information society was earmarked as a priority by
the current incumbents during their electoral campaigning in 2005.
But this priority was quickly forgotten and was neglected in the final
National Development Plan (2007-2013). Information technology ac-
counts for less than 1% of the overall budget for activities in the plan
(AEAF, 2005).
Additional ICT policy documents were developed by the SAITC,
such as the Operational Programme on the Information Society and
the State Policy on Accelerated Development of the Information Soci-
ety, but so far both have failed to win the approval of the Bulgarian
Council of Ministers (ARC Fund, 2006).
The supreme document on ICT policy in Bulgaria – the Strategy
on Information Society Development – was drafted in 19998  and up-
dated two years later. In accordance with its stipulations, several regu-
latory acts were adopted, setting a framework for the development of
the information society. These regulations include the Telecommuni-
cations Law, the Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Act
(National Assembly, 2001), and an update to the Criminal Code re-
garding cybercrimes. However, other measures were not defined, re-
sulting in a lack of uniform rules for the development of a common
information and communication environment in state institutions, and
a lack of a legislative basis for privacy and security issues, among
other issues. In addition, the Law on Electronic Commerce was ac-
cepted by parliament despite public criticism of its flaws and its lack
of compliance with existing legislation.
The newly forged ICT laws in Bulgaria transpose the provisions
of the EU directives. In 2006, besides the Law on Electronic Com-
merce, the Law on Electronic Communications was also accepted by
parliament and scheduled to enter into force on 1 January 2007. The
draft Law for Electronic Governance is expected to be voted on by
parliament in 2007.
E-government
An e-government strategy in Bulgaria was implemented in 2001 with
parliament accepting the Electronic Document and Electronic Signa-
ture Act. Over three years were necessary for the government to es-
tablish an administrative framework for the strategy, allowing minis-
tries and related executive institutions to start working with electronic
documents and provide services to citizens using e-signatures. In an
attempt to evaluate the progress of the e-government initiative, the In-
stitute for Market Economy conducted an empirical survey in 2006.
The survey asked whether it was possible for citizens to exercise their
right to access public information and government services electroni-
cally. Only one out of five Bulgarian ministries appeared to be capable
of coping with simple administrative electronic services. E-signatures
crippled access to state administration, instead of helping the process.
5 The ERA is a European Commission initiative. It seeks to increase pan-European
cooperation and coordination of national research activities.
6 The “i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and employment”
initiative was launched by the European Commission on 1 June 2005 as a
framework for addressing the main challenges and developments in the
information society and media sectors up to 2010. (EC, 2005).
7 The Electronic Communications Law aims at protecting the rights of consumers,
including disadvantaged groups; encouraging competitiveness; stimulating
investment in infrastructure and innovations; ensuring universal service; and
assisting integration with the EU ICT market, among others.
8 See: <www.bild.net/iscalenden.htm>.
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The ARC Fund (2006) asserts that e-government could boost
information society development. Yet its e-Bulgaria 2006 report shows
weak political commitment to implementing e-government services,
inefficiencies in public IT procurement and little horizontal coordina-
tion among the various government agencies.
Another challenge was the government’s requirement that
Microsoft software be used for the e-government gateway. The con-
troversial step to use proprietary software appeared to be in conflict
with the proclaimed vision at the WSIS for overcoming the “digital
divide”. It resulted in a heated debate in the Bulgarian administration,
which started as the Bulgarian e-government gateway was launched
(its effects were also felt at WSIS).9
However, the SAITC has confirmed that there are open source e-
government projects underway – among them e-Government in Bul-
garia10  and the lengthily titled Support for e-Government Initiatives Based
on the Use of Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) at the Local Level
in Southeast Europe. Both projects are UNDP-sponsored initiatives.
FOSS in Bulgaria
A major campaign issue for civil society organisations (CSOs) in Bul-
garia is the introduction of FOSS in the administration and encourag-
ing the use of open standards more generally. CSOs say software
development using FOSS is a necessary state priority and acknowl-
edge the need for more highly qualified ICT university graduates.
There are several initiatives that have paved the way for FOSS in
the country.11  The Support for e-Government Initiatives project as-
sists in harnessing the potential of FOSS to increase the use of suc-
cessful e-government tools in local governance practices. The UNDP
and the Internet Society of Bulgaria (ISOC-Bulgaria) have launched
the project to help municipal governments use the internet to better
respond to citizens’ needs. The project was deployed in nine munici-
palities from the Balkans region – Kardjali, Vratza, Mezdra, Peshtera,
Belovo, Dryanovo – and Kostenetc (in Bulgaria), Gevgelija (in Mac-
edonia), and Klina (in Kosovo).
The initiative may be considered a pilot project that lays down
the groundwork for the wider implementation of FOSS at other levels,
both in public administration (including the central and regional ad-
ministrations) and in businesses. The project is unique in the sense
that it uses the public-private partnership model to benefit local econo-
mies and to build local skills and capacities. The partnership between
the UNDP and ISOC-Bulgaria was also seen to directly contribute to
the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),12  which
have been adapted to Bulgaria’s transitional context.
Another project in this regard involves the development of a set
of web-based FOSS applications that can be used to increase the ef-
fectiveness of local labour and social departments, and enhance their
coordination with other departments and partnership initiatives, as
well as with the labour bureau.
For its part, the “Yes to FOSS” project aims to stimulate the adop-
tion of open source software and open standards in the Bulgarian
administration, as well as other sectors. It also hopes to encourage
the use of FOSS in the home. It is an informal initiative that has at-
tracted the attention and participation of Linux experts in Bulgaria.
The project follows EU requirements and reviews suitable open stand-
ards for the current status of the administration. The objective is to
prepare the migration from current software platforms to recom-
mended EU open source technologies. A free CD is already available
and will be followed by a special beginner’s migration guide.
NGO adoption of FOSS in Bulgaria became possible due to an Inter-
space Media Art Centre initiative which started the first FOSS project in
the country. By assisting NGOs to switch to open source software, the
project helped save the NGO sector funds that could be used for worthy
causes, rather than buying commercial products. “After two years of
work on supporting the migration of Bulgarian NGOs to FOSS, we can
say that they are positive about using FOSS in their daily work. Moreo-
ver, they became independent from proprietary software and self-con-
fident enough in their own resourcefulness to start their own FOSS
projects,” Interspace announced (i-Space, 2003).
More good news for civil society was the adaptation of the Crea-
tive Commons licences into the Bulgarian language in 2006, thanks
to the efforts of ISOC-Bulgaria.13
Participation
Until 2006, Bulgaria was characterised by insufficient institutional sta-
bility and poor coordination of the ICT policy implementation proc-
ess. A significant number of administrative bodies did not have real
governing power and financial security for implementing state policy
in the ICT arena. Responsibilities were spread among the Ministry of
State Administration; the Coordination Centre for Information Society
Development and the Agency for ICT Development, both in the Minis-
try of Transport and Communications (MTC); and the Coordination
Centre for ICT and Coordination Council for Information Society De-
velopment (CCIS), both in the Council of Ministers.
In 2006, to a large extent, the responsibility for the elaboration
and implementation of ICT policy in Bulgaria rested with two state
bodies – the newly established SAITC and the Ministry of State Ad-
ministration and Administrative Reform (MSAAR). It is expected that
the CCIS will also play a significant role in specifying roles and func-
tions of governing bodies in order to minimise doubling-up on work
and institutional confrontation.
The SAITC is in charge of state ICT policy and ensures that it is in
line with the social and economic development goals of the country.
The statutory and regulatory framework for information technologies
is being drawn up as part of the activities of the CCIS, which is re-
sponsible for the operational coordination of state bodies, public or-
ganisations, institutions and the private sector. The MSAAR is respon-
sible for e-government implementation in the country.
Another state actor in ICT policy implementation in Bulgaria is
the Communication Regulation Commission (CRC). It is an independ-
ent regulatory body responsible for implementing sectoral policy and
deals with issues such as the control and licensing of telecommuni-
cation services, radio frequencies management, and postal services
regulation.
9 For instance, Veni Markovski, the head of the Bulgarian branch of the Internet
Society, was quoted during WSIS by the International Herald Tribune saying that
he had approached the UNDP for help and that he was shocked by the outcome of
several government contracts involving Microsoft products (Schenker, 2003).
10 The project’s particular goals include: the establishment of a Coordination Centre
for ICT – a one-stop government focal point for the ICT sector; the development
and implementation of a national e-government strategy and national strategy for
the information society; and the design and implementation of e-government pilot
projects.
11 See: <www.foss.bg>.
12 <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>. 13 <www.cc.isoc.bg>.
According to the SAITC, the decision-making process regarding
ICT policies and strategies is transparent and involves the principal
stakeholders from government institutions, industry and civil society.
“ICT advocacy efforts by civil society and other relevant actors ap-
pear to be very effective in impacting on the decision-making proc-
ess. Regular information on national priorities is being published on
government websites and in specialised media,” said Nelly Stoyanova
from the SAITC (BlueLink, 2006a).
The Bulgarian government has stated that it supports the imple-
mentation of the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action
adopted at the first phase in Geneva, and shares the Tunis Commit-
ment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. “We look for-
ward to the process of enhanced cooperation among governments,
the private sector, civil society and the relevant international institu-
tions, for effective implementation of the agenda set forth by the Tu-
nis Summit,” said an official statement (SAITC, 2005).
However, the scope of stakeholders’ participation shows that
some significant issues exist. For instance, despite civil society’s im-
pact, business associations seem to be more effective in advocating
for their causes. The participation of representatives of Bulgarian busi-
nesses in the CCIS is formalised, with a Council decree to this effect
in its founding document, while civil society is not mentioned at all.
Both stakeholder groups – business and CSOs – exercise their
right to influence the legislative process by making proposals to parlia-
mentary commissions. A recent example is a proposal by the Elec-
tronic Communications Association (ECA) for changes to the draft Law
on Electronic Communications. According to the ECA, important changes
should be made to the text to bring it in line with European norms. The
changes relate to improving the liberalisation conditions of fixed tel-
ecommunications and the creation of a more effective regulator through
the increased independence and visibility of the work of the CRC.
Government decisions can be appealed in court. A public scan-
dal erupted in the summer of 2006 when the Bulgarian Association of
Information Technologies (BAIT) accused the MSAAR of rigging the
public bid for e-government implementation by manipulating the cri-
teria in favour of a single company. Additionally, BAIT criticised the
ministry’s decision because a large portion of the budget (90%) is
intended for hardware, leaving little for software.
The SAITC has actively participated in international forums since
its establishment in 2005. Where possible, the government includes
civil society members in the governmental delegations to those fo-
rums, including the WSIS.
Conclusions
Despite the initiatives outlined in this report, Bulgaria still lags behind
other EU member states in its ICT development. There are several
ways in which the situation can be dramatically improved:
Competitiveness: According to the government, one of its main
goals is to use ICTs as an opportunity for economic growth. Some
possible ways of promoting ICT sector growth include:
• Establishing a venture capital fund targeted at small and me-
dium enterprises (SMEs) with an ICT profile
• Developing regional, national and international ultra-high speed
network infrastructure
• Improving the cooperation between academic institutions and
the private sector
• Supporting public-private partnerships
• Supporting local FOSS development companies
• Encouraging research and development
• Supporting the innovative use of ICTs
• Developing human resources generally.
The rapid and complete implementation of the EU electronic com-
munications regulatory framework, the effective use of the European
Structural and Cohesion Funds in 2007 to 2013, as well as better coor-
dination and cooperation between more and less-developed EU regions
will also assist in increasing the competitiveness of the sector.
FOSS and open content: The Bulgarian government needs to
develop a strong policy on the use of FOSS and open content. This
means:
• Supporting the use of FOSS at all levels of the administration
• Stimulating the use of open standards
• Stimulating the production of local content
• Publishing the texts of legislation under open content licences.14
School connectivity: While the government has made great strides
in this area, simply providing access to infrastructure is not enough. In
its most recent e-Bulgaria report, the ARC Fund (2006) states: “The
government’s large-scale investment in ICTs in schools has dramati-
cally levelled the digital divide, but other important issues remain unre-
solved – e.g. the need for training teachers in some regions of country.”
Research and development: More funds need to be made avail-
able for local projects. This is one of the least developed ICT areas in
Bulgaria, and it is a situation that needs to be improved.
Participation: The government needs to do more to publicise leg-
islation, to formalise the participation of the NGO sector in decision-
making, and to make processes more transparent in reality.
Human resources: The “brain drain” of Bulgarian ICT specialists
who leave for lucrative positions abroad or join foreign companies
with branches in Bulgaria has become a negative trend. So far the
Bulgarian government has not taken any measures to prevent this. At
the same time, the capacity and abilities of non-governmental actors
working in the ICT field is still not appreciated by the government –
both at the policy-development and implementation levels. Perhaps
the biggest challenge facing the Bulgarian authorities in general, and
those working in the field of ICTs in particular, is the lack of capacity
to implement sustainable development principles at the policy level
and in practice. Efforts should be made to apply a multi-sectoral and
participatory approach in order to overcome this problem. The great
knowledge that civil society has in the field of sustainable develop-
ment should be drawn upon. 
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Introduction
Although the Colombian government has invested significant time and
resources in social information and communications technology (ICT)
programmes, Colombia continually ranks below world and regional av-
erages if we look at ICT statistics, such as the number of internet users
and indices for digital opportunities, e-readiness and ICT dissemination.
Even though topics such as the use of free and open source
software (FOSS), alternative licensing methods (such as Creative
Commons), and community telecentres have earned a place on the
ICT agenda, both in the government and private sector, important
issues like the inclusion of a gender perspective in ICT policies are
still missing.
Analysing the possible scenarios for participation and the limits
to achieving full dialogue between the government and its citizens on
ICT policies, it is evident that, except for certain instances convened
by the government within the last year, no formal mechanisms exist
to facilitate this dialogue. Nor do citizens have strategies for monitor-
ing ICT plans or for seeking ways to influence them.
This report is based on data obtained through background re-
search and interviews. Official websites and research on ICTs in Co-
lombia were reviewed, as well as the annual reports of international
organisations.
Country situation
Colombia’s public policy on ICTs is implemented through three pro-
grammes: the Connectivity Agenda, Compartel and Computers for
Education.
The Connectivity Agenda and Compartel were among the first e-
strategies created in Latin America and have served as models for
other countries. At the moment Compartel is formally advising some
eight countries in the region, as is Computers for Education. These
initiatives are now under Colombia’s Ministry of Communications,
although from February 2000 to June 2003 the Agenda operated as a
presidential programme, independent of any ministry. Computers for
Education is part of the Ministry of Education.
Connectivity Agenda
The Connectivity Agenda3  was created as a long-term policy pro-
gramme through the National Council on Economic and Social Policy
(CONPES). It is one of the strategies aimed at improving quality of life
for Colombians, increasing competitiveness of production and mod-
ernising public institutions (MC, 2000).
The Agenda targets three groups: citizens, the business sector
and public administration. For the public sector the goal is to mod-
ernise public administration, make it more efficient and transparent,
and support the “policy of democratic security” (MDN, 2003). For the
private sector, the programme seeks to increase productivity and com-
petitiveness. For citizens, the goal is to increase community access to
ICTs, build bridges across the “digital divide” and facilitate the inter-
action between government and citizens.
The development and management of the Agenda as a pro-
gramme has been influenced by each new government. We can iden-
tify three phases in its development. In the first phase, the “Leap to
the Internet” (April 2001-August 2002), the use of ICTs to improve
services was strengthened and a great deal of information was placed
online by public institutions. In the second phase, “Towards a Knowl-
edge Society” (August 2002-May 2003), the focus was on decentral-
ising work through alliances with regional bodies and sectors outside
government.
Phase three is the current one, which began in June 2003. Since
then the Agenda has aligned its work with the government’s online
strategy.4  The goal is to facilitate interaction between citizens, the
business sector and government bodies.
The programme has benefited some 620 mayors’ offices, which
now have internet access, email and a webpage, which they use to
share information about the municipality, public administration op-
erations, the mayor’s activities and contracting procedures. It is hoped
that 1,051 municipalities will benefit by 2007.
Compartel telecentres
The Compartel programme5  was created to democratise access to
telecommunications infrastructure through telecentres, community
telephone systems and community internet access centres in isolated
rural areas and municipal centres (MC, 2002).
In the first phase of the programme, 670 telecentres were in-
stalled in municipalities with less than 8,000 inhabitants. In the sec-
ond phase, 270 telecentres were installed in municipalities with more
than 10,000 inhabitants. In the third phase, 550 telecentres were in-
stalled in municipal centres not being served and areas with more
than 1,700 inhabitants. As of February 2007 Compartel had installed
1,490 telecentres throughout the country, benefiting an estimated 5.2
million inhabitants (MC, 2007a). Between 2001 and 2002 Compartel
implemented the Community Outreach Strategy so that telecentres
could be used for local development projects.
In August 2006 Compartel began to evaluate the socioeconomic
impact of the telecentres, including 249 telecentres set up by compa-
nies such as Colombia Telecomunicaciones, Orbitel and the Empresa
de Teléfonos de Bogotá (ETB). The organisations and people who are
developing community telecentres in Colombia hope that this evalua-
tion will connect faces and stories to the Compartel telecentres, and
that the initiative’s achievements, success stories and lessons learned
will be shared.
Besides the telecentres, 10,045 rural telephone points have been
installed which benefit six million inhabitants in rural areas.
1 <www.colnodo.apc.org>.
2 Background research support: Paola Liévano and Patricia Romero.
3 <www.agenda.gov.co>.
4 In 2000, Presidential Directive No. 02 was issued to set up three phases of online
government strategy: i) to provide information; ii) to provide online services and
iii) to provide online transactions and information that can encourage the
development of viewpoints among the citizenry.
5 <www.compartel.gov.co>.
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It is important to point out that Compartel was a programme
created to provide infrastructure, and that it is only in recent years, by
government mandate, that it has begun to increase its impact through
a strategy of capacity-building and content provision.
Linked to the Connectivity Agenda’s online government project,
Compartel has the potential to allow people in remote locations to be
in contact with local and national governments without having to travel
great distances. Because of the opportunities they provide, it is im-
portant to guarantee the sustainability of the telecentres. The survival
of a telecentre depends on building alliances with local government
and organisations, and on the involvement of the community. This is
one of Compartel’s major challenges, especially since the government
plans to have 10,000 telecentres located in public schools by 2010.
Computers for Education
The Computers for Education programme6  has operated since 2000
with the goal of providing the country’s public education institutions
with access to ICTs and promoting their use in educational processes.
The computers are donated by private companies and governmental
entities and then reconditioned. This programme receives advisory
services from the Canada-based Computers for Schools programme.
As of 2006, a total of 71,474 computers had been distributed, poten-
tially benefiting 2,048,908 students in some 6,545 schools around
the country (MC, 2007b).
Investment
Of the approximately 750 billion Colombian pesos (roughly USD 326
million) invested by the Ministry of Communications in social pro-
grammes from 2001 to October 2006, approximately 57% was as-
signed to Compartel, 12% to the Connectivity Agenda, and 5% to
Computers for Education. The remainder went to regular postal serv-
ices and other investments.
Like Compartel, Computers for Education has conducted an im-
pact study. However, this study has not been made public. It would be
important to know what contribution these programmes have made
to digital inclusion as an engine of socioeconomic development, and,
in particular, to analyse their part in fulfilling the country’s develop-
ment goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).7
Statistics
Table 1 shows the increase in internet access in Colombia since 1995.
According to the Telecommunications Regulation Commission
(CRT), a significant percentage of internet users continue to be con-
centrated in the country’s four major cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and
Barranquilla. However, Compartel maintains that the CRT’s method-
ology does not include the total number of telecentre users, and that
the impact of the programme is not properly reflected. Nevertheless,
despite the increase in internet users, Colombia’s ranking with
respect to other countries in Latin America has not improved.
Internet World Stats8  reports that Latin America and the Carib-
bean have 88,778,986 internet users. This number represents barely
8% of the total number of internet users in the world. South America,
with 370,225,923 million inhabitants – 41.5% of the population of the
Americas – has 16.5% of the Americas’ internet users. According to
this same source, Colombia has 5,475,000 internet users, which means
12.9% of the country’s population. This number is well below coun-
tries such as Argentina (34%), Chile (42%), Costa Rica (22.2%),
Mexico (19%) and Venezuela (16.5%).
In the UN Global E-Government Readiness Report 2005, Colom-
bia had an index of 0.5221 in 2005, holding 54th place in the world
and 6th in South and Central America. In 2004 Colombia was in 44th
place. The government says the drop in Colombia’s position is due to
a drop in webpage statistics, as a result of e-government facilities
being underutilised (MC, 2005). The Latin American countries that
rank above Colombia are Chile (22nd), Mexico (31st), Brazil (33rd)
and Argentina (34th). Below Colombia are found Venezuela (54th),
Peru (56th) and Panama (64th) (UN, 2005).
In 2005, in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s e-Readiness Index
(EIU, 2005), Colombia occupied 48th place among 65 countries ana-
lysed. The index measures a country’s level of e-preparedness, the
environment for doing e-business and market opportunities related
to internet use. Colombia dropped seven places compared to 2004,
and was down eleven places from 2003. The government says this
drop is due to changes in measurement methodologies and the incor-
poration of new indicators, among other factors.
According to the Digital Divide Report of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 2004 Colombia held
85th place among 180 countries, with an ICT diffusion value of 0.328
(on a scale from 0 to 1). This can be broken down into a value of
0.531 for “access”, a calculation based on the number of internet
users, literacy and the cost of a local call, and 0.124 for “connectiv-
ity”, based on the available physical infrastructure: internet, comput-
ers, fixed and mobile telephone systems. Colombia’s position has also
dropped notably over the years: from 73rd place in 1997 to 80th in
1999 and 85th in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2004).
The Digital Opportunity Index (DOI) published by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) assigned Colombia a value of 0.38 (on
a scale from 0 to 1) in 2005. The DOI measures three elements: oppor-
tunity, infrastructure and the use and quality of ICTs. Ranked in first
place was Korea (0.79), followed by Japan and Denmark (0.71). In Latin
America, Chile (0.52) and Argentina (0.47) hold the highest spots. Co-
lombia ranks below Latin American countries such as the Dominican
Republic (0.39), Peru (0.39) and Panama (0.39) and above Ecuador
(0.36), Bolivia (0.30), Paraguay (0.30) and Guatemala (0.30) (ITU, 2005).
Despite the apparent negative trend in many of these indices,
Colombia does stand out in the area of electronic government. The
country’s official electronic government website9  has been recognised
6 <www.computadoresparaeducar.gov.co>.
7 <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
Table 1: Internet access (1995-2006)
Year % of internet users Total internet users
1995 0.1 37,635
2000 1.9 715,067
June 2003 6.1 2,295,741
December 2003 6.9 2,596,821
June 2004 7.9 2,973,172
December 2005 9.9 4,166,960
June 2006 13.2 5,555,946
Sources: Biannual reports of the Telecommunications Regulation Commission
(CRT) and National Statistics Department (DANE)
8 <www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm>.
9 <gobiernoenlinea.gov.co>.
as one of the best in the world, along with those of Belarus and Brazil.
The e-Participation Index of the UN Global e-Government Readiness
Report measures, on the one hand, a country’s disposition to increase
citizen participation through the use of electronic government and,
on the other, the quality, usefulness and relevance of the information
and services provided by the government. In the 2005 report, Colom-
bia held 10th place worldwide in electronic participation, along with
Chile, surpassing developed countries like Germany, Finland, Sweden
and France.
Free and open source software (FOSS) and Creative Commons
In the past, there have been attempts by non-governmental actors to
promote FOSS legislation in Colombia. However, these were largely
unsuccessful and did not reach the country’s Congress. Today there
is a growing critical mass, especially in the education sector, that uses
FOSS. For example, Moodle is a virtual education platform built using
open source that is now being used by several educational institu-
tions. This includes the National Learning Service (SENA) and the
“Colombia Learns” Portal,10  an educational content strategy operat-
ing under the Ministry of Education.
One of the most important advances in licensing models has to
do with the adaptation of Creative Commons to the Colombian con-
text. Creative Commons establishes a legal model to facilitate the dis-
tribution and use of content in the public domain. In 2004, a group of
lawyers at the Colombian University of Rosario decided to adapt this
type of licence, already adapted to suit the legal environments of other
countries, to Colombian legislation. As a result, the Creative Com-
mons licence has been available in Colombia since 22 August 2006
and has been adopted by well-known institutions in the country, such
as the newspaper El Tiempo (CC, 2004).
Media
The government faces a number of challenges in developing the Co-
lombian media sector. This includes coordinating departmental strat-
egies where developmental programmes are in place. It is also neces-
sary to link efforts in the area of regulation between the CRT, admin-
istrative supervision departments (“superintendencies”) and minis-
tries. This need was evident, for example, in the discussion on a stand-
ard for digital television, which placed the Ministry of Communica-
tions and the National Television Commission (CNTV) at odds.
There are interesting government initiatives in the area of com-
munity media. Recently a tender was issued for the installation of
community radios that will benefit some 400 small localities. This proc-
ess is part of the Ministry of Communication’s National Technical Plan
for Radio Broadcasting. The ministry has promoted the Community
Radio Draft Law, which seeks to create public policies on community
radio broadcasting. The Ministry of Culture, for its part, is supporting
the development of media in rural communities by creating spaces on
public radio where citizens can air their views. The project increases
citizen participation, cultural diversity and democracy in the sense that
it benefits populations far from large urban centres.
Participation
Participation in ICT policies is not a priority for Colombia’s social sec-
tors. Participating in the information society seems to be a subject of
lesser interest, and its relationship to the improvement of peoples’
living conditions is not obvious.
ICT programmes in Colombia have been created by trial and error.
When they were designed, few countries in Latin America had imple-
mented e-strategies. This allowed for greater learning but also meant
more time and effort in determining priorities and reaching goals.
While Colombia has been creative in capitalising on opportuni-
ties and changes in the field, as seen in its leadership on the issue of
electronic government, there have been few opportunities for partici-
pation by non-governmental actors in defining policies, goals and
approaches. In contrast, there is significant participation by the pri-
vate sector in the development of plans prepared by the government,
the execution of the projects, and the establishment of alliances with
those programmes.
Although national ICT programmes have on several occasions
looked to experiences outside government (as in the case of
Compartel), the models established for the operation of these pro-
grammes do not allow for the active participation of actors with expe-
rience, nor for the possibility of making substantive changes in the
models and development of the programmes.
One way for civil society to have an impact on public policy in a
practical way is to offer the government the use of tools, methodolo-
gies and models developed by civil society organisations.
For example, one tool used in the online government strategy was
developed within the framework of the Internet Accountability Project
(IPRC),11  which is being implemented by the Colombia Transparency
Corporation and Colnodo, two Colombian non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs). This project, financed by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) through Casals and Associates,
seeks to strengthen transparency in mayoral offices and municipal fi-
nance departments through software that facilitates the publication of
information on the internet. The project aims to increase accountability
and foster the right and duty of citizens to inform themselves, express
opinions and monitor the actions of government officials.
The Colombia Transparency Corporation and Colnodo donated
the IPRC tool to the Colombian government after employing it in
several municipalities around the country. In this way, a tool devel-
oped by two NGOs, with the active participation of municipalities, is
placed at the disposal of the federal government. From there it is
extended to the rest of the country, in a combined bottom-up/top-
down model which, in addition to being very novel, offers many
learning opportunities. So far, 628 websites have been installed us-
ing the IPRC tool and the plan is to reach approximately 1,000 mu-
nicipalities during 2007.
A similar example is the Management and Exchange of Experi-
ences between Community Telecentres and Compartel Telecentres in
Colombia project, financed by the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) and coordinated by Colnodo in conjunction with the
Universidad Autónoma de Occidente (UAO) and the Compartel Pro-
gramme. This project seeks to share the experiences of organisations
that have developed community telecentres with Compartel telecentres,
in order to generate collective methodologies, resources and proc-
esses aimed at achieving the social appropriation of ICTs and a greater
impact for the Compartel telecentres.
Outside of the public and private sectors, many diverse actors in
Colombia (such as universities, unions, NGOs, research centres, etc.)
promote the social use of ICTs. Some of these actors establish alliances
among themselves in order to develop initiatives; however, few take a
position on the government’s ICT or telecommunications strategies.
10 <www.portalcolombiaprende.edu.co>. 11 <www.iprc.org.co>.
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Beyond the CRIS (Communication Rights in the Information Society)
Colombia initiative, which brought together a good number of groups
around a common agenda, there have not been initiatives at the na-
tional level that link social organisations, unions and universities in a
common strategy that critiques government ICT programmes, poli-
cies and plans.
Throughout the entire process of the World Summit on the In-
formation Society (WSIS) there were only a few meetings called by
the government prior to the Geneva and Tunis Summits. In the post-
Tunis phase, some channels for dialogue were opened. The Ministry
of Communications, for instance, tried to schedule an ICT Thematic
Roundtable in November 2006, led by civil society, in order to provide
input to the National Development Plan. Unfortunately, this roundtable
was not held due to insufficient time to organise it before the dead-
lines for the definition and design of the Plan.
In January 2007, the president held the First Community Council
on Telecommunications in which the president, the minister of com-
munications and programme directors presented their e-strategies.
The government showcased the development of its ICT programmes
and the advances towards its WSIS commitments and the country’s
2010 goals.
According to the presentations, the ICT sector is dynamic in Co-
lombia and has a significant impact on the country’s gross domestic
product (GDP). The decrease in prices in telephony has contributed
to the expansion of the sector without impacting on inflation. Even if
Colombia is behind other countries in the region, there has been an
important evolution in terms of internet connectivity from 2002 to
2006, particularly in public administration and educational centres.
At this first council, the government announced the creation of
an advisory committee that would help develop a definition for a stand-
ard for digital television, based on international norms. The govern-
ment also announced the reformulation of national e-strategies (such
as the extension of the Compartel programme to cover rural telephony)
and the establishment of discussion forums where various issues could
be discussed and analysed, such as the consequences of renaming
the Ministry of Communications the Ministry of Information and Com-
munications Technologies.
Hundreds of people participated in this event, among them un-
ion representatives, universities, NGOs and other national organisa-
tions (including Colnodo).
In 2006 the Ministry of Culture promoted a broad, participatory
process on citizen and community media, with the idea of designing a
national plan. Many of the country’s organisations had the opportu-
nity to present their demands in this process. It goes without saying
that the issue of ICT and development was raised and was included as
an important focus of the plan.
However, these opportunities offered by the national government
should be more open to dialogue and not consist solely of plans be-
ing presented without the ability to question them. It is in these set-
tings that an alliance of various sectors could act with greater strength,
and would have arguments and legitimacy to discuss the plans pre-
sented. Such an alliance could also monitor implementation. In prac-
tice, this does not yet exist.
Colombia stands out in the region for its level of e-participa-
tion, which would in theory indicate that the opinion of citizens is
taken into account in decision-making, that citizens’ concerns are
taken care of, and that government-citizen feedback on public is-
sues is encouraged. However, the truth is that this does not reflect
reality.
The Colombian e-government initiative is still in a first phase of
development in which the local and national governments are making
preparations to provide information needed by their citizens. From
there it should evolve into a model for the provision of services and
transactions, and finally towards a model of deliberative electronic
democracy, where citizens can use ICTs to demand accountability in
public administration, participate in the design of government plans
and programmes, and question government leaders. This, of course,
requires strengthening the public sphere and broadening access to
and use of ICTs.
Conclusions
Colombia has invested a great deal of effort in its three major ICT
programmes. However, there are still major challenges facing the coun-
try’s ICT strategy. In particular:
• There is still no communications law that promotes the develop-
ment of the ICT sector, the provision of services at a reasonable
cost and, above all, access to telecommunications services and
the information society for all citizens.
• The government’s three ICT programmes do not currently in-
clude affirmative action policies that favour access to and use of
ICTs by vulnerable groups. The current plan for 2010 includes
accessibility to ICTs by persons with disabilities, but does not
consider women, youth, the elderly, or ethnic populations, among
others.
• Current statistics on national ICT trends can be misleading. For
example, the CRT reports do not break down their internet user
statistics to show the percentage of users who are peasants,
indigenous people, women or youth. They also do not say if the
users are based in rural areas, and what work they do. The im-
pact of national ICT programmes is also not measured. Depart-
ments12  in the Pacific region, such as Nariño and Chocó, have
the highest levels of poverty in Colombia, and also experience
the greatest “digital divide”. However, this cannot be seen in the
official statistics.
• There is little synergy between the ICT programmes in different
government departments, despite attempts by the government
to create cooperation and teamwork at an institutional level. In
order for other social sectors to form alliances with the govern-
ment, a minimal framework of cooperation between government
departments would be necessary.
• In addition to the national programmes, there are departmental
and municipal initiatives that seek to broaden the use of ICTs
among the public,13  but there is no coordination or joint efforts
between these projects.
• The production of local content that reflects the country’s cul-
tural diversity should be strengthened.
• Technological convergence is important in Colombia, given that
barely 13.5% of the population has access to the internet, but
more than 50% has access to mobile telephones. In many re-
mote rural areas, the population went from having no telephone
service to having mobile phones. Although the Ministry of Com-
munications has spoken a great deal in the last year about the
12 Colombia is divided into 32 departamentos (departments) and one capital district.
13 Such as the Infocentres programme and the “common point” centres in Medellín,
among others.
importance of technological convergence, this convergence is
also about services, knowledge, and content, and requires a sta-
ble regulatory framework. To prevent any communications law
from becoming obsolete, it should be designed to allow for the
entry of new services.
• In general, ICT support for micro enterprises, helping less-fa-
voured sectors use ICTs, and the use of ICTs to promote urgent
national issues such as human rights should be among the tar-
gets set to resolve the concrete needs of Colombians. 
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6 Introduction
According to Croatian Chamber of Commerce documents, the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Croatia and the EU is
the driving force for further developing the information society in the
country. General objectives include preparing citizens for the digital age,
attracting investment, and the delivery of e-services. In January 2002
the Croatian Parliament adopted a strategy entitled Information and Com-
munication Technology – Croatia in the 21st Century, and endorsed the
General Measures for the Development of the Information Society. The
government’s programme for the period 2003 to 2007 has included the
e-Croatia 2007 Programme2  among its priorities. This programme sets
out measures for encouraging the development of science, technology,
and information and communications technology (ICT) in particular. The
government plans to finish networking the education system and to al-
low citizens easier communication with the public administration, fo-
cusing on health, justice and other services via the internet (CCE, 2003).
Country situation
Network infrastructure
The Croatian telecommunications network is almost 100% digital,
which is not to be found in any other Central European country. The
installed fixed network capacity for Deutsche Telecom’s T-Com, pre-
viously the sole service provider, is sufficient for 2.33 million sub-
scribers, with actual subscribers currently numbering 1.7 million.
The Croatian government followed a trend towards privatisation
on the grounds that state ownership is no longer deemed necessary
for the achievement of national communications objectives, and be-
cause such ownership may interfere with fair competition. Privatisa-
tion was also seen as a welcome source of revenue for the state.
Nevertheless, the sale of 35% of Croatian Telecom (HT) to T-
Com in October 1999 (later a further 16% was sold)3  did little to
immediately liberalise the telecommunications environment. The HT
monopoly was part of the conditions of sale, and an exclusivity pe-
riod was extended for two years from 2003 to 2005. This was a sig-
nificant impediment to the use and growth of ICTs in Croatia.
There is a general agreement that telecommunications policies
should promote a fair and competitive environment, and that this can
best be achieved by having a regulatory function that is separated
from telecommunications operations. Unfortunately, the “independ-
ent” telecoms regulatory body, the Croatian Agency for Telecommu-
nications,4  is seen as an employer for former HT employees, thereby
diminishing its objectivity and independence.
Croatia’s regulatory framework is a hybrid, with elements from
both the 1998 and 2003 acquis communautaire.5  A recent bylaw sets
out procedures for market analysis according to the 2003 acquis. Until
the market analysis is completed, the current balance of power in the
telecommunications market will continue (Cullen International, 2006).
Penetration rates
The penetration rates of the most important operators and compa-
nies active in fixed telephony show that T-Com is still the main access
and service provider (68% of the market), followed by CARNet (21%),
Iskon Internet (10%), and Globalnet and VIPonline, each controlling
2.5% of the market.6
The number of internet users per 100 people is 33.6 (Cullen In-
ternational, 2006). According to the e-Communication Household
Survey in Croatia, 31% of households in the country have internet
access and 5% have broadband access. According to market research
conducted by GfK,7  51% of internet users are male and 49% are fe-
male. GfK also says 48% of households have a PC. The main obsta-
cles to increasing the number of internet users are falling living stand-
ards and the lack of English language skills (EC, 2006).
Under the Telecommunication Law of 1999, voice over internet
protocol (VoIP) service was considered a part of internet services, so
that no further legislation was needed. Under the Law of 2003, VoIP
has been defined as a separate service requiring a licence. Moreover,
the licensing fees for VoIP were initially kept unusually high: a EUR
33,000 (USD 43,500) once-off fee, plus an annual fee of 1% of rev-
enue. The bylaw on payments of fees for provision of telecommuni-
cations services amended on 17 February 2005 lowered the once-off
fee by a factor of 50 to EUR 670, and the annual fee was lowered
tenfold to 0.1%.8
According to the e-Communication Household Survey, 71% of
households have fixed telephone access and mobile telephone ac-
cess, 19% have fixed telephone access but no mobile telephone ac-
cess, 8% have mobile telephone access but no fixed telephone ac-
cess, while 2% have neither fixed nor mobile telephone access. Only
6% have ISDN,9  compared to 15% of EU households.
Croatia has local call tariffs that are moderately above the EU
average, and international call tariffs that are around the EU average
(Cullen International, 2006). Generally speaking, the average spend-
ing on telecommunications of around 4% of GDP in the South East
Europe (SEE) countries is significantly higher than in the EU, where
the average is around 2.7% when cable TV revenues are included.
(Croatia’s GDP per capita in 2005 was above EUR 6,000 (USD 7,900)
which is the highest in SEE) (Cullen International, 2006).
1 <www.zamirnet.hr>.
2 <www.e-Croatia.hr>.
3 The state currently owns 42% of HT, and the Fund for Homeland War Veterans
the remaining 7%.
4 <www.telekom.hr>.
5 Body of EU legislation.
6 T-Com recently bought Iskon Internet, strengthening its superior position in the
market.
7 GfK - the Centre for Market Research Data, Gradjani i Internet 2006,
(<www.gfk.hr/press1/internet.htm>).
8 Ibid.
9 Integrated services digital network, an international standard for switched, digital
dial-up telephone service for voice and data.
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IT economy
A study conducted by the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) in 2000 concluded that Croatia has tremendous
potential to create an IT10  economy: it has an excellent fibre optic
backbone network and the necessary intellectual capital (USAID, 2000).
Yet the utilisation and deployment of ICTs remain quite low, largely
due to the high cost and barriers to entry caused by the HT/T-com
monopoly, and the lack of an ICT strategy in government.
During the 1990s the ICT sector in Croatia gradually lost its lead-
ing position among Central and East European transition economies,
a position built on the country’s previous openness (then within the
former Yugoslavia) to Western influences. The war in the first half of
the decade, badly managed privatisation, the government’s lack of an
industrial policy, a sluggish economy, and the limitations of a small
market have caused the Croatian ICT industry to lag well behind those
of Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and even Slovakia. While
the telecom sector and the IT sector stem from the same environ-
ment, they had different starting positions and have each performed
differently (CEA, 2006). Surging demand for telecom services from
households, enterprises and the public sector, and lucrative profit
opportunities, fuelled the inflow of USD 2.5 billion in foreign direct
investment into the country.
In 2002, small IT companies (with up to 10 employees) were
dominant in the market (making up 86% of the total number of IT
companies). Their share of employment was 49%, and their share of
revenue was 35%. At the same time, the 93 largest companies (with
51 or more employees) accounted for 15.4% of all employees in the
sector and for 10% of total revenue (CCE, 2003).
In 2004, ICT firms constituted 2.1% of the total number of enter-
prises in Croatia and contributed 5.7% to the country’s total business
revenue. ICT exports accounted for 2.4% of the country’s total ex-
ports of goods and services, while ICT imports constituted 4.7% of
total imports. Those employed in the ICT industry accounted for 2.9%
of the total business workforce in Croatia (CEA, 2006).
From 1999 to 2005, the Croatian government invested HRK
730.46 million (USD 122.15 million) to procure IT and communica-
tions equipment and software programmes. Annual ICT capital ex-
penditures declined in 2000 and again in 2004, both of which were
election years. (It appears that central government ICT spending freezes
during the change of administration. Insiders claim that one to two
quarters before the elections, and two to three quarters after, the ICT
activities of the administration slow down dramatically) (CEA, 2006).
Benchmarked against several other diverse countries (i.e. Slovenia,
Austria, Ireland and the EU-25)11 Croatia has the lowest share of ICT
spending in its state budget. Particularly significant for the comparison
is the case of Slovenia, whose ICT spending is approximately three
times larger than Croatia’s. In 2004, Croatia’s ICT spending was only
36.4% of the average ICT spending of the EU-25.12
National ICT strategy: e-Croatia
The country’s ICT strategy was developed and adopted during the
mandate of the centre-left Ivica Racan government (before 2003), while
the subsequent implementation plans came from the centre-right Ivo
Sanader government, by definition more inclined towards new
neoliberal public management practices. The first law passed by the
new government dealt with changes in the structure of the govern-
ment itself, and founded four new central state administrative offices,
among them the Office for e-Croatia 2007. The e-Croatia 2007 project
aims to enable citizens to communicate with public administration
through the internet.
The Central Administrative Office for e-Croatia analysed different
stages in the online availability of services. It states that significant
improvements have been made since 2004. In December 2004 public
services for businesses scored an average of 5.73%,13  and public
services for citizens 3.36%. In 2005 public services for business scored
29.77%, and public services for citizens 38.22% of availability.
However, the project has run into difficulties. While a lack of co-
ordination between the ministries responsible for Croatia’s overall ICT
strategy has impacted on the project,14  it has been difficult to prop-
erly evaluate the efficiency of e-Croatia 2007. The project’s opera-
tional plan explicitly stated that it will publish quarterly progress re-
ports on its website, but only one report per year has been published
(Miosic-Lisjak, 2005).
Moreover, the change of government demonstrated a shift of
focus away from e-democracy towards e-government, which is a
worrying factor. It is quite possible to imagine a fully functioning and
efficient e-government which lacks other aspects of good democratic
governance, to the extent that it actually facilitates undemocratic gov-
ernance in which governments use ICTs to control their citizens, rather
than vice versa (Miosic-Lisjak, 2005).
Open source software policy and interoperability
Restricting information systems to proprietary programme code that
can be maintained by a single service provider only is considered one
of the most important obstacles to attaining the goals outlined in the
EU’s new i2010 programme.15  On 12 July 2006, the government
adopted a free and open source software (FOSS) policy.16  In doing
so, Croatia has joined a group of countries, predominantly members
of the EU, which have realised the importance of the use of open
source software in the public sector.
According to the deputy state secretary for e-Croatia, interoper-
ability is one of the key challenges for Croatia. The objective of the EU
IDABC17  programme is to establish a framework which will enable
the harmonious delivery of pan-European e-public services among
public administrations of member states. By participating in this pro-
gramme, Croatia is getting involved in the process of developing an
e-public administration programme in the EU and a European inter-
operability framework. In line with this, the country has begun to de-
velop open technical specifications for electronic public tenders within
the framework of implementing the European Commission Action
Plan.18
10 IT is used here to mean primarily hardware and software used in the office or
home environment. ICTs includes telecommunications infrastructure.
11 The study was done by IDC, a market intelligence and advisory company.
(<www.idc.com>).
12 Ibid.
13 The online availability of services is measured on a scale of 0 to 4. This is then
converted to a percentage.
14 Absurdly, two portals have claimed to be the gateway to the country’s “one-stop
shop”.
15 i2010 is a comprehensive strategy for modernising and deploying all EU policy
instruments to encourage the development of the digital economy. See:
<ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/introduction/index_en.htm>.
16 Open Source Software Policy (<www.e-Croatia.hr>).
17 IDABC stands for Interoperable Delivery of European e-Government Services to
Public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (<europa.eu.int/idabc>).
18 <www.e-Croatia.hr>.
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Participation
The participation of citizens in ICT policy development in Croatia is
rather limited. The government and its relevant institutions have not
encouraged an inclusive, multi-stakeholder environment.
While the Croatian Agency for Telecommunications (HAT) an-
nounces public online discussions on its website, participation is not
properly facilitated. This particularly refers to a lack of technical and
policy development knowledge needed for citizens to properly par-
ticipate. However, some efforts have been taken by organised con-
sumers. For example, the Croatian Association of Consumers
(<www.huzp.hr>) has reacted to the high prices and lack of some
telecommunication services, while the Association of Consumers
(<www.potrosac.hr>) has raised questions about ownership over dis-
tributive telephone channels (DTK).19
One of the most active associations seems to be Telemah, the
Association of Dissatisfied Users of Telecommunication Services
(<www.mreza-telemah.info>). Telemah monitors activities in the ICT
sector – from public procurement of IT services and hardware to ICT
policy. In 2006 the association organised a survey of the public’s un-
derstanding of the telecommunications market, including the owner-
ship of DTKs. According to the survey results, most citizens think that
the DTKs are owned by the public.20
When it comes to the public procurement of telecommunication
services, the situation is also worrying. According to Telemah, out of
21 tenders in January 2006, eight were concluded in direct negotia-
tion (exclusive negotiations with a prospective provider or buyer with-
out a prior competitive process), four were cancelled, and only nine
were completed according to principles of good governance, allow-
ing all telecommunications companies to compete. The total value of
contracts concluded in direct negotiation processes in January 2007
was HRK 3.86 million (USD 690,000).
Engagement has often meant opposition. For example, T-
Zombix21  became a prominent blogger writing about all aspects of
the telecommunications sector, including privatisation, monopolies,
censorship, etc. He became known to a wider audience when the gov-
ernment ordered his website Zatvorena vrata (Closed Doors) to be
shut down. Zatvorena vrata was a mock website, created as a parody
of the government project Otvorena vrata (Open Doors), which aimed
to increase transparency and improve communication with citizens.
The government’s move raised concerns about freedom of speech on
the internet.
Another organisation, Multimedia Institute (mi2),22  sprang up in
1999 as a spin-off of the internet programme of the Open Society
Institute-Croatia. Entering locally uncharted territory between social
and cultural action and new technological developments, mi2 brought
together an emerging generation of civil activists, media practition-
ers, urban culture actors and social and media theorists.
Over the past years, mi2 has become increasingly involved in
cooperative activities at the local, regional and international levels that
look to strengthen the cultural scene and advocate on behalf of the
public domain. It is working towards initiating structural changes in a
wide range of areas, including non-institutional culture, informal edu-
cation, technology, intellectual property rights, and access to public
resources.
In 2003 and 2004, mi2 implemented a project that aimed to lo-
calise Creative Commons licences. Four people, including two pro-
fessional lawyers, worked on the translation and adaptation of the
licences to the Croatian legal system. The Croatian versions of the
licences were officially launched at the beginning of 2005.
Two organisations who have been working in the area of FOSS are
equally relevant: HULK (<www.linux.hr>) and HrOpen (<www.open.hr>).
HULK stands for the Croatian Association of Linux Users. The Associa-
tion promotes the use of Linux, and facilitates networking and informa-
tion sharing. HrOpen is the Croatian Association for Open Systems and
Internet. It promotes open systems and organises an annual confer-
ence of Linux users.
In this context, we should also mention a recently announced
initiative in the business sector, lead by the Croatian Association of
Employers, to establish a cluster of open source software producers.
The cluster should improve services to end users, but also enable
FOSS producers (primarily small businesses) to develop joint prod-
ucts and command bigger market shares.
Conclusions
If one looks only at official statistics (such as internet penetration
rates), the pace of information society development in Croatia might
be considered satisfying. However, there is no data to assess the “dig-
ital divide” properly – including the “digital gender gap”. As a result,
no effective strategy to improve in these areas can be developed.
National strategies are not well coordinated and strategic docu-
ments often get tossed in the garbage bin with a change of govern-
ment. As a consequence, the institutional continuity necessary for a
systematic approach to any development initiative is ruined. It also
seems that the majority of government efforts are aimed at increas-
ing its revenue through improved tax collection (or similar objectives)
and supporting the business sector, while other citizen needs remain
neglected. This particularly refers to using technology for inclusion
(e.g., of elderly persons with special needs that are poorly addressed
by national strategies and even more poorly by various implementa-
tion plans.)
The participation of citizens in decision-making that affects the
development of the information society in Croatia is minimal. While
HAT regularly holds public online discussions, they are not well ad-
vertised in the media. The process is also not developed in a way that
allows for maximum participation of all stakeholders. Agencies rarely
hold workshops and public hearings or convene advisory commit-
tees or roundtable sessions before issuing new proposed regulations.
Publicly expressed criticisms of some of HAT’s decisions come
from civil society, political parties and members of Parliament. How-
ever, these do not seem to have any effect on the regulator’s leadership.
HAT often comes across as ineffective. Theoretically it is in charge
of the DTKs, but the evidence suggests that it has no control over
them. For example, T-Com was allowed to cut cabling belonging to a
competitor without consequences.23  HAT publicly condemned T-Com’s
move, but did not take any action to stop it.19 Telecommunication cables that are laid underground in cities.
20 The survey was organised around discussions that caught significant media
attention on whether or not the government sold the DTKs to T-Com when
privatisation started in 1999. The result of the dispute between the government
and T-Com about DTK ownership is still not clear.
21 T-Zombix is a pseudonym. See: <www.t-zombix.net>.
22 <www.mi2.hr>.
23 The competitor assumed that the DTKs were public property and can be used by
any operator who has a licence.
T-Com also launched several promotional campaigns for new
services without informing the regulatory agency about the campaigns,
as it is obliged to do. When HAT responded, the campaigns had al-
ready run in the media.
In line with the very few avenues for holding regulatory agencies
accountable, the fact remains that the “public” that participates in the
shaping of ICT policy is a narrow slice of the entire citizenry. Gener-
ally not many organisations and individuals (apart from business and
public administration) are involved in national ICT policy. We believe
this is mostly due to a lack of interest (or an inability to recognise
what would be in their interest) and a lack of knowledge among the
wider public, as well as a lack of appropriate channels (procedures
and processes). Most citizens are reduced to mere consumers of tel-
ecommunication services.
Citizens who have engaged have done so using alternative chan-
nels and mainstream media. Yet if the goal is to improve the quality of
public discussions, participation should be supported by training and
educative content that is adjusted to the level of knowledge of “non-
techie” citizens.
Steps should be taken to raise awareness among citizens and
civil society organisations about ICT policy, and to search for allies in
the business sector and opposition parliamentary parties. 
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0 Introduction
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in a post-conflict
reconstruction period at the moment. Up until now, information and
communications technologies (ICTs) have not been considered an
inherent part of reconstruction and are not included in development
schemes for the country.
The four main ICT challenges we have identified are a lack of
infrastructure, the lack of a broad-based ICT vision for the country,
the absence of properly defined institutional roles and responsibili-
ties, and a lack of public funds and human resources.
Where possible, this report refers directly to official documenta-
tion. Given the scarcity of reliable resources (e.g. because of geo-
graphically partial studies) and the difficulty in accessing them (e.g.
because of the absence of governmental websites), this report seeks
to present the most up-to-date information available through inter-
views with key public and civil society representatives.
The report was produced by Alternatives, a Canadian social rights
non-governmental organisation (NGO), which has been working in the
DRC since 2002. Alternatives works on ICT advocacy and capacity-
building projects by supporting local NGOs that share its objectives.
National situation
In its recent history, the DRC has been through a 30-year dictatorship
(1967-1997), followed by two short presidencies (Laurent Kabila and
his son, Joseph Kabila). These were marred by two wars (1998 and
2002) involving, among others, Uganda and Rwanda and their prox-
ies. Although the DRC has been relatively stable since the last quarter
of 2002, there are still sporadic violent conflicts in the eastern part of
the country. Following peace negotiations, a transitional government
formed by representatives of different parties prepared the way be-
tween 2003 and 2006 for the inauguration of a democratic republic.
The first elections in 46 years were held in 2006 and Joseph Kabila
was elected president.
Quantitative data concerning ICTs are rare in the DRC. Studies
conducted by civil society are available, but only cover the capital,
Kinshasa. Private operators, reluctant to share information with the
authorities because of a lack of confidence in them and a fear of wide-
spread corruption, carefully keep their data to themselves. The Con-
golese Office of Post and Telecommunications (OCPT), the state-owned
and only legitimate telecommunications operator, for example, does
not know how many clients the country’s internet service providers
(ISPs) have or even the price they pay for broadband.
Set against this socio-political backdrop, which is exacerbated
by rampant poverty, we have identified the main ICT issues for the
DRC as being:
• A lack of ICT infrastructure
• The lack of a broad-based ICT vision
• A lack of definition of the roles and responsibilities of public
institutions
• The inability of the state to fulfill its mandate concerning ICTs,
given the lack of public funds and qualified human resources.
Lack of infrastructure
The land-line telephone network in the DRC is now almost completely
depleted due to years of negligence under the Mobutu2  dictatorship
and the subsequent destruction of infrastructure during the two wars.
According to a survey conducted by the Dynamique Multisectorielle
pour les TIC (DMTIC),3 a civil society organisation dedicated to ICT
advocacy and capacity-building projects, only 2.54% of respondents
in Kinshasa say they own and use a fixed-line telephone (DMTIC, 2005).
While the OCPT is responsible for the telecommunications network, it
has yet to announce any plans to rehabilitate it.
There is no national fibre optic backbone in the country; and the
absence of a broadband connection is the main infrastructural obsta-
cle to the proliferation of ICTs. Out of 25 ISPs in the DRC, all use
satellite and only one (Congo Korea Telecom) uses fibre optic to con-
nect its offices to its clients in Kinshasa.4
There are currently three backbone projects that the private sec-
tor has proposed to the OCPT: Siemens has proposed to install a na-
tional telecommunications network; Ericsson has proposed to install
a network in Kinshasa; and the West Africa Festoon submarine cable
system (WAFS), managed by Telkom, has proposed to create an ac-
cess point to the SAT3 cable.5  So far, the government has not com-
mitted itself to any of these projects.
On 29 November 2006, the Ministry of Post and Telecommuni-
cations and the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority
(ARPTC) officially signed the broadband protocol for the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), thereby including the DRC
in the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy) project. As
part of its commitment, the government must pay USD 2 million be-
fore March 2007.6
Of the new technologies, mobile phones have experienced the
highest growth in the DRC over the past few years. Over 70% of peo-
ple in Kinshasa now own at least one mobile phone (DMTIC, 2005).
The four private operators in this sector are: Celtel, CCT, Tigo (for-
merly Oasis) and Vodacom. They share around 3.5 million subscrib-
ers nationally. Other companies that have tried to launch themselves
in this arena are Sogetel, Cellco, and Afritel, but they have failed to do
so for political or administrative reasons.
The lack of a broad-based ICT vision
Given the DRC’s recent history, the country is just beginning to lay
the foundations for basic ICT policies and laws.
1 <www.alternatives.ca>.
2 Mobutu Sese Seko.
3 <www.societecivile.cd/node/2927>.
4 Interview with Jacques Tembele, Director of the ICT Department, OCPT.
5 Ibid.
6 <www.rdc-tic.cd/?q=node/41>.
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The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSCRP) put for-
ward by the transitional government provides a framework for the
country’s redevelopment. The third of the five pillars of this strategy,
entitled “Improving access to social services and reducing vulner-
ability”, calls for country-wide access to basic telecommunication and
postal services. In particular, schools and universities should be con-
nected to the internet (WB, 2006).
However, none of the documents guiding the current reconstruc-
tion of the country mention ICTs as a priority. This includes the Multi-
Sectoral Programme for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PMURR),
the Emergency Project in Support of Reunification (PUSPRES), and
the Emergency Project in Support of Better Living Conditions
(PUAACV). ICTs have therefore not been seen as a necessary focus
area for the post-conflict development of the country.
The state recognised the importance of the private sector as an
economic driver in its Telecommunications Law of 2002.7  But the
Telecommunications Law is not an expression of national policy on
ICTs or a national strategy, given that it governs just one sector. It was
also ill-fated. Under the Mobutu regime, the state awarded its first
private licence for telephony in 1989. A second licence was granted in
1995 (MPT, 2006). According to interviews, this liberalisation was
officially justified by the need to save a desperately neglected sector,
but in reality, it was another occasion for government officials to re-
ceive bribes in a very corrupt system.
According to the only official document available on the process
of creating a national ICT policy, the aim is to have a single policy
framework that encompasses three sectors: telecommunications, in-
formation technology (IT) and media and communications. This means
that new legislation will be created and the telecommunications law
might be modified in order to assure uniformity.
The absence of a national ICT policy impedes the propagation of
ICTs and awareness of ICT issues amongst the general population,
and limits the potential for the person in the street to participate in the
information society. There is a strong demand for ICTs, especially in
urban areas, but very little knowledge of ICT issues and debates. The
general population, for example, does not understand where the
internet comes from, how the country would benefit from a national
backbone or why the internet is so expensive. Poverty, of course, is
the major obstacle to access to ICTs for the Congolese. Technology is
still very expensive.
A lack of clarification of institutional roles
The four Congolese institutions responsible for ICTs are the Ministry
of Post and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Press and Informa-
tion, the High Authority on Media (HAM), and the ARPTC. They have
often been in conflict or tangled in power struggles because legislation
does not clearly express their respective responsibilities (Mwepu, 2005).
ICTs are under the mandate of the Ministry of Post and Telecom-
munications. The OCPT also falls under the authority of the Ministry.
However, the regulating agency, the ARPTC, falls under the authority
of the Office of the President (see Chart 1).
The Ministry of Press and Information is responsible for the serv-
ices and institutions relating to the audiovisual sector. Under its jurisdic-
tion is the public media regulator, HAM, which was created as an institu-
tion to strengthen democracy for the duration of the transitional govern-
ment. It will be replaced by the Audiovisual and Communications High
Council (CSAC) as stated in Article 212 of the country’s Constitution.
HAM OCPT
ARPTC
Ministry of Post
and Telecommunications
Ministry of Press
and Information
Chart 1: ICT-related institutions
Office of the
President
A lack of public funds and human resources:
consequences for ICT policies and management
A lack of public funds and human resources within government agen-
cies and ministries is hampering the policy-development process. An
example of this was suggested by the management of the .cd country
code top-level domain (ccTLD).
Over the past ten years, the management of the domain has been
ad hoc, lacking in transparency – even chaotic. The main reasons for
this are internal governmental power struggles, a lack of political will
due to political instability, and a lack of public funds and adequate skills.
The management of the domain name was first given to a private
citizen (it remains unclear by whom) by the name of Fred Grégoire.
He created a company, Internet au Zaïre pour Tous (Internet in Zaïre
For All, IZPT), for this specific task. In April 1997, as the post-Mobutu
war began, the domain servers were moved from Kinshasa to Brus-
sels for security reasons. It is not clear how the domain was managed
during the war (1998-2002). In July 2002, a management contract
between Congo Internet Management (CIM), another private firm, and
the Congolese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications was signed.
CIM then became the manager of the .cd domain.
In March 2005, the OCPT was named by ministerial decree as
the agency in charge of the domain. This mandate was confirmed by
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
in a letter dated March 2006.
ICANN placed some pressure on the OCPT, giving it a deadline of
20 October 2006 to present a dossier detailing a management and host-
ing plan for the domain. The domain servers needed to be hosted in the
DRC; if the OCPT was unable to do so, ICANN said it would not author-
ise the state to manage it for a period of another 10 years. In that case,
the management would probably keep its current form, through a pri-
vate company. The OCPT submitted its dossier four days before the
deadline, and it is now being considered. However, its solution was
rushed and unconvincing, suggesting a lack of capacity in the agency.
The OCPT initiated the creation of a multisectoral management
structure called “DOT.CD”. This structure, part of the OCPT but oper-
ating, in theory, independently, is composed of observers from com-
panies, organisations and associations that work with ICTs in all sec-
tors of society: civil society, the private sector, the media and academia.
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Seeking observers from the civil society sector, the OCPT ap-
proached the DMTIC in October 2006. The organisation was asked to
rally other civil society organisations (CSOs) in the ICT sector. A meet-
ing was held at the Alternatives office in Kinshasa. A list of signatures
from members of CSOs agreeing to be observers in DOT.CD was
handed over to the OCPT representatives. Since this meeting, the CSOs
have not been contacted by the OCPT and there is no news on the
status of the DOT.CD structure.
The second requirement of the mandate is that the OCPT host
the domain servers. Neither the OCPT nor the Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications has the infrastructure or the qualified personnel
to host the domain servers on its own premises. As a result, they are
hosted by an ISP, Afrinet, whose manager, Aubin Kashoba, is also a
representative of the Internet Service Provider Association (ISPA) for
the DRC.
The whole .cd saga was indicative of government processes gen-
erally, especially concerning information and communication issues.
It was impossible to acquire a .cd address for several months in 2006:
there was confusion about where to apply, and the domain appeared
to be blocked. It was very difficult for anyone to get information. When
a governmental or state agency initiates a process, such as the DOT.CD,
it does so unprepared and under severe time constraints. The results
are therefore often poor.
Participation
WSIS: government and civil society participation
In the DRC, civil society was, until very recently, the main driving
force behind ICT policy initiatives on a national, regional and interna-
tional level. The fact that there is no national ICT policy, among other
things, created a climate where each stakeholder organised its advo-
cacy work around its own interests. Civil society was the first
stakeholder to participate in the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) and, importantly, the first to understand its impor-
tance for the socioeconomic development of the DRC.
Prior to the Geneva phase of the WSIS in 2003, the Congolese
government had done very little to circulate information or promote
the upcoming Summit to other stakeholders. According to Baudouin
Schombe, national coordinator for the African Centre of Cultural Stud-
ies (CAFEC), civil society actors were informed about the WSIS by
their international partners, who also helped them prepare for the Sum-
mit. He adds that since the government representatives spent most of
their time “shopping in Geneva,” the government was left leading a
national process of which it had very little knowledge. It could not,
therefore, mobilise the relevant actors (Mwepu, 2006). On the other
hand, Josephine Ngalula, head of the women’s organisation Forum
pour la Femme Ménagère (FORFEM), explains this lack of leadership
by pointing to the fact that the purpose of the transitional government
was to concentrate on organising elections, putting on hold other “non-
urgent” matters (Mwepu, 2006).
During 2004, CSOs that were present during this first phase of
the WSIS started sharing information about key WSIS issues among
CSOs more generally. The government, conscious of the growing in-
terest in ICT policy issues among CSOs, started taking the initiative,
such as forming a multi-stakeholder consultative committee; but these
efforts never became concrete.
CSOs, on the other hand, showed little interest in matters they
considered too far removed from the everyday realities of the Con-
golese population. For instance, Professor Jean-Pierre Manuana,
director of a documentation centre at the University of Kinshasa, feels
that the information society is a utopia for rural regions and still a
luxury for most Congolese (Mwepu, 2006).
Mostly due to the efforts of civil society and international pres-
sure from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA), which demanded a list of participants beforehand, the gov-
ernment organised several meetings involving all stakeholders in
preparation for the Tunis meeting in 2005.8  As a result it did end up
leading the way; but only following international pressure.
Since the Tunis Summit, and until very recently,9  the govern-
ment has done almost nothing to promote or initiate any ICT-related
activities, whether they be capacity building or policy-related.
Obstacles for CSOs in dealing with ICT issues
The obstacles encountered by civil society in dealing with ICT issues
are political and economic. CSOs are influential among the general
population and are viewed with suspicion by the authorities. Histori-
cally they were a driving force in the opposition to the Mobutu re-
gime. Considering that the state is continually struggling to impose
its authority, it is fearful that other sectors will take hold of the proc-
esses it is responsible for.
For their part, CSOs are limited in the scope of action they can
undertake precisely because these issues are the responsibility of the
government. For example, Alternatives and its local partner, the DMTIC,
failed to get funding from the UNDP in 2005 for a national ICT policy
consultation on the grounds that these matters concerned the state
and the government. But as far as ICTs go, state institutions fail to act
on their responsibilities out of ignorance and a lack of political will.
On the economic level, local CSOs are not supported in any way
by state or governmental institutions. They rely on regional and inter-
national allies for funds, usually by submitting proposals for specific
ICT projects or advocacy initiatives. There is no known Congolese
CSO specialising in ICTs that has constant and stable funding. Moreo-
ver, individuals committed to these organisations are not employed
on a full-time basis, since they have to work elsewhere to make a
living. This financial uncertainty obviously affects the potential work
and impact that they can have on society.
Conclusions
Civil society in the DRC is a proactive stakeholder in information and
communication issues in the country and at the international level.
Through different platforms, it has promoted a multi-stakeholder ap-
proach to ICT issues. Unfortunately, the government, which should
be the national leader in these issues, does not fulfill its role. New
technologies are not part of any reconstruction or development plan
for the country and the government typically does not organise or
promote events, projects or activities relating to ICTs. Efforts at initi-
ating a multi-stakeholder forum for the management of the .cd do-
main have not yet borne fruit. In the worst of cases, ICT activities
launched by CSOs are sometimes taken over by the government. This
discourages civil society from initiating such activities.
As the first elected government will take power in 2007, there is
an advantage in starting afresh. People are hopeful that the govern-
ment will become more transparent, as it has shown more openness
8 Interview with Jean-Claude Mwepu, Alternatives-RDC Director and DMTIC
member.
9 Current initiatives such as DOT.CD are very recent and due to an increase in
political stability, international pressure, and pressure from civil society.
very recently. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications started a
multi-stakeholder consultation for an ICT national policy in January
2007: a first for the DRC. Since almost all conflicts have ceased, the
DRC will also be more politically stable. This gives the new leaders
the chance to think about long-term development policies, as opposed
to managing crisis after crisis.
In light of the current situation, it would be beneficial to:
• Push for ICTs to be included in short and long-term develop-
ment strategies.
• At a national and international level, educate authorities on the
importance of a national backbone and lobby for an Open Ac-
cess model to be adopted.
• Encourage current multi-stakeholder platforms, including those
created by CSOs, to improve communication and knowledge-
sharing among all sectors, and to increase the level of trust be-
tween these sectors.
• Continue capacity-building projects and initiatives for civil soci-
ety organisations. 
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wealth that it generates. The statistic expresses the growth of telecommunica-
tions and postal services jointly.
Introduction
This report outlines the way in which information and communications
technology (ICT) policies are managed in Ecuador through an analysis
and review of the process that led to the compilation of the Libro Blanco
sobre la Sociedad de la Información (White Paper on the Information
Society) (CONATEL, 2006a). The white paper serves as a multi-
stakeholder framework for the development of a national ICT strategy.
This report covers the viewpoints of diverse actors. Interviews
were conducted with key people in government, civil society organi-
sations (CSOs), academia and the private sector. Official and unoffi-
cial documentation was also reviewed, including legislation, statis-
tics, public policy proposals, articles written by civil society activists
and academics, agreements, national position documents in regional
and global processes, and the websites of the institutions involved.
The report concludes that the attention given by the government
and different social actors to ICTs as a sector and as a tool supporting
national development has increased significantly in the last few years.
The country’s involvement in the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) process led to the adoption of a new focus on the
participation of all interested parties in the ICT public policy process.
Nevertheless, challenges remain for the dialogue to truly be a multi-
sectoral national exercise in pursuit of development objectives.
Country situation
Context
The telecommunications sector in Ecuador has grown rapidly in the
last decade, notably since 2000, when the telecommunications mar-
ket was liberalised through legal reforms that tended to increase com-
petition. According to the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE, 2006), the
sector grew approximately 22.7% from 2004 to 2005. Although this
statistic includes postal services, it gives a good sense of the dynam-
ics of the sector, which grew 11.2% from 1999 to 2000 and in 1994
had a growth rate of only 0.1%.2
But the sector has evolved in a complex context which has not
generated the conditions for a majority of the population to benefit
from the transformative potential of ICTs. Despite liberalisation, an
oligopolistic system predominates.
Ecuador is a country of socioeconomic inequalities and political
instability. According to the results of the 2005-2006 survey of living
conditions carried out by the National Statistics and Census Institute
(INEC), 28.6% of the population lives in poverty and 9.9% lives in
extreme poverty These percentages are lower than they might be due
to the massive emigration rate over the last five years. It is estimated
that at least two and a half million people have left the country, and
that they send remittances of nearly USD two billion back for their
families (INEC, 2006).
In this context, the ICT policies put in place have been inspired
by the euphoric idea that the expansion of telecommunications in-
frastructure and connectivity are a panacea for poverty and under-
development.
The history of ICT policies in the country shows a culture of
planning and public management which has generally followed a hi-
erarchical and centralised model, in which organised civil society does
not participate. This has meant, on the one hand, that measures are
implemented which favour specific economically and politically pow-
erful groups in the area of telecommunications and, on the other hand,
that only those who have the ability to pay for the services provided
by state and private businesses benefit.
While it is likely that the new presidential administration, which
began on 15 January 2007, will institute changes, the formulation
and execution of policies, as well as the regulation and control of
telecommunications and ICTs, falls to four agencies which issue some-
times contradictory directives: the National Telecommunications Coun-
cil (CONATEL), the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Coun-
cil (CONARTEL), the National Secretariat of Telecommunications (SNT)
and the Telecommunications Superintendent’s Office (SUPTEL).
CONATEL is currently in charge of the regulation and adminis-
tration of telecommunications. The SNT is responsible for the imple-
mentation of telecommunications policies. CONARTEL regulates and
authorises radio and television broadcasting services, and SUPTEL
controls telecommunications services and the use of the airwaves.
The rapid growth of the telecommunications sector has occurred
despite the fact that in Ecuador internet access costs and mobile phone
charges are among the highest in the world.
Mobile phone use grew a staggering 9,970.39% from December
1996 to December 2005. According to SUPTEL, in November 2006
there were 8,190,923 mobile phone users among the 13,520,430 in-
habitants of the country. Access to the internet grew 12,548.13%
between December 1998 and December 2005. According to CONATEL,
10.13% of the population is connected to the internet, although 80%
of those connected are concentrated in the two major cities, Quito
and Guayaquil. There are, however, no indicators that show how ICTs
are being used and the impact they are having (SUPTEL, 2006).
The country is not well equipped with networks (copper or fibre
optic). In 2006, a 128/64 kbps DSL (broadband) connection cost USD
95 and a cable modem connection cost USD 75, according to
CONATEL. The cost per kbps is USD 0.508. Many areas are neglected
and some lines are duplicated. The line out to the backbone of the
Americas through Miami is inefficient and expensive, and the costs of
local telephone calls via both landline and mobile telephones are high
(USD 0.028 and 0.50 a minute, respectively). The cost per minute for
a local call in a public phone booth is USD 0.10 (CONATEL, 2006b).
The reasons that connection costs are high in Ecuador can be sum-
marised as follows:
• There is no direct line out to the high capacity submarine cables,
so a toll must be paid for the international connection.
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• There is no local information exchange network.
• There is low internet penetration.
• The costs for installing a network and equipment are high.
• There is a lack of training in the use of new technologies.
According to the UN e-government readiness index,3  Ecuador
has made great strides in the online presence of the public sector.
From 2003 to 2004 the country’s rank rose from 101 to 87. This has
more to do with the availability of online public information and the
provision of online services than with a substantial increase in online
citizen participation and interaction with public officials. The situation
is somewhat different among local governments, where e-govern-
ment aims to deepen democracy by providing channels for interac-
tion with citizens and open opportunities for citizen participation in
decision-making processes. However, its actual impact has not yet
been measured.
Communication activists working through the Ecuadorian Grass-
roots Radio Network (CORAPE) began to push for reforms to radio
and television legislation in 1996. In November 2002 they won a legal
reform whereby community radios are recognised and allowed to be
self-sustaining through the sale of advertising time. Nevertheless, the
legislation does not establish mechanisms for community radios to
access the concession of frequency licences in a more equitable man-
ner. Community radios have to compete with commercial media in
the frequency auction. In January 2007 allegations of illegal conces-
sions of radio and television frequencies came to light.
An important legal precedent exists in the country: Article 23,
No. 10 of the Constitution of the Republic recognises the right to
communication, to establish social communication media, and to equal
access to radio and television frequencies (ANC, 1998). CSOs, com-
munity media, development activists and citizens in general can use
this legal instrument to advocate for reforms to the ICT legal frame-
work. These should guarantee that the majority of the population ben-
efits from the use of ICTs, that they are considered a common good,
and that they are used for the improvement of living conditions.
ICT public policy management processes: the design and
formulation of the White Paper on the Information Society
In June 2005 CONATEL became regularly and actively involved in the
global and regional WSIS processes. It began to take the first internal
steps towards reconfiguring the national strategy for the information
society by incorporating the involvement of various sectors. Partici-
pation became one of the criteria for the formulation of proposed ICT
policies.
CONATEL called national actors together in May 2006 for a pub-
lic discussion of a proposal for a national strategy, as well as to reflect
on the focus, components, objectives and goals appropriate to na-
tional ICT needs and priorities. It also initiated the discussion for the
design of the White Paper on the Information Society, in the light of
new regional and global benchmarks offered by processes such as
the WSIS and eLAC2007, a regional plan for an information society.
The new strategy was put forward as a replacement for the
National Agenda for Connectivity and the National Connectivity Com-
mission, which were proposed in 2001 as the government policy
for the development of the information society. These involved the
diffusion of ICTs in five areas: education, governance, infrastruc-
ture, e-commerce and health. The implementation of the Agenda for
Connectivity was extremely limited and many of its political, social,
technical and financial objectives were not viable.
Based on new political and technical guidelines, CONATEL pro-
posed to address the following overlapping issues: the existence of
inefficient structures and institutions; the low levels of involvement of
strategic sectors of the state; the absence of multi-sectoral and multi-
disciplinary participation mechanisms that would allow for relevant
and sustained work; the lack of knowledge among citizens, as well as
authorities responsible for ICTs ; the duplication of efforts by public
institutions, CSOs and the private sector; the inefficient use of limited
public resources; and the lack of leadership and coordination among
organisations, among others. In short, CONATEL acknowledged the
lack of a comprehensive state policy, and in doing so, it predefined a
thematic agenda that sought to align efforts in the ICT sector with
broad socioeconomic and developmental goals. Its principles included
encouraging multi-stakeholder involvement and a transparent and
democratic process. The next challenges are to put these principles
into practice by implementing the white paper and to evaluate if it
manages to establish an effective link with national development and
poverty reduction strategies.
CONATEL’s proposed methodology was to form 36 issue-based
working groups along three axes: infrastructure, access and univer-
sal service; social appropriation and enabling environment; and local
innovation, content and applications. The proposals that came out of
27 groups (after the merger of some) formed the main source mate-
rial for the white paper.
The white paper was formally issued on 21 December 2006 at a
public event organised by CONATEL, which committed to publicising
and distributing it, and to presenting it as a contribution to the gov-
ernment administration beginning its term in January 2007.
The convening of different actors, especially CSOs, is a step for-
ward in the creation of multi-sectoral interactions and public-private
alliances. The adoption of participatory mechanisms and the incorpo-
ration of human rights and development perspectives in the construc-
tion of public policy are the fruit of the advocacy work carried out by
CSOs, who began to push for dialogue with public officials in Febru-
ary 2003.
These organisations have played a fundamental role in achieving
recognition of the need for legal and regulatory frameworks that en-
sure community access to ICTs. This recognition can open up opportu-
nities for transforming the current system, which is marked by a
technocentric and market-oriented discourse and practice, into juridi-
cal environments that enable the use and capitalisation of ICTs as pub-
lic goods. It can also create the conditions for planning the comprehen-
sive and coordinated use of ICTs in key national development areas.
The vision offered in the white paper is additional evidence of
effective advocacy by CSOs. It states that public policy should aim to
achieve “a country in which all of the population participates in and
benefits from the potential of communication and knowledge, with-
out barriers and in equal conditions, through the access, use, capi-
talisation and appropriation of information and communications tech-
nologies, to ensure comprehensive development and the improve-
ment of living conditions” (CONATEL, 2006a).
However, some fundamental issues such as gender equity and
the importance of free and open source software (FOSS) for knowl-
edge creation were not addressed in the public agenda and the white
paper. Although there were significant advances in the understanding
of the role that ICTs can play in development, it is difficult to establish
a wider and more comprehensive concept of access.3 <www.unpan.org/egovkb>.
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Incorporating issues which aim to even out the imbalances and
overcome the limitations that prevent the majority of the population
from benefiting widely from the relevant and effective use of ICTs also
turns out to be complicated. Crucial issues such as the renegotiation
of telephone company contracts and the concession of operating li-
cences were left out of discussions.
On the other hand, issues related to the improvement of com-
petitive conditions and economic development through ICTs, the con-
solidation of the national and local ICT industry and the strengthening
of state capacities to take advantage of ICTs in an effective and rel-
evant way were dealt with in exhaustive detail.
Though the process was a constructive exercise in multi-
stakeholder interaction, it is necessary to improve the process of reach-
ing agreement on agendas and to balance the weight of certain inter-
est groups who, because of their lobbying capacity and closeness to
the public sector, participate more directly in the decision-making.
One important proposal is for the creation of a multi-sectoral
commission for the information society. This will be mandated to for-
mulate public ICT policies and guide their application, beginning with
ensuring and overseeing the implementation of the white paper. But
this will not come to pass unless the responsibilities and roles of
actors are defined, resources are assigned, and the procedures for
multi-sectoral interaction are spelled out.
The efforts to follow the guidelines that came out of the WSIS
and eLAC2007 in the development of the white paper have been clear,
as have been those that take on the commitments of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs),4  and consider the impact of technology
convergence. However, the success of the country’s national ICT strat-
egy depends on political will.
A crucial challenge will be ensuring a connection to the coun-
try’s development and poverty reduction strategies. This requires co-
ordination with the Secretariat for the Millennium Development Goals
(SODEM) and achieving a political commitment from the government.
It also depends on the decentralisation of strategy processes, their
transparency, the presence of citizen oversight mechanisms, outreach
programmes and the community appropriation of ICTs, and propos-
als for the strategy’s financial sustainability.
Participation
As suggested, WSIS marked a sharp turning point in how the differ-
ent actors began to participate in the national ICT policy process.
However, the characteristics, motivations and expectations of the dif-
ferent players at the Summit were different.
CONATEL and the National Council for the Modernisation of the
State (CONAM) positioned themselves as the lead public agencies in
the configuration of the information society in the country, with re-
newed visions of the public management of ICTs and the role of the
different actors. Nevertheless, this leadership is not systematically
capitalising on the experience and input of local governments that
have made extremely important advances in defining ICT strategies
that respond to local needs and priorities. The response and political
commitment of key institutions in charge of managing strategic na-
tional development areas were also extremely limited. A utilitarian and
technical discourse around ICTs continues to predominate in the ma-
jority of public agencies, which do not go beyond computerising pub-
lic institutions and, in the best of cases, adopting ICTs as tools for
improving administration.
The private sector was represented through local businesses
dedicated to the development and promotion of the software indus-
try, and small and medium-sized ICT service providers. The involve-
ment of these actors can be seen as being motivated by the desire to
improve and strengthen market dynamics favourable to them. In this
sense, it could be said that their participation is seen as an invest-
ment and an opportunity to do business and make alliances.
Delegates from universities and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) made up the civil society group. Expectations varied within
this group, and their ability to intervene in the process depended on
how consistently they participated, their ability to draft proposals, and
the strength of their arguments.
For many in the civil society group it was particularly difficult to
understand clearly the political dimensions and impact of some of the
technical issues that emerged, such as the management of airwaves.
Parallel to the issue-based working groups established by
CONATEL, some CSOs decided to meet on their own to critically ana-
lyse the process, agree on agendas and find the right balance for their
participation. They sought to legitimise the process without endors-
ing that which did not meet their expectations or fit their vision, focus
or objectives. This oversight role is something which different civil
society actors want to advance through the creation of collective and
common platforms. And this is likely to be their main contribution to
the ICT policy process in Ecuador. They need to ensure that the intent
of proposals is maintained, that the multi-sectoral mechanism is for-
malised, that topics which were left aside are integrated, and, ulti-
mately, that the next steps correspond to what was approved. Few
CSOs see themselves as actors in the implementation of the projects
and initiatives of the white paper.
Conclusions
The White Paper on the Information Society is an instrument which
brings together the approaches of diverse sectors in the country. It
can serve as a framework for ICT policy development in future gov-
ernment administrations, and help to implement a comprehensive
national strategy for adopting ICTs for development.
Its democratic, transparent and multi-stakeholder approach rep-
resents an important leap in ICT policy development processes. How-
ever, there is still a long way to go for all of the sectors to be included
under equal conditions, and under a common strategic development
perspective.
Civil society needs to take on the challenge of monitoring the
national ICT policy process and improving its capacity for direct in-
volvement. It needs to advocate for the formalisation of inclusive and
participatory mechanisms, contribute to widening the awareness of
the importance and impact of ICT policies, and demand the sustain-
ability of the process, independent of any particular government ad-
ministration in power.
It is important that the country continues to build ties with re-
gional and global ICT policy processes through its relevant public
institutions. CSOs need to be allowed to play an active role at this
level as legitimate representatives of the country, so that common
interests in development can be advanced. 
4 <www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.
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1 <www.arabdev.org>.
2 Such as ICT tools that are being used for the creation of the Egyptian Information
Society Initiative (EISI). These include e-government, e-health, e-content and e-
business applications.
3 Egypt has been a member of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
since 1976.
Introduction
The Egyptian government has made information and communications
technologies (ICTs) a developmental priority and has modernised and
upgraded the sector’s infrastructure, services, regulations and hu-
man resource capacity. Egypt had an antiquated ICT infrastructure
until the early 1990s. People waited sometimes for years to have fixed
phone lines installed, and the old copper infrastructure made connec-
tions unstable. Phone lines outside major cities were failing. Mobile
technology aided in the diffusion of phones, but the government also
extended fibre optic connections throughout Egypt, upgraded the cop-
per lines and data centres, improved the integration of applications2
and in general provided more fixed-line connections. Now it only takes
a few weeks to have a fixed line installed.
The liberalisation of Egypt’s telecom sector is linked to the coun-
try’s economic reform programme initiated in 1991 and has been set
as a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) priority. Egypt
has signed the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Basic Telecommu-
nications Agreement (BTA), which sets up a framework for the inte-
gration of its ICT industry with the global economy.3
The telecom sector has sustained good performance for nearly
a decade, despite Egypt’s economic slowdown during 2001 to 2004.
The government sees the sector as a prerequisite for attracting for-
eign investment and supporting the local private and government
sectors.
While liberalisation is progressing relatively smoothly, there are
signs of the over-protection of the incumbent telecoms operator in
the liberalisation process. Other challenges to completing liberalisa-
tion include the role of the minister as the final decision-maker for the
regulator and for Telecom Egypt, a dual role that does not favour de-
regulation. At the same time, the lack of public participation opportu-
nities in the ICT policy-making process makes liberalisation a techno-
cratic process without adequate public checks and balances.
The average Egyptian is not the main beneficiary of the liberali-
sation process. It is driven by pressures from the global market and
not by mass internal demand to make the price structure for certain
services like international calls and broadband internet more com-
petitive. The user base for high-level services in Egypt are the local
and foreign business sectors and, at home, the upper-income strata.
Egypt’s ICT diffusion ranking between 1997 and 2004 hovered around
135 (ranging between 132 to 137 over various years). It is one of the
countries with the least diffusion of ICTs, with Niger rating lowest at
180 (UNCTAD, 2006).
This report was completed through desk research, interviews
with role players in the sector, and the author’s own participation in
the ICT for development sector in Egypt.
Country situation
1854 - Establishment of the National Organisation for
Telecommunications
1881 - Purchase of the Eastern Telephone Company and
development of the Telephone and Telegraph Authority
1957 - Establishment of the Egyptian Telecommunication
Organisation (ETO)
1982 - Creation of the Arab Republic of Egypt National
Telecommunication Organisation (ARENTO)
1998 - Founding of Telecom Egypt and the Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology (MCIT)
1998 - Establishment of the Telecommunication Regulatory
Authority (TRA)
2003 - Creation of the National Telecommunications
Regulatory Authority (NTRA)
Box 1: Overview of the liberalisation process
The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
(MCIT)4  was established in 1998 as an entity independent from the
former ministry of transportation and telecommunication. MCIT has
been responsible for developing ICT infrastructure, stimulating the
knowledge economy, and forging an e-government strategy and a
legal framework that is in line with international digital requirements.
One of these requirements is deregulation.
To encourage sector privatisation, legislation turned Telecom
Egypt, the state-owned incumbent operator, into a joint stock com-
pany in 1998.5  Law 19/1998 and Presidential Decree 101/1998 sepa-
rated operator and service provider from the regulatory functions.
Accordingly, MCIT created an independent regulator, the Telecommu-
nication Regulatory Authority (TRA) in line with Decree 10/1998.
Liberalisation was further regulated by Telecommunication Regu-
lation Law 10/2003 and its presidential decree. The law rests on four
main pillars: information disclosure, free competition, the provision
of universal services and user protection.
A central aspect of the law is the establishment of the National
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), which replaced the
TRA in 2003 and was assigned all regulatory functions as an independ-
ent regulatory authority.6  Another crucial aspect was the deregulation
4 <www.mcit.gov.eg>.
5 Telecom Egypt continued to be the sole fixed-line operator.
6 Law 10/2003 stipulates the NTRA’s duties and functions. These are to: draw up
telecommunication plans and programmes; prepare and publish telecom services
statistics; set the general policies and regulations for non-economical telecom
services; establish customer protection rules; provide state-of-the-art services with
the best prices; ensure the quality of telecom services; set up and manage a customer
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of Telecom Egypt’s monopoly of domestic and international telephone
service by January 2006. Accordingly, the NTRA will have completed
the main elements of the first liberalisation phase by the end of 2006.
The first phase of the liberalisation process runs from 2006 to 2008.
During this phase licensees are allowed to run voice and data serv-
ices over satellite earth stations and cable landing points operated by
Telecom Egypt. Licences to establish independent landing station in-
frastructure are set for a future date (MCIT, 2006).
Law 10/2003 governs licence categories and related fees. The
NTRA grants the licences. It awarded over 20 licences to operators
who offer telecommunications services to the Egyptian market, in-
cluding mobile, payphone, prepaid calling card, internet, data, and
VSAT (satellite) services. The NTRA is also responsible for the ad-
vanced radio management and monitoring system and is rationalis-
ing the radio frequency spectrum to introduce new services. Licence
fees are a main source of income for the NTRA. The authority’s budget
is further supplemented by government funds.
Consumer protection, negotiation and arbitration
As regulator, the NTRA is the sector’s consumer rights protector. The
authority has offered a hotline for customer service since September
2002. The hotline responds to both technical and non-technical com-
plaints and enquiries (e.g. the customer can report a failure in serv-
ices but also pursue billing issues).7
The NTRA has established several committees to address con-
sumer protection issues: the Consumer Rights Committee, the Con-
sumer Awareness Committee, the Health Committee, the Service Qual-
ity Committee, the Pricing Committee and the Privacy Committee.8
The NTRA also manages interconnection agreements in accord-
ance with the stipulations of Law 10/2003. As a result, the NTRA is
the negotiator if two service providers have a dispute over an inter-
connection agreement. The dispute is only taken to court when the
NTRA is unable to act as arbitrator.9  Law 10/2003 gives exact instruc-
tions on offences and their financial penalties (in extreme cases there
are prison penalties).
Liberalisation of main sector stakeholders
To date there are ten licensed telecommunications service providers
in Egypt:
• Telecom Egypt, the government operator, which provides tradi-
tional fixed landline services
• Three GSM (mobile) operators
• Two payphone operators
• Four low earth orbital systems operators.10
Telecom Egypt
Telecom Egypt11 replaced the Arab Republic of Egypt National Tel-
ecommunication Organisation (ARENTO) in 1998. It has been mod-
ernising the ICT sector through upgrading Egypt’s ICT infrastruc-
ture, expanding and improving quality of services and, through de-
regulation, offering consumers more competitive prices. Some ex-
amples of the upgrades are the installation of fibre optic cables and
digital microwave links throughout Egypt’s 26 governorates, adding
a third mobile carrier and, recently, liberalising the monopoly on
international calls.
Telecom Egypt was the monopoly fixed-line call operator until
the end of 2006. Domestic fixed-line calls are cheap by international
standards (approximately USD 0.17/hour) because Telecom Egypt has
subsidised them through high international call tariffs. The challenge
that Telecom Egypt now faces is how to manage fees for local calls
with the anticipated lower revenues due to liberalising international
call tariffs (Hashem, 2006).
One solution is to try to increase demand for international calls,
thereby expanding its user base. Telecom Egypt’s chairperson, Akil
Bashir, sees the liberalisation process in the short term as potentially
raising prices for local fixed-line calls. He further emphasises the im-
portance of creating more demand. Lower international tariffs should
translate into offering the service to sectors of the economy that have
not been using international telephony on a frequent basis. Here the
assumption is that the price change will create demand (Hashem, 2006).
Before the liberalisation of the sector, Telecom Egypt’s revenue
from international calls was approximately EGP 2 billion (USD 35 mil-
lion) per year. This amounted to 25% of its total returns. The subsi-
dised local calls cost the operator a loss of revenue of EGP 0.5 billion
(USD 8.7 million) per year until recently. Income from international
telephony is also the only hard currency earner for the company
(Hashem, 2006).
Law 10/2003 required Telecom Egypt to give up its monopoly on
landline telephone services and open them up to at least two addi-
tional operators by early 2006. The telecoms law gives the govern-
ment a free hand in selling a stake in Telecom Egypt, but stipulates
that the state must retain more than 50% of the company. The law
also decrees that 5% of the operator should be offered to employees
in the event of any kind of sale proceeding.
Telecom Egypt has two liberalisation scenarios for international
calls: either to offer two new public tenders or to offer an international
licence to the three mobile carriers. It also plans to expand regionally
to be able to earn hard currency.
Liberalisation is carefully managed, however. For example,
MobiNil12  and Vodafone will channel their calls through Telecom Egypt,
thereby offsetting a drop in revenues. Telecom Egypt has also pur-
chased Vodafone Egypt shares to secure a stake in the thriving mo-
bile market.
The NTRA set up the Universal Service Fund (USF)13  in 2005 to
compensate sector stakeholders, one of the most prominent of them
being Telecom Egypt, for expansion in low-density, low-profit areascomplaints system; regulate licence issuance procedures; create the National
Numbering Plan; regulate equipment type approval processes; build and operate the
Universal Services Fund (USF); and conduct research and development and training.
7 NTRA. Customer Service. See: <www.tra.gov.eg/english/
DPages_DPagesDetails.asp?ID=236&Menu=4>.
8 NTRA. Costumer Protection. See: <www.tra.gov.eg/english/
DPages_DPagesDetails.asp?ID=276&Menu=9>.
9 A possible scenario would be a lack of qualifications (technical or legal) to act as
arbitrator between the affected parties.
10 VSAT Service, Globalstar, Al-Tharaya, and Alkan.
11 <telecomegypt.com.eg>.
12 MobiNil was the first mobile phone operator in Egypt, and is still a leading
operator now, while two additional companies have been added: Vodafone and
recently Etisalat. By channelling their networks through Telecom Egypt they are
paying a fee to the latter. In this way Telecom Egypt is benefiting revenue-wise
from the mobile sector, though it is not a mobile operator per se.
13 The USF’s budget is made up from annual NTRA budget surpluses. The initial
budget is LE 50 million (USD 8.7 million).
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to meet set ICT access targets. The NTRA’s main universal service
goals were to guarantee access to telecommunications services at
reasonable prices and make them accessible to all citizens; provide
access to remote areas, schools and general libraries; guarantee free
competition and discourage monopolistic tendencies; and help to
consolidate national, political, economic and cultural interactions. The
fund is financed by licensing fees, in addition to other funds from the
state’s budget.
The NTRA is very supportive of Telecom Egypt. The regulator is
setting pricing formulas that take into consideration the transition the
operator is going through due to deregulation. Telecom Egypt has
also been advantaged in relation to other ICT service providers in that
it was exempted from paying licence fees on services before 2006. It
helps that both the NTRA and Telecom Egypt are under the auspices
of the minister of the MCIT.
The operator also maintains a stronghold in the sector through
its subsidiaries. It has investments in over 18 companies (e.g.
Vodafone Egypt, Nile Online, Egyptnet, Middle East Radio Company,
MenaTel and Nile Telecom), giving it a wide spread in the sector and
varied revenue sources.
To increase its hard currency revenue, Telecom Egypt has begun
bidding for regional and international contracts. It is in the process of
establishing Orascom, a second fixed network in Algeria. Through its
subsidiary TEData, it is offering in Palestine a “free internet”14  model
that it established in Egypt, and has opened a branch in Jordan
(AmCham, 2003).
One example of Telecom Egypt’s engineered liberalisation process
is its recent acquisition of Vodafone Egypt shares. While Telecom Egypt’s
shares went public on the Egyptian stock market in December 2006,
the cooperative partnership between Telecom Egypt and Vodafone has
increased Telecom Egypt’s stake in Vodafone to 45%. This partnership
allows Vodafone Egypt to extend its services and products through
Telecom Egypt’s outlets. Through this partnership, Telecom Egypt could
potentially work regionally on fixed and mobile operations. It will fur-
ther maintain a sizable portion of international call revenues while main-
taining its commitment to liberalisation (Vodafone, 2006).
Liberalisation examples from other sector participants
Mobile service providers
Egypt has become the largest internet market and the third largest
mobile market in Africa (after South Africa and Morocco). Telecom
Egypt was the first mobile operator, beginning its services in 1996.
The mobile sector was partially liberalised in 1998, when the MobiNil
consortium began offering mobile services. MobiNil was comprised
of four companies: Orascom Telecom; Al Ahram, a subsidiary of
Motorola; Systel, controlled by Alcatel; and Raouf Abdel-Messih, a
local partner.
The government sold a licence for a second network to a consor-
tium led by Vodafone and Misrfone, which launched its services in No-
vember 1998 under the name Click GSM. In the same year, Menatel and
Nile Telecom, both private companies, were licensed to provide payphone
services. A third provider – Etisalat – was chosen by a lengthy tender in
2006, and is expected to be fully operational by mid-2007.
Internet service providers (ISPs)
Public data networking services were liberalised in 1999. The first
ISPs were able to enter the market in this way; however, it was not
until the following year that the market for internet infrastructure was
opened to competition. The market for high-speed access services
was liberalised in 2001, while the first virtual operators – mostly ISPs
– were licensed in 2003.
Internet service licensing has been fully liberalised, and any or-
ganisation may apply for a licence. However, there are three licence
classes of ISPs in Egypt: class A, B and C. Class A is an all-inclusive
licence and is used by the leading ISPs (e.g. Link.net, Internet Egypt
and GegaNet). These licensees can install networks throughout Egypt
and can resell bandwidth to other ISPs. Class B licensees are not
allowed to sell bandwidth to other ISPs. Class C ISPs have to lease or
buy bandwidth from Class A licensees and can only provide internet
services to their customers. Most ISPs work on a revenue-sharing
model with the incumbent operator, which currently benefits both the
ISP and incumbent. There is a danger, however, that failure on the
part of the incumbent would disrupt services for many customers, as
there is only a single point of failure.
Call centres
The liberalised regulatory environment supports the development of
offshore services like call centres. These are becoming economically
competitive due to the reduction in telecommunication costs. How-
ever, foreign language skills are not as strong in Egypt as they are in
countries like India. At the same time, skilled ICT labour is in general
a challenge in Egypt (Rasromani, 2006). Despite being a latecomer,
Egypt is trying to position itself as a global and regional call centre
destination.
Egypt is in the process of establishing the first transit telecom-
munications free zone. Located in Alexandria, the free zone will offer
co-location services, managed services and application services via a
“telecom hotel”.15
E-commerce initiatives
There are limitations, at present, for widespread e-commerce serv-
ices in the local market due to the relatively low diffusion of internet
users and the minimal use of credit cards in financial transactions
within Egypt. However, MCIT is planning to launch e-commerce ca-
pabilities in Egypt by 2007.
Law 15/2004 on e-signatures and the establishment of the Infor-
mation Technology Industry Development Authority (ITIDA)16  was
passed on 22 April 2004. The Central Bank of Egypt has licensed 12
banks to provide e-banking services. The services include phone and
mobile banking as well as internet banking services.
A full modernisation of the National Postal Authority is currently
a key government project. The postal authority started to build a net-
work to connect its 3,000 post offices throughout the country. Plans
for transforming the authority into a joint stock company17  are al-
ready under way. The opportunities exist for partnerships with the
private sector to introduce electronic postal services and new appli-
cations in postal banking (CIT Egypt, 2002).
14 Through Telecom Egypt, ISPs offer numbers (0777-0000 or 0707-0000) that can
be dialled from any landline phone to access the internet without paying a
monthly subscription fee to an ISP. A per-minute rate for online use is billed
towards monthly phone use.
15 A building that is constructed or rebuilt for data centres.
16 <itida.gov.eg>.
17 The formerly 100% public National Postal Authority will offer at least 49% of the
shares to private Egyptian entities.
Total population 78,887,007 (July 2006 est.)
GDP (USD) Purchasing power parity - 316.3 billion (2004 est.)
GDP/capita (USD) Purchasing power parity - 3,960 (2004 est.)
Independent regulator National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (NTRA)
Fixed telecom operators Telecom Egypt is a state-owned fixed network monopoly – privatisation process
completed end 2006.
Fixed network growth Fixed-line diffusion rate reached 14% June 2005.
Fixed lines in service 10 million (2005)
Fixed line capacity Total number of subscribers reached 10 million (2005)
Fixed lines/100 pop. 13.5
Main line waiting list 100,000
Main line waiting time Approx. one month
Number of ICT employees 50,000+ (2005)
Telecommunications revenue (USD) 2.9 billion (2000)
Mobile subscriptions 14 per 100 population (2005)
Mobile diffusion 14,045,134 (2005) – 3rd largest mobile market in Africa
Internet dial-up subscribers NA - Subscription-free internet, based on a revenue-sharing system between
Telecom Egypt and leading local ISPs. Offers internet at the price of a local
long-distance call (USD 0.17). This system lifted monthly payment barriers and led
to a significant leap in numbers of online users, reaching 4.2 million in mid-2005
from 0.65 million in 2000.
Internet users 5 million (2006), 4% of the population
ISPs 196 (2004)
Internet bandwidth Dial-up and broadband approx. 32-40 Kbps
Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber EGP 150-200 (USD 26-35)/month
Lines (ADSL)
WiFi - WiMAX WiFi predominantly used in Cairo and Alexandria, WiMAX has been tested for public
application; NTRA is planning a 3.5 GHz spectrum auction in 2007-2008.
Cities with dial-up IP POPs Universal access in cities and towns
VSAT International VSAT gateways permitted for data communications. ISPs can get their
own international bandwidth using VSAT if they are licensed international VSAT
operators.
Local loop CDMA WLL access system in the Nile River Delta area.
The network will have a total capacity of 60,000 subscriber lines, extending Telecom
Egypt’s services into rural and remote areas where its existing copper network does
not reach.
Cybercafés Over 600
VoIP VoIP PC-to-PC allowed, PC-to-phone not allowed. Government working on
liberalising the latter; main stumbling block is decreased revenue from international
calls for Telecom Egypt.
Exchange rate EGP 1 = USD 0.173
Table 1: Key statistics
Sources: NTRA, Telecom Egypt, Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC), ITU, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), World Bank.
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Participation
Currently there are no public consultation forums for ICT policy for-
mulation. While telecommunications law gives the NTRA clear rules
and guidelines on regulating the market and protecting the consumer,
as well as for imposing penalties on defaulters, public participation in
law-making processes are not as clear. For example, the law does not
establish a way to contest decisions adopted by the NTRA. It also
does not require the NTRA to make its decision-making process pub-
lic. In one instance this led to a heated debate by opposition groups
regarding the transparency of the selection process of the third mo-
bile carrier, Etisalat (although the process has been deemed transpar-
ent by the government and the international community).
According to Mustafa (2002), Egypt’s liberalisation status com-
pares favourably in the region. However, while Egypt has a relatively
transparent regulatory framework, the analysis points out that the
regulator is not fully independent due to the NTRA’s ultimate subjuga-
tion to the sector’s minister, and the lack of an open, public decision-
making forum.
Conclusions
Egypt has made strides in its liberalisation plan, progressing largely
according to schedule. To date the NTRA is showing signs of a well-
functioning regulator. While it is fairly independent, it ultimately is
governed by the MCIT minister, who also governs Telecom Egypt.
This lack of independence from the sector could potentially place it in
a conflict of interest.
Telecom Egypt faces a challenge in maintaining and expanding
its profit level after liberalisation. As a result, the liberalisation proc-
ess is being carefully engineered to allow it to keep its advantageous
edge over competition.
While Egypt’s liberalisation process is running relatively smoothly,
its publication and public participation processes leave a lot to be
desired. There is, in effect, a dichotomous approach towards liberali-
sation in Egypt: liberalisation of services and technical applications,
but limitations on the “liberalisation” of expression and on the inclu-
sion of public involvement in the decision- and policy-making proc-
esses in the sector. 
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Introduction
This report provides a brief overview of the information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) situation in Ethiopia and the key stakehold-
ers’ roles in the sector, together with a concluding remark on key
areas that need to be addressed. The methodology for this report
involved mainly desk research, complemented by interviews with in-
dividuals in the telecom sector.
The first section describes key areas of progress in the ICT sec-
tor in Ethiopia, while the Participation section presents the country’s
ICT policy-making bodies and implementers, including stakeholders
that contribute to the development of the ICT sector.
The ICT sector in Ethiopia is still characterised by a low penetra-
tion of services, including fixed-line telephones and mobile and internet
services. Reasons behind this include the monopoly of the telecom-
munications incumbent and far from effective regulation. Although
governmental agencies have a key role in ICT development plans, pri-
vate sector companies, donors and civil society organisations have
been the main drivers behind ICT development in the country. The
high tariffs that inhibit rapid growth in access remain a key challenge.
There are signs, however, that ICTs have created an important oppor-
tunity for the socioeconomic empowerment of women.
Country situation
Although there have been developments in liberalising and privatis-
ing the different sectors of the Ethiopian economy, the telecommuni-
cations industry remains under the monopoly of the government. The
Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC)2  is the only pro-
vider of telecommunications services, including fixed-line and mobile
telephony and internet service.
The number of fixed-line telephone subscribers more than dou-
bled from 105,985 in 1987-1988 to 283,683 in 2000-2001, reaching
725,046 by June 2006. This means that 70.9% of all exchanges are in
use (the capacity of the fixed-telephone exchange grew to 1,022,399
by the end of June 2006) (ETC, 2006a).
The effective teledensity reached 1,39% (including mobile
phones), still a very low figure compared to the sub-Saharan Africa
average of 2.68% (2003). Residential subscribers represent 71.2%
of the total fixed-line subscribers, business 15.8%, government 7.2%,
and other customers, including international organisations, 1.1%.
However, international, business and government customers
contribute to the incumbent’s revenue substantially. By the end of
June 2006, the number of waiting subscribers for fixed telephone
lines reached 56,023.
The mobile sector is growing fast. In June 2006, the number of
subscribers reached 866,700, more than double the total of 410,630 in
2005. Out of the total number of subscribers, 358,052 were pre-paid
subscribers. ETC offers value-added services such as international roam-
ing, SMS, voicemail, general packet radio service (GPRS) and satellite
mobile service. Ethiopia is registered as a GSM-user country.
The internet market is poorly developed compared to the poten-
tial demand and size of the population. This is mainly due to the in-
cumbent’s monopoly as the sole internet service provider (ISP). Al-
though internet charges have been revised a number of times in the
past to encourage more users, the number of subscribers remains
low. Usage has, however, more than doubled in two years. ETC had
10,465 subscribers in 2003, of which the majority were business and
non-profit organisations. This figure grew by 14% to 12,155 in 2004
– still a small number compared to the population size of over 70
million. In May 2006, the number of internet subscribers reached
26,642.
A major change occurred in 2001, with the start of the govern-
ment’s broadband roll-out project. This project introduced a dedicated
digital data network (DDN) service that provides a broadband infrastruc-
ture with a frame relay connection of up to 2 Mbps (although the maxi-
mum speed that is available for subscription is 512 Kbps). Both internet
and satellite broadband services are offered. In May 2006, subscribers
to the DDN and its multimedia services reached 628 (ETC, 2006b).
In recent years, the government of Ethiopia has tried to take ad-
vantage of ICTs in a bid to accelerate the rate of economic growth. To
this end, it is conducting multi-sectoral projects.3  The objective of
these projects is to deliver IP4 -based services through the use of
broadband terrestrial and VSAT5  (satellite) infrastructure. In 2004 ETC
made its infrastructure available to all woreda (district level adminis-
trations) and secondary schools. This connected the schools with
eight-channel satellite television for educational purposes; some 550
secondary schools have been connected so far. The broadband roll-
out also aims to provide access to rural communities, agricultural
research institutions, corporate organisations and financial institu-
tions. A total of 600 districts, around 5,000 rural communities (or
kebele) and 34 agricultural research institutions have already been
connected.
The number of local websites has increased over the past five
years. However, many feel that government websites do not contain
information that is useful to the general public or institutional cus-
tomers, since no applications or enquiries can be submitted online. A
few private companies have developed e-commerce websites, selling
goods and services.
According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2002,
cited by Demeke and Biru, 2002) estimates, there were 75,000 com-
puters in Ethiopia in 2001 and 367,000 TV sets in 2000. Only 2.8% of
all households have access to TV sets. The distribution of TV sets is
concentrated in the major urban centres, where more people can af-
ford the cost and electricity is available. The national survey of 1999-
2000 also showed that 18.4% of the population owns radios.
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1 <www.efossnet.org>.
2 <www.telecom.net.et>.
3 Among them, the SchoolNet and WoredaNet projects.
4 Internet protocol.
5 Very small aperture terminal, a ground station used in satellite communications of
data, voice and video signals.
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TV and radio stations in Ethiopia belong to the state. The govern-
ment TV station used to have a single channel, Ethiopian TV, until the
Addis Ababa Television channel was introduced three years ago. Ad-
dis Ababa Television is available only in Addis Ababa and its suburbs.
The federal government owns two radio stations, the most impor-
tant being Radio Ethiopia, which has two channels. The second radio
station, Education by Radio, covers most of the country and provides
educational radio programming to primary schools and distance edu-
cation to adults. The Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency recently issued an
FM radio licence to a private company. The slow licensing process is
not encouraging for the many who were initially enthusiastic about the
potential new business opportunities that this would bring.
There is considerable interest in free and open source software
(FOSS) in Ethiopia, and a network of over 300 ICT specialists promot-
ing FOSS has been formed under the banner of the Ethiopian Free and
Open Source Software Network (EFOSSNet). Apart from a few high-
profile representatives, the government has been slow to wake up to
the potential of FOSS. Little is also being done to promote FOSS in
higher education.
Like many other developing countries, ICT skills in Ethiopia are
in short supply in many sectors of the economy. However, there are
several institutions offering tertiary training, run both by the private
sector and the government. Currently there are more than 20 emerg-
ing higher education institutions that have started to train at a di-
ploma and degree level. Studies also show that there are more than
150 private computer training centres in the country, although 82%
of them are in the capital. These centres offer courses on Microsoft
Office packages, database systems, various programming languages,
and specialised software packages, among others.
Participation
There has been increased involvement by all stakeholders in the de-
velopment of the ICT sector in Ethiopia over the past five years. The
Ethiopian government has embarked on a wide-ranging national ICT
capacity-building programme aimed at accelerating development and
reducing the level of poverty by improving public and private services
in the health, agriculture and education sectors, among others. The
vision for the programme is to “[d]evelop and exploit ICTs as an ac-
celerator for the attainment of national development objectives and
global competitiveness.”6  The programme is embedded in a decen-
tralisation policy entrusting regions and woredas with the task of re-
sponding to local needs.
It has four strategic aims:
• Establishing a national ICT policy, advocacy and coordination
body to facilitate the mainstreaming of ICTs for socio-economic
development
• Creating an enabling policy, regulatory and legal environment
for the growth of ICTs and establishing locally adapted ICT in-
dustry standards
• Developing the necessary ICT human resources and infrastruc-
ture, facilitating rural access, and promoting diversified content
• Facilitating the use of appropriate technologies for the develop-
ment of applications and content in various sectors to support
rural development, good governance, and service delivery in pri-
ority sectors.
We have identified ten major ICT players in Ethiopia:
The Digital Opportunity Trust (DOT) (<www.dotrust.org>) is a
Canadian-based non-profit organisation that promotes locally
driven social and economic development through the use of ICTs.
Its flagship programme, Global NetCorps, is in operation in five
countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya and Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian Free and Open Source Software Network
(EFOSSNet) (<www.efossnet.org>) is a non-governmental profes-
sional network established by a group of interested ICT profes-
sionals and individuals in February 2005. The vision of EFOSSNet
is to see FOSS contribute to the development of Ethiopia. EFOSSNet
is committed to research and development in the area of FOSS,
and to awareness-raising through training and fostering partner-
ships with the private, non-profit and public sectors.
The Ethiopian ICT Development Agency (EICTDA)
(<www.eictda.gov.et>) is an autonomous federal government public
office coordinating ICT-related development in Ethiopia and advis-
ing the government on ICT policy issues. EICTDA is also responsi-
ble for the development and implementation of ICT activities ap-
proved by the government. The agency is the main executing or-
gan for the ICT-Assisted Development Project, which aims to help
communities improve their livelihood through the use of appro-
priate ICTs that facilitate increased access to markets, develop-
ment information and public services.7
The Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency (ETA)
(<www.eta.gov.et>) is the country’s telecommunications regulator.
The Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC) is the state-
owned monopoly provider of telecommunication services in Ethio-
pia. According to its website, ETC’s vision is to see the entire country
connected with state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure that provides high
quality, reliable and secure communication service at affordable
prices, while its mission is to introduce ICT infrastructure across
the nation to support voice, data and video services.
The Graduate School of Telecommunications and Information
Technology (GSTIT) (<www.gstit.edu.et>) is sponsored by the
ETC. GSTIT offers postgraduate programmes intended to fill the
gap for high-level professionals demanded in the ICT sector, both
in Ethiopia and in the region. GSTIT provides forums for sharing
knowledge and exchanging information on new technologies and
management tools and practices.
The School of Information Studies in Africa (SISA), now called
the Faculty of Informatics, Addis Ababa University, was estab-
lished in 1990 with the assistance of the International Develop-
ment Research Centre (IDRC) and UNESCO (see below). It of-
fers graduate as well as short-term training programmes and
refresher courses in ICTs.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
(<www.et.undp.org>) provides technical advice to the ETC. It also
supports the local SchoolNet project which is being implemented
in collaboration with the EICTDA. The project delivered the first
batch of 1,500 computers to the Ministry of Education in 2004
as part of efforts to bring ICTs to more than 160 secondary
schools across the country.
6 <www.iactadethiopia.org>. 7 For more information see: <www.ictadethiopia.org>.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
(<www.uneca.org>) plays a key role in the development of ICTs,
particularly in enabling countries to develop and implement their
National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI)
plans.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
sation (UNESCO) (<www.unesco.org>) supports ICT initiatives
and development in Ethiopia. This includes establishing
telecentres (it launched the sixth telecentre in Ethiopia in August
2005) and supporting FOSS development, as well as initiatives
assisting visually impaired people, among others.
Conclusions
Although the situation is improving (from a very low baseline), the
ICT sector in Ethiopia is still characterised by a low penetration of
fixed-line, mobile and internet services, a state monopoly, and far
from effective regulation.
The establishment of an ICT coordinating body (the EICTDA) is
expected to promote the sector’s growth. But although governmental
agencies have a key role in developing ICT strategies, private sector
companies, donors and civil society organisations have been the main
drivers behind the development of ICTs in the country.
The government actively participated in the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS) process, and a national consultative
workshop with ICT stakeholders was organised by the ETA in collabo-
ration with UNECA in February 2003. However, this was largely invis-
ible to the public.
The monopoly of the telecommunications environment in Ethiopia
poses a number of challenges. The policy environment needs to be
opened up to encourage private sector investment and to improve the
quality of services by introducing competitive pricing for services.
As stated in its website, the ETC’s “vision” is to connect the coun-
try with state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure at affordable prices. How-
ever, this is unlikely to be realised if the market is not liberalised. A
liberalised market will also make the existing regulator more effective
in developing and implementing standards that encourage service pro-
viders to meet their service level agreements and respond to custom-
ers’ needs.
Billing problems and affordability are regarded as the major con-
straints in utilising fixed phones effectively. The low level of internet
penetration reflects an expensive but slow and low-quality service.
While there is still a scarcity of fixed lines, there has been an
increase in the use of public access points, such as private kiosks,
telecentres and public phones. Tariffs should be revised to allow those
in rural areas to make calls, and effective strategies need to be put in
place to sort out billing problems.
There remains a significant gender gap in accessing communi-
cation services in Ethiopia. However, there are also signs of improve-
ment, such as the growing access to prepaid mobile phones and pub-
lic access points run by women. There has also been a significant
increase in the number of women operating telecentres, following the
liberalisation of public call services in 2003. This is expected to im-
prove women’s access to ICTs more generally. 
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6 Introduction
This report was compiled by the research team at IT for Change using
varied primary and secondary data. The primary data includes key
interviews with civil society experts such as Arun Mehta and Vickram
Crishna (Radiophony),2  Mahesh Uppal (independent telecom consult-
ant), Sunil Abraham (Mahiti Infotech), TK Manzoor (Akshaya), Basheer
Ahmed Shadrach (International Development Research Centre, IDRC)
and Nikhil Dey (Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan). Our secondary
data included a survey of literature on information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) policy in India. We paid particular attention to
the legal and regulatory framework for ICT policy at the national and
state levels.
This report is organised into six sections, arranged to cover ar-
eas where there has been rapid development of ICT-related policy (up
until the end of 2006). The sections on telecommunications,
telecentres, community radio, open standards and intellectual prop-
erty rights, and the information technology (IT) industry outline the
key policy initiatives and the regulatory framework. They also sketch
tentative future directions for development of policy in these areas. A
section on Participation briefly notes the level of civil society partici-
pation in policy formulation and implementation.
This report shows that, unlike some other developing countries,
India has not developed comprehensive ICT policy or legislation and
has not established a specialised ICT agency to address all areas of
ICT policy. Presently, different components of ICT policy are decided
by the relevant line ministry vested with that responsibility. In this
institutionally fragmented policy arena it is apparent that there are no
common principles of a “people-centred, inclusive and development-
oriented information society,” the goal set by the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS, 2005). In the sections below, we ex-
amine the development of policy against these benchmark principles,
and briefly propose some alternative lines of action which may be
pursued in the years to come.
Country situation
Telecommunications
While there has been a revolutionary shift in telecom growth in India
in the last decade, several lacunae persist and need sustained policy
attention to achieve a just distribution of telecom resources.
Voice telephony
In 1994, the central government deregulated the Indian telecom mar-
ket by allowing private players to bid for telecom licences, and in
doing so ended the state monopoly over the telecom sector (TRAI,
1994). Telecom policy has been revised significantly over the years.
In 1999, the New Telecom Policy was drafted, and there was a pro-
posal to revise this policy in 2006, but this revision is now likely to
take place in 2007 (TRAI, 1999).
The establishment of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
(TRAI) as the single regulator for the telecom industry has been one of
India’s most successful regulatory policy reforms in the last decade. While
TRAI has stimulated market growth, its ability to enhance consumer pro-
tection, promote rural telephony and enforce quality of service norms
has been far from satisfactory (the continued deficiency in quality of
service norms has been noted in TRAI documents) (TRAI, 2005).
Since 1994 there has been a rapid deployment of telephones all
over the country (183.95 million telephones as of November 2006).
The rate of growth in terms of teledensity is noteworthy when one
considers that India has moved from 1.39 telephones per 100 inhab-
itants at the end of March 1994, when the shift to a new, more liberal
telecom policy began, to 16.3 per 100 inhabitants in November 2006.3
Mobile telephony grew exponentially over this period, while the number
of land-line telephones has stagnated and occasionally shown signs
of decline (Chandrasekhar, 2007). Official estimates indicate that the
growth in teledensity will be sustained, and it is expected to increase
from 16.3 per 100 inhabitants in November 2006 to 22 per 100 in-
habitants by December 2007, thereby satisfying the target set by the
Department of Telecommunications (DoT) (PIB, 2006a).
The difficulty is that a closer examination of the data suggests
that it may not be a good measure of the extent of diffusion. To start
with, the aggregate figure conceals a high degree of urban and re-
gional concentration. Teledensity in rural India in 1998-1999 was just
0.5 lines per 100 people. While the figure crossed 1 per 100 in 2001-
2002, and stood at 1.79 in December 2005, urban teledensity had
risen to 34.77 during the same period. In November 2006, rural phones
amounted to just 14.8 million compared to 183.5 million across the
country. Furthermore, interregional variations were also substantial.
In March 2003, while total teledensity in the state of Delhi was 26.85,
in the state of Bihar it was as low as 1.32 (Chandrasekhar, 2003).
Access to voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services in India
has resulted in the dramatic reduction of international and national
tariffs over the last two years. However, there has been a recent pro-
posal to regulate VoIP services by requiring service providers to ac-
quire telecom licences and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
telecom regulator as well as local tax authorities. If VoIP services are
heavily regulated, it is likely to reduce or even eliminate the big price
differential presently available in comparison with conventional public
switched telephone network (PSTN) telecom tariffs (Elwood, 2006).
Data connectivity/internet connectivity
Data connectivity through packet switching networks also falls under
the regulatory control of TRAI.4  The development of this sector has
1 <www.itforchange.net>.
2 The institutional affiliations of the contributors are indicated in brackets.
3 The rate of growth has indeed been rapid during this period, with teledensity
reaching 2.86 lines per 100 people in March 2000, 3.64 in March 2001, 4.4 in
March 2002, 5 in March 2003 and 9 in March 2005.
4 While TRAI’s regulatory mandate is primarily confined to circuit-switched telecom
networks, where a dedicated line carries data from end to end, this mandate has
recently been expanded to include packet switching telecom networks, using the
key protocols of the internet, such as TCP/IP. See: <www.webopedia.com/TERM/
P/packet_switching.html>.
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proceeded along two distinct paths: private sector networks and state-
owned networks. The spread of data connectivity by these networks
has been modest. While the state-owned telecom provider accounts
for almost 50% of the connections available, the overall availability of
data connectivity in India is very low when compared with similarly
placed developing countries (TRAI, 2006).
The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
(MCIT) has set ambitious targets for the roll-out of high bandwidth
broadband connectivity nationwide through the incumbent state-
owned telecom provider BSNL.5  It is expected that more than one
million broadband connections will be added before the end of 2007.
A proposal has also been put forward to modify the definition of
broadband connectivity from the present 256 kilobytes per second
(Kbps) to 2 megabytes per second (Mbps) download speed (PIB,
2006a). This increase can be easily accommodated, as India pres-
ently has an installed bandwidth capacity of 16 terabits, of which only
0.2 terabits has been used (LirneAsia, 2006). BSNL and MTNL have
already shifted to providing 2 Mbps connectivity in their basic
broadband plan.
The recent decision by the DoT to invest resources from the
Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF)6  in broadband technolo-
gies like WiFi and WiMax is a step in the right direction. It has planned
to set up about 8,000 towers – the biggest cost components for wire-
less connectivity – in remote areas which are presently not served by
any telecom network (PIB, 2006a).
One way for the DoT to achieve its ambitious broadband targets
will be to encourage local governments to implement their own wire-
less projects. Various local governments in different parts of the world
have invested public money in creating public networks which are
accessible to all citizens.7
State-owned data networks have been rolled out by the central
government and various state governments. Different state govern-
ments have developed different connectivity models. One noteworthy
state government model is the Akshaya (Kerala) model. Akshaya
telecentres use a mix of wireless and wired networks, as in the pilot in
Malapuram district, where connectivity is provided through a public-
private partnership. However, as the project looks to expand into the
remaining 13 districts, they will ride on the State Wide Area Network
(SWAN) which promises connectivity up to the “block” (sub-district)
level.8
SWAN is the core infrastructure being developed by the central
government under the National e-Governance Plan,9  which promises
to deliver e-government services and serve as a platform for G2G
(government-to-government) communication (DIT, 2004).
The current implementation status of SWAN networks is unsat-
isfactory, however. It is only in four states (Maharashtra, Sikkim,
Uttaranchal and Chandigarh) that the plan is going as per schedule
(DIT, 2006a). Certain states already have their existing network pro-
vided by the National Informatics Centre (NIC).10  The aim is to
synergise SWAN and existing networks and avoid duplication. The
emphasis will also be on using/buying existing broadband infrastruc-
ture from public sector and private sector players.
Rural telephony
As pointed out, the deployment of telecom networks in India is geo-
graphically skewed and citizens in rural areas have little or no access
to voice telephony or data connectivity. It is primarily the urban areas
which have benefited from opening the telecoms markets to private
sector participation. The policy effort to increase rural connectivity
has rested on raising resources through the Access Deficit Charge
(ADC) and USOF, relying on a state-owned telecom provider to roll
out the necessary networks.
The 1999 National Telecom Policy established the goal of univer-
sal access to telephony, even in rural areas, leading the BNSL and
other fixed-line operators to move into these areas. The entry of pri-
vate players in the telecom market, however, has led to price wars
that affect the profit margins of BSNL and private operators alike.
BSNL operates in rural areas where it is the only service provider and
revenues do not cover fixed costs, and while these were previously
cross-subsidised with local and long distance calls, the price wars
have made this increasingly difficult. The levying of an ADC on private
operators is meant to help cover the deficit.11
The inability both to meet rural connectivity targets and to main-
tain a steady rural telephony growth rate has prompted a vigorous
policy debate. This debate has three prominent strands.
First, it is suggested that rural telephony is an area which is not
commercially lucrative. As a result, the government should step in
and subsidise private sector investment in rural areas or should do
the job itself.12  Quoting Mahesh Uppal (2006), an independent tel-
ecommunications consultant:
So if rural connectivity is necessary, the government must give tax
incentives… What we did instead was to allow all players to move
from rural markets to the more lucrative markets, and in the proc-
ess rural markets got neglected. We do not have transparent sub-
sidies. If we believe in the market system, markets will not do
certain things and cannot be expected to do certain things.
The second argument calls for private players to honour their
licence obligations to provide rural connectivity. As tough competi-
tion to acquire customers has required significant investment in ur-
ban areas, both state-run telecom players and private telecom play-
ers have under-invested in rural areas.
Prabir Purkayastha of the Delhi Science Forum seems to sug-
gest that recent moves like BSNL’s “OneIndia Tariff Plan”, which the
company adopted under political pressure exerted by the telecom
minister, will adversely affect the company. The Tariff Plan reduces
the tariff for national long-distance calls to one rupee (slightly over
0.02 USD) per minute, thereby leading to a reduction in the ADC which
accrues to the company. The ADC was seen to be a major subsidy for
5 BSNL (<www.bsnl.in>) is one of two state-owned telecom providers, the other
being MTNL (<www.mtnl.net.in>).
6 The Universal Service Obligation Fund was established in 2003 with the primary
goal of providing access to basic telecommunication services to people in rural
and remote areas at affordable prices. The financial resources for meeting this
obligation are collected by way of a levy on telecom service providers. For more
information, see: <www.dot.gov.in/uso/usoindex.htm>.
7 Some policy advocates like Arun Mehta (2006) suggest that universal broadband
access is unlikely to be achieved as long as “governments continue to look at
telecommunications as a commercial venture rather than a public infrastructure.”
8 See: <210.212.236.212/akshaya/swiderollout.html>.
9 See: <www.mit.gov.in/plan/about.asp>.
10 The National Informatics Centre (NIC) of the Department of Information
Technology, Government of India, provides network backbone and e-governance
support to the central government, state governments, union territory
administrations, districts and other government bodies. See: <home.nic.in>.
11 See: <www.19.5degs.com/element/2329.php>.
12 The Bharat Nirman social inclusion programme launched by the central
government does exactly this. The programme aims to establish village public
telephones (VPT) covering 30,808 villages. (PIB, 2006a).
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rural telephony. Purkayastha (2006) says that this, along with non-
compliance by private players in fulfilling their obligation to invest in
rural areas, is not doing any good to connectivity in rural areas:
The net result of all this is that BSNL and MTNL are likely to lose Rs
3,000-4,000 crore [USD 680-907 million]13  of their long-distance
revenue, even after higher landline rentals are taken into account.
With the additional loss of Rs 1,800 crore [USD 408 million] from
the lower ADC levy, at one stroke [this move] has converted what
were still thriving public sector units, even under a strong com-
petitive regime, to possible basket cases. Effectively, BSNL, which
is the only company providing rural telephony, is being asked
[through the new policy] to take a major hit in its revenue, while
companies that are wilfully flouting the terms of their licence of
providing 10% rural telephones get away scot-free.
It is apparent that neither a reliance on a state-owned telecom
provider nor on private providers has worked. BSNL has been around
for close to 40 years, but has failed to provide rural telephony. The
free market approach has been in operation for more than a decade
and the fact is that private operators have systematically excluded
rural areas from their area of operations. It does not appear that pro-
viding them with further incentives would be useful.
A third policy framework has been proposed by the Rural Telecom
Foundation (RTF). It seeks to ensure that rural telephony is a com-
mercially viable enterprise run by small entrepreneurs. The founda-
tion believes that both BSNL and MTNL, which have substantial land-
line operations, should seriously consider using low-cost shared party
lines (also referred to as Gram-phones by the RTF)14  to increase their
respective market share and expand telecom access to the masses.
RTF has installed pilot projects and has petitioned TRAI and DoT to
adopt the model by granting it legal and policy sanction.
Telecentres
Currently, there are around 12,000 to 13,000 telecentres spread across
the country. Of these, 45% to 50% are government initiatives or pub-
lic-private partnerships.15  The remaining telecentres are “for profit”,
with the most successful one being “e-Choupal”, run by a private
commodities trading company, the Indian Tobacco Company (ITC).16
The Department of Information Technology (DIT) recently em-
barked on a programme under its National e-Governance Plan to es-
tablish 100,000 telecentres. These are being called Community Serv-
ice Centres (CSCs). Each CSC will serve five to six villages. It is envi-
sioned that connectivity to these centres will be provided by SWAN
and content will be provided by various public sector agencies, as
well as private players. The structure is a three-tiered one, with the
village level entrepreneur (VLE) at the bottom, a services centre agency
(SCA) managing a cluster of CSCs (for one or more districts), and the
state designated agency (SDA) in charge of providing the requisite
policy, content and other support to the SCAs (DIT, 2006b).
Despite the potential impact of CSCs in building an infrastruc-
ture of digital inclusion, some serious issues remain:
Accountability: How the CSCs are going to be accountable to the
local self- government structure at the village level (gram panchayat)17
remains a key area of concern. Since CSCs are serviced and main-
tained by entrepreneurs and guided by SCAs that are often private
companies, community control over activities at these centres, and
their adherence to larger social and developmental objectives, will be
difficult to ensure.
In this context, it is important to refer to the Akshaya model in
the state of Kerala. Although it is a public-private partnership with the
centres run by a village entrepreneur, it is accountable to the gram
panchayat. According to TK Manzoor (2006), the director of Akshaya:
They [the entrepreneurs] are not hardcore entrepreneurs, they
are social entrepreneurs. The panchayat involvement is very high
in the process; the entrepreneur is only a catalyst. The entrepre-
neur cannot take a huge profit. The ultimate beneficiaries are the
people. This is what sets apart the Akshaya experience from other
telecentre models.
Revenue generation: A related concern is the revenue generation
model of the CSC. The scheme is premised on the assumption that
over time (as government subsidy is phased out) these centres will
become self-sustainable. However, current experience with telecentres
in rural areas is not at all promising, and there are very few that have
been able to achieve financial sustainability. While CSC documents
do mention that the entrepreneurs can expect “guaranteed provision
of revenue from governmental services” (DIT, 2005a), some key ques-
tions remain unanswered. Given the limited progress on developing
back-end operations by the line ministries, whose digitalised services
are to be provided through these centres? How long will it take to
make enough relevant e-government services available at these cen-
tres? Will the revenues from e-government services be enough to
incentivise the centre operators to balance social objectives with the
commercial ones?
Aruna Sundararajan, the chief executive officer for the CSC
project, insists that the business model will work:
The scheme has a calibrated kind of structure, in which govern-
ment will provide at least a third of a kiosk’s revenues via e-
governance services. And if kiosks are not able to generate enough
revenues, the government actually supports them financially. The
scheme has already envisaged that the third of a kiosk’s capital
expenditure and operating expenditure will be guaranteed by the
state and central government for four years. In other words, there
is a strong element of financial support inherent in the scheme.
In the first four years, entrepreneurs can draw on this support
and after that – once the kiosks stabilise – they can be on their
own (Talgeri, 2006).
Content generation: Content is another area about which the CSC
scheme is not very clear. The current plan is to ensure that CSCs will
serve as the nodal points for the implementation of an integrated serv-
ice delivery model, under the National e-Governance Plan, whereby citi-
zens can access different government department services across a
single platform.18  However, there is very little activity on the ground in
terms of development of content and applications for these services.
13 One crore equals 10 million in the Indian numbering system.
14 A Gram-phone works on the principle that one telephone number, which would
normally have been associated with one family, is instead associated/connected
to four families. For more information see: <www.ruraltelecomfoundation.org>.
15 See: <www.i4donline.net/articles/current-
article.asp?articleid=846&typ=Columns>.
16 E-Choupal is a system of village internet kiosks which provide information,
products and services for improving farm productivity, reducing transaction costs
and improving farm-gate price realisation. See: <www.echoupal.com> and
<www.itcportal.com>.
17 Gram panchayats are local government bodies at the village level, elected by the
adult population of the village. See: <panchayat.nic.in>.
18 See: <www.mit.gov.in/plan/backdrop.asp>.
There is also an emerging view that services available under the
Right To Information Act of 2005 should be channelled through the
CSCs. The Right To Information Act (MLJ, 2005) is a recently passed
law which empowers citizens to demand and obtain government in-
formation. The Act mentions that information should be disseminated
over different media, including the internet. Chapter II of the Act states
that “[I]t shall be a constant endeavour of every public authority to
take steps in accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of sub-
section (1) to provide as much information suo motu to the public at
regular intervals through various means of communications, includ-
ing internet, so that the public have minimum resort to the use of this
Act to obtain information.”
In this situation, it would make perfect sense for CSCs to be the
place where the Act can be implemented on issues related to access-
ing information, demanding access to information, and training on
exercising citizen rights under the Act. A form of this model is the e-
Seva initiative in the West Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh. Infor-
mation related to various welfare schemes right down to the village
level has been put on the internet, which can be accessed by villagers
at community telecentres run under the initiative.19
The Kerala government’s Akshaya model once again has impor-
tant lessons in the area of content development. According to Manzoor
(2006): “There is primary-level content generation in the local lan-
guage [Malayalam] in agriculture, health and education. Further plans
are afoot to equip citizens in content development skills.”
Amalgamating existing kiosks into the CSC system: There is also
the question of amalgamating existing telecentres with the multi-tier
CSC system. There are currently around 13,000 kiosks out of which
45% to 50% are owned or supported by governments. Village self-
government bodies are also acquiring computers in thousands of vil-
lages across the country, and they may also be interested in deliver-
ing e-government and other CSC services. It may be difficult to align
the CSC system, with its strong private sector involvement and em-
phasis on providing many private sector services along with public
services, with existing governmental initiatives at the state and local
government levels. These may be differently oriented in many funda-
mental ways.
Issues of monopolies in private services and in service delivery
points: Two kinds of monopoly concerns have been raised regarding
the existing CSC design. One, since private service providers are al-
lowed to become SCAs, would this not lead to the discriminatory ex-
clusion of competing service providers? This is especially relevant in
light of the fact that the government is subsidising the SCAs as well
as lending its CSC brand name and credibility to them. The second
issue regards monopolies on service delivery points. It is not clear
from the present documents on the CSC scheme as to what happens
if any person or agency other than the SCA-designated village level
entrepreneur wants to “front-end” and deliver government services.
Such an agency could be a local community group or the village local
government body itself. Can they be refused the right to deliver e-
government services? And if they are allowed to do so, would it vio-
late the conditions under which SCAs and local entrepreneurs enter
into agreement with the CSC system, because it could affect their
revenue projections?
Open standards/intellectual property policies
Open standards
The issue of open standards is one of special significance in the pub-
lic procurement context, given that the government is close to imple-
menting the National e-Governance Plan and issues of data and soft-
ware interoperability, procurement costs and national security need
to be tackled upfront.
The DIT has convened a Core Group on Standards to look at the
entire issue of interoperability. As software programs and the accom-
panying databases are developed at different levels of government by
different agencies on different technology platforms, interoperability
across platforms is essential for e-government to be functional and
efficient (DIT, 2005b). It is also important that these platforms are
accessible to all citizens irrespective of the operating systems or other
software platforms used by them. The Indian Linux Users Group-Delhi
has published a “Hall of Shame” list of Linux “unfriendly” Indian ven-
dors, internet service providers (ISPs) and websites which “force
consumers to use proprietary software or technologies, or otherwise
perpetuate vendor lock-in.” Many government and public sector
websites, including both the BSNL and MTNL sites, are included in
the list. Apparently the website of the President of India, which was
also listed, took notice and “removed the link promoting use of pro-
prietary technology.” 20
The MCIT and NIC are also currently working on a draft docu-
ment for open standards through a Working Group on Open Stand-
ards. However, it is important that the implementation of the guide-
lines evolved by this group is monitored to make sure that govern-
ment departments follow them. Many government agencies continue
to take the easy route of being led by propriety software vendors in
their e-governance plans.
Ideally, software procured with public money should be licensed
under an open licence. In the present situation, where the intellectual
property rights lie with the vendor, governments are left at the mercy
of proprietary software providers. In contrast, with open source soft-
ware vendors, the government should be in a position to use local
competition to drive down prices and improve services, since with
open licence software many local agencies could bid for the mainte-
nance of the product.
Digital rights management
The issue of digital rights management (DRM) is an area of emerging
concern. The Indian government has tabled a Copyright Amendment
Bill (2006) which seeks to insert a DRM clause into the Copyrights
Act of 1957 (MHRD, 2006).
The following statement was submitted by the Alternative Law
Forum (ALF) to the Registrar of Copyrights.21
DRM is a term used for technologies that define and enforce pa-
rameters of access to digital media or software. The reason for the
deployment of such measures is – ostensibly – to “enforce” the
copyright of the manufacturer or the copyright-holder as the case
may be. However, DRM is extra-statutory. Consequently, rights
that are conferred by the law are enforced by the copyright holder
himself through technological measures so as to prevent access
to such digital media or software which would infringe the copy-
right of the copyright holder. But, more importantly, this would
19 West Godavari District Portal. See: <www.westgodavari.org>.
20 See: <lug-delhi.org/wiki/HallOfShame>.
21 See: <www.altlawforum.org/ADVOCACY_CAMPAIGNS/copyright_amdt>.
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also mean that DRM allows for copyright holders to restrict ac-
cess to digital media or software under terms which would be
currently permissible under copyright law. Furthermore, DRM
will have a significant impact on innovation. This has particular
significance for India where the fruits of innovation need to be
accessible to both the innovator and the consumer. An example
is the invention of the Simputer2, which was built on reverse
engineering. With the introduction of DRM and the criminalisation
of its circumvention, low-cost, locally relevant and contextually
appropriate computer hardware and software may never become
available to the public at large.
If an adequate policy response is not given to technology-en-
forced international property restrictions, the internet may soon lose
its egalitarian character.
Software patents
The issue of software patents has been a long and contentious one.
Around the world, very few countries actually allow software patents
(US and Japan are notable exceptions).22  Even the EU has deferred
its decision on software patents after vociferous campaigning by small
and medium industries.
A 2002 amendment by the Indian government declared that soft-
ware would be non-patentable (MLJ, 2002). In 2005, however, the
government sought to bring in software patents by defining non-pat-
entable as applying only to a “computer programme per se other than
its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware, a
mathematical or business method or algorithms” (PIB, 2005). Since
any commercial software has some industry application and these
applications are technical in nature, this approach would open virtu-
ally all software to patenting. This formulation was deleted from the
proposed Act when it was brought up for discussion, because of the
resistance from some parties in the ruling coalition, but there is no
guarantee that it will not be brought up again, and in a harsher form.
Free and open source software (FOSS)
Since the ICT industry has been a major employer and revenue-earner,
many state governments have not been able to openly come out in
support of FOSS for fear of antagonising the industry, which is domi-
nated by multinational companies. While most Indian companies tend
to plug into global value chains offered by multinationals, most mul-
tinationals have a strong interest in promoting proprietary software
products.
The Indian government does not have any formal policy on FOSS,
but open source software is supported in a number of ways. A Na-
tional Resource Centre for Free and Open Source Software (NRC-FOSS)
has been created at the Centre for Development of Advanced Com-
puting (C-DAC), Chennai. There are other similar centres, like the Open
Source Software Resource Centre (OSSRC) based out of C-DAC,
Mumbai, and supported by the Indian Institute of Technology. An-
other FOSS initiative, supported by Anna University, has introduced
two electives in this area in 300 engineering colleges across the In-
dian state of Tamil Nadu. Even though there is no official position, the
central government’s National Informatics Centre indirectly supports
FOSS, for example, by creating 118 websites using Plone.23
Mahiti Infotech’s Sunil Abraham (2006) explains:
Certain government departments have diktats which endorse the
use of FOSS. For instance, the government of Delhi has man-
dated the use of Open Office instead of MS Office. In Tamil Nadu,
the Electronics Corporations of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT) – the gov-
ernment’s ICT agency – has also supported the use of FOSS. It
also insists that all hardware which is procured needs to be FOSS-
compatible. The government of Kerala has mandated the use of
FOSS in schools.
The Kerala government’s recently announced ICT policy lays an
even greater stress on use of open source software (DIT, 2007). Call-
ing for an active, but pragmatic, policy on FOSS in India, Abraham
(2006) adds:
If we were a country with zero ICT, it would have helped to have
mandated a FOSS policy as they have done in Vietnam. How-
ever, since we already have an ICT policy, it would make sense
to move incrementally towards open standards and open source
policy. The example of Vietnam can be a problem, since in that
country it’s only the private sector which uses FOSS extensively.
Malaysia is a better example. Malaysia mandates the use of
open standards. In the case of Malaysia, if all other things re-
main the same in terms of functionality and price, they would
prefer FOSS.
Community radio
In 1995 the Indian Supreme Court ruled that airwaves are public
property: they were to be used for promoting the public good and
for broadcasting a plurality of views, opinions and ideas. Its judge-
ment held that freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, includes the right to ac-
quire and disseminate information. In turn, the right to disseminate
includes the right to communicate through any media, although rea-
sonable restrictions were permissible on such rights. The judge-
ment said that “[t]he burden is on the authority to justify the restric-
tions,” adding that “public order is not the same thing as public
safety and hence no restrictions can be placed on the right to free-
dom of speech and expression on the ground that public safety is
endangered” (MIB, 1999).
In 1999, the central government opened up the airwaves to com-
mercial broadcasters, but no mention was made of community radio.
In any case, the heavy licence fees being charged for opening India’s
first private radio stations were enough to ensure that only commer-
cial broadcasters could take up the offer.
It was only in 2002 that the central government allowed “educa-
tional institutions” to broadcast, paving the way for campus radio
stations. Despite this, only a few institutions used the opportunity
effectively, and most broadcast facilities, even when available, lie
unutilised.
The government recently came out with new guidelines in No-
vember 2006 for community radio (MIB, 2006). They define commu-
nity broadcasts as follows: “The community radio station should be
designed to serve a specific well-defined local community and the
programmes for broadcast should be relevant to the educational, de-
velopmental, social and cultural needs of the community.”
As a result, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are now
allowed to set up their own radio stations, and the decision is ex-
pected to trigger a new community radio revolution in India. How-
ever, issues of the public funding of infrastructure and shared access
22 See: <www.wipo.int/sme/en/e_commerce/computer_software.htm>.
23 Plone is an open source content management system (CMS). See: <plone.org>.
to this infrastructure will become key issues if broad-based and sus-
tainable community radio activity across various development sec-
tors in India is to become possible.
Indian IT industry
The Indian IT industry (comprising the IT, ITES24  and hardware sec-
tors) has been the “poster boy” of the entire liberalisation process.
India’s IT-ITES industry is expected to exceed USD 36 billion in an-
nual revenue in the 2005-2006 financial year, and its contribution to
the national GDP has been pegged at 4.8% for the same period. The
total direct employment in the Indian IT-ITES sector is estimated to
have grown by over a million, from 284,000 in the 1999-2000 period
to a projected 1,287,000 in the past fiscal year (2005-2006). It is also
estimated that the IT industry has helped create an additional three
million job opportunities through indirect and induced employment
(NASSCOM, 2006).
The Software Technology Parks India (STPI) Act, and the liberal
tax policy it implements, have driven investment in the sector. The
law provides for direct and indirect tax exemptions, and channels all
relevant government licences and permissions through a single agency.
The STPI exemptions are to be phased out in 2009 and the industry is
keen to get another extension. The central government seems sym-
pathetic to the demand (Narayan, 2007).
While India has developed considerable expertise in the soft-
ware export sector, the global orientation of this industry has not pro-
duced significant productivity gains for the domestic economy. The
islands in which the software industry tends to operate have not had
a great effect on the surrounding industrial and services ecosystem.
The IT industry has also had little relation with and responsibility
for social development in India, and this has often meant a backlash
against its ostensible opulence. This is contributing to social strife in
cities like Bangalore, which is also called the “Silicon Valley of India”.
Participation
ICT policy in general has been driven mostly by IT industry interests,
although the urban consumer lobby is becoming increasingly asser-
tive. There has been little input from development sectors into ICT
policy processes, with the effect that the processes have mostly dis-
regarded key developmental objectives. While being driven by indus-
try and urban consumer interests, most ICT policies have generally
taken a narrow techno-managerial orientation of efficiency and eco-
nomic growth.
Recognition that ICTs can be a core public infrastructural re-
source, important for all-round social and economic development,
will allow for a normative policy consensus for the information soci-
ety. By requiring all ICT policies to satisfy the WSIS standards of be-
ing people-centred, development-oriented and inclusive, India can
develop congruent ICT policies across the various sectors that are
responsive to its developmental needs. However, this will require a
wider participation of civil society actors from various developmental
and social sectors in the ICT policy processes.
The current relationship between the public authorities and de-
velopment-oriented civil society in this sector is very uneasy, and the
latter’s participation in policy-making processes is abysmally low. The
indifferent attitude of the establishment to civil society’s participation
is evident from this excerpt from a recent report:
TRAI’s policy is to invite the consumer groups for consultations
twice a year. But, it also invites service providers at the same
time, making one-to-one interactions between TRAI and con-
sumer groups virtually impossible. “There is no lobby for rural
people. They are not considered consumers,” says Professor
Ashok Jhunjhunwala of the Indian Institute of Technology, Ma-
dras. Under-served rural communities unfortunately have little
access to the tools available to city users. With hardly any serv-
ice, leave aside choice, market mechanisms clearly do not help.
Complaints mean little… In his response to some of these is-
sues, the outgoing chairperson of TRAI found little wrong with
its working. He said civil society was inadequately represented,
weak and poorly organised, which TRAI could not help (SATC,
2006).
The likelihood of the internet being regulated in the future makes
it critical that civil society groups get involved in the policy process at
an early stage, contributing to the agenda. For this purpose civil soci-
ety organisations involved in different development sectors will first
of all have to understand and appreciate the importance of ICT poli-
cies to their work.
Conclusions
Our report shows that in India, ICT policy debates and the institu-
tional environment are quite robust. However, civil society’s partici-
pation in policy discussions is low, or even non-existent. This has
resulted in an industry-driven and technocratic policy process.
While the ICT industry itself is flourishing, there is a poor distri-
bution of ICT resources across geographical regions, linguistic groups,
social classes, gender and differently abled people. The failure to de-
velop policy which responds to these concerns has resulted in a situ-
ation where certain parts of the country, and some social sectors,
enjoy “developed-country quality” ICT services, while the rest of the
country subsists with little or no ICT access to speak of.
The current policy efforts and business models to expand rural
telephony may not do the trick. For instance, auctioning spectrum to
attract high bids only serves to hike prices and prevent large-scale
penetration of telecom services. Instead, such technologies must be
de-licensed as far as possible. Services such as internet telephony
must be legalised, a community entrepreneurship model must be en-
couraged, and direct public funding for spreading ICT use for social
and developmental activities needs to be taken up as a priority. At a
broader level, this will require a basic shift in the ICT policy paradigm
whereby basic ICTs come to be seen as public goods, rather than as
ordinary economic services left to the vagaries of the market. While
internet regulation is still a fuzzy space, with convergence it has be-
come an increasingly important arena: the opportunity is ripe for civil
society groups to engage early on in setting the agenda.
While the new community radio policy promises much, there
are certain issues which will need to be addressed early on. A key one
is the ban on news and current affairs programmes for community
stations, which limits their effectiveness as a medium of the masses.
Arun Mehta (2006) from Radiophony points out: “News and current
affairs is not part of this policy. What will people air – entertainment?
[The New Delhi-based University] Jamia Milia Islamia’s community
radio station has a surfeit of Urdu poetry, because without news and
current affairs, they don’t have much else.” The ban applies only to
radio broadcasts; several 24/7 TV news channels beam news and
current affairs programmes into Indian homes.
24 IT-enabled services.
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With regard to the issue of intellectual property rights, a briefing
note by ALF on the impact of software patents on the software industry
in India says:
Software technology is evolving much faster than other indus-
tries, including its own hardware industry. In this light, a patent
that lasts up to 17 years is extremely alarming. Microprocessors
double in speed every two years. Research in software is gallop-
ing ahead of developments. In most industries, researching new
ideas often costs more money than bringing them to the market.
The software industry is, on the other hand, loaded with ideas.
The idea behind most software patents can be coded in just 20
lines of code, but any program incorporating that idea – along
with many others – will be a thousand times larger. It is the writing
of a program that takes all the time, not coming up with ideas.25
Arun Mehta (2006) maintains that “software patents are an un-
workable idea. There is no formal system of classification of software
algorithms. If I come up with a code, how do I know if I have broken
the law? It is not possible to keep track of all the literature (codes). All
the big technology companies have signed mutual pacts not to sue
each other. It is a cartel.”
This issue, together with that of DRM, needs a clear policy inter-
vention which upholds the public interest, especially in terms of In-
dia’s developmental needs. It may be inadvisable, for instance, for
developing countries to enter a “TRIPS plus”26  agreement that in-
volves an even higher degree of intellectual property protection than
what is already mandated by the WTO-TRIPS norms. They should
retain their freedom to legislate in the interests of safeguarding ac-
cess to knowledge and information, and for broad socioeconomic
development. 
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4 Introduction
There have been significant changes in the information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) sector in Kenya over the last ten years,
despite the lack of a legislative framework to guide it. While it is diffi-
cult to capture all the developments in detail, the formation of the
multi-stakeholder Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) has been a
remarkable achievement. Through the network, an inclusive policy
process has been catalysed, resulting in the country’s first draft ICT
policy document, approved by cabinet in February 2006.
This report provides an overview of the ICT policy process in Kenya
and the role of KICTANet in this process. It has been prepared by KICTANet
through desktop research and by drawing on various documents from
KICTANet meetings. Key policy documents were also reviewed.
Country situation
According to Brock (1994), public policy creates public good by cre-
ating a predictable framework that results in the production of goods.
The point is that a policy framework should be predictable and should
not easily be changed once implemented. This is the logic that drove
US telecommunications policy development. Developing countries like
Kenya appear to be driven by the same desire. Conscious of the poor
and unpredictable quality of services, the rapid policy evolution in
Kenya over the past few years is based upon the recognition that in
order to create public good, it is important to create a predictable
policy environment.
Despite the lack of a legislative framework to guide the ICT sec-
tor, there has been a massive change in the ICT landscape over the
last decade. Once characterised by an expensive state propaganda
organ in broadcasting and by a highly indebted and inefficient state
telecommunications monopoly, it was the broadcast media sector that
started the breakaway from state monopoly provision to a liberalised
communication sector by lobbying for media freedoms.
The Kenya Postal and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC)
previously operated as the sole service provider and regulator of tel-
ecommunications services. With pressure from global forces – spe-
cifically the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but to a lesser extent
regional blocs – to change policies and accommodate global trading
activities, the government began to embrace global trends in recogni-
tion of the significant role played by ICTs in achieving development
and socioeconomic objectives.
In 1998 parliament passed the Kenya Communications Act No. 2
of 1998, which liberalised the telecommunications sector. This Act is
by far the most influential policy paper that affects the ICT sector. It is a
unique piece of legislation that has enabled Kenya to successfully move
from a monopoly market structure to a multi-operator structure.2
The Act unbundled the KPTC into five separate entities: the Com-
munications Commission of Kenya (CCK), which is the regulator; the
National Communications Secretariat (NCS), which serves as the policy
advisory arm of the government on all matters pertaining to the infor-
mation and communications sector; the fixed-line operator, Telkom;
the Postal Corporation of Kenya (POSTA); and a Communications
Appeals Tribunal.
In December 2001, the Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tions issued the Telecommunications and Postal Sector Guidelines
(CCK, 2001). This recognised convergence trends, which were mak-
ing it difficult to clearly separate telecommunications and broadcast-
ing concerns. As a result, the government had to review policies that
affected licensing processes, frequency management and signal trans-
mission requirements. The aim of the review was to combine broad-
casting and telecommunications policy and to eventually develop a
combined ICT policy document.
The intention of the policy reform process was to position ICTs
as a service to the economy. Yet the reform process itself took a while
to get going. Attempts by the government to review the sector’s policy,
to widen its scope and to integrate it with socioeconomic endeavours
only bore fruit in 2006. The slow pace of ICT policy development en-
couraged other sectors to produce sector-specific strategies, with a
consequent loss of synergy between the sectors.
Key strategy and policy developments (1996-2006)
Key structural changes during the period from 1999 to 2006 were:
• The elucidation of a long-term vision for the ICT sector as a con-
tributor to socioeconomic development.
• The redefinition and clarification of roles in telecommunication sec-
tor development. Distinct roles for policy-making, market regula-
tion in a competitive environment, dispute resolution and the op-
eration of services among multiple players have been identified.
• The promulgation of a new market structure driven by the pri-
vate sector in a competitive environment. The private sector is
considered the key investor in the ICT sector with profit its main
incentive. Government is to withdraw as an investor through
the privatisation of the incumbent telecommunications service
provider. Competition is expected to safeguard consumer in-
terest.
Within the country’s Economic Recovery Strategy (2003-2007)
the government identified key ICT-related goals. These included in-
vesting in adequate ICT education and training; reviewing the legal
framework to remove impediments that have discouraged the adop-
tion and use of e-commerce; implementing tax reductions and tax
incentives on both computer software and hardware to make them
affordable to micro-enterprises and low-income earners; establish-
ing an interministerial committee to incorporate ICT into government
operations; and developing a master plan for e-government by the
end of June 2004 (MPND, 2003).
The government published an e-government strategy in March
2004. The strategy aims to use ICTs to improve service delivery and
“transform government operations and promote democracy” (Gov-
ernment of Kenya, 2004). A multi-stakeholder team from various or-
ganisations and government agencies developed the strategy, which
1 <www.kictanet.or.ke>.
2 A commentary on the Kenya Communications Act is available from:
<www.cck.go.ke/sector_legislation_in_policy_and_legislation>.
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included an e-government directorate consisting of a committee of
permanent secretaries.
The CCK also worked in partnership with the International Devel-
opment Research Centre (IDRC) to conduct a universal access study.
The general objective of the study was to help articulate a strategy for
universal access in Kenya. This report is essential in guiding policy
decisions on universal access mechanisms.3  It recommends the es-
tablishment of telecentres and ICT training institutions with a focus
on the affordability of communications services in rural areas. It also
recommends the establishment of a Universal Access Fund financed
by the government, telecommunications operators and service pro-
viders, as well as development partners. One of the challenges the
CCK/IDRC strategy faces is that it focuses on access to communica-
tion infrastructure and tools rather than on the broader issue of com-
munications rights.
In implementing its mandate to facilitate affordable universal
access to ICTs, the CCK has undertaken a series of regulatory and
structural reform initiatives meant to enhance the development of the
ICT sector. Apart from the policy liberalisation of the sector, the com-
mission has also started to involve itself in developing ICT infrastruc-
ture. Noteworthy among its initiatives are the development of a na-
tional backbone and the commission’s engagement in the East Afri-
can Submarine System (TEAMS). TEAMS is a government-led initia-
tive to build a fibre link to Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. The
project is expected to be finalised by November 2007, according to a
statement issued by Telkom Kenya. These initiatives will provide greater
access to low-cost broadband internet connectivity and ultimately
contribute significantly to the country’s ICT development.
Participation
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) has been influ-
ential in building a multi-stakeholder culture for policy formulation in
Kenya. It provided an excellent window of opportunity to integrate the
multi-stakeholder approach into ICT policy frameworks.
The national ICT policy process had generally lacked political
will and leadership. This was reflected in the absence of a national ICT
policy, but also in the ineffective coordination between different gov-
ernment departments and agencies with ICT responsibilities. There
was also a reluctance to opening up the ICT policy process for partici-
pation by all stakeholders.
A number of civil society organisations (CSOs), private sector
players and media groups had been actively attempting to contrib-
ute to the development of an ICT legislative and regulatory frame-
work in Kenya, even prior to the WSIS process. Initial key advocacy
concerns were fundamental issues of access and the removal of the
monopoly in telecommunications service provision, as well as the
integration of telecommunications into the national economic de-
velopment programme.
The private sector umbrella body for internet service providers
(ISPs), the Telecommunication Service Providers of Kenya (TESPOK),
was by far the most mobilised and organised lobbying group. TESPOK
had been engaged in advocacy and lobbying the government, and
had several achievements which had led to significant changes in the
ICT sector. It had also consistently expressed concerns around the
failure of the government to include the private sector in policy for-
mulation and lamented that a policy draft of 2003 had failed to include
private sector input.
However, while private sector operators had been very enthusi-
astic about pinning the government down in order to liberalise the
sector and finalise the national ICT policy, they were caught up in the
narrow perception of assuming that growth in ICT-enabled services
would amount to economic and social development. Their biggest
failure was their tendency to forget about the wider development con-
cept in their lobbying strategies.
The role of KICTANet
Research conducted in 2003 by Muruiki Mureithi for the Association
for Progressive Communication’s (APC’s) Africa ICT Policy Monitor
project indicates that civil society played a significant role in the de-
velopment of ICTs by creating awareness, training, and introducing
ICT services in the early 1990s (APC, 2003). CSO involvement in ICT
policy processes was in the form of a caucus, the Kenya WSIS Civil
Society Caucus, with a secretariat based at the Arid Lands Informa-
tion Network (ALIN-EA), an APC member in Kenya.
While the work of the caucus had been laudable in the WSIS
process, it had been driven by a very small group of CSOs that were
directly and actively involved in the ICT sector. Similar to the private
sector, CSOs had lamented that the government did not take them
into consideration when developing various legal and regulatory frame-
works for the sector. While civil society and private sector lobbies had
achieved results,4  there had not been a collective effort towards en-
couraging the government to speed up the ICT policy process in an
open and inclusive manner. Many of the organisations that had been
involved in ICT policy advocacy felt that there was a need to form a
network that would attract all role players in the sector, and, by work-
ing with government, increase the legitimacy and social capital of the
ICT policy process.
The decision to form a multi-stakeholder network was reached
during a meeting held in October 2004, organised jointly by the Me-
dia Council, a non-statutory, self-regulatory body set up by journal-
ists, editors and media owners in 2002; the APC; the Catalysing Ac-
cess to ICTs in Africa (CATIA) programme (a three-year ICT interven-
tion in Africa by the UK Department for International Development,
DFID); TESPOK; a communications research firm called Summit Strat-
egies; and the Kenya WSIS Civil Society Caucus.
Participants unanimously agreed that the vacuum in the ICT policy
process was compelling enough for the creation of a network that
would work towards encouraging the government to speed up the
development of an ICT regulatory framework for Kenya in an open,
inclusive and participatory process. The proposal for a multi-
stakeholder network was also based on the perceived strength and
effectiveness of collaborative policy advocacy activities, which would
be based on pooling support and resources. Initial members of the
network were the APC-led CATIA project in Kenya, TESPOK, Summit
Strategies, the IDRC, the Kenya ICT Federation (KIF), and the Civil
Society Caucus.
A window of opportunity for KICTANet to encourage a multi-
stakeholder process of policy dialogue was created when the National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) – the political party that won the 2002
elections – launched an official draft of the country’s ICT policy in
November 2004 (it was published for comment in February 2005).
3 <www.cck.go.ke/universal_access>.
4 For instance, lobbying for the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector had
resulted in the formulation of the Kenya Communications Act (1998), which
ended the monopoly of Telkom Kenya, as well as the full liberalisation of very
small aperture terminal (VSAT) services.
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KICTANet lobbied, agitated and advocated for the involvement of non-
governmental actors in the policy process. As a result, the network
was tasked with coordinating civil society, private sector, media and
development partners’ input into the policy development process, and
“dialoguing” with the government.
KICTANet mobilised groups from the various stakeholders for
workshops, seminars, electronic mailing list and roundtable discus-
sions, and constituency-level forums, which aimed at collecting and
consolidating substantive comments on the ICT policy. The network
also worked with the Ministry of Information and Communications,
the NCS, the CCK and the Kenya ICT Donor Roundtable to organise a
national ICT policy workshop to finalise the ICT policy. The workshop
was held in Mombasa in June 2005. The workshop’s output was in-
corporated into the draft.
The content of submissions from various KICTANet groups was
not surprising and was in line with the interests and positions that
each sector held. For example, while the private sector was in favour
of the fast liberalisation of the sector, civil society was more con-
cerned with issues of universal affordable access and the right to com-
municate.
Contributions from media groups were disappointing. Prior to
the telecommunications legislation of 1998, pluralism existed only in
the print media – a result of intense lobbying and advocacy from media
owners and practitioners. However, the media has been slow in tak-
ing on the developments within the context of the knowledge economy.
Despite the fact that the policy document was addressing issues that
will affect content, cross-media ownership and the licensing of broad-
cast equipment, media owners and practitioners hardly contributed
to the process.
The document covers many issues such as universal access,
radio frequency spectrum management, market structure, and tel-
ecommunication services. It represents a broad consensus reached
between the different stakeholders on most issues. And although the
content is not revolutionary, the broad participation process initiated
by the Ministry of Information and Communications was innovative
and participatory when compared to other policy processes in the ICT
sector in other countries. According to the CCK, the policy replaces
the Telecommunications and Postal Sector Guidelines of December
2001 (CCK, 2001). The final document was submitted in December
2005 and gazetted by the government in March 2006 (MIC, 2006a).
In April 2006, the ministry released an Information and Commu-
nications Bill 2006 for comments from the public (MIC, 2006b). In
addition, a Media Bill and Code of Conduct for broadcasters were
released for discussion and finalisation. KICTANet has been instru-
mental in facilitating discussions around these bills and consolidat-
ing input, which has been officially submitted to the government with
financial support from the IDRC, the Embassy of Finland in Kenya, the
APC, and more recently the Open Society Initiative for East Africa
(OSIEA).
Conclusions
Both the ICT policy and the Information and Communications Bill proc-
esses recognise the role of civil society, media and the private sector
in the policy process, and seek to include them as equal partners in
the appropriation of ICTs for development. If enacted, the bill will, for
the first time, provide a legal framework for meaningful partnerships
in development.
It is because of KICTANet – and an open government – that the
national ICT policy process became participatory. The network
provided mechanisms and a framework for cooperation and collabo-
ration among civil society, private sector, academic, media and gov-
ernment stakeholders. As a result, it helped increase the legitimacy of
the policy process.
The multi-stakeholder ICT policy development process in Kenya
confirms the need for a more inclusive and effective manner to dis-
cuss critical policy issues. It also demonstrates that the government,
private sector, media, development partners and non-government
entities working on ICT issues are keen to work together to provide an
enabling ICT policy environment and an implementation framework.
For its part, the Kenyan government is finally acknowledging the
important role the various stakeholders play in the communications
sector. There is now a more democratic space for participation in
governance processes. (It is worth noting that recent KICTANet policy
discussions are graced by the new Ministry of Information and Com-
munications permanent secretary, which goes to demonstrate the
goodwill that KICTANet enjoys from policy-makers in the sector.)
However, civil society’s engagement with the policy processes
has not been as active as the private sector’s. And while a few CSOs
engaged in the ICT sector have managed to articulate the complexi-
ties of interactions between ICTs, poverty reduction and development,
and have managed to link ICTs to human rights and social justice,
these organisations are not adequately represented.
There is also a need for civil society to engage in more outreach
and mobilisation activities to include CSOs that work in sectors other
than ICTs. Currently there is a culture where many CSOs feel they are
not part of a process or do not need to act on ICT issues because they
are not directly involved in the sector. NGOs working in areas such as
agriculture or human rights still do not recognise how ICT policy im-
pacts on their work.
Despite its poor participation in the ICT policy process, the me-
dia sector is aware of its vulnerability to the state in the absence of
legislation. As a result it has created a number of institutions, which
seek to establish self-regulatory systems. They are also engaging
KICTANet stakeholders to ensure that they are included in policy proc-
esses as part of a larger multi-stakeholder network. 
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Introduction
The end of 2006 meant a change in national-level government for
Mexico. It is a good opportunity to review the previous government’s
record in the area of information and communications technologies
(ICTs), and to examine the context that allows us to envision steps
that could be taken by the new government. This document considers
concrete actions carried out by the previous government, and is based
on desk research conducted from September to December 2006, as
well as interviews with various civil society actors, academics and
national government employees.
Country situation
Mexico’s change of government does not signify a change in political
orientation. Vicente Fox left the presidency and Felipe Calderón took
office at the end of 2006. Both men are from the conservative Na-
tional Action Party (PAN).
During its term the previous government expressed interest in
expanding ICTs in the country. Its efforts, however, were not adequate.
When the government changed hands, only 19% of the population
had access to a telephone line. The number of internet users esti-
mated by the Mexican Internet Association (AMIPCI) was 20.2 mil-
lion people (AMIPCI, 2006a), a figure representing slightly more than
20% of the country’s population. In 2005, only 11.2 of every 100
Mexicans had a computer and only one had access to broadband.
These figures are below the international average, and far below
the figures seen in developed countries such as the United States or
Europe, where more than 70% of inhabitants have internet access
(AMIPCI, 2006b). Therefore it is not surprising that Mexican invest-
ment in information technologies is only 1.4% of GDP, a percentage
significantly lower than the 4.3% of GDP average budgeted by the
other countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), of which Mexico is a member (EIU, 2006).
This analysis becomes more dramatic when we look at the “dig-
ital divide” geographically. Mexico is a country with considerable struc-
tural differences. The northern and central regions have greater fi-
nancial resources, while the south, an area of greater density of indig-
enous, campesino (peasant) and migrant populations, has higher levels
of poverty. While 21% of the population in the central region access
the internet, only 6% do in the southeast. It is interesting to note that
the eight poorest states in the south have teledensities of only 5 to 10
land-line telephones in use for every 100 individuals (EIU, 2006).
Over the last six years – the length of a presidential term in Mexico
– the government said it had attempted to make progress in increas-
ing connectivity on a national level and also in the growth of digital
services in various sectors critical to government and society, such
as health, housing, education and tax collection. But the development
of ICTs was oriented largely towards competition and the market, and
much less towards expanding the benefits afforded by these tech-
nologies in the social and community realms.
In the period of government transition, various sectors of soci-
ety are making efforts to support the use of ICTs at the national level.
But they are also using them like a life raft amid the loss of competi-
tiveness experienced by the country.2  ICTs are seen by various sec-
tors as one of the most efficient tools for increasing production, thereby
reversing the loss of competitiveness, as indicated in a report entitled
Public Policies for the Appropriate Use of Information and Communi-
cation Technologies to Promote Competitiveness in Mexico – 2020
Mexico Vision.3  According to this document, innumerable actions will
be necessary by the government to reach the “2020 Mexico Vision”.
These can be largely summarised as five objectives (AMITI, 2006):
• The establishment of a national agenda for competitiveness, in-
novation and adoption of ICTs, which promotes Mexico’s transi-
tion towards a knowledge society.
• The early and efficient adoption of ICTs by the government, to
spur the economy’s competitiveness and improve the well-being
of all Mexicans.
• The stimulation of the ICT sector so that it may hold a significant
place and be an engine of growth in the country’s economy.
• An efficient government whose public services become “world
class” through the adoption of ICTs.
• The use of ICTs in education and the development of ICT training
curricula, with the goal of rapidly closing the “education divide”.
This is, however, far from establishing a specific model for the
country adapted to its multicultural character, extreme economic, social
and educational differences, high poverty rates and other factors that
place it in a vulnerable situation.4  Instead the federal government’s
actions reproduce, at the level of ICTs, a market model designed in
the global sphere,5  and tending to seek high profits for national power
groups. In this way, not only do economic and technological forces
that establish new conduits for income increase in influence (Micheli
and Martínez, 2005), but those already existing nationally, which base
their profit and power chains on information and communication proc-
esses, are strengthened.
1 <www.laneta.apc.org>.
2 The World Economic Forum estimates that in the last ten years Mexico has
dropped more than twenty places, falling from 32nd to 55th place in its
competitiveness ranking. In addition, Mexico is reported in the Business
Competitiveness Index (BCI) as one of the countries with the greatest absolute
decline, along with Thailand and Poland (AMITI, 2006).
3 The document was prepared by the Mexican Association of the Information
Technology Industry (AMITI), the National Chamber of the Electronics,
Telecommunications and Informatics Industry (CANIETI) and the Mexican Digital
Foundation (FMD), under the leadership of the Mexican Institute for
Competitiveness (IMCO), with the collaboration of the Centre for Economics
Research and Teaching (CIDE) and the market research company Select.
4 One needs only to look at the recent political situation: conflict sparked by
electoral fraud, violence and open repression, political ungovernability in Oaxaca,
etc.
5 Taking the United States and South Korea as examples, growth in the ICT industry
reportedly represents 30% of economic growth in the United States since 1995,
and 50% of economic growth in Korea since 2000.
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There are some obvious examples with the well-known corpora-
tions Televisa and Telmex, which largely control the television and
telecommunications industries, respectively. These enormous mo-
nopolies want the whole pie offered by digital convergence, starting
from their current positions. Telmex, for example, controls 95% of
local phone services, 80% of long distance, 75% of the mobile phone
market and around 70% of the country’s internet services (EIU, 2006).
According to its current plans, it intends to get into television, which
will undoubtedly mean a greater concentration of its monopolistic
capacity.
Although various government bodies are in favour of this move,
completely unified positions do not exist within the national govern-
ment. While the Ministry of Communications and Transportation fa-
vours eliminating the restrictions in Telmex’s concession title (licence),
which would allow it to provide television services, the Ministry of
Finance has been trying to block this. The small telephone companies
that have been excluded through competition from fully participating
in the regular provision of telephone services obviously support the
Ministry of Finance. But the division shows that the actions taken by
the government, and by some companies endorsed by the national
government, do not represent a clearly defined public policy (Ramírez,
2006).
Mexico continues to be characterised by changes to laws and
approval of reforms that do not include the protections agreed on and
established in public policies. These changes and reforms typically
respond to the need for transformation and growth in certain sectors,
and even companies. This was evidenced by the recent approval of
changes to the country’s media legislation that resulted in the so-
called “Televisa Law”, which favours companies already awarded ra-
dio and television frequencies by offering them the possibility of us-
ing those frequencies to extend their range of services – frequencies
which ideally should be national rather than private resources.
The way this happened was astounding. In November 2005 the
House of Representatives passed in just eight days – voting unani-
mously in seven minutes without any discussion in the legislative
session – a proposal of reforms to two of the country’s fundamental
laws: the Federal Radio and Television Law and the Federal Telecom-
munications Law.
Those who proposed the reforms did so behind closed doors,
and expected them to be approved in a similar manner in the Senate.
But actions by some senators allowed this crucial issue to come to
light publicly before the approval of the reforms. Numerous consulta-
tions and debates began in which the majority expressed opposition.
National institutions such as the Federal Commission on Competi-
tion, the National Commission for the Development of Indigenous
Peoples, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Federal Elec-
toral Institute and the Federal Telecommunications Commission ar-
gued for the need to reconsider the approval of the reforms (Solis,
2006). The various observations, hearings and public consultations
were, however, in vain. The Senate approved the regrettable “Televisa
Law” in March 2005 and published it in the Official Register of the
Federation on 11 April 2005.
With the approval of this law, the state was placed at the service
of the monopolistic interests of media companies. It did not recog-
nise the needs expressed by numerous sectors of the population for
community development. It assigned communication only the mea-
sly role of merchandise for accumulating more capital, and auctioned
off the wealth of the nation to the highest bidder, without employing
criteria for the benefit and development of the communities. And it in
no way respected a multiparty negotiation in which private companies,
the state and representatives of civil society should have participated.
The threat of strategic partnerships being formed that result in
monopolistic business practice is very real in Mexico. A good exam-
ple is the attempt by Telmex and Televisa to develop a business alli-
ance. If this partnership is successful, Telmex would become the leader
in the pay-TV market and, through the agreement with Televisa, would
offer the same content currently produced by this monopoly for na-
tional television.
With the reforms to the legislation, a greater concentration of
already existing monopolies is facilitated. Far from the benefits of tech-
nological convergence becoming the property of the Mexican nation
and forming part of a potential reserve of concessions to be distrib-
uted in a gradual, transparent and public way according to the needs
of the majority of society, the interests of the very few are favoured.
As a continuation of the model developed by the previous gov-
ernment, the new administration’s Minister of Communications and
Transportation Luis Téllez has defined basic points in his strategy for
his ministry – a key institution in the area of ICTs. These are: greater
competition and quality of services in telecommunications and trans-
portation; a review of compliance by those granted concessions; block-
ing the concentration of permits to individuals; and the promotion of
investment and infrastructural development in close coordination with
the private sector (“with all possible advantages”) but without losing
the state’s jurisdiction (Cardoso, 2006). It is worth noting that Téllez,
appointed in November 2006, comes from the boards of powerful
national and foreign companies such as Grupo DESC, Cablevisión,
Bancomer, Grupo México and GAP, among others. Right before his
appointment he was on the boards of directors of the Carlyle Group in
Mexico, one of the most important private capital investment firms in
the world, as well as Sempra Energy, both of which are linked to US
president George W. Bush.
In addition to reforms that in no way benefit society in general,
Vicente Fox’s government developed two other avenues of work in
the area of ICTs. The first was the promotion of his e-Mexico pro-
gramme, which goes hand-in-hand with the actions undertaken in the
area of e-government. The other involved the development of the soft-
ware industry, a sector still in its initial phases but with some entities
created at the national level: the Digital Mexico Foundation, the Small
and Medium Enterprise (SME) Fund, the Special Science and Tech-
nology Programme (PECyT), the Programme for Competitiveness of
the Electronics and High Technology Industries (PCIEAT), and the
Programme for the Development of the Software Industry (PROSOFT).
The federal government’s e-Mexico initiative is moderately well
known for its series of portals: e-learning, e-health, e-economy, e-
government, and some others aimed at specific populations such as
indigenous groups. It is less well known for the installation of its con-
nectivity points, through agreements with various governmental and
private entities. In terms of e-government, the growth in national policy
has been heavily oriented towards developing online services that make
it easier for citizens to transact with the government – such as mak-
ing online payments. In December 2005 an agreement was issued
that established the Interministerial Commission for the Development
of Electronic Government, whose purpose is to support the various
initiatives, projects and governmental processes in the area of e-gov-
ernment. Among the technological changes that have been made as
of 2006 are a citizen’s portal, compranet (an electronic system for
government procurement), a taxpayers’ registry, and a professional
careers service (Gigli, 2006).
These developments present a fabulous opportunity to increase
the public visibility of government action, thereby reinforcing a public
image of transparency, good government and the modernisation of
management (Micheli and Martínez, 2005), even when the results are
not completely positive. They foster the positive transformation of
administrative culture in aspects such as access to documentation,
or the reduction of the time needed for administrative procedures.6
However, there is a negative side. The government’s adoption of tech-
nology is done at the expense of human labour, as it results in cut-
backs in personnel at federal entities. More than 80% of government
contracting is currently handled online.
The previous government’s implementation of the Federal Trans-
parency and Access to Public Government Information Law of April
2002 should be seen as on target (Cámara de Diputados, 2006). The
objectives approved in this law were:
• To provide whatever may be necessary for everyone to have ac-
cess to information through simple and quick procedures.
• To make public transactions transparent through dissemination
of the information generated by those in charge.
• To guarantee the protection of personal information in the pos-
session of those in charge.
• To encourage accountability to citizens, so they may evaluate the
performance of those in charge.
• To improve the organisation, classification and handling of docu-
ments.
• To contribute to the democratisation of Mexican society and the
full effects of the rule of law.
The implementation of the law, however, has not been easy. At
first this law was a good incentive for the population. However, after
numerous refusals to comply by several federal and state entities,
enthusiasm slowly began to fade for what once seemed to be a prac-
tical step in the right direction towards securing the right to informa-
tion in Mexico.
Some government departments have refused to provide public
information, as was the case with the Ministry of Foreign Relations,
which denied public requests on at least three occasions in 2006,
availing itself of legal procedures to avoid turning over the informa-
tion (Velasco, 2006). Similar cases occurred with refusals by the presi-
dent to hand over documents (La Jornada, 2006); the Federal Insti-
tute for Access to Information (IFAI) resolution not to release files
pertaining to an administrative procedure that the Ministry of Public
Operations (SFP) maintained against several employees; and keeping
information requested on 206 ruling party members of Congress con-
fidential for twelve years, to mention but a few.
While there has been progress in implementing the law despite
these setbacks, it is important to note that the social right of society
to be informed, considering all its implications, does not appear in
the Mexican government’s current legislation (García and Rendón,
2005). The right to information cannot be limited to public govern-
mental information, as defined in our current law, but should include
access to whatever information is found in governmental institutions.
Legislation is still needed in Mexico on this point.
There are other issues related to the right to information, such
as the guarantee of freedom of expression, which has suffered seri-
ous setbacks in the last six years. Impunity continues for those re-
sponsible for the assassination of 25 journalists; 20 of these assassi-
nations are directly related to issues or information that these jour-
nalists made public. Accordingly, the organisation Reporters Without
Borders rated Mexico second-to-last on the list of Latin American
countries that defend press freedom. Due to the alarming incidents
that occurred during the last six-year period, the International Fed-
eration of Journalists considers Mexico as the most dangerous coun-
try in Latin America for journalists who report on crime and corrup-
tion. In 2005, during the Fox administration, Mexico became “the most
lethal country for the press in the entire American continent,” and in
2006 it ranked in second place worldwide, surpassed only by Iraq
(León, 2007).
Another issue pending in this governmental transition period is
the commitment of the new government to the rights of indigenous
peoples, including their right to information and communication. More
than 150 members of indigenous communities from 19 countries in
Latin America met in Mexico City in November 2005 for a workshop
sponsored by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the
Ministry of Communications and Transportation of Mexico, and the
National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples,
also of Mexico. Many of the demands expressed by indigenous peo-
ples from across the continent at this gathering apply to the Mexican
reality. The indigenous representatives saw as a starting point their
need to participate in the use, administration and control of ICTs on a
national level. This included participating in the development and de-
sign of public policies from the perspective of their own cultures,
contexts and realities. This implies reflecting on the impact of mod-
ern technologies on indigenous peoples, and how grassroots cultures
appropriate the information society.
The workshop participants pointed to the urgent need to recog-
nise and defend the practice of basic rights for indigenous peoples,
and freedom of expression through ICTs. At the same time ICTs should
be used as effective tools to prevent the violation of their rights. Re-
spect for the San Andrés Accords on culture and indigenous rights
signed in 1996 between indigenous communities and the federal gov-
ernment is particularly relevant for Mexico.7  Indigenous peoples’ rep-
resentatives made a proposal to shape the creation of communal laws,
petitioned governments regarding freedom to exercise their own spir-
ituality, and also demanded that governments recognise the legal plu-
ralism of indigenous peoples, and their human and collective rights
to exercise their own forms of communication with respect to ICTs
(Sandoval and Mota, 2005).
Participation
Throughout these last six years federal government bodies have opted
to align themselves closely with the business sector; there has been
very little opening up to civil society organisations (CSOs) that promote
ICTs for the common good and sustainable human development. As a
result, CSOs that promote ICTs from a human rights perspective have
had little luck in forming partnerships with the federal government.
In addition to the monopolies already mentioned, various busi-
ness groupings are also federal government counterparts. For ex-
ample, AMIPCI is an association founded in 1985 with 260 member
6 The UN Global E-Government Readiness Report 2005 ranked Mexico in 31st
place among 191 countries evaluated and in 2nd place in Latin America after Chile
(UN, 2005).
7 For more information, see: <zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/chiapas/docs/
sanandres.html>.
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companies who joined together to stimulate the ICT industry in the
country. Its president is the director of Microsoft Mexico, and one
of its vice presidents is the brother-in-law of President Felipe
Calderón. Calderón’s brother-in-law was also involved in a scandal
over the number of federal government contracts granted to his
company, Hildebrando S.A. de C.V., and over irregularities in his tax
payments.
In large measure, the relationship between government and busi-
ness has not allowed the open participation of other sectors of soci-
ety. We should expect more openness from any democratic govern-
ment. Over the past six years, and in the context of political reform,
the government has amply demonstrated that the diagnostics, de-
mands and basic initiatives for communication policies presented by
Mexican civil society in forums, seminars and public consultations
have been denied, belittled, ignored and marginalised by the power
structures. Once again, the profound disillusionment and disenchant-
ment of civil society resurface, questioning whether the spaces cre-
ated by the state are viable avenues for the transformation of these
public policies (Esteinou, n.d.).
Mexican civil society continues to demand that the federal gov-
ernment guarantee dialogue so that the various proposals and posi-
tions of the different sectors can be taken into consideration. Mecha-
nisms are also necessary to make transparent the positions and proc-
esses employed by the federal government in national and interna-
tional frameworks related to decisions on public ICT policies. These
are currently absent from the government-society relationship – a
situation that must be changed in this six-year term, because the par-
ticipation of civil society as an essential actor in the construction of
public policies in the country is indispensable.
For its part, civil society continues to build alternative models,
proposals and projects aimed at using the media and ICTs for the
common good. There are numerous initiatives that involve a great
deal of effort within an adverse political and economic context.
Communication and human rights organisations, as well as vari-
ous alternative publications, labour daily to set the issue of ICTs within
the basic human rights framework. Others work to strengthen and
build infrastructure so that vulnerable populations can access new
technologies that will allow them to create content according to their
local needs. CSOs focused on technical and educational material are
promoting the recognition and practical uses of free and open source
software (FOSS) as a powerful tool. Associations of journalists, among
others, are working for the defence of freedom of expression and the
right to information. (Their efforts, however, have unfortunately not
been very successful.)
Organisations and communities are also working arduously to
promote radio as a public service that facilitates democratic partici-
pation in communications media, mostly for those historically
marginalised such as women, youth and minorities, among others.
Community radio stations fight an uphill battle, but are deeply rooted
in their localities in different parts of the country. Internet radio is also
emerging as an alternative.
Initiatives dedicated to education and ICTs are developing ca-
pacity. Not only are they bridging the “digital divide” by installing hard-
ware, they are building local capacity by training people to use ICTs.
They are helping users become creators and producers of new tools
and content, and not merely consumers of information. Several suc-
cessful initiatives are based on work with young people and women.
This effort, linking gender and ICTs, is especially interesting. Hun-
dreds of women have been trained and empowered in the use of ICTs.
A number of alternatives to the co-option of the information soci-
ety by big business have also emerged. One of them, a proposed Citi-
zens’ Observatory of Electronic Media (OCME), aims to promote a criti-
cal conscience that can take an active part in reorienting the role of the
communications media. The OCME was born as an initiative of a radio
programme specialising in communications media analysis called “El
fin justifica @ los medios” (which can be translated as either “the end
justifies the means” or “the end justifies the media,” since the Spanish
word medios has both meanings). The programme has been on the air
for seventeen years on Radio Educación [Education Radio], a cultural
radio station. The overall aim of the OCME is ambitious since it outlines
a comprehensive model for media literacy education. This model in-
cludes canvassing the opinion of audiences on media content, develop-
ing audiovisual learning material, provide training on communications
media, and analysing and reporting on the media. The OCME will also
help develop a space for social reflection on the media, and channel
audience opinions to government bodies and media companies. It is
hoped that this space will eventually have the social support necessary
to promote the creation of a legal framework aimed at democratising
the media.
Conclusions
Public information and communications policies in Mexico are oriented
towards strengthening competitiveness, the market, and the interests
of monopolistic groups. The government sworn in at the end of 2006
does not foresee any substantial changes in the next six years.
The relationship between government and society has been ex-
pressed as a unilateral strengthening of the business-government bi-
nomial. Businesses with strong economic interests have been par-
ticularly privileged. This has occurred despite the different needs, pro-
posals and initiatives that have come from very diverse sectors of
civil society. Examples of this can be found in the approval of reforms
to two of the country’s fundamental laws: the Federal Telecommuni-
cations Law and the Federal Radio and Television Law, subsequently
dubbed the “Televisa Law”. As a result, the state has been placed at
the service of the monopolistic interests of the communications com-
panies. The government has auctioned off the nation’s wealth without
taking communities into account. And it did not respect a multiparty
negotiation in which businesses, government and representatives of
civil society should have participated.
Considering the composition of the new government and its ini-
tiatives announced to date, we cannot foresee any substantial changes
in the next six years in the actions of the federal government in terms
of creating public policies aimed at benefiting communities and de-
veloping the social function of technologies, at least as far as those
used for information and communication are concerned. 
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2 Introduction
This report presents an overview of ongoing and planned information
and communications technology (ICT) initiatives in Nigeria. It has been
compiled through online research, supplemented by interviews with
role players involved in the three key regulatory bodies, the Nigerian
Communications Commission (NCC), the National Information Tech-
nology Development Agency (NITDA), and the National Broadcasting
Commission (NBC). Discussions were also held with two civil society
ICT activists, and the government’s national ICT policy development
team. The author also attended the national consultative process sup-
ported by the Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
which was held during the inauguration of the Telecentre Network of
Nigeria, 25-27 January 2007.
Country situation
Nigeria has a population of 140 million people, 70% of whom live in
underserved and remote areas of the country. It also has the fastest
growing ICT market in Africa and its telecom penetration has improved
from 400,000 lines in 1996 to 4.7 million in March 2004. Teledensity
rose dramatically from 0.4% in 1996 to 3.92% in 2004, exceeding the
International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU’s) minimum recommen-
dation of 1%. Nigeria has the most lucrative telecoms market in Af-
rica, growing at twice the African average (eShekels, 2006).
In spite of this obvious and significant progress, Nigeria’s per-
formance on a global scale is still far behind countries like Sweden,
which has 100% access. On Africa’s Digital Opportunity Index, Ni-
geria ranked 31st, with an index of 0.15, while South Africa ranked
7th, with an index of 0.38. In the global ICT diffusion ranking, Nigeria
ranked 161st, staying in the same lower ranks as Ethiopia at 146th,
Senegal at 149th and Mali at 157th (UNCTAD, 2005).
Nigeria’s relative performance is also illustrated by comparing the
number of community radios in different countries in West Africa. Mali
tops the list with 120, while Nigeria has only one. On 8 February 2007,
the regulatory body, the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)
granted 28 new radio licences, six of which were for educational insti-
tutions (Auchi Polytechnic, Edo State; Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka,
Anambra State; the National Teachers Institute, Kaduna; Ahmadu Bello
University, Zaria; Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State; and
Madonna University, Okija). The remaining 22 were for commercial or-
ganisations. There was none for community radios (NBC, 2007).
Mobile telephony holds some promise for increasing access for
marginalised sectors of the population. There has been exponential
growth in mobile subscriptions (there were three million subscribers
in 2004 alone) and all Nigerian states now have some form of mobile
coverage.2
While rural access is often intermittent, the growth of mobile
telephony can be illustrated by the financial performance of one of the
major operators, MTN. In 2003 MTN generated USD 437 million in
Nigeria, compared to USD 356 million in the rest of Africa combined.
Its African subscribers outside Nigeria total 6.1 million. Nigeria alone
accounts for 1.9 million subscribers (Ajijola, 2004).
ICT initiatives
The government’s role in creating an enabling environment has faced
considerable challenges, despite support by pan-African bodies like
the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), with its National
Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) process,3  and
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), with its
eSchools Initiative.
The National Information Technology Development Agency
(NITDA), which is charged with implementing ICT policy, began to work
with UNECA on the country’s NICI process in March 2000. While a draft
ICT policy has been produced by NITDA, it has yet to be finalised.
A Presidential Task Force on ICT Harmonisation was inaugurated
in August 2006. Its job is to examine the duplication of efforts and
absence of cross-sectoral convergence in the government’s ICT strat-
egies. Various sub-committees have prepared reports, but it appears
that their efforts have been overtaken by an unexpected announce-
ment in December 2006 by the Federal Executive Council that several
of the 27 government ministries have been merged, reducing the to-
tal number to 19.
The merger of the ministries has also impacted negatively on the
work of a team of Nigerian experts that has been drafting a strategic
plan for 2005 to 2008, with support from an UNECA consultant. It
was hoped the plan would streamline the various ICT initiatives in the
country.
Despite these challenges, several initiatives can be grouped to-
gether as efforts to facilitate affordable access for Nigerians:
Universal Service Provision Fund (USPF) The Nigerian Com-
munications Act 2003 provided for the establishment of a USPF,
which finally became operational with the inauguration of its Gov-
erning Council in September 2006 (NCC, 2003). All licensed
Table 1: Community radios, West Africa
Country Community radios
Mali 120
Senegal 44
Burkina Faso 27
Niger Republic 24
Republic of Benin 22
Ghana 8
Nigeria 1
Source: Ajijola (2006)
1 <www.fantsuam.org>.
2 See: <www.ncc.gov.ng>.
3 NICI is the mechanism that facilitates the implementation of African Information
Society Initiative (AISI) e-strategies at the national level.
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telecoms providers are required to contribute 2.5% of their an-
nual financial turnover to the Fund, and calls for proposals have
been issued by Nigeria’s telecoms regulator, the Nigerian Com-
munications Commission (NCC). The Fund is expected to com-
plement NCC projects such as Wire Nigeria (WiN), which aims
to link up all the country’s states with fibre optic cable, and the
State Accelerated Broadband Initiative (SABI), which involves the
provision of wireless broadband services in Nigerian cities.
Broadband infrastructure. One of the major constraints to the
growth of rural telephony and internet connectivity has been the
absence of broadband backbone infrastructure. This is one of
the issues that is already being addressed through the setting up
of Galaxy Backbone, a company owned by the Nigerian govern-
ment. A deployment of 2,000 VSATs (satellite terminals) across
Nigeria is planned. This will offer access to remote, underserved
locations, and ensure that each of the 774 local governments
will have connectivity. However, there are as yet no installations
in place. Recently Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar chal-
lenged the process by which the funds for Galaxy Backbone are
disbursed, and it is now the subject of a senate investigation.
Fibre optic cables have been laid from Lagos to Kano, and Zaria
to Jos, by Glo Telecoms, as part of its Nigeria to UK project. The
National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA)4
also plans to launch a second satellite in May 2007. It is being
built by Surrey Satellite Technology, and is expected to aid agri-
cultural and economic planning as well as help in disaster man-
agement.
Computers for All Nigerians Initiative (CANI) The aim of this ini-
tiative is to improve Nigerians’ access to computer hardware. It
includes a funding mechanism whereby civil servants will be able
to purchase computers and pay back the loan at a low rate of
interest. Launched in July 2006, CANI is a typical example of a
public-private partnership. It is being coordinated by NITDA and
involves Microsoft, Zinox and Omatek. Related to the initiative is a
Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) plan to build
and equip computer centres in higher education institutions across
Nigeria. However, this plan does not include internet access.
Universities Bandwidth Consortium This is a pilot programme
in which six of the nation’s universities are able to bulk purchase
bandwidth for academic purposes. The scheme holds promise
for the over 600 higher education facilities in Nigeria.
National Rural Telephony Project (NRTP) The NRTP was ex-
pected to provide 500,000 connected lines to 343 local govern-
ments in Nigeria within one year. In 2003, the federal govern-
ment accessed credit from the World Bank’s International Devel-
opment Association (IDA), and a part of the funds obtained was
to be set aside to improve national teledensity, as well as to step
up telecommunication penetration in rural areas. The govern-
ment also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Peo-
ples Republic of China, supported by a concessionary loan of
USD 200 million for the NRTP. The project was to be executed in
two phases by Alcatel-Shangai and ZTE. However, the project
was only flagged off in August 2004. The supervising Ministry of
Communications reports that implementation is currently
ongoing in 108 of 218 targeted local government headquarters
in Nigeria. The project is expected to combine with the USPF to
offer concessionary licensing for the providers.
Internet exchange points (IXPs). The establishment of internet
exchange points will help keep local internet traffic within the
country, which reduces the need to use international bandwidth
and thus significantly lowers costs. An IXP allows different
internet service providers (ISPs) to exchange internet traffic be-
tween their autonomous networks without cost. Although the
Lagos IXP has been completed, it has not been commissioned.
Seven more were expected to have gone live by now.
Telecentre Network of Nigeria (TNN) The inaugural meeting of
the Network was held at the National Institute for Policy and Stra-
tegic Studies, Kuru, on 25-27 January 2007, with the support of
the International Development Research Centre’s (IDRC’s)
telecentre.org programme. It is hoped that the Network, by
leveraging opportunities presented by the USPF, among other
initiatives in Nigeria, will attain the goal of one telecentre in each
of the country’s 774 local government areas.
Participation
The near absence of the voice of Nigerian civil society in the nation’s
policy development processes has deprived the nation of much-needed
robust consultation and discussions. However, recent events, such as
the halt of an attempt to change the Nigerian Constitution and extend
the term of office of the president and his governors, have demon-
strated that mass mobilisation can have a significant impact. The role
of civil society and media organisations across the country in stopping
the challenge to the Constitution can be seen as a political watershed in
Nigerians’ slow and steady adoption of a democratic culture.
Civil society has also had an important impact in two other proc-
esses: the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill and the drive to develop
a community radio sector in the country.
The FOI Bill – a cornerstone of democratic government in any
country – had been pending before the National Assembly since 1999.
It was unanimously passed by the Nigerian Senate on 15 November
2006, largely because of the staying power of the advocacy efforts by
a civil society coalition, led by the Media Rights Agenda (MRA).5
The MRA, among others, has also been active in the field of com-
munity radio. While the National Broadcasting Commission Act No.
38 of 19926  did not make allowance for community radio, this was
rectified in 2001 when the MRA presented a draft Media Bill to the
National Assembly. Since then, civil society has led the advocacy push
for community radio in Nigeria. Key advocacy activities include col-
laborations with the Association for Progressive Communications
(APC)7  and the work of the Nigeria Community Radio Forum and the
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC).8
These collaborations have had results. The government began
to give consideration to the issue through the resolution of the Na-
tional Council on Information in 2005. Working papers on commu-
nity radio were developed by the NBC.
4 <www.nasrda.org>.
5 See: <www.mediarightsagenda.org>.
6 As amended by Act No. 55 of 1999. See: <www.nigeria-law.org/
National%20Broadcasting%20Commission%20Decree%201992.htm>.
7 <africa.rights.apc.org/catia1c/nigeria>.
8 <www.amarc.org>.
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A Community Radio Policy Drafting Committee, which was inau-
gurated by the government in August 2006, submitted its report to
the federal government on 12 December 2006. The government’s
decision is pending, but indications are that the present administra-
tion would like to bequeath the first community radio policy to Nigeria
before its exit in 2007.
Conclusions
When considered individually, the inherent ICT4D (ICT for develop-
ment) credentials of the various initiatives discussed in this paper are
clear. However, when viewed holistically, a lack of coherence and a
lack of optimisation of resources become evident. For example, some
higher education institutions have received up to three VSATs from
different government programmes. This is due to the policy vacuum
in which these otherwise laudable initiatives are being implemented.
While some of this duplication might be resolved through the
recent merger of ministries, ICT policy issues are not likely to receive
much attention in the short term, given that the current president is
expected to vacate office by July 2007. The exception may be a few
areas in which the president wants to leave a legacy, such as in the
community radio sector. He would also, no doubt, like to leave his
imprint on the development of a national backbone infrastructure.
However, numerous other policy interventions are needed. For
example, telephony issues that still require regulatory attention and
increased government intervention include tariffs, the local assembly
of mobile handsets, maintenance and repair, and signal coverage to
underserved communities.
Given Nigeria’s recent military dictatorship, it may be understand-
able that acquiring a culture of consultation and inclusive democratic
governance is slow. Civil society continues to be the most vocal ad-
vocate for sustainable ICT development and the most active facilitator
of an enabling environment. Recent legislative approval of the FOI Bill
may convince the next government of the advantages of an inclusive
national ICT policy process.
The challenges for civil society in the coming months and years
is to fill existing gaps such as the lack of a national focus with respect
to the use of open standards, open access and open source software,
either in education or public administration. SchoolNet Nigeria was
once a champion of these innovations, but these efforts are now largely
undertaken by the Nigerian Linux Users Group.
ICTs also need to be popularised and access to knowledge for
development needs to be promoted, especially in underserved rural
communities, and for young women and men. 
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Introduction
Bytesforall.org (B4A) is a South Asian-wide network of information
and communications technology (ICT) professionals and practition-
ers and a member of the Association for Progressive Communica-
tions (APC). Under the auspices of APC’s Communications and Infor-
mation Policy Programme (CIPP), B4A Pakistan is managing the Pa-
kistan ICT Policy Monitor Network and maintaining the Pakistan ICT
policy portal.
A small team within the Pakistan ICT Policy Monitor Network
brainstormed and agreed on the process for compiling this report
and on the key focus areas. Efforts were then made to involve differ-
ent experts and key organisations with expertise in those areas. For
example, the section on community radio was written by Internews
Pakistan, the section on free and open source software (FOSS) by the
Free and Open Source Software Foundation of Pakistan (FOSSFP),2
and the section on access to information by the Centre for Peace and
Development Initiative, Pakistan. This arrangement helped to gather
the best possible information on the topics addressed.
Country situation
Pakistan is a developing country with a population of approxi-
mately 160 million. It ranked 134th out of 177 countries on the 2006
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2006). The country faces many
development challenges, including extreme poverty, a low literacy rate,
poor health facilities, and a fragile socio-political situation, character-
ised by corruption and a lack of informed decision-making.
The ICT4D (ICT for development) sector in Pakistan is still at a
nascent stage, particularly from a civil society perspective. Over the
last seven years, however, ICTs have been one of the major focus
areas of development for the government. There is a growing realisa-
tion among policy-makers that ICTs hold great socioeconomic poten-
tial, to the extent that the government is encouraging the use of ICTs
at all levels, with planned investment in both infrastructure and tech-
nological application. This has resulted in Pakistan having the most
extensive internet penetration among the countries of South Asia, with
probably the cheapest internet rates. Similar progress has been seen
in the development of telecommunications infrastructure, particularly
regarding mobile telephony.
A comprehensive IT Policy was formulated in 2000, followed by
an ambitious IT Action Plan. But for reasons such as a lack of capacity,
corrupt governance structures, and an inability to comprehend the rapid
developments in the field, there are not many success stories.
In terms of grassroots ICT4D projects, Pakistan has yet to present a
strikingly good example that could be replicated on a larger scale in the
country and elsewhere in the developing world. While it may come as a
surprise, Pakistan lags behind even Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, not to
mention India or Nepal, which can boast of dozens of such initiatives.3
Table 1: Statistics
Population (estimated January 2007) 159,278,000 *
GDP (2005) USD 110.7 billion+
GDP growth rate (2005-2006) 6.6% +
Adult literacy rate (age 15 or above) 53% +
Adult literacy rate – male 60% +
Adult literacy rate – female 40% +
MDGs 2015 target for literacy 80% +
Human Development Index (HDI) rank 134th ^
Human Development Index (HDI) value 0.539 ^
Telecom sector share in GDP (2005-2006) 2.0% **
Foreign direct investment in telecom sector USD 146.9 million **
Total telephone subscribers (fixed) 5,184,132 **
as of Dec. 2006
Total telephone subscribers (mobile) 48,289,136 **
as of Dec. 2006
Teledensity (total) 10.37% **
Total internet service providers 131 **
Total internet users on dial-up 2.4 million **
Total DSL subscribers 26,611 **
Length of fibre optic link 5,227 km **
Total FM radio licences issued 86 #
FM radios (on-air) 51 #
Total campus FM radios 3 #
Female only campus FM radios 2 #
Total household TV sets 24 million #
Satellite private television licences issued 16 #
Satellite private televisions (on-air) 12 #
Satellite television viewership (urban) 11 million
Satellite television viewership (rural) 3 million #
Cable TV licensees 1,301 #
1 <pakistanictpolicy.bytesforall.net>.
2 <www.fossfp.org>.
3 “ICTs for Development: Moving out of the Pakistani Paradox”, Hasan Rizvi,
Sustainable Development Networking Programme, Pakistan.
The following sections highlight three key areas of policy con-
cern: access to information, community radio and free and open source
software (FOSS).
Sources:
* Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) (<www.statpak.gov.pk>).
+ Government of Pakistan (<www.finance.gov.pk>).
^ Human Development Report-UNDP (<hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics>).
** Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) (<www.pta.gov.pk>).
# Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)
(<www.pemra.gov.pk>).
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Access to information: policy and political constraints
The poor state of governance and weak protection of rights in Paki-
stan can largely be attributed to a lack of access to information on
public affairs, which restricts the ability of citizens, civil society groups
and public representatives to effectively monitor the performance of
public institutions. Access to information is the first step towards pro-
moting and institutionalising public accountability at various levels.
Its absence often results in arbitrary and non-participatory decision-
making,4  weak monitoring, inefficient project execution, human rights
violations and rampant financial corruption in public bodies.5  Lack of
access to information also contributes towards sustaining excessive
bureaucratic controls and the weakening of democratic institutions.
Almost all government activity in Pakistan currently takes place
in a pervasive culture of official secrecy, which is manifested in both
official attitudes and various pieces of legislation (e.g. the Official
Secrets Act 1923).6  Any disclosure or sharing of information, if and
when it takes place, is on a “need to know” basis, as determined by
official authorities, and not in recognition of a “right to know” as one
of the fundamental human rights.7  Citizens have hardly any say or
control over public information, even though the information and
records held by various government departments may have direct
implications for their environment, health, safety and well-being, as
well as their ability to make political or economic choices. This par-
ticularly affects the weaker sections of the population, as powerful
people find it easier to access the required information by using their
contacts and influence.
The culture of secrecy is so predominant that it has seriously
undermined almost all mechanisms created for providing access to
government information. Official statements and media releases of-
ten provide one-sided information and lack credibility. Annual reports
are either not published or lack details and appropriate analyses which
could help in determining the credibility of data presented and as-
sessing the performance of departments. Parliamentary questions lead
to the disclosure of some information, but delayed or misleading re-
plies, and the summary dismissal of many questions, especially ones
relating to any aspect of the security establishment, are common.
Court proceedings take place in the open and, therefore, can re-
sult in the disclosure of useful official information, especially when the
case involves government departments. However, the amount of infor-
mation disclosed is often very little and may not automatically become
available to a large number of people unless a particular case attracts
substantial media attention. Information could also be made accessible
through websites, but most government websites offer little useful con-
tent. Similarly, the archives are not properly maintained and updated
and it is difficult to access old records. All of this is, partly or wholly,
because of the absence of a comprehensive policy that recognises the
right to information as a fundamental human right and provides an
efficient legislative and institutional framework for its implementation.
The Constitution of Pakistan does not explicitly talk of a right to
information (Constituent Assembly, 1947). However, the Supreme
Court of Pakistan has interpreted Article 19 of the Constitution, which
is about freedom of speech and expression, as including the right to
information.8  Despite this, the government of Pakistan preferred not
to refer to it as a constitutional right in the Freedom of Information
Ordinance (FOIO) 2002.
The FOIO 2002 is currently in force. The Freedom of Information
(FOI) Rules have been developed for its implementation. While about
40 ministries have designated officers who are responsible for deal-
ing with information requests, the FOIO 2002 is extremely flawed,
and offers little help in changing the culture of secrecy in government
(Government of Pakistan, 2002).
The government needs to take urgent steps to provide a com-
prehensive legislative and institutional framework for access to infor-
mation. This must conform to international best practices, including
maximum disclosure, obligation to publish, promotion of open gov-
ernment, limited scope of exceptions, minimum costs, processes that
facilitate access, open meetings, precedence of disclosure, and pro-
tection of whistle-blowers.
The FOIO 2002 does not conform to any of these best practices.
It is applicable only to the federal departments and leaves out the
provincial and local departments, as well as private organisations (in-
cluding the ones funded by the government). It does not provide a
comprehensive definition of information or records; nor does it pro-
vide an efficient mechanism for its implementation and handling com-
plaints. It puts very limited demands on the government departments
to proactively disclose information through publications, notice boards
and websites. Most importantly, it includes too many exceptions and
restrictions, which leave only a few records accessible. The FOI Rules
2004 have imposed further restrictions on public access to informa-
tion by prescribing strict information request formats and asking high
fees and photocopying charges.
A comprehensive policy on the right to access to information is
a prerequisite for transparent and accountable governance. But this
will only be possible when the government is willing and able to make
a critical shift from a culture of secrecy to proactive information dis-
closure as a matter of fundamental human right.
Empowering grassroots Pakistan through community radio
Until April 2002, Pakistan’s electronic media was monopolised by the
government, with just the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Paki-
stan Television ruling the radio and TV airwaves. Heavily propagandist,
these channels still give out highly censored news and information.
With national newspaper circulation hovering around three million, and
no private radio or TV, the majority of the population had no access to
reliable, independent and relevant sources of information.
Then the government decided to open the airwaves to private own-
ership, creating the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
(PEMRA) to issue licences for private radio and television. By Novem-
ber 2006, licences for over 100 commercial FM radio stations, two dozen
satellite TV channels, an IPTV9  and two DTH10  channels had been is-
sued, transforming the country’s media scene dramatically.
4 This point was illustrated in 1999 by UN Special Rapporteur Abid Hussain, who
said: “Implicit in freedom of expression is the public’s right to open access to
information and to know what governments are doing on their behalf, without
which truth would languish and people’s participation in government would
remain fragmented.” (Article 19, 2001).
5 Pakistan ranked 146th on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency
International in 2006 (TI, 2006).
6 Available from: <www.ijnet.org/
Director.aspx?P=MediaLaws&ID=101585&LID=1>.
7 “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone for
all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” (UN, 1946).
8 Supreme Court, Pakistan Legal Decision, PLD 1993 SC 473 and 746.
9 Internet protocol television.
10 “Direct-to-home” satellite TV.
A low literacy rate means that print media circulation figures are
also low. Most Pakistanis rely on the electronic media to get their
information. Even though private television in Pakistan has begun to
reflect the country’s diverse society and offer independent sources of
news, radio has proved the most effective mass medium. By the end
of October 2006, more than 60 FM stations were operational. These
filled critical information gaps that television cannot address, attend-
ing particularly to local and regional languages.
An official study by PEMRA declares that Pakistan has the po-
tential for over 850 viable FM radio stations, enabling even far-flung
communities in information-dark areas to benefit from locally relevant
coverage. Radio has the potential to accelerate the pace of socioeco-
nomic transformation sweeping Pakistan. Already the information
consumption patterns of Pakistanis have changed as audiences re-
ceive information in real time and in local languages. Assisting radio
stations to develop information relevant to local communities repre-
sents a major opportunity to make communications a cornerstone of
the grassroots development process in the country.
This is the bright side. The rapidly evolving legal environment in
Pakistan challenges the newer, smarter media to react to critical re-
form issues in their coverage of the legal rights of citizens, and to
realise their potential to educate the public on socioeconomic and
political concerns. But the exploding number of radio stations face a
chronic shortage of journalists qualified to cover these complicated
issues, and to make them understandable to grassroots communities
in their own languages. These radio stations need technical assist-
ance to play a more active role in public discussion and to participate
in political processes.
Community broadcasting on a mass scale is a relatively new
phenomenon – one that has not been served by the dozen or so uni-
versities in Pakistan that teach journalism. Some of these universities
are only now coming to grips with the need for professional broad-
cast journalism degrees that can meet the requirements of an emerg-
ing community broadcast industry. Internews Network, an interna-
tional media development non-governmental organisation (NGO), is
the only organisation currently helping universities develop broad-
cast journalism curricula for students and strengthening broadcast
journalism generally. This includes investigative journalism courses
for radio and television journalists, building campus radio stations
and production facilities, starting media law clinics for broadcasters,
advocacy and lobbying on media law reforms with stakeholders, and
research on media issues.
The challenge of ensuring a community orientation for the ra-
dio stations is made more complicated by the fact that the radio
stations are set up as commercial enterprises. At the heart of this
problem is a technicality. PEMRA issues licences through an open
bidding process, which brings “big money” into play at the cost of
broad stakeholder involvement. As a result, most operational FM
stations in Pakistan are not run by community-based organisations
(CBOs) or NGOs.
Several licensees are permitted to run FM stations in multiple
cities. In many cases a licensee runs stations in cities or regions
where it has no roots, and therefore no stake other than promoting
business interests or carving out large slices of advertising revenue
for itself.
PEMRA insists that by its very nature every FM station in Pakistan
currently has to profile its audiences and respond to local needs. As a
result it says the stations are de facto community stations, and that
“big money” can only be good for the sustainability of the enterprises.
Despite the challenges, in varying degrees Pakistani commercial
FM broadcasters are doubling up as community service centres, at
times serving their listeners by offering a variety of information and
programming geared towards the local area. This includes paying at-
tention to particular interest groups that are poorly served by other
media outlets, and making space for local voices and marginalised
groups such as women, CBOs and NGOs.
Such is the success of FM radio stations as local information
sources in Pakistan that they have even attracted the attention of ul-
tra-conservative clergy who wish to create new captive audiences.
Clerics in parts of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
tribal areas and some parts of Balochistan – all bordering Afghani-
stan – operate unlicensed, small-range one-way broadcasts, sermon-
ising to increase new spheres of influence for themselves over com-
munities that do not have access to traditional media.
In some instances, mullahs operating these illegal “suitcase”
mobile radio stations have been instigating sectarian or ethnic vio-
lence that killed about 25 people in 2006 alone. The authorities have
conducted crackdowns against these illegal stations, but because they
are easy to get up and running, and are low-cost, they crop up again
soon after they are closed down. This phenomenon is restricted to
areas where no legal licences have been issued, and will continue
until PEMRA allows local community-based groups to undertake le-
gal broadcast operations.
The relatively recent phenomenon of private radio in Pakistan
has shown the following characteristics:
• Improved timeliness, accuracy and credibility of information flow
to communities
• Increased relevance of information reaching local communities
• Increased reach of information to isolated, information-dark areas
• Improved two-way communication flows between and among
stakeholders
• Increased flow of information between communities and policy-
makers
• Empowered local communities, through inclusion of their voices
in the media
• Ongoing attention to the needs of communities in times of disaster
• Increased understanding of the role of local media in emergencies
• Increased space for independent media and professional journalism.
However, the situation on the ground would be altogether better if
the radio stations could find roots in a development perspective. A
strong policy advocacy campaign is required to encourage PEMRA to
consider working with civil society organisations (CSOs) and creat-
ing non-profit community radio licensing for nominal fees.
FOSS in Pakistan
FOSS11  made its way into Pakistan between 1999 and 2004 through a
top-level intervention by the Ministry of Information Technology and
Telecommunications (MIT)12  and grassroots interventions by various
civil society voluntary community initiatives. These include the Paki-
stan Linux User Community (PLUC),13  the Free and Open Source Soft-
ware Foundation of Pakistan (FOSSFP), the Ubuntu-Linux Pakistan
11 <www.fossfp.org/fossophy>.
12 < www.moitt.gov.pk>.
13 <www.linuxpakistan.net>.
PA
KI
ST
AN
 / 
17
7
Gl
ob
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
So
ci
et
y 
W
at
ch
 / 
17
8
Team (Ubuntu LUC),14  the Linux Professional Institute (LPI),15  and
the Computer Society of Pakistan’s Special Interest Group on FOSS.
In 2003, the MIT set up a Task Force for Linux and as a result the
Open Source Resource Centre (OSRC) was established by the Paki-
stan Software Export Board (PSEB) in January 2004 in Islamabad.
The centre promotes FOSS in the local IT industry, and also conducts
training. Other public sector institutions have joined the drive behind
FOSS, such as the Pakistan Computer Bureau, which has trained 4,000
government officials on various IT issues.
The PLUC was formed in December 1999 and now has over 3,500
members. Meanwhile, the FOSSFP and Ubuntu LUC launched the
National FOSS Mass Awareness Campaign (FOSSAC). The campaign
aimed to educate 7,000 people, notably women, from over 506 or-
ganisations nationwide. It provided free-of-charge training, certifying
over 4,800 Ubuntu Linux users and distributing 10,000 FOSS CDs. It
involved a public sector university partner that donated 700 comput-
ers, 22 trainers and 600 volunteers to manage the campaign for four
days (16 to 19 August 2005). The FOSSAC case study was highlighted
during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tuni-
sia as an example for other countries to learn from.
Within the context of software piracy, nearly all sectors of society
are still unaware of the potential benefits of FOSS as an alternative to
pirated proprietary software. According to international agencies, the
rate of software piracy was 82% in 2006. This was only one percentage
point lower than the 83% reported in 2005, despite the government’s
strict measures to ban the illegal production of CDs and DVDs.
Widespread open source adoption is still lacking within the pub-
lic and private sectors, due to the absence of concrete policies for
FOSS procurement. Widespread adoption and use of FOSS is also
lacking amongst CSOs, and can be attributed to a lack of awareness
and know-how. Similarly, the country lacks a telecentre programme
in the rural regions that can benefit from the combination of FOSS
and low-cost refurbished computers.
There is also a lack of women participating in FOSS activities,
although small numbers of female students are receiving Linux train-
ing as part of the IT curriculum in higher education institutions. Gen-
der-based CSOs continue to lack FOSS capacity.
Pakistanis speak over 70 different regional languages, with the
English-speaking community making up less than 10% of the total
population. In order to take ICTs to all corners of the country, local-
ised Urdu language content needs to be developed. This includes the
translation of software for desktop and server sides. Such efforts are
already being made by FOSSFP and Ubuntu-Linux.
FOSS priority recommendations for Pakistan are:
• The government should invite multi-stakeholder partnerships to
develop its technical capacity and encourage the formulation of
concrete policies that mandate the wide use of FOSS in light of
WSIS recommendations.
• FOSS should be adopted within higher education, while the in-
clusion of women and youth should be the priority of all ICT and
FOSS-related activities. A Women Linux Users Group should be
formed, and where there are religious or social constraints,
women-run telecentres should be established.
• The government should take measures to combat software pi-
racy through making citizens aware of their software freedoms
through FOSS capacity development. Small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) should be encouraged to use FOSS instead of
pirated proprietary software.
• Multi-stakeholder partnerships should be formulated to educate
all sectors of society about Digital Commons and alternative copy-
righting such as Creative Commons, GPL, Open Standards and
Open Content.
• The government should support language localisation efforts, such
as those making various Linux distributions available in Urdu.
• The government should encourage the funding of small busi-
nesses initiated by women and youth that involve FOSS-based
service delivery and business models.
• Telecentre initiatives should be established to promote ICTs and
universal access in all rural regions by deploying low-cost refur-
bished computers running FOSS, instead of pirated or costly li-
censed proprietary software packages.
• International donors should be encouraged to include FOSS poli-
cies in their funding guidelines.
Participation
The government of Pakistan was part of the WSIS process and ac-
tively participated in the global event through the MIT. However, both
civil society and the private sector were not represented at the event.
A steering committee on the WSIS was formed, but that too had no
representation from civil society or the private sector. The commit-
tee’s membership is still not known.
The one and only WSIS consultation inclusive of all stakeholders
was conducted by the Sustainable Development Networking Pro-
gramme in November 2003.16  This consultation resulted in an agree-
ment on the greater inclusion of various stakeholders in the WSIS
process, but this never happened in subsequent years.
A project that was to be implemented between the Geneva and
Tunis phases of the Summit was also agreed on. However, funding
could not be provided by the government.
The project had the following three goals:
• Using ICTs to provide the necessary information and to support
interaction between different stakeholders, including excluded
groups. The information was to focus on education, health, and
welfare. A central feature was that the ICT-based interactions
would have taken place in Urdu, and possibly other regional lan-
guages.
• To adopt a truly multi-stakeholder approach, bringing together
the public sector, civil society and the private sector in a clearly
defined, balanced and equal relationship.
• To support, from the ground up, the emergence of a multi-
stakeholder strategic process for implementing the WSIS in Pa-
kistan.
A large official delegation headed by the prime minister of Paki-
stan participated in the WSIS in Geneva. At the Summit itself, the
honourable prime minister spoke about his government’s focus and
keenness to harness the potential of ICTs for economic advancement
14 <www.ubuntu-pk.org>.
15 <www.lpi.org>. 16 See <www.wsis.sdnpk.org>.
and the social development of the people of Pakistan. In particular, he
mentioned that his government had earmarked a significant part of
its resources to build the necessary infrastructure, and to develop ICT
applications in health, education and public sector management. How-
ever, nothing seems to be planted on the ground.
One might believe that the personal presence of the prime min-
ister of Pakistan at the WSIS was a clear indication of the priority
accorded by the government to the WSIS process, and to the use of
ICTs for social and human development in the country. However, one
could also argue that more could have been achieved if there had
been proper planning and serious pre-event preparations. In addi-
tion, there was never any gender consideration in the composition of
the delegation. Only two women participated in the Tunis phase of the
WSIS,17  but as individuals, one being part of the WSIS Youth Caucus,
and the other representing a United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) forum. Among other things, this skewed representation re-
sulted in Pakistan becoming a villain in civil society circles.
Various caucuses on diverse themes such as gender, youth, spe-
cial people, science and trade were set up with representation from all
over the world, but unfortunately Pakistan had no planned presence
in any of these (other than the youth caucus in the Tunis phase). One
can say that Pakistan as a nation never gave WSIS serious thought or
considered how it could impact on the country’s long-term future.
Conclusions
Even though the government is committed to the development of ICTs
in Pakistan, the country is a graveyard of many failed and unsuccess-
ful projects. Unfortunately, the government seems committed to im-
plementing every initiative on its own, without the involvement of CSOs
or other relevant stakeholders.
On the other hand, CSOs have no access to funds to pilot inno-
vative, development-oriented projects. Government rules and proce-
dures do not facilitate access to funding, a situation that needs to be
changed immediately.
There has been no consultation with CSOs before embarking upon
big ICT-related projects. In ICT development projects, commercial
interests nearly always take precedence over development interests.
The exorbitant FM radio licensing fees is one example.
It is also clear that mainstreaming gender in the development
process is not a priority for the government. There have been no ini-
tiatives where gender empowerment through ICTs could be addressed.
Unfortunately, the government takes massive loans from the
World Bank and others but there are practically no checks to gauge
the success of the initiatives they spend the money on, or ways of
helping to root out corruption in the implementation of projects. There
are hardly any monitoring and evaluation processes.
There is a serious lack of capacity in a whole range of different
fields which needs to be bridged immediately if the country intends to
make any advancement in the field of ICTs for development. Paki-
stan’s IT Policy and IT Action Plan need an immediate review. Strong
policy advocacy is required from CSOs, and continuous engagement
with the government at all levels is needed, so that the goal of people-
friendly and people-centred policies can be achieved. 
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0 Introduction
This report attempts to summarise the status of the information soci-
ety in Peru by analysing the data offered by the National Institute of
Statistics and Computing and considering the reflections of various
national actors.
With regard to information and communications technology (ICT)
policies in Peru, 2006 was a year of both progress and setbacks. It
marked the end of Alejandro Toledo’s Perú Posible party government
and the beginning of the one led by Alan García of the APRA party
(Partido Aprista Peruano), providing democratic continuity which is
important for Peru’s stability. Toledo began his government five years
earlier with the Huascarán Plan3  and ended it leaving in place a fol-
low-up commission for the Commission for the Development of the
Information Society (CODESI), which is also known as CODESI 2.
The APRA government does not have a clear programme re-
garding the information society, despite the fact that the president
himself identifies it as a priority area for the country (García, 2003).
On the contrary, some worrisome measures have been taken, such
as the dismantling, for all practical purposes, of the National Insti-
tute of Research and Training in Telecommunications (INICTEL)4
and budget cuts for the National Council of Science, Technology
and Technological Innovation (CONCYTEC).5  Also unclear is the stra-
tegic purpose for the absorption of the Fund for Investment in Tele-
communications (FITEL)6  into the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (MTC),7  a move which appears to be aimed more
at reducing state bureaucracy than part of any government policy in
the area of the information society.
Moreover, even with the development and publication of a na-
tional strategy on ICTs, the Digital Agenda for Peru (CODESI, 2005)
remains more a technological policy than a state development policy:
it is not part of the national process of dialogue initiated by the gov-
ernment and aimed at establishing government policies for the next
20 years, known as the National Accord.8
Even though public policy in Peru has prioritised the installation
of infrastructure, the year 2006 also allowed for the opening of im-
portant spaces for dialogue and proposals around ICT policies. These
spaces, however, have yet to include broad sectors of society or to
ensure that the policies related to the information society cut across
the entire government. Until this happens, Peru’s citizens will con-
tinue to be spectators and not protagonists.
This report is based on a study undertaken by Miguel Saravia as
a contribution to the research project Acceso efectivo y en igualdad
de oportunidades de las comunidades rurales a la radiodifusión,
estrategia clave de inclusión digital para América Latina y el Caribe
(Effective and equal access to radio broadcasting for rural communi-
ties, a key digital inclusion strategy for Latin America and the Carib-
bean). The study was undertaken at the request of the Association for
Progressive Communications (APC) and financed by the Regional Fund
for Digital Research in the Americas (FRIDA). This report also draws
on the Reporte sobre Sociedad de la Información en el Perú (Report
on the Information Society in Peru) prepared by Erick Iriarte for Perú-
Digital.9  The authors also consulted other reports and articles pub-
lished on the Perú-Digital list and on the Blog TIC_Rural (Rural ICT
Blog),10  among other sources of information.
Country situation
The Peruvian government subscribes to the definition of the informa-
tion society set forth in the Declaration of the Latin America and Car-
ibbean Regional Conference for the First Phase of the World Summit
on the Information Society (WSIS), which took place in Bávaro, Do-
minican Republic, in January 2003. According to this declaration, the
information society is “an economic and social system where knowl-
edge and information constitute fundamental sources of well-being
and progress and […] represents an opportunity for our countries
and societies.” The declaration has a strong human rights perspec-
tive, and states that the development of the information society re-
quires a “deeper appreciation of fundamental principles, such as those
of respect for human rights within the broader context of fundamen-
tal rights, democracy, environmental protection, the advancement of
peace, the right to development, fundamental freedoms, economic
progress and social equity” (ECLAC, 2003).
In 2001 the Multi-Sectoral Commission to Broaden Public Internet
Use was created to organise the various initiatives being designed by
the new government. It produced the document e-Perú: Propuestas
para un Plan de Acción para el Acceso Democrático a la Sociedad
Global de la Información y el Conocimiento (e-Peru: Proposals for an
Action Plan for Democratic Access to the Global Information and
Knowledge Society) (CMMUI, 2001). At the same time, all public of-
fices were obliged by law to prepare action plans referring to the in-
formation society, measures for access to public information, and
content for webpages. This decree included local governments.
Several government bodies have developed initiatives for the in-
formation society. In 2002, CONCYTEC, INICTEL, the Oversight Body
for Private Investment in Telecommunications (OSIPTEL), the National
Institute for Statistics and Computing, the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers and the MTC formed a working group to create a National
Information Society Plan appropriate to the Peruvian situation. While
progress was made in the design of the plan, it was also evident that
the degree of consensus on all its points was still insufficient, and
1 A collective formed by Alfa-Redi (<www.alfa-redi.org>), the Consortium for the
Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion/InfoAndina (CONDESAN)
(<www.condesan.org>) and the Peruvian Centre for Social Studies (CEPES)
(<www.cepes.org.pe>).
2 Maicu Alvarado also contributed to this report.
3 See: <www.huascaran.gob.pe>.
4 <www.inictel.gob.pe>.
5 <www.concytec.gob.pe>.
6 Universal access fund in Peru. For more information see: <www.fitel.gov.pe>.
7 <www.mtc.gob.pe>.
8 <www.acuerdonacional.gob.pe>.
9 <www.dgroups.org/groups/peru-digital>.
10 <tic_rural.blogspot.com>.
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that it was necessary to work on guidelines for a national strategy
that would get the country on track towards an information society.
During 2003, with the first phase of the WSIS approaching, the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers relaunched its e-government
strategy and linked it to the process of modernising the state, which
was started in 2004 with funding of approximately USD 300 million
from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).
That year the Presidency of the Council of Ministers also created
the Multi-Sectoral Commission for the Development of the Informa-
tion Society (CODESI)11  as an entity charged with creating “a plan for
the development of the information society in Peru, which should in-
clude a diagnostic of Peru’s current situation within the context of the
information society, the actions that must be taken to develop it, and
the proposed rules and measures that facilitate the appropriate devel-
opment, implementation and promotion of the information society in
Peru” (Council of Ministers, 2003).
On its website, CODESI declares its support for a society that
gives priority to resolving poverty and other inequalities in a sustain-
able way. In order to achieve this goal, the participation and commit-
ment of every generation is required, ensuring the intervention of a
variety of social and linguistic groups, cultures and peoples. Special
attention must be paid to “those most exposed to exclusion, discrimi-
nation and prejudice,” while also promoting gender equity.
The plan for the development of the information society designed
by CODESI, the Digital Agenda for Peru, points out that “ICTs can be
used either to exacerbate or transform unequal power relations. ICTs
can be powerful tools for social action and positive social change,
can contribute to building gender equality, and eliminate poverty
caused by social status, gender, race, capabilities and age” (CODESI,
2005, Chapter II).
The government’s concrete mechanisms for the development of
the information society are the Fund for Investment in Telecommuni-
cations (FITEL) and the Projects Office of the Vice Ministry of Com-
munications of the MTC.
While FITEL has concentrated on the expansion of the telephonic
network in rural areas through subsidising operators, and some ac-
tions related to facilitating internet access, the MTC has worked on
developing an electronic platform for the state, and has several initia-
tives related to internet access centres in its portfolio. However, a
clear relationship between the two institutions has not yet been es-
tablished in order to avoid duplication and ensure a more rational use
of the state’s resources.
Investments in ICT
Peru’s telecommunications market was liberalised in 1999 and has
open competition in fixed and mobile telephone networks, internet
and value-added services. The number of mobile telephone subscrib-
ers reached that of fixed telephone subscribers in 2001, and the mo-
bile market is continually expanding. According to OSIPTEL data,
teledensity for fixed telephones systems went from 3.21% in 1994 to
7.20% in 2004. For mobile telephones, the levels rose from 0.16% in
1993 to more than 13% in 2004.12
Since 1991, when the liberalisation process began, there have
been many measures to help promote the opening of the market, en-
courage investment in critical areas, and guarantee minimal condi-
tions for competition in Peru’s telecommunications sector. However,
as the Peruvian Scientific Network (RCP) points out, despite these
measures, teledensity in Peru remains below other countries in the
region:
Disparities due to socioeconomic and regional strata persist in
our country – meaning that sectors with fewer resources have
limited access to these services – and there has been a marked
deceleration of growth in fixed telephone systems in recent years.
The industry’s structure shows high levels of concentration, and
there is a limited supply of services responding to the needs and
demands of consumers with lower incomes, mainly in smaller
cities and in the urban periphery zones.13
Investments in telecommunications have been led by foreign
capital, especially by Telefónica de Perú (part of Telefónica España), a
company with which the Peruvian government has held a contract
since 1994. These investments have principally benefited the inhabit-
ants of Lima and to a lesser degree those of the rest of the country
(Campodónico, 1999).
In October 2006 the government proposed renegotiating the
Telefónica contract, seeking to lower rates but maintain investment in
technological innovation. According to the ministry governing this
sector, the investment “would allow for educational, professional, and
business needs to be met as well as access to government services…
Investment to increase access to the internet through broadband would
allow for a reduction in the existing digital divide. This effort would
contribute to achieving the goal of one million connections by the
year 2011” (MTC, 2006a).
Regulatory limitations
The MTC and OSIPTEL are in charge of regulating the telecommuni-
cations public service networks in Peru. The regulatory framework is
defined by:14
• Universal Access Policy Guidelines
• General Policy Guidelines for Promoting Internet Access in Peru
• Policy Guidelines for Promoting Greater Access to Telecommu-
nications Services in Rural Areas.
Moscol Salina (2003) points to regulatory limitations on the in-
stallation of ICT infrastructure in rural areas:
• The rules for interconnection are insufficient for the develop-
ment of infrastructure in rural areas.
• Requirements for market access must be reduced or removed,
for instance, by reducing taxes for telecommunication services
in rural areas.
• It is necessary to develop an appropriate legal framework for
electronic security and e-commerce that protects users.
• Internet access has not been defined as a public telecommuni-
cations service. There is also a regulatory vacuum for centres
providing internet service.
• It is necessary to share infrastructure between urban and rural
networks. Institutions should be obliged to share infrastructure
when there are economic or technical limitations preventing com-
munities or sectors from participating in the information society.
11 <200.62.145.115>.
12 <www.osiptel.gob.pe>.
13 Internet Atlas produced by RCP. <www.yachay.com.pe/especiales/internet>.
14 See <www.osiptel.gob.pe/Index.ASP?T=P&P=2727> for more information on the
legal framework.
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At the same time, the development of content and local training
is needed, especially for the educational, health and economic sec-
tors and others necessary for rural development.
These barriers affect access to new technologies and the sus-
tainability of new enterprises, facilitate concentration of media own-
ership into a few hands, and make the participation of the community
in the development of the information society difficult.
OSIPTEL and the MTC have made progress in the development
of regulations aimed at partially resolving the challenges, with an em-
phasis on the problem of access. Nevertheless, as the Telecommuni-
cations Sector Analysis and Forecasting Group (GAPTEL)15  of Spain
points out, the emergence of wireless technologies and broadband
are creating new regulatory challenges that go beyond access and
involve better management of the spectrum to assure greater supply.
There is also a need to establish rules governing the relationship be-
tween a regulated service, such as telecommunications, and an un-
regulated one, such as the provision of content.
In response to the above, the MTC has proposed a process of
“single concession”, defined as “the right to provide all public tel-
ecommunications services” (MTC, 2006b, Art. 47).
As for wireless technologies, the General Regulations of the Te-
lecommunications Law define the radio frequency spectrum as a lim-
ited natural resource that is part of the nation’s heritage. The MTC is
responsible for the administration, assignment and control of the fre-
quency spectrum. The same regulations state that the assignment of
the spectrum in the bands identified by fixed wireless access sys-
tems, and primarily designated for public telecommunications serv-
ices, will take place through public tender in areas with restrictions on
the availability of frequencies.16
However, according to the general manager of OSIPTEL, WiMax
in Peru is only used to transmit data, which is not regulated. In addi-
tion, he believes that as long as WiMax infrastructure does not ex-
pand, no regulation is necessary.
The administration of FITEL was initially the responsibility of
OSIPTEL (MTC, 1993). Through Law No. 28900, published on 4 No-
vember 2006, FITEL was attached to the MTC, allowing a maximum of
60 days for OSIPTEL to transfer its administration to the ministry, which
will continue to approve the projects declared viable and grant the cor-
responding concessions.
Statistics
Indicators from the National Institute of Statistics and Computing show
that as of October 2006, 28.65% of the total number of homes had a
fixed telephone, 32.49% of homes had a mobile phone, 15.45% of
homes had access to cable television and only 6.05% had access to
the internet (INEI, 2006). 17
If we compare the penetration of fixed telephone networks, mo-
bile networks, cable TV and internet in Peruvian homes by geographic
area, we can see that all ICTs grew significantly in population centres
of more than 2,000 inhabitants in the August-October 2006 quarter,
compared to the same period in 2005.
Interestingly, mobile telephony in the metropolitan area of Lima
(59.1%) has reached the number of fixed-line subscribers (59.8%),
while in population centres of more than 2,000 inhabitants mobile
phones (35.9%) are already more prolific than fixed-lines (29.97%).
For population centres of less than 2,000 inhabitants – that is,
rural areas – there is limited presence of ICTs. Only fixed and mobile
telephones showed significant levels in the quarter analysed. Moreo-
ver, more people by far own a mobile phone compared to a fixed-line
telephone.
While 4.4% of homes had computers in 2000, this percentage
increased to 6.8% in the period 2003-2004. Taking area of residence
into account, we find important differences in the number of homes
with computers, as well as other ICT services. As of October 2006,
29.06% of the homes in the Metropolitan Area of Lima had a compu-
ter, while only 13.39% of the homes in the remaining urban area and
0.72% of rural homes had computers.
Cabinas públicas (cybercafés) have been an important factor in
internet access in Peru, and the figures indicate that they will con-
tinue to play a key role. Between 2005 and 2006 there was a major
increase in the number of people who use them. For the period Au-
gust-October 2006, 42.06% of homes had at least one person who
used cabinas públicas for internet access. The percentage for the same
period in 2005 was 27.24% of homes.
Other public institutions have carried out research that provides
essential information for policy design. OSIPTEL carried out several
research projects between 2003 and 2005 (Villafuerte, 2005) which
showed that the internet has little impact on the rural population, and
that the main internet users in rural areas are not the rural inhabitants
themselves, but city dwellers who find themselves temporarily in the
area for work reasons.18
A rights-based approach
In January 2007 the Office of the Ombudsman presented its report El
desafío de la telefonía rural: una mirada desde los ciudadanos (The
challenge of rural telephone networks: a citizens’ view) in which it
proposes placing on the public agenda the issue of access to a public
telephone service of reasonable quality in rural areas, preferably for
social benefit (Office of the Ombudsman, 2007).
This is a rights-based approach, which understands that when
we speak of the information society, we are speaking about people.
Echoing what is stated in the Telecommunications Law,19  the report
declares that providing access to these public services reaffirms the
government’s policies of inclusion. It also facilitates the implementa-
tion of strategies of citizen registration and identification, allowing a
greater number of people in disadvantaged situations to be included
in development projects. In addition, it means reducing many trans-
action costs when buying or selling goods or services, particularly for
rural people.15 <observatorio.red.es>.
16 Article 128. The granting of a concession, as well as the assignments of the
corresponding spectrum, must take place through public tender of offers when:
1. In a certain locality or service area there is a restriction in availability of
frequencies or band of frequencies for the provision of a specific public
telecommunications service; 2. It is indicated in the National Plan for Frequency
Assigment (Plan Nacional de Atribución de Frecuencias); 3. The number of
concessionaries for a specific public service covered by article 70 of the Law is
restricted due to technical restrictions based on limited resources.
17 While the Institute has very precise statistics, it is nuclear how these are used to
shape public policy.
18 See: <tic_rural.blogspot.com/2006/05/dia-mundial-de-la-sociedad-de-la.html>.
19 As stated in the Texto Único Ordenado of the Communications Law,
telecommunications are provided under the principle of service with equity
(article 5), whereby all have the right to use telecommunications services (article
3). The right to their use covers the entire country promoting the integration of
areas at great distances from urban centres (article 5) (MTC, 1993).
The Ombudsman’s report sets out important conclusions which are
in fact a call for public action. It concludes, for example, that investment
by FITEL has stagnated, and calls for stronger mechanisms for transpar-
ency and citizen oversight in FITEL’s operations after its incorporation
and attachment to the MTC.
But it is under the section on recommendations that we find the
most valuable contribution of the Ombudsman’s report, not only be-
cause it clearly calls for independent management of FITEL, but be-
cause it sets forth the urgent need for the country’s Congress to rede-
fine the allocation of FITEL’s resources in order to broaden the “uni-
versal access” concept to include that of “universal service”. This would
allow for a scaling up in the implementation of fixed lines in rural
areas. It also proposes that FITEL assign more resources to develop-
ing capacity in rural areas, a demand that has been insistently made
by various civil society actors.
Regional and international context
The first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF)20  in Athens
towards the end of 2006 provided a vision of the upcoming interna-
tional dialogue on the subject of internet governance. It attempted to
achieve the necessary balance between access to information, devel-
opment of content, maintenance of infrastructure and protection for
internet users. This is a delicate balance which is often upset. In 2007
the IGF meeting will take place in Rio de Janeiro, which will allow for
a greater presence of Latin American participants.
An important milestone for the development of information soci-
ety policies in the region was reached in the 36th General Assembly of
the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 2006. The OAS member
countries adopted the Declaration of Santo Domingo: Good Govern-
ance and Development in the Knowledge-Based Society, with a clear
emphasis on the use of ICTs for development. The first item of the
Declaration of Santo Domingo (OAS, 2006) underlines the need to:
Emphasise the importance of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) as crosscutting tools for achieving equitable
and sustainable development and strengthening good govern-
ance, the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as
the need to work intensely to ensure that every person in the
Americas, particularly those in situations of vulnerability or with
special needs, may participate in the benefits generated by the
knowledge-based society.
In addition, the Regional Plan of Action for the Information Soci-
ety in Latin America and the Caribbean (eLAC2007) has continued to
move forward. The eLAC working groups have generated agenda items
for the next meeting in November 2007 in El Salvador, where their
work will be evaluated and a longer-range strategy (probably going
until 2011) will be designed.
At a sub-regional level, the Andean Forum on the Information So-
ciety was convened by the National Telecommunications Council of
Ecuador (CONATEL) in September 2006. At this meeting it was deter-
mined that the Andean Committee of Telecommunications Authorities
(CAATEL)21  should work on the development of an Andean strategy in
line with existing policies and the WSIS and eLAC 2007 documents.22
Participation
At first there were no mechanisms for civil society to access discus-
sions about establishing a digital agenda in Peru. When the Com-
mission for the Development of the Information Society (CODESI)
was made official, its exceptional nature was noted, since it allowed
civil society participation: “[A]s necessary, CODESI may ask other
bodies, institutions, unions and associations in general, public or
private, and specialists, for the advice, information and support nec-
essary to fulfill its objective” (Council of Ministers, 2003) While this
occurred in each of the commissions created by CODESI, and civil
society supported the work of the commission, very little has been
done to bring about a change to the hegemonic structures that gov-
ern the development of the information society in Peru.
OSIPTEL and the MTC have established consultation mecha-
nisms for policy and regulation projects, opening up the possibility
for participation by different sectors of society. But this opening
does not translate into a real possibility for participation in deci-
sion-making.
FITEL provided an opportunity for civil society organisations
(CSOs) to present projects that would be financed with resources
from the Fund. However, the mechanisms for actually receiving the
financing are very complicated and require years of continual nego-
tiation. The Vice Ministry of Communications’ Projects Office has
not provided opportunities for engagement in implementing projects,
and all the initiatives are directly implemented by the Projects Office
or in conjunction with other state entities.
Various CSOs have begun contacting each other, spurred by a
need to join together to create an agenda that allows them to design
a common strategy. This process has resulted in the creation of the
Private Council for a Digital Agenda for Peru (CPAD),23  initially formed
by the Committee for Information Technologies of the Chamber of
Commerce of Lima, the Peruvian Association of Internet Service
Companies, COMMON Peru (Association of Information Technol-
ogy User Companies) and Alfa-Redi.
Since May 2005, Perú-Digital24  has been the electronic discus-
sion space for issues related to the information society in Peru. More
than 300 messages circulate monthly on the list, which brings to-
gether more than 370 social actors involved in information society
processes in Peru. The presence of political actors and policy-mak-
ers on the list has allowed collective reflection to inform some po-
litical decisions. The list has become, in effect, the most important
space for engagement by civil society and the private sector.
Conclusions
In analysing the development of information society policies in Peru,
we come up against a structure that still perceives ICT issues as
“technical” issues, in which the relevant political actors have yet to
take the reins.
A multi-sectoral commission set up to monitor the implemen-
tation of the Digital Agenda for Peru (developed by CODESI) is one
of the spaces from which there has been an attempt to carry for-
ward a coordinated effort for a national ICT strategy. However, a
document worked on between 2003 and 2004 and finalised in April
2005, which then spent all of 2006 under “review”, was overtaken
by reality. An update of the Agenda found that many of the goals had
20 <www.intgovforum.org>.
21 The member countries of CAATEL are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela, which comprise the Andean sub-region of South America.
22 For more information, see: <www.funredes.org/mistica/castellano/ciberoteca/
participantes/docuparti/Informe_Foro_Andino_de_SI.rtf>.
23 <www.agendadigital.org>.
24 <www.dgroups.org/groups/peru-digital>.
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no baseline, making the setting of minimal indicators the first task
(which OSIPTEL has efficiently done).25
Aside from this, CODESI’s greatest contribution has perhaps been
the promotion of dialogue, the search for consensus, placing the is-
sue of the information society on the agenda and helping to under-
stand that the phenomenon is not just technological.
The dialogue with the CPAD has led to the understanding that
public efforts cannot be separated from private ones, and that a shared
agenda is more than necessary. Above all, the need to make the themes
of the information society a government priority has become evident,
just as they are being prioritised in the private sector and in civil soci-
ety, and are reflected in the activities of international and regional
bodies.
While some countries create specialised institutions for research
on infrastructure topics, the one that existed in Peru (INICTEL) – and
that needed improvement and updated goals – was dismantled.
We have said that 2006 saw progress and setbacks with regard to
ICT policies in Peru. It resulted in a fruitful and constructive dialogue
among activists, academics and businesspeople linked to ICTs, and a
positive balance with respect to the consensus generated at certain
levels of public administration regarding the sector’s needed reforms,
beyond the installation of infrastructure. We now possess valuable in-
formation for directing and guiding policies, and there is an entity (the
Office of the Ombudsman) charged with rigorously ensuring that citi-
zens are the principal beneficiaries of the reforms implemented.
On the other hand, 2006 has left many questions. Among them:
How does the dismantling of INICTEL fit into plans for the informa-
tion society? How would renegotiation with Telefónica help increase
internet penetration in Peru? Why has CODESI 2 not created a space
for political dialogue with the relevant actors? It is also worth asking
about follow-up on promising experiences such as the Multi-Sectoral
Commission on Computer and ICT Crimes led by the MTC and the
Multi-Sectoral Commission on Domain Names, as well as necessary
legislation such as the legislation on protection of personal data.
For non-governmental actors, questions also arise. What is the
private sector’s responsibility in creating public-private alliances on
issues of ICT for development? How is civil society involved in the
processes of the information society? What are non-governmental
actors doing on the issue of digital literacy? How can we move from
reflection to direct action?
From another perspective we could ask ourselves how local ef-
forts have been meshed in the context of a regional and global process
like the information society, and how we can ensure that Peru’s efforts
are not disconnected from regional trends. To what degree can Peru
lead and become an engine of regional processes in ICT policies?
The year 2006 also left a negative balance of government reform
that is not based on an understanding of how to move the country’s
information society forward. In particular, it left unresolved the ur-
gent need for a government ICT policy incorporated into the National
Accord, and therefore by consensus of the various political forces.
Deepening political dialogue, expanding public-private alliances
and continuing to safeguard the development of the information soci-
ety are three things that should be priorities for those who are work-
ing to make Peru a more equitable and just society. 
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Introduction
The Republic of the Philippines, with a population of almost 90 mil-
lion, is an archipelago of more than 7,100 islands spread over 300,000
square km. It occupies a strategic position within the Southeast Asian
region. The Philippines emerged, after a 425-year history of colonial-
ism and a recent traumatic period of authoritarianism, as a flawed
democracy labouring under continuing economic underdevelopment
and periodic political upheaval.
The country has been ruled by a succession of elected govern-
ments by and large representing political elites who are also domi-
nant in the economy, including the media and information and com-
munications technology (ICT) sectors. The economy continues to
struggle amidst a shifting globalised world order: economic growth
is sluggish, poverty still widespread, and wide income disparities en-
dure.3  Political crises hound the administration of current President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, amidst lingering questions on her 2004 elec-
toral mandate.4  Armed challenges from communist rebels and Mus-
lim separatists persist, and a restive military continues to gain influ-
ence in the country’s political life. At the same time, however, Philip-
pine civil society is one of the most vibrant in the world, and contin-
ues to be at the forefront in advocating for good governance, sustain-
able development, socioeconomic and political reforms, and commu-
nication rights.
After the Martial Law years,5  freedom of expression naturally
exploded, and a largely free (and freewheeling) press and mass me-
dia regained its pre-Martial Law reputation as one of the most liberal
in the region. Ironically, despite a free press, working in the Philippine
media was recently considered a dangerous job for journalists – many
have been murdered over the past five years.6
The telecommunications sector was deregulated in the 1990s,
and universal access to telephony rose steadily, especially with the
recent boom in mobile phones and short messaging service (SMS).
The Philippines formally linked to the internet in 1994, and it remains
largely unregulated today. Though the infrastructure is present, ac-
cess rates for the majority of the population remain low. The neoliberal
free market economic paradigm continues to be contested, including
within the communications sectors, where significant sections are
dominated by big private enterprises and conglomerates. ICTs are
embraced in national plans for their socioeconomic potential, but ICT
and internet governance is uneven due to limited state capacity, lack
of resources, and occasional regulatory capture by dominant market
players.
This report seeks to present national trends in the country’s ICT
sector, with a particular emphasis on the framework for ICT policy
and governance in the Philippines. It also looks at how civil society
has been engaged in this arena.
The first of two main sections seeks to give a brief national over-
view. Its sub-sections look to provide both the context for public policy,
as well as an initial evaluation by civil society of the current state of
existing ICT plans.
The next section provides a short assessment of people’s par-
ticipation in ICT policy and governance for the period 2000 to 2006,
with a description of civil society engagement in the policy process. It
ends with an evaluation of recurring issues that still have to be ad-
dressed by development stakeholders, particularly civil society or-
ganisations (CSOs).
The choice of what to include in this report is informed by it
being the first one on the Philippines information society to be part of
a collection of reports that will be updated periodically. It hopes to
serve as a conceptual baseline for looking at ICT policy and govern-
ance in the Philippines. Specific areas introduced here can be further
fleshed out in future publications.
This report draws from research conducted by the Foundation
for Media Alternatives (FMA) dealing with many of the policy areas
and themes under discussion. It reflects a perspective of advocates-
in-action – the public policy issues pertaining to people’s participa-
tion in the policy process are ongoing advocacy concerns for CSOs in
the Philippines (including the FMA). Actual CSO engagement serves
as the experiential backbone of this report, which the authors hope
will serve to unite diverse constituencies of communication rights
advocates, and build a common public interest front for multi-
stakeholder policy initiatives in 2007 and beyond.
Country situation
Indicators and statistics
National Indicators
Telephony: The Philippines has around 6.5 million installed fixed phone
lines, but only a little more than half (3.4 million) are subscribed – an
indicator of the service’s continuing lack of affordability for a signifi-
cant portion of the population. Still, liberalisation and competition
during the 1990s has served to move the Philippines from a country
with a teledensity of less than one telephone for every 100 persons in
1 <www.fma.ph>.
2 With research assistance from Nina Somera.
3 From a ranking of 77th in 2000, the Philippines dropped to 84th in the 2006
United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report (UNDP,
2006).
4 There were two failed attempts to impeach Arroyo in Congress, after she admitted
phoning a top election official at the height of the 2004 vote counting. This
triggered prominent Cabinet resignations and periodic street protests in 2005-
2006. She has so far survived, labelling the protests part of a rightist-leftist
conspiracy to oust her.
5 This refers to the period from 1972 to 1986. Then-president Ferdinand Marcos
declared martial law in September 1972, and established authoritarian rule up to
the time he was ousted in a popular uprising in February 1986, which came to be
known as the EDSA People Power Revolt.
6 For a state of the country’s media, see the website of the National Union of
Journalists of the Philippines (<www.nujp.org>) and reports from international
groups such as Reporters Without Borders (<www.rsf.org/
article.php3?id_article=20795>). Reports of recent attacks on freedom of
expression during the 2006 state of emergency are widespread. See the blogsite
of the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism (<www.pcij.org/blog/
?p=668>).
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the years from 1970-1990, to one with a fixed-line density of 7.76 and
a mobile phone density of 41.3 in 2005.
By 2005, mobile telephone subscribers outnumbered fixed line
subscribers ten to one, given the popularity and affordability of SMS.
Fixed-line subscriptions have seen very little growth, and installations
have declined since a peak in 2001. On the other hand, total mobile
phone subscribers have increased tremendously from only 34,600
subscriptions in 1991, to 34.8 million in 2005. Recent data from the
telecommunications industry estimates the number reaching 40 mil-
lion, 90% being prepaid subscribers.11  Data from the National Tele-
communications Commission (NTC), the industry’s regulator, shows
that by the end of 2005, Philippine mobile phone users sent an aver-
age of 250 million text messages daily, making the Philippines one of
the top “texting” countries in the world.12
Internet: It is difficult to peg the actual number of internet users,
with estimates ranging from 4 million in 2004,13  to 7.82 million as of
the first quarter of 2005 (CICT, 2006). The latter figure represents
about 9% of the population. It is estimated that around half of the
internet users are internet subscribers, while the rest have only inter-
mittent access (i.e. via schools, offices or internet cafés).
Broadcasting: The number of radio and television broadcast sta-
tions has also increased significantly over the past ten years. The NTC
reports a 50% increase in AM stations (from 275 to 373) from 1991 to
2004, and a tripling of FM stations (from 208 to 587). Television sta-
tions have increased from 80 to 229, while cable television stations
have increased almost 30 times over from 56 to 1,453.14  This space is
dominated by large privately-owned national media networks with local
affiliate TV and radio stations; they typically also account for the high-
est market shares.15
Regional data
Compared to its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
neighbours, in 2003 the Philippines had one of the highest education
and literacy levels, but had a moderate ratio of ICTs to population. This
reflects the relative socioeconomic standing of the country among its
neighbours. According to the International Telecommunications Union,
while the Philippines has the second highest literacy and primary and
Table 1: Selected Philippine ICT indicators
Indicators Number
Installed fixed telephone lines 6,538,387 (2005)
Subscribed fixed telephone lines 3,367,252 (2005)
Mobile telephone subscribers 34,778,995 (2005)
Fixed lines per 100 population 7.76 (2005)
Subscribed lines per 100 population 4.00 (2005)
Mobile phones per 100 population 41.30 (2005)
Internet subscribers 1,440,000
(estimate, 2005)
Internet users (estimates, 2005) 4 million
to 7.8 million
Broadband internet subscribers 165,000 (2005)7
Internet café prices (per hour) PHP 33.43
(2005) (USD 0.65)8
Internet subscription prices PHP 386.48
(per month) (2005) (USD 7.02)
Fixed line rental charges PHP 500.07
(per month) (2005) (USD 9.08)
Mobile telephony charges variable9
Personal computers (home use) 2,140,000 (2003)
Televisions (households) 10,579,000 (2003)
Radios (households) 10,937,000 (2003)
Television stations 232 (2005)
Radio stations 375 AM,
580 FM (2005)
Cable television stations 1,480 (2005)
Sources: National Telecommunications Commission 2005 Statistical Data;10
National Statistics Office 2005 Consumer Price Index data; AC Nielsen August-
December 2004 survey; National Statistics Office 2003 Family Income and
Expenditure Survey; International Telecommunications 2003 ICT Report.
7 As reported in the Manila Standard Today (MST, 2006).
8 At the 2005 average foreign exchange rate of PHP 55.08 to USD 1
(source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas).
9 Entry costs for mobile telephony are very low, with brand new phones costing as
little as PHP 2,000 (USD 40), and a SIM card from PHP 65-150 (USD 1.30-3.00).
While a local voice call costs an average PHP 7 (USD 0.14) a minute, SMS is very
inexpensive, costing just PHP 1 (around USD 0.02) per SMS to networks within
the country.
10 See: <www.ntc.gov.ph/consumer-frame.html>.
11 Based on initial figures given by telephone companies and market share
projections by analysts (<www.cellular-news.com/story/21070.php>). The figures
are probably overstated, mainly by marketing departments of phone companies,
as they refer to total numbers of subscriptions, and do not account for churn
rates or inactive accounts.
12 The prepaid model lets owners buy on-air “credits” via ubiquitous prepaid cards
in PHP 100 and 300 (USD 2.00-6.00) denominations. However, the introduction
of “retail” on-air credits (“loads”) which can be purchased from neighbourhood
stores for as little as PHP 25 (USD 0.50) or can be passed from phone to phone
within the same network in denominations as low as PHP 5 (USD 0.10) has made
it possible for users to buy just enough credits for their daily budgets.
13 “Philippine internet users reach four million” [online], Asia Media, 30 March
2004. Available from: <www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-
southeastasia.asp?parentid=9672>.
14 The high number of TV stations is due to the fact that a great majority are merely
local stations which operate in small regional areas. They produce local content
and earn local advertising revenue, and usually are affiliated with one of the six
large national TV stations. This is also true for local cable stations, which act as
resellers of the national cable companies for a particular local market.
15 Although there are media ownership restrictions, large media conglomerates
typically have local “affiliates” in regional centres as part of their network. There is
a state-owned TV and radio network, but it is not as popular as it is perceived to
be by government mouthpieces. There are very few pure community-owned
outlets, mainly because the licensing regime is restrictive.
secondary enrollment rates, its fixed-line telephone penetration rate is
one of the lowest in Southeast Asia. However, other ICT indicators such
as mobile phone, personal computer (PC) and internet penetration rates
are close to the median of its neighbours (ITU/ORBICOM, 2005).
Global rankings
Globally, the Philippines is typically ranked somewhere in the middle
or lower echelons of international indices that attempt to measure
ICT access, availability and resources (NSCB, 2006):
• The latest ITU/Orbicom Digital Opportunities (Infostates) Index
(2005) ranks the Philippines 94th out of 180 countries.
• The UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) ICT Diffu-
sion Index (2005) ranks the country 97th out of 180 countries.
• The International Data Center (IDC) Information Society Index
(2005) ranks it 48th out of 53 countries.
• The Economist Intelligence Unit’s E-Readiness Index (2006) ranks
it 56th out of 68 countries.
• The World Economic Forum Network Readiness Index (2005)
ranks it 70th out of 115 countries.
In these ranking systems the country is shown to have higher
levels of human capital and a relatively open investment/business
environment. But it fares poorly primarily due to a low rate of access
to ICTs amongst the general population (except for mobile phones)
and the relative lack of public and private investments in improving
telecommunications infrastructure.
ICT policy development: instruments, institutions, roadmaps
Policy instruments
National ICT planning is a fairly recent phenomenon in the country.
The following is a brief overview of the evolution of the country’s ICT
plans and policy institutions (Alegre, 2001).
Planning documents, from NITP to IT21: An early Strategic Pro-
gramme for Information Technology (SPRINT) in the mid-1980s
evolved into a National IT Plan (NITP) in 1989. This was updated in
1994 to NITP 2000, and for the first time was integrated into the coun-
try’s broad socioeconomic planning framework, the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP, 1993-98). This signified that
ICTs could not be separate from overall economic and social goals
and national development strategies.
NITP 2000 was in turn updated in 1997, resulting in the National
Information Technology Plan for the 21st Century (IT21), which sought
to provide direction for ICTs over the long term (i.e. 10-25 years).
Because of its overarching objectives and long-term perspective, it
became a main reference document for other succeeding policy in-
struments, including the Philippine Information Infrastructure Policy
(PIIP), the Philippine government’s web strategy, RPWeb, and the
Government Information Systems Plan (GISP).
ICT for global competitiveness: In 2000, a particular policy han-
dle for promoting e-business in the country was developed, the Internet
Strategy for the Philippines, or ISP.com. This strategy was developed
in parallel with efforts led by the private sector to have a law govern-
ing e-commerce passed at around the same time. The Electronic Com-
merce Act of 2000 was passed that year due to these joint private-
public sector efforts (Congress of the Philippines, 2000).
Telecommunications-related instruments: Other notable policy
instruments were those formulated for the recently liberalised telecom-
munications industry. The main one is the Public Telecommunicatio-
ns Policy Act of the Philippines (Congress of the Philippines, 1995),
to which several amendments are now being proposed to mirror shifts
in the ecology of telecommunications (particularly in relation to con-
vergence). However, several other recently issued policy guidelines
from the National Telecommunications Commission (see below) are
also significant. These include Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 05-
08-2005, Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) as a Value Added Service
(VAS); MC No. 07-08-2005, Rules and Regulations on the Allocation
and Assignment of 3G Frequency Bands; and guidelines issued on
the use of 802.11 (Wi-Fi).
Policy institutions
The key policy institution that served as a coordinating body for ICT
policy formulation and implementation evolved from the original IT Co-
ordinating Council (ITCC) of the mid-1980s into the National IT Council
(NITC) in the 1990s. It then became the IT and e-Commerce Council
(ITECC) – a merger of the ITCC and the e-Commerce Promotion Coun-
cil – which existed from 2000 to 2004 until a new governmental body
came into being as a transition to an envisioned (and still to be created)
Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT).
Country Lines per 100 population Literacy rate Enrollment (as percent Number per 100 population
of school-age population)
Fixed Mobile Internet Primary Secondary Tertiary TV Residential PC Internet
lines
Table 2: Comparative ICT indicators, ASEAN countries
Philippines 3.6 27.0 0.6 95.6 112.1 81.9 30.4 76.4 14.4 3.2 5.5
Indonesia 3.9 8.7 0.3 88.4 110.9 57.9 15.1 56.7 12.6 1.3 3.8
Malaysia 18.0 44.2 4.3 88.9 95.2 69.7 26.0 92.0 60.6 16.7 34.4
Singapore 45.0 85.2 115.7 93.1 94.3 74.1 43.8 98.6 100.0 69.5 50.9
Thailand 9.6 39.4 1.6 96.0 12.1 82.8 36.8 93.3 28.2 4.5 11.1
Vietnam 4.7 2.3 0.2 93.0 103.4 69.7 10.0 86.1 13.4 1.1 4.3
Lao PDR 1.2 2.0 0.2 67.3 114.8 40.6 4.3 30.7 4.8 0.4 0.3
Cambodia 0.2 3.5 0.1 70.1 123.4 22.2 2.5 42.8 1.0 0.2 0.2
Source: ITU/Orbicom (2005)
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This transitional body was the presidential Commission on Informa-
tion and Communications Technology (CICT).
Other government agencies have also played key roles in ICT
policy development and implementation even before the CICT’s time:
• The National Computer Centre (NCC) is the agency tasked to
oversee the government’s acquisition of ICT resources and in-
frastructure and to build its technical capacities, making it cen-
tral to e-government initiatives.
• The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),
as its name reveals, is in charge of the country’s transportation
and communications systems and is the government’s repre-
sentative to the ITU. One of its sub-agencies, the Telecommuni-
cations Office (TelOf), was traditionally tasked to provide telecom-
munications services in under-serviced areas.
• The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is the regu-
latory and quasi-judicial body that approves guidelines, rules,
and regulations related to telecommunications and media facili-
ties and services. NTC was for a long time also an attached agency
of the DOTC.
All these institutions (or, in the case of the DOTC, its communi-
cation-related agencies) were to be integrated under a new DICT, which
still had to be created by legislation, and which would also then sub-
sume the functions of ITECC.16  When the proposed DICT legislation
got snagged in Congress, the CICT was created to continue institu-
tional momentum.
Commission on Information and Communications Technology
(CICT): With the governance of ICTs moving to the forefront of global
and national policy discourse, there was an effort to streamline ITECC
and make it more responsive to new challenges. However, it remained
essentially a private-public sector advisory council without special-
ised administrative and operational support. With the DICT on hold,
President Arroyo issued Executive Order 269 in 2004, creating the
CICT and placing it directly under her office. This affirmed her role as
top “ICT champion” within government, and gave political weight to
the role of ICTs within her administration.
The CICT was set up as a merger of the following government
agencies: ITECC, the NCC, the NTC, TelOf and the Telecommunicatio-
ns Policy and Planning Group – all components of the DOTC. Execu-
tive Order 269 provided for the appointment of five full-time commis-
sioners, headed by a chair who was conferred the rank of cabinet
secretary (i.e. minister).
The CICT immediately set out to fulfill its mandate to be the gov-
ernment’s “primary policy, planning, coordinating, implementing, regu-
lating, and administrative entity,” and to develop “integrated and stra-
tegic ICT systems and reliable and cost-efficient communication fa-
cilities and services.”17
From the start, the CICT was deemed a transitional institutional
arrangement. While the opposition to a new department for ICTs con-
tinues to this day, the creation of a DICT from the current CICT
remains on the radar of the present administration. It has a growing
base of support from government and industry players who feel a
department-level agency would be beneficial to ICT policies and pro-
grammes in the country.
However, the CICT faces other political obstacles. Aside from a
very low budgetary allocation, it continues to lose much of its politi-
cal clout. While the NTC – the powerful licensing and regulatory agency
for media and telecommunications – was part of the CICT since its
creation, it was transferred back to the DOTC in 2006 by virtue of a
legal technicality and under less than transparent circumstances. Both
NTC and CICT officials expressed surprise at the unexpected move
and civil society groups privately communicated their disapproval and
saw political agendas at work.18  However, the NTC transfer became a
fait accompli with CICT officials who had to advance the line that the
regulatory agency would still fall under the envisioned DICT – eventu-
ally. However, this development has served to weaken the CICT’s po-
sition in overseeing the all-important (and lucrative) telecommunica-
tions industry in favour of the DOTC (perceived as more “friendly” to
the carriers).
The 2006 strategic ICT roadmap
This body of legal instruments and the ecosystem of institutions out-
lined above form the framework for the country’s ICT policy develop-
ment. Initiatives are implemented subject to particular points of em-
phasis depending on the priorities of the administration in power, as
well as those of particular people appointed to the policy institutions
themselves. During ITECC’s streamlining in 2001 – marked by its trans-
fer from the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry to the
Office of the President – the need for a strategic roadmap was felt in
order to operationalise the broad ICT plans into concrete and coher-
ent programmes.
As a result, ITECC devised a shorter and more focused planning
framework to guide its own work. The ITECC “roadmap” was not a
comprehensive country strategy as some were expecting, but did
contain priorities for five main areas (which corresponded to ITECC’s
working committees active at the time): e-government, business de-
velopment, infrastructure, human resource development, and legisla-
tion and policy. The significance of this focused but quite limited agenda
cannot be underestimated – the strategy also became by and large
the operational framework of the soon-to-be created CICT.
When the CICT was born in 2004, it carried over the ITECC
roadmap as a de facto initial work plan; it became the core of CICT
presentations in various forums in 2004 and 2005. By late 2005, after
the conclusion of the Tunis phase of the World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society (WSIS), the CICT chair then initiated a process to up-
date the roadmap, and to develop a more comprehensive strategy for
the five-year period 2006 to 2010.
The result, The Philippine Strategic Roadmap for the ICT Sector:
Empowering a Nation Through ICT (CICT, 2006), which underwent
limited consultation in the latter part of 2006, was prepared for pub-
lishing in time for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) meetings in
Greece and the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Turkey (both in
November 2006).
16 Other national government agencies which may develop some ICT policy
functions but do not have organic links to the CICT at present include the Optical
Media Board (OMB), the Intellectual Property Office attached to the Department of
Trade and Industry, and some agencies of the Department of Science and
Technology.
17 A recent global ranking of e-government readiness in 191 countries placed the
country at 41st, ahead of most of its ASEAN neighbours, save Singapore – a
development well received by government officials. See: <www.cict.gov.ph>.
18 Some NGOs, including the FMA, analysed the move as related to the
administration’s desire to monitor broadcast agencies more closely, coming on
the heels of moves to limit freedom of expression in the light of the political crisis
which erupted in 2005. The “rent-seeking” angle put forward by some observers
relates to the lucrative licensing functions of NTC, a part of which some
politicians were perceived to covet.
Aside from outlining a set of seven guiding principles, it included
what it called “Strategic Programmes and Initiatives”. These were:
• Ensuring universal access to ICTs
• Developing human capital for sustainable human development
• E-governance: using ICTs to promote efficiency and transpar-
ency in government
• Strategic business development to enhance competitiveness in
the global markets
• Outlining a legal and policy agenda for the Philippine ICT sector.
Recent changes in the CICT (in 2006, three commissioners re-
signed, including the former chair who had initiated the roadmap re-
view process) posed challenges to the adoption of the new strategy:
the new commissioners were not invested in the original process of
developing the document. Indications are that a newer version, incor-
porating the views of the new commissioners, will be produced in the
future, suggesting a lack of institutional continuity that plagues bu-
reaucratic transitions of this nature.19
Participation in global and regional governance spaces
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)
The Philippine government participated in the WSIS and sent representa-
tives to all the preparatory meetings, as well as to the Summits in Geneva
(2003) and Tunis (2005). Government delegates came either from the
DOTC, NTC or CICT (which came into being during the second phase of
the WSIS); or, when costs became a problem, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), from its mission in Geneva or its consulate in Tripoli.20
However, there was no continuity of participation – government
representatives to the Preparatory Committee meetings changed from
meeting to meeting, with hardly any coordination among attendees –
and no formal Philippine position for the WSIS was developed which
would guide its interventions in the intergovernmental negotiations.
A proposed Philippine position during the early Geneva phase drafted
by representatives of the DOTC, NTC and NCC was not approved by
their DFA counterparts, and no process to harmonise divergent posi-
tions was ever initiated. As a result, the Philippines was not a player
in the WSIS debates, and merely allied itself with either regional (e.g.
ASEAN) positions taken previously, or those of the Group of 77 devel-
oping nations during the actual WSIS meetings.
It was clear that the Philippine ICT policy infrastructure – which
itself was undergoing transition at the time from ITECC to the CICT –
was not prepared to engage the WSIS in a strategic way, due to a host
of factors, such as reorganisation, lack of resources, weak state ca-
pacity, and inter-agency turf wars. The CICT did convene a Philippine
Summit on the Information Society (PSIS) in 2004 and 2005, osten-
sibly to develop a Philippine position, but discussions never reached
the level needed to strategically engage the WSIS debates. The two
PSIS meetings were primarily high-profile industry-driven events,
rather than public policy summits that were a culmination of a strate-
gic consultation process. CSOs had been proposing the latter since
2003, but no resources were ever allocated for this.
To be fair, the Philippines maximised its WSIS participation in
other ways. For instance, it considered the Summit agreements as
reference documents for its own national policy development and it
took advantage of the intergovernmental meetings to strengthen ex-
isting networks and forge new ones with donors and other ICT ac-
tors. The Philippines also sent the new CICT chair and a new commis-
sioner to the Athens IGF meetings and Antalya ITU meetings in 2006,
indicating the country’s commitment to WSIS implementation.
Other global spaces
The country continues to participate in all annual ITU conferences,
and recently regained a seat in the 12-seat ITU Council (Oliva, 2006a).
Though it is an active member of global bodies such as the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organisa-
tion (WIPO), and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
sation (UNESCO), there is little (if any) interface between the policy
discussions taking place in these spaces and ICT policy forums relat-
ing to WSIS commitments and their implementation. Communication
rights advocates are increasingly saying that trade considerations (i.e.
as articulated in the WTO and WIPO) continue to override the more
socially oriented goals expressed at the WSIS.
Regional spaces
Philippine ICT policy-makers are more present in regional spaces.
The Philippines is a member of the regional counterpart of the ITU,
the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT). The same government networks
collaborate in two other distinct bodies – ASEAN and Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) – each with its own plans and pro-
grammes relating to information society issues.
In 2000 ASEAN adopted an e-ASEAN Framework Agreement
(ASEAN, 2000) and an e-ASEAN Roadmap, and the telecommunica-
tions and information ministers of the member countries (TELMIN) and
their senior officials (TELSOM) meet regularly. An e-ASEAN Working
Group and various TELSOM working groups have been set up.21  Simi-
larly, APEC has its own counterpart TELMIN and TELSOM mechanisms,
and its Telecommunications and Information (APEC TEL) Working Group
works to implement an e-APEC Strategy adopted in 2001 (APEC, 2001).
It is worthwhile to note that all of these forums require time and
resources for the government to attend and meaningfully participate
in them – resources not always available to developing countries like
the Philippines. The swift pace of change in the global ICT sector – a
situation which has policy lagging behind technology – also places
particular pressures on the government.
One tactic used by the government is to let the private sector take
the lead in developing the parameters of the country’s policy framework
within global spaces such as the ITU or WIPO, or even – despite civil
society criticism – in defining national policy itself. The results have been
uneven in producing sound policies that promote the public interest.19 Although a late version of the strategic roadmap was published in November
2006, as part of the grant received by the CICT from a donor agency,
conversations with the new CICT chair indicate that the new commissioners were
not as committed to it, as it did not as yet contain their own refinements and
suggestions. The presentation of a civil society critique of the roadmap (produced
in late 2006) also became a factor in the new chair considering it merely a
working document. It is not clear whether an updated version will be prepared for
2007.
20 The DFA, through its United Nations International Office, traditionally coordinates
country participation in UN summits.
21 TELSOM working groups address the following issues: information infrastructure;
e-society/ICT capacity-building; e-commerce/trade facilitation; and universal
access/digital divide. There is also an ASEAN Telecommunications Regulators
Council (ATRC). For background on the e-ASEAN initiative, see:
<www.aseansec.org/7659.htm>.
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Public policy issues: a civil society agenda
An initial assessment of the strategic ICT roadmap
In November 2006, representatives of more than 40 CSOs presented
their comments on the new draft roadmap to the CICT in a multi-
stakeholder forum. CSOs did affirm certain specific sections of the docu-
ment, including its guiding principles; its section on human capital de-
velopment; its proposals on free and open source software (FOSS) in
education; and its initial position on universal access. However, they
also presented a comprehensive critique of the roadmap, calling atten-
tion to specific gaps corresponding to key public policy concerns deemed
strategic, but which were not addressed. It noted a lack of harmonisa-
tion of the roadmap’s goals with those established in international agree-
ments, notably the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and even
most of the WSIS commitments themselves. CSOs also challenged the
apparent underlying market-driven development paradigm of the draft.
Listed below are just some of the major areas that represent
gaps in the draft from the point of view of civil society (FMA, 2006a).
These also represent a cross-section of the public policy issues that
CSOs are critically engaging with:
• Universal access/digital divide: Even with high mobile telephony
penetration, there remain glaring inequalities in ICT ownership
and use among households in different areas (e.g. rural versus
urban) and among different income brackets. For example, in
2003, only 11.2% of farming households owned telephones, com-
pared to 28.9% of all households nationwide. Access to personal
computers and especially internet services is clearly limited to
the most urbanised areas (Tuaño et al, 2007).
• CSOs rue the lack of baseline data on these “divides”, as well as
the inadequacy of current interventions to bridge them. The im-
portance of sectoral access strategies (e.g. for farmers, the ur-
ban poor, persons with disabilities, women) was emphasised,
the use of traditional media technologies (e.g. community radio)
was endorsed, and key policy gaps were noted (foremost was
the lack of an updated strategic spectrum management policy,
which would allocate spectrum for development use.)
• Competition policy/anti-trust issues: Even with the liberalisation
of the telecommunications sector, problems persist which need
strong regulatory action. CSOs note a lack of explicit rules that
prevent the dominant incumbents from controlling specific seg-
ments of the ICT market, allowing them to gain very high price
margins – already estimated at 84% in 1997. Predatory pricing
and unregulated bilateral interconnection agreements have tended
to squeeze out smaller industry players, and anti-trust issues
abound.22  CSOs have lauded a draft NTC consultative paper on a
competition policy for the ICT sector (NTC, 2006), which seeks to
strengthen regulation in this area, including the imposition of par-
ticular obligations on incumbents with significantly dominant mar-
ket power. Unfortunately this whole issue is absent in the roadmap.
• Free and open source software (FOSS): In 2004, 70% of govern-
ment operations still ran on proprietary platforms at enormous
cost to the country. The Philippines has yet to adopt FOSS as a
key development strategy. Although the CICT is beginning to
develop FOSS in its education strategy,23  the government has
been slow to do the same in public administration. At the very
least, CSOs were calling for a policy position adopting open stand-
ards in government.
• Internet governance: ccTLD administration reform: A long-stand-
ing issue has been the ownership and control of the Philippine
country code top-level domain (ccTLD), currently run as a pri-
vate monopoly by the original administrator. Public policy is-
sues abound, making this a test case in local internet govern-
ance and the extent of state sovereignty over a public internet
resource. A significant section of the internet community is clam-
ouring for reform and the re-delegation of the administrative func-
tions (and handing over of the databases/zone files) to a private
not-for-profit entity, a scenario contemplated by the CICT’s own
2005 guidelines.24  Yet the roadmap is silent on this issue, be-
traying a lack of political will to implement the latter.
• Intellectual property rights (IPR) and access to knowledge: Any
discussion of IPR – one of the more controversial issues in vari-
ous global governance spaces – is totally absent in past or present
ICT policy in the country. Given the growing critique of dominant
IPR frameworks and the effect of corporate-led patent and copy-
right regimes on developing countries, CSOs are pushing for more
flexible policies that take advantage of exceptions and
“flexibilities” in global rules, explore various open access mod-
els, and incorporate an indigenous articulation of the “commons”
concept (Peria et al, 2007).
• Mainstreaming gender in ICT policy: In 1995 the government
released a Gender and Development (GAD) Plan to facilitate gen-
der mainstreaming in public administration, with mandatory pub-
lic spending of 5% in each agency’s budget for women’s pro-
grammes. However, ICT policies and policy institutions have gen-
erally been gender-blind. The view that technology is gender-
neutral remains pervasive within the ICT policy community, and
special measures that recognise differences among men and
women users have been lacking. As a result, technologies and
user environments (i.e. for access) are not informed by gendered
analysis, design and planning and do not result in outcomes spe-
cifically targeted for women. A recent FMA study outlined the
various interventions needed to make ICT policy in the country
more gender-sensitive (Somera, 2007).
These are some of the public policy issues that CSOs have cited
as lacking in the current roadmap. They also represent key elements
of a more comprehensive civil society agenda for ICTs that is still to
be finalised – an initiative that CSOs plan to pursue in 2007.
Participation
Public-private sector collaboration
From the beginning, Philippine policy development has been relatively
open to private sector participation. In the various policy institutions,
the private sector – almost always represented by big business/indus-
try, but including the education sector – has been involved. With the
more open policy environment in the post-1986 era, and the tacit ac-
ceptance of the key role of the private sector in ICT development, pub-
lic-private sector collaboration has marked all institutional arrangements
up until the creation of the CICT. ITECC, in fact, had a private sector
22 For studies on competition in the telecommunications sector, see Patalinghug and
Llanto (2005) and Aldaba (2005).
23 See Lallana et al (2007).
24 For the CICT’s .ph guidelines, see CICT (2004). A comprehensive case study on
the issue is in Yu et al (2007).
co-chair, and its various working committees were all co-chaired by a
government and a private sector (usually industry) representative.
Even the current CICT, though a purely governmental structure,
has been open to private sector participation, particularly from the
carriers, service and applications providers, and industry associations.
As a result, in the various policy arenas the private sector’s voice is
often heard loud and clear.
CSO participation
Entering the policy space: ITECC
Civil society participation as a distinct sector is a fairly recent phe-
nomenon in the country, and is driven by individual non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs) with a communication rights-based perspec-
tive (CRIS, 2005). It was essentially in the more open ITECC structure
in 2000 that CSOs participated – albeit still under the ambit of the
private (i.e. non-government) sector.25 The leading role of the private
for-profit sector was largely the norm in major ICT policy spaces,
such as ITECC and the NTC on the national level, and the ITU confer-
ences and meetings on the international level, where the big telecoms
players sit side-by-side with government as “sector members”.
CSO representatives sensitised ITECC to the more social issues
surrounding ICTs, and gained legitimacy for their public-interest posi-
tions, although civil society’s impact was limited by the small number
of CSO representatives: only two persons in the 40-person council
meetings were from civil society. Realising that civil society’s constitu-
ency was still too weak for an effective lobby, one CSO representative
opted out of direct ITECC participation upon the latter’s restructuring in
2001, choosing to concentrate on constituency-building work.
 WSIS as catalyst
Aside from the early involvement in ITECC, there were few opportuni-
ties for CSOs to sit around the policy table before 2003. It was only
during the onset of the WSIS process, with its mandate for govern-
ments to reach out to the non-profit sector, that then-ITECC Executive
Director Virgilio Peña considered inviting civil society representatives
to join the WSIS national delegation. CSO participation in UN sum-
mits was common in other contexts, but there was no similar prec-
edent for the ICT sector, which was traditionally open only to industry
players and sectoral associations. Although NGOs engaging in ICT
policy during the time were still relatively few, the inclusion of two
people as civil society (and youth) representatives in WSIS Prepara-
tory Committee meetings, as well as the Summit itself, was a mile-
stone in 2003.
The WSIS appeared to change how government considered the
policy arena. Civil society ceased to be lumped together with indus-
try, and was now recognised as a distinct actor with its own impor-
tant contributions to the policy table. This clear shift was reflected in
the first Philippine Summit on the Information Society in 2004, par-
ticularly in determining summit participants. Half of the 200 slots for
invited participants were reserved for government representatives,
while the other half were now equally divided between the private
industry, education, and civil society sectors. The WSIS had opened a
door; it was now up to civil society to enter.
CSO-CICT engagement
Since then, ITECC and its successor, the CICT, have become more
open to civil society collaboration than any previous policy institu-
tions ever were. Either through informal consultative meetings (e.g.
for the ICT in Education Strategy), or through more formal joint initia-
tives (e.g. co-sponsored ICT training for NGOs), CSOs were generally
recognised as legitimate dialogue partners and the government reached
out to CSOs in a manner usually reserved for private industry. As civil
society’s advocacy initiatives increased, the CICT opened policy dis-
cussions on a wide range of concerns important to NGOs. These ranged
from traditional “NGO issues” (e.g. telecentre development, FOSS,
gender issues), to non-traditional NGO areas of concern (e.g. techni-
cal issues like Wi-Fi, ccTLD administration, broadband policy,
cybercrime). NGOs contributed positively to discussions and debates.
The CICT’s openness was reciprocated by civil society, which be-
came a partner in some CSO-driven policy initiatives. From 2005 to
2006, for instance, the FMA partnered with the CICT in setting common
policy development and research agendas in areas such as the “digital
divide”, the ccTLD administration issue, FOSS, and gender and ICT policy.
Earlier, WomensHub – an NGO focusing on gender and ICTs – also
partnered with the NCC on a gender and ICT policy study.
It appeared then that initial CSO disappointment at the Philippine
government’s WSIS (non)position abroad was being replaced by a
critical appreciation for a much more open and consultative Commis-
sion that was evolving at home.
Public hearings
CSOs explored other policy spaces alongside these developments.
Certain agencies of the government – in particular the NTC and the
ICT committees in Congress – were mandated to convene regular
public hearings whenever they would issue important sector guide-
lines or memorandum circulars, or when a draft bill was filed. These
consultative meetings were open venues where stakeholders could
voice their comments or concerns on a particular draft policy issued.
Few NGOs usually attended such hearings until fairly recently,
mainly because telecommunications (and the internet) was not yet a
traditional area of concern for many local civil society activists. But as
their technical understanding of the issues grew, and the public inter-
est character of the discourse became more evident, more began to
participate.
In a country where no strong consumer movement exists, NGOs
initially represented the consumer protection perspective in policy
discussions; from there it was not difficult to advocate for the public
interest character of public communication systems. Hearings from
2003 to 2006 in Congress (on the Cybercrime Bill, the Optical Media
Bill, the Anti-Terrorism Bills, and the FOSS in Government Bill), and
the NTC (on the WiFi and VOIP Guidelines and the Competition Policy),
plus CICT consultations (on the Public Domain Information and
Broadband Policy), increasingly included more and more NGO stake-
holders (FMA, 2006b).
Of course, these hearings were merely consultative in nature;
they certainly were not co-deliberative – i.e., government was basi-
cally still free to accept or reject any comments made by CSOs. But
they were the only expression of public consultation within the sec-
tor, and government officials were generally open to comments. In
addition, CSOs brought a public-interest perspective to these hear-
ings, a view that was not being expounded on by the members of the
“public” who usually attended: the phone companies, service provid-
ers, and other corporate industry players.
25 FMA Executive Director Alan Alegre was invited to sit in ITECC in 2000, the first
representative with a clear civil society perspective to sit in the highest Philippine
ICT policy-making body.
PH
IL
IP
PI
NE
S 
/ 1
91
Gl
ob
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
So
ci
et
y 
W
at
ch
 / 
19
2
An initial assessment of CSO engagement
Compared to before 2000, when hardly any civil society representa-
tive was actively engaging national ICT policy institutions, Philippine
CSOs have come a long way in carving their own space in the ICT
policy arena.
However problems persist in advancing peoples’ participation in Phil-
ippine ICT policy:
• Limits to transparency and accountability: Certain political deci-
sions still seem to be shielded from broad public information
and stakeholder intervention. These include: the CICT reorgani-
sation plan (involving how the new Commission is to be struc-
tured and “re-engineered”); NTC licensing decisions (e.g. the con-
troversial grant of 3G licenses currently being investigated by
Congress); and political decisions regarding the .ph ccTLD is-
sue. Even in determining the appointments to the CICT itself,
candidates are not publicly nominated and vetted, and the search
for possible appointees is opaque. At best, it shows that govern-
ment still lacks the full transparency essential for good govern-
ance and genuine multi-stakeholder partnership; at worst, it may
signify political horse-trading or even an orientation towards rent-
seeking (i.e. corruption-driven) agendas.
• There is often a tendency by policy-makers to confine civil soci-
ety participation to certain areas of concern – notably those re-
lating to the “social side” of ICT development, such as “digital
divide” issues and universal access programmes, and social wel-
fare concerns (health, education, agriculture, etc.). Although these
areas have a legitimate need for attention, and provide an oppor-
tunity for CSOs to craft significant public policy, CSOs’ work is
not limited to engagement in these areas only. Civil society must
be allowed to interrogate all facets of ICT policy development,
particularly those that are not usually considered part of its tra-
ditional ambit (e.g. macro-economic policy, technical specifica-
tions, etc.). The challenge is also for CSOs to show competence
in these areas, and to present concrete alternatives.
• Lack of institutionalisation of multi-stakeholder partnership: It
has been observed that the relatively open relationship between
CSOs and the CICT up to mid-2006 was affected by the resigna-
tions of two commissioners (and the pending resignation of an-
other in January 2007) who had been dealing with civil society
representatives directly. The appointment of new officials with
no previous experience in dealing with CSOs visibly slowed down
the momentum of the budding partnership. This was most evi-
dent in the roadmap review process, where civil society inputs
were not reflected in the latest draft, despite the fact that it was
the previous CICT chair who had called for civil society com-
ments (Oliva, 2006b). It is clear that the partnership was based
largely on good interpersonal relationships with specific com-
missioners forged during the WSIS process, without the corre-
sponding institutionalisation of CSO participation in the CICT.
• Lack of regional (sub-national) policy development spaces: Dur-
ing a policy dialogue between the CICT and CSOs in November
2006, CSOs pointed out that the lack of regionalisation of policy-
making structures and processes serves to privilege stakehold-
ers based in the capital, where most of the face-to-face policy
engagements occur. (Most policy processes and mechanisms
are not yet conducted online.) This gives a Manila-centric bias to
the whole process, as many regional stakeholders do not have
the resources to travel to the capital, fuelling the usual resent-
ment felt by a majority against “Manila imperialism”, and result-
ing in a potentially flawed policy.
• Limited CSO capacities in policy intervention: In many cases
where government solicits civil society inputs, CSOs do not al-
ways have the resources to adequately respond quickly and in a
meaningful way, reducing their potential influence on the policy
process. Civil society’s impact on public policy will always be a
function of both the soundness of its recommendations and the
capacity of its organised constituency to effectively advocate
them. CSO policy engagement will have to be supported by a
further strengthening of its intellectual and organisational re-
sources.
• Gender gaps: A recent study (Somera, 2007) outlined the vari-
ous gender gaps in Philippine ICT policy development, mani-
fested in ICT programmes and initiatives (e.g. universal access
projects, capacity-building programmes, budgetary allocation)
which are gender-blind. This is due to an absence of gender-
sensitive mechanisms within the ICT policy institutions (Somera,
2007). Although women comprise the majority of the CICT bu-
reaucracy, it is important to note that there has never been a
woman appointed as commissioner.
Conclusions
The Philippine experience presented in this paper shows both the limits
and possibilities of developing-country participation in governance
arenas (e.g. the WSIS). It demonstrates how effectively international
processes can influence local policy environments, but equally re-
veals how national contexts and dynamics play out in the local power
relations that influence public policy. It also shows how civil society
can be a significant actor if it engages strategically.
The Philippine experience at the WSIS has had a largely positive
impact on the country’s overall policy ecosystem, notwithstanding
the country’s passive role in the actual intergovernmental processes
and negotiations. CSOs took advantage of the Summit’s processes
and mandates, especially in advancing multi-stakeholder approaches
locally, and auditing national ICT plans.
Civil society has undoubtedly entered the ICT policy arena and has
positioned itself as a legitimate actor in this space. It has successfully
promoted a public interest discourse to frame its interventions and has
pinpointed specific policy areas for reform. But the task remains unfin-
ished, requiring continued strategic action on the national (and sub-
national) levels. The challenge is for CSOs to leverage their initial suc-
cesses, while strengthening their internal capacities, and to link up with
like-minded policy actors in order to have a tangible impact on specific
Philippine policy areas that remain problematic. 
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4 Introduction
During August and September 2006, the Strawberrynet team identi-
fied key ICT policy actors from Romania and mapped their roles and
relationships using public information available on government, busi-
ness and civil society organisation (CSO) websites. We paid particu-
lar attention to laws and regulations related to information and com-
munications technologies (ICTs), official statements, statistical data
and scientific research. Our empirical research consisted of key in-
formant interviews conducted during October 2006. These aimed at
understanding different stakeholders’ standpoints on Romanian ICT
policy priorities. We found the information provided by the Associa-
tion for Technology and Internet (APTI)2  particularly useful for our
analysis.
The Country situation section (below) presents the regional con-
text for Romania’s ICT policy-making process, highlighting the posi-
tive role played by EU accession criteria. We also discuss ICT-based
social inclusion policies and programmes concerning the three pil-
lars of strategic ICT use: access, skills and understanding. We con-
clude that Romania has experienced better access to ICTs and an in-
crease in ICT skills over the past years. This is supported by statisti-
cal data on progress made by Romania from 2003 to 2006. However,
gender and open source issues are not apparent in official ICT-related
public discourse.
The main ICT policy actors and their roles in the policy-making
process are presented in the Participation section. We find that gov-
ernmental agencies play a primary role in shaping ICT development,
supported by active business organisations. A key finding of this sec-
tion is that although there have been dynamic and positive changes
towards transparent ICT policy-making in Romania, problems remain.
These include the administration and management of the country code
top-level domain.ro. In terms of participation in the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS), the government’s involvement was
significant, but publicly invisible.
Country situation
Romania’s ICT policy landscape has been shaped by the political con-
text, particularly the accession negotiations with the EU from 15 Feb-
ruary 2000 to 8 December 2004. The EU considers ICTs a strategic
objective, and the European Commission insisted on ICT policy align-
ment with EU standards. As a result, the Romanian government ac-
celerated legislative processes during the period between 2001 and
2004. Some of the most important regulatory changes contributing
to an ICT-enabled environment included the liberalisation of the mar-
ket from 1 January 2003, and legislation dealing with universal ac-
cess, e-commerce and online security (such as e-signatures and e-
procurement).
This favourable context explains the rapid growth of the ICT mar-
ket in Romania and the steps taken towards more equitable access
and better skills. The ICT sector is the largest investment sector in
Romania, accounting for 68% of total investments, and has experi-
enced some of the most dynamic growth in the country: 22% from
2003 to 2004 and up to 25% for the 2004 to 2005 period, according
to estimates. The legal framework (free competition, a flat tax rate of
16%, more transparent and participatory decision-making processes)
has encouraged ICT investments in infrastructure, service quality
improvement and the launching of nationwide educational projects.
Market value is estimated to be over USD 1 billion. The sector now
boasts 1,800 general service providers. Among the top ten businesses
operating in Romania, three operate in the ICT field (Georgescu, 2006).
Internet penetration in June 2006 was 11.7% and 5.5% for
broadband access, calculated for the total number of inhabitants (22
million people). The audiovisual retransmission penetration rate, which
measures the percentage of households connected to a cable or sat-
ellite TV, was 55%, calculated for the total number of Romanian house-
holds.
The main social inclusion programmes run by Romanian gov-
ernmental agencies and international organisations such as the World
Bank and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) have focused on ICT access and skills improvement issues.
Community access to ICTs has been enabled by two ongoing
initiatives: the telecentres project, run by the National Regulatory Au-
thority for Communications (ANRC), and the Knowledge Economy
project,3  run by the Ministry of Communications and Information Tech-
nology. The ANRC’s telecentres project provides basic ICT access to
disconnected rural communities: two computers enabling internet, a
fax machine and two telephone terminals. The project started in De-
cember 2004, when five public access points were created through
public tendering. In 2005, 33 more villages were connected to the
world, and 170 more in 2006. The villages where the ANRC installed
telecentres were disadvantaged, as the demand and the consump-
tion potential of their inhabitants did not stimulate investment in
infrastructure roll-out. The ANRC, in partnership with the local ad-
ministrations and with telephony operators, covers the cost of
1 <www.sbnet.ro>.
2 <www.apti.ro>.
3 The project documents are available from: <www.worldbank.org.ro/external/
default/main?menuPK=287326&theSitePK=275154&pagePK=64027221&piPK=
64027220&Projectid=P088165>.
31 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Dec. 30 Jun.
2003 2004 2005 2006
Fixed telephones 19.98% 20.24% 20.31% 20.46%
Mobile telephones 32.47% 47.12% 61.76% 68.76%
Number of ISPs 233 515 981 1,154
Broadband
internet access 196,106 382,783 751,060 522,796
Table 1: ICT service penetration
Source: National Regulatory Authority for Communications (ANRC) (2006)
Strawberrynet Foundation1
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installation and maintenance of the access link for the telecentre. At
the end of a three-year period, the obligations of the operator will
cease and the local public administration will have to turn the telecentre
into a self-sustainable business.
The Knowledge Economy project aims to create 200 community
knowledge centres in rural and small town areas, after a pilot phase
of developing eight centres in strategic locations across Romania.
The most important digital inclusion programme for education
is the Romanian Education Network (RoEduNet).4  The aim of
RoEduNet is to offer universities and cultural and scientific non-profit
institutions the means to communicate with each other, as well as to
have access to the internet. The network is made up from redundant
bandwidth (34-155 Mbps) connecting the main communication nodes
in six big cities: Bucharest, Iasi, Tirgu Mures, Cluj, Timisoara and
Craiova. Most educational institutions are connected through local
nodes at the county level5  to the national backbone. The internet con-
nection is provided at the Bucharest node, using a 622 Mbps link
from GÉANT (a multi-gigabit pan-European data communications
network reserved specifically for research and educational use) and a
10 Mbps back-up link from the internet service provider (ISP) Roma-
nia Data Systems.
At the same time, the Ministry of Communications and Informa-
tion Technology and the Ministry of Education and Research ran the
200 Euro programme, through which the state provided PC-purchas-
ing aid to students from low-income families. In 2006, 28,005 fami-
lies benefited from the programme.6
International organisations played a positive role in raising aware-
ness on ICT issues and educating local non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and communities about ICTs and ICT-related issues from
2001 to 2005. Issues dealt with included e-government, internet rights,
data security and telecentre management. USAID funded and assisted
the Romanian Initiative for Information Technology, a know-how trans-
fer project targeting policy-makers, legal system actors and telecentre
developers, and the World Bank funded the eRomania Gateway initia-
tive in an effort to stimulate a knowledge society.7
In 2005, Romania ranked 44th out of 179 countries in a UN e-
readiness report. The report describes five stages of e-government,
each involving more citizen participation and more “networked pres-
ence”. The first stage is “emerging presence”, meaning passive online
visibility, such as a static website; the second is “enhanced presence”,
with some interactivity involved; the third is the stage of “interactive
presence”, where two-way communication between an institutional
entity and its client is enabled; the fourth stage is “transactional pres-
ence”, where financial transactions are possible; and the fifth is the
“networked presence” level, where all ICT services are integrated in a
user-friendly manner (UN, 2005).
A case study we developed on e-government in environmental
issues showed that Romanian environmental agencies are on the
second level of e-government – few of them have reached the inter-
active level.
Nevertheless, e-government initiatives have become part of
the mainstream ICT discourse in the country. Paying local taxes (a
pilot project in most Romanian municipalities) and accessing public
information on institutions’ websites are common daily topics for the
urban citizen, if not yet daily practices.
In October 2006 the ICT ministry published draft regulations on
website standards for local and central governments and their agen-
cies. This is an important regulatory step towards better usability and
accessibility for people with special needs. If implemented, the offi-
cial sites will be easier to find, use and update.
Public discourse in Romania is marked by a strong tone of “tech-
nocratic developmentalism” (Thompson, 2004, p. 11). The key mes-
sage in the public arena is that ICTs enable a better economic, social
and cultural environment for individuals and institutions, and that they
are a tool for development. But while access- and skills-related issues
are explicitly addressed, understanding processes and the power
games involved in policy-development are not explicit. This includes
debates concerning software alternatives and gender, ICTs and power.
Free and open source software (FOSS) is not part of the main-
stream ICT discourse. On a professional programmers’ community
level there is intense developmental activity, organised into twelve
Linux groups.8  However, no visible initiative promotes FOSS in public
administration and community development. In 2006 the Romanian
Open Source and Free Software Initiative (ROSI) was founded to pro-
mote FOSS and bridge the fragmented Linux communities. ROSI is
preparing to organise a conference in Romania in May 2007, and to
start up a FOSS advocacy project.9
Gender mainstreaming is also absent from public ICT discourse in
Romania. Non-profit initiatives aimed at women include events such as
the 2006 Eclectic Tech Carnival,10  “a carnival of exchanging computer-
related skills, ideas and art, by women and for women.” In 1997
Strawberrynet ran an Association for Progressive Communications
(APC) women’s networking project in Romania, providing basic emailing
and networking skills and distributing modems to women’s groups.
The internet is a new space for free expression in Romania, and
ICTs are beginning to influence power. The presidential campaign in
2004 had a significant ICT base (e.g. SMS-campaign, blogs, elec-
tronic posters) which impacted on the young, urban, connected popu-
lation (Manolea, 2005).
Participation
The information society is defined as a strategic goal by key govern-
mental actors (MCTI, 2002). We have identified twelve major ICT play-
ers in Romania, and they can be divided into three categories: gov-
ernmental agencies, business interest promoters and general public
interest advocates.
Seven of the major ICT players (more than half) belong to the
first category. Governmental agencies create, develop and monitor
the regulatory framework of ICT activities. The four business interest-
promoting associations identified are also strong and visible in the
public space. Their websites are linked to the main governmental ICT
portals and they are actively involved in the related policy-making
processes, at both the national and international level. Although most
business interest groups presented themselves as general public in-
terest advocates, we could only identify one genuine public interest
association: the Association for Technology and Internet (APTI).
4 <www.roedu.net>.
5 Romania is divided into 41 judetes (counties) and one municipality.
6 See: <euro200.edu.ro>.
7 More information available from: <www.riti-internews.ro> and <www.ro-
gateway.org>.
8 See: <wiki.lug.ro/mediawiki/index.php/Pagina_principal_>.
9 See: <www.eliberatica.ro>.
10 <www.eclectictechcarnival.org>.
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The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
(MCTI) (<www.mcti.ro>) is one of the most visible ICT policy actors
in Romania. According to its website, the ministry’s mission is to
“create solid premises that will ensure the transition to the informa-
tion society in Romania,” and it defines its role as implementer of the
government’s ICT policy. Communications Minister Zsolt Nagy is a
visible political personality and is seen as a “young technocrat”. Stra-
tegic documents and ICT-related laws and regulations are posted on
the MCTI website.
The National Regulatory Authority for Communications (ANRC)
(<www.anrc.ro>) is the institution entrusted with the implementation
of the national policy. The ANRC aims to accomplish major objectives
for the citizens’ benefit, such as promoting competition, protecting
the best interests of end-users and encouraging investment in infra-
structure. It is responsible for guaranteeing access to universal serv-
ice, and for protecting users’ rights, such as privacy, consumer pric-
ing transparency and special needs.
The General Inspectorate for Communications and Informa-
tion Technology (IGCTI) (<www.igcti.ro>) administers the radio fre-
quency spectrum and operates three e-government services: e-
guvernare (e-government), e-licitatie (e-procurement) and
autorizatiiauto (car authorisations).11  It has a user-friendly, profes-
sional website developed with EU funding.
The National Institute for Research and Development in
Informatics (ICI) (<www.ici.ro>) is the national operator of the Ro-
manian Computer Network for Research and Development (RNC). It
has been a research and development unit in ICTs since 1970 and is
the administrator, through the RNC, of the top-level domain .ro.
The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) (<www.cna.ro>) is a
public, autonomous authority under the control of parliament. The
Council was founded in 1992 in order to provide a legal framework
for a competitive audiovisual market in Romania. It regulates content
on TV and radio in order to protect consumers in general, and chil-
dren in particular. It has advisory competence, but no right to legisla-
tive initiative.
The Romanian Post (<www.posta-romana.ro>) is an important
ICT player for rural and remote areas due to its well-rooted network of
offices across Romania. The network, which is computerised, was
extended to 436 offices in April 2006. Computerised postal offices
offer online money transfer services for the general public, as well as
traditional postal services.
The National Radiocommunications Company (SNR)
(<www.snr.ro>) is shareholder-owned and one of the main providers of
networks and electronic communication services in Romania. It is a
leader in the broadcasting market. Separated from the state-owned post
and telecom company in 1991, SNR owns the main telecommunica-
tions infrastructure built in Romania before 1989. This largely accounts
for its prosperity as an ICT business. Its website is linked to the main
government website, suggesting some level of recognition in its field.
The Romanian Association for Audiovisual Communications
(ARCA) (<www.audiovizual.ro>) represents the interests of Romanian
broadcasters. ARCA is an extremely active association. It was involved
in a working group set up by the CNA that developed a draft proposal
for regulations concerning digital broadcasting. It also participated in
public consultations on the review of the Television Without Frontiers
Directive (TWFD) organised by the European Commission, as well as
in a consultation process devoted to the new draft of the Audiovisual
Media Services Directive in 2005.
The Technology and Communications Association (ATIC)
(<www.atic.ro>) advocates for ICT policy laws and regulations at the
national and international level. ATIC is a member of the World Infor-
mation Technology Software Alliance (WITSA) and the Council of Eu-
ropean Professional Informatics Societies (CEPIS) and has a busy
international conference schedule.
The Romanian Association of Engineers in Telecommunica-
tions (AITR) (<www.aitr.ro>) is a membership organisation for the
major telecommunications companies in Romania.
The Romanian Association for the Electronic and Software In-
dustry (ARIES) (<www.aries.ro>) is a strong professional association
lobbying for an enabling ICT environment. It is linked to the main
government websites.
The Romanian Association for Technology and Internet (APTI)
(<www.apti>) promotes internet rights, spam-free internet and pro-
gressive ICT regulations for businesses and civil society. Its mem-
bers were involved in the USAID-funded Romanian Initiative for Tech-
nology and Internet (RITI) from 2003 to 2005 and contributed to ICT
policy development through capacity-building and training, including
a skills transfer programme for the newly-formed ANRC, training
judges in cyberfraud and assisting telecentre managers with project
management. APTI president Bogdan Manolea is an active promoter
of internet rights in Europe and maintains a website and a blog on ICT
legislation.12
The country’s main ICT priorities were established in 2002 and
reinforced by the new government in 2004. They highlighted four key
areas in Romania: to increase economic competitiveness through ICTs;
to consolidate the ICT industry; to increase institutional performance
of the public administration through integrated ICT services; and to
increase citizens’ comfort. In order to achieve these developmental
standards, MCTI established a set of strategic objectives to be at-
tained by 2008. These included affordable and high quality telecom-
munications; access to broadband services; more employment op-
portunities for highly skilled job seekers in the new economy; better
information facilities for citizens to facilitate social integration; and
efficient, responsive public administration.13
ICT policy-making evolved quickly, pushed by the business com-
munity and pulled by the EU accession requirements. Between 2001
and 2005 an avalanche of legislative measures were adopted to com-
ply with the EU legislation (e.g. 2001: e-signature; 2002: communica-
tion regulation, audiovisual regulation, e-commerce; 2003: universal
access to e-services, e-data collection, e-procurement, e-payment
system; 2004: e-data security, e-time stamp; 2005: finalising
RomTelecom privatisation and initiating Romanian Mail privatisation).
The year 2006 was mainly dedicated to e-government and knowledge
economy initiatives, such as e-tax payment pilot projects and the es-
tablishment of knowledge centres, co-funded by the World Bank.
11 Respectively: <www.e-guvernare.ro>, <www.e-licitatie.ro>,
<www.autorizatiiauto.ro>.
12 See: <www.legi-internet.ro> and <www.legi-internet.ro/blogs>.
13 While an interministerial task force, the Group for Promoting the Information
Technology (GPIT), was established in March 2001 to develop Romania’s
information society strategy and to coordinate major players’ legislative actions,
analysts say the task force no longer exists. Some analysts also dismiss the
notion that anything like a comprehensive government ICT strategy exists. They
say any claim to the contrary amounts to window dressing.
Romanian involvement in the WSIS process was significant, in
spite of weak public visibility in terms of an official online presence
and the availability of WSIS-related strategic documents (no WSIS
documents were found on key government websites and the WSIS-
related website14  did not work). In 2002 Romania hosted the Pan-
European Regional Ministerial Conference (November 2002, Bucha-
rest) to prepare for the WSIS Tunis meeting.
Conclusions
One finding of this report is that there have been dynamic and posi-
tive changes towards transparent ICT policy-making in Romania. How-
ever, there remains work to be done in key areas.
While government and business are actively involved in shaping
and developing ICT policy, civil society is poorly represented. Per-
haps as a result, a technocratic rather than a developmental discourse
prevails. For example, gender and open source issues are totally in-
visible in official public discourse.
While governmental ICT players’ roles and responsibilities were
legally redefined and clarified throughout 2002 to 2005 (in line with
the EU’s directives and requirements), administrative procedures and
mechanisms are unclear to the public. Policies and procedures that
are defined should theoretically be publicly available on government
websites. However, this is not always the case. For instance, the MCTI
website has a number of broken links, making key documents una-
vailable, such as the national strategy on the information society. This
amounts to a disempowerment of citizens.
As far as internet governance goes, the administration and man-
agement of the top-level domain .ro is also not transparent (several
attempts by the authors to clarify the issue failed). This remains a
serious concern.
Future ICT policy priorities for Romania should include promot-
ing active civil society involvement and bottom-up consultation in the
ICT policy process, and stimulating public awareness on ICT policy
issues. 
14 See: <www.wsis-romania.ro>.
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The year 2006 marked the twelfth anniversary of South Africa’s for-
mal transition from the racially based oppressive apartheid regime
that ruled the country from 1948, to the fully democratic dispensation
that was inaugurated in 1994. The twelve years were marked by con-
siderable progress, including economic growth and social develop-
ment, as well as significant developments in respect of information
society issues – although major challenges remain.
South Africa is mid-way into the third term of office of a popu-
larly elected African National Congress (ANC) government. The coun-
try is governed by one of the more progressive constitutions in the
world, premised on the need to “heal the divisions of the past,” con-
taining firm commitments toward a “society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights,” and governed
by “the will of the people” (RSA, 1996a).
This report provides a bird’s eye view of the status of South Afri-
ca’s information and communications technology (ICT) sector and of
progress made toward the development of the country’s information
society. In order to do this, a brief overview of the country is given.
The status and level of development of the various ICT sectors are
then described, before an overview of policy, legislation and institu-
tional frameworks governing the sector is provided. The final section
of the report offers an overview of some of the institutions in the
country with a specific information society/ICT focus, together with a
summary of some of the issues and campaigns they have taken up
recently. Their effectiveness is briefly assessed.
Country overview
South Africa has a population of some 47 million (Stats SA, 2006)
spread across 1.2 million square km. The country has nine provinces,
and eleven official languages are spoken.
The economy is of medium size, with a gross domestic product
(GDP) of USD 200 billion (CIA, 2007). South Africa ranks as a middle-
income country in terms of GDP per capita, estimated at USD 4,230 in
2006 – or, adjusted for “purchasing power parity” to more accurately
reflect the real cost of living, USD 13,000 (CIA, 2007) – but the society
remains characterised by extreme income inequality, with high levels of
structural unemployment and a large percentage of the population liv-
ing in poverty. In recent years economic growth has moved steadily
above 4%, although unemployment continues to hover around 25%.
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) currently ranks South
Africa a lowly 121st out of 177 countries, with a GINI co-efficient of
57.8, on its Human Development Index (UNDP, 2006, p. 337). This
represents a decline from 94th out of 162 countries in 2001, suggest-
ing the considerable challenges facing the country in improving the
quality of life of its citizens.
South Africa is characterised by a strong and vibrant civil soci-
ety, partly inherited from the upswell of opposition to apartheid in the
1980s. Organisations such as the powerful Congress of South Afri-
can Trade Unions (COSATU), under whose umbrella over 1.8 million
workers are unionised, and the South African NGO Coalition
(SANGOCO), a national umbrella body for some 4,000 non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), are powerful and vocal on a range of
issues that affect workers and civil society. There is also a range of
NGOs with a greater or lesser degree of specific focus on ICT issues.
The issues and campaigns taken up by some of these bodies will be
discussed below.
Prior to 1990, ICT services in South Africa were the sole respon-
sibility of the state. Beginning with broadcasting, which was seen as
key to the success of the incipient democratic transformation, a proc-
ess of sector reform, including liberalisation, privatisation and the
creation of independent regulation began, albeit somewhat piecemeal,
from about 1993. The broadcasting sector has probably seen the great-
est degree of change, with the transformation of the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) from a government mouthpiece into
a public broadcaster, the privatisation of numerous of its radio sta-
tions, and the licensing of many more, mainly in the community broad-
casting sector. The pace has probably been slowest in fixed telecom-
munications, where the partially-privatised incumbent, Telkom, re-
mains a de facto monopoly. Mobile telecommunications has seen
rather more progress, with two mobile operators licensed in 1993
and a third in 2001. The internet was, from its inception, fully liberal-
ised in South Africa, despite attempts by Telkom to roll back the tide
(Lewis, 2006).
Regulation of the sector was initially undertaken by the Inde-
pendent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), constitutionally entrenched to
protect democracy, and later also by the South African Telecommuni-
cations Regulatory Authority, both of which were merged in 2001 to
form the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa1 <link.wits.ac.za>.
 <0.223  0.224 - 0.597
 0.670 - 0.725 0.726 - 0.819
0.598 - 0.669
Map 1: South Africa, GINI coefficient by district
Source: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)
LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand1
Charley Lewis
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(ICASA). After the initial, rather rushed broadcasting reforms, telecom-
munications reform was completed in a highly contested process around
1996, with a second wave of reform following in 2001 (Gillwald, 2002),
and a third, which will be discussed in more detail below, in 2006.
South Africa has been involved in a wide range of global informa-
tion society processes over the last decade, often in a leadership role.
This can partly be attributed to the legacy of the struggle against apart-
heid, and the consequent commitment to enabling development, in-
cluding through the use of ICTs and through the provision of universal
access to ICT services to all citizens. Following interventions by the
then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa hosted the 1996 In-
formation Society and Development (ISAD) conference, and participated
in both the Global Knowledge (GK) processes of the World Bank and
the various iterations of the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
Country situation
It is worth looking at the various aspects of the ICT environment in
South Africa in more detail.
Indicators and statistics
Summary of national indicators
Table 1 presents a snapshot of indicators benchmarking South Africa’s
ICT sector. Figures, as far as possible, present the picture in 2006.
Telephony
South Africa’s telephony market has historically been separated into
fixed line and mobile cellular – although this is likely to change in the
future as the impact of new legislation filters through.
The fixed-line telecommunications sector in South Africa is in
transition to competition, subject to a process of “managed liberali-
sation” (Esselaar and Gillwald, 2005). A single fixed-line incumbent
operator, Telkom, was licensed in 1997, with a legislated five-year
exclusivity period. Despite the formal lapse of this monopoly in 2002,
a protracted and complex licensing process has seen the second net-
work operator, NeoTel, only receiving its licence in December 2005
(Stones, 2005). NeoTel is first entering the wholesale market, and is
unlikely to serve any retail customers before mid-2007 (iAfrica, 2007).
Telkom’s latest annual report (Telkom, 2006) lists its customer base
as comprising a total of 4,708,000 lines. Of these only some 52% are
identifiably residential customers, a very low proportion by global
standards (ITU, 2006). It is important to note that, for a range of
reasons, probably related to lack of affordability and poor customer
focus, the fixed-line market has shown a slight but steady decline (of
about 0.4% per year) since around 2000.
The mobile telephony market in South Africa is substantially larger
than that for fixed-line services. There are currently three providers of
mobile communications services operating in the South African mar-
ket, two of which have been in operation since 1993 (Vodacom and
MTN), with the third (Cell C) having been in operation since 2001.
Their combined customer base is some 32,299,000 subscribers
(Esselaar and Gillwald, 2007; Vodacom, 2006; MTN, 2006; Cell C,
2006), of which Vodacom and MTN have the largest market shares of
59% and 32% respectively, leaving Cell C a relatively distant – and
weakening – third with 8%. In contrast to the fixed-line market, where
the overwhelming majority of customers (82%) are on postpaid con-
tracts, the overwhelming majority of mobile customers (85%) use
prepaid services, which target the poorer sections of the community.
In further contrast to the fixed-line telecommunications sector, the
mobile telephony market has enjoyed exponential levels of growth
over the last several years, with Vodacom and MTN reporting sub-
scriber growth of 32% and 28% respectively between 2004 and 2005.
There are some suggestions that the mobile subscriber data over-
state the actual numbers of mobile customers. This is inherent in the
very nature of mobile prepaid services, where the customer base is
Table 1: South Africa - ICT indicators
Indicators Number
Population 47,390,900
GDP USD 200.5 billion
GDP per capita USD 4,230
GINI co-efficient 57.8
Main (fixed) telephone lines 4,708,000
Teledensity (fixed) 9.9%
No. of fixed line operators 2
Mobile telephone subscribers 32,299,000
Teledensity (mobile) 68.2%
No. of mobile operators 3
Internet subscribers (estimated) 3,665,707 (2005)
Broadband internet subscribers 283,839
No. of personal computers 5,300,000
No. of internet service providers 355 (2005)
No. of television sets 7,000,000
No. of radio sets 10,000,000
No. of television stations 6
No. of radio stations 130
Sources: Stats SA (2006), CIA (2007), UNDP (2006), Telkom (2006), Esselaar
and Gillwald (2007), Goldstuck (2006), Laschinger and Goldstuck (2006),
Mochiko and Khuzwayo (2006), Alexander (2006), GCIS (2006).
Graph 1: Telephony market (1999-2006)
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
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relatively fluid due to the cheap availability of “starter packs” –
Vodacom, for example, reports a churn rate of just over 30% of its
prepaid subscribers (Vodacom, 2005) – and where significant num-
bers of customers may be inactive or lapsed at any given point in
time. The subscriber figures probably therefore overstate the number
of customers, possibly by as much as 30% (Goldstuck, 2005).
Finally, it is important to note that there is likely to be a consider-
able overlap between fixed and mobile telephony subscribers. A sig-
nificant proportion of fixed-line customers also have mobile access;
although there are no recent figures, in 2001 nearly 60% of fixed-line
telephony subscribers also had mobile phones (Stats SA, 2001).
Following the 2001 changes to the telecommunications policy
and legislative framework (RSA, 2001), a new category of telecom-
munications providers, Under-Serviced Area Licensees (USALs), was
introduced. Most analysts are sceptical about their viability, with the
few that have come to market doing so as resellers of mobile services
(Esselaar and Gillwald, 2007). No subscriber figures are available from
them, and their impact on the market is likely to be negligible.
Internet
Despite rapid and impressive growth in the mid-1990s, the internet
sector has in recent years shown signs of reaching a plateau, with
growth having “slowed to a crawl” (Goldstuck, 2006, p. 47), and an
estimated total user base at the end of 2005 of only some 3.6 million.
Of these, a growing majority (52%) are corporate users, accessing e-
mail and the internet from their places of work, with under a third
(30%) getting access through dial-up connectivity. These figures would
suggest that some 7.5% of South Africans have access to the cornu-
copia of the internet, but that only a little over 2% of the population
can do this from the comfort of home.
The internet market is serviced by 355 internet service providers
(ISPs), the majority of which are “corporate ISPs” (Goldstuck, 2006).
The largest provider of dial-up access remains M-Web (accounting
for about 29% of dial-up consumers), with Telkom Internet (21%)
hot on its heels (Goldstuck, 2006). As with fixed-line telephony ac-
cess, it is important to note that the actual number of users exceeds
the number of subscribers by a considerable margin (estimates range
from 100% upwards) due to the sharing of accounts by both domes-
tic and business users (Goldstuck, 2006).
Broadcasting
The television market in South Africa remains dominated by the state-
owned SABC, which provides three free-to-air TV channels and en-
joys 65% of the national viewership (OMD, 2006) of some seven mil-
lion households (Mochiko and Khuzwayo, 2006). The balance of
viewership is split between e-tv, a private free-to-air station with 21%,
and the terrestrial and digital satellite subscription services provided
by MultiChoice through its M-Net and DSTV channels, with 14% (OMD,
2006). There is also a religious free-to-air TV station targeting the
Eastern Cape, called Trinity TV, as well as two part-time community
TV station projects in existence; but the latter broadcast infrequently,
with special event licences. A third community TV project is currently
at the formation stage.
The television landscape is likely to see significant changes in
coming years. Two regional television licences, covering respectively
the north and south of the country and broadcasting primarily in in-
digenous languages, are in the process of being awarded to the SABC;
applications are open for an unspecified number of subscription tel-
evision licences likely to be awarded during 2007; and a migration to
digital terrestrial television is very much on the cards (Mochiko, 2006;
Mochiko and Khuzwayo, 2006; Glazier, 2007). In addition, the two
largest mobile operators are already offering TV broadcasts to mobile
handsets on a trial basis. Much of the impetus behind many of these
developments is the anticipated media demand and opportunities
linked to South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup.
Perhaps less glamorous, but with greater popular reach, is ra-
dio, with some 10 million radio sets in use and nearly 92% of South
Africans having listened to the radio in the last seven days (OMD,
2006). The number of radio stations serving this market is about 130,
with some monthly fluctuation in the number of active community
radio stations (OMD, 2006; GCIS, 2006).
As with the television market, the state-owned SABC is a leading
player, operating eighteen stations, of which five have national cover-
age, with the remaining thirteen serving regional and local audiences.
The content of these stations is a mix of public service and commer-
cial broadcasting. The three most popular radio stations, each with
national listenership figures above 15%, are Metro FM, which broad-
casts nationwide in English to “trendy, sophisticated black” audiences,
and Ukhozi FM and Umhlobo Wenene FM, broadcasting across sev-
eral regions in isiZulu and isiXhosa respectively (OMD, 2006).
South Africa has a further thirteen private commercial radio sta-
tions, mostly serving regional audiences. The most popular station is
Radio Jacaranda, which broadcasts mainly music to the populous
Gauteng province and enjoys a national listenership of some 8%.
ICASA is expected to award additional regional private commercial
radio licences during the course of 2007.
South Africa also has a relatively vibrant community broadcast-
ing sector, with some 100 community radio stations currently licensed.
Most of these are geographically based, serving local communities,
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Graph  2: Internet users (1996-2005)
Source: Goldstuck (2005)
A variety of reasons have been suggested for the slowdown in
internet access, including pricing and policy uncertainty. Goldstuck (2006)
argues that “accelerated growth in [i]nternet usage is heavily dependent
on the timely and effective roll-out of the [second fixed-line operator].”
He also points to the relative failure of a number of high-profile school
connectivity projects, such as Gauteng Online, designed to provide ac-
cess to all public school learners, describing them as a “damp squib”
(Goldstuck, 2006). The decline in dial-up subscribers can largely be at-
tributed to the migration to broadband, which now accounts for just
over 4% of users, having grown six-fold since 2003 (Goldstuck, 2006).
Country GDP per Fixed line Mobile DSL PC Internet Internet TV Radio
capita (USD) teledensity teledensity subscribers density density2 hosts density3 density4
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
South Africa 2,293 10.4 43.1 60,000 8.3 7.9 609,284 19.7 24.8
Botswana 4,124 8.0 32.9 - 4.7 3.5 1,734 4.4 75.6
Kenya 474 0.9 7.9 - 1.4 4.6 11,706 4.8 21.8
Lesotho 524 2.1 8.8 - - 2.4 - 3.7 6.2
Mozambique 217 0.4 3.7 - 0.6 0.7 7,234 2.1 -
Namibia 1,523 6.4 14.2 - 10.9 3.7 3,553 8.1 21.2
Swaziland 1,871 4.4 10.4 - 3.3 3.3 2,437 3.6 17.2
Tanzania 282 0.4 4.4 - 0.7 0.9 - 4.2 41.8
Zambia 338 0.8 4.3 1,000 1.0 2.1 3,927 6.5 14.8
Zimbabwe - 2.7 3.6 4,000 8.4 6.9 6,705 5.1 14.4
Africa 708 3.1 9.1 224,900 1.7 2.6 - - -
Sources: ITU (2006), Goldstuck (2006).
with many affiliated to the National Community Radio Forum, but there
are also several “community of interest” stations, mostly religious in
character.
Regional indicators
Compared to its neighbours, South Africa ranks highly on most ICT
indicators, reflecting the sophisticated level of development of its ICT
infrastructure, as well as its considerably greater wealth – notwith-
standing the great internal disparities that remain the legacy of apart-
heid. Only Botswana has a higher GDP per capita, reflective of a smaller
population and that country’s diamond wealth. It is also the only coun-
try in the region to come close to South Africa in respect of any of the
indicators.
Global rankings
Globally, South Africa is generally ranked in the middle levels of many
of the international indices that attempt to measure ICT access, avail-
ability and resources, although many commentators make the point
that the country is being out-performed by many of its competitors
and continues to slide down a number of the indices (Esselaar and
Gillwald, 2007):
• The latest Orbicom Infostates Index ranks South Africa 78th out
of 180 countries, noting that the country has experienced very
low rates of growth since 1995 (Sciadas, 2005).
• The ITU ranks South Africa 78th out of 182 countries in terms of
its composite Digital Access Index (ITU, 2003).
• The ITU describes its most recent index, the ICT Opportunity In-
dex, as a “merger of the ITU’s Digital Access Index (DAI) and
Orbicom’s… Infostates conceptual framework.” It characterises it
as an “inclusive index [providing] measurement across 183 econo-
mies [and relying] on ten indicators that help measure ICT net-
works, education and skills, uptake and intensity of the use of ICT.”
The index ranks South Africa 90th out of 183 countries with a
score of 96.78. This is below the global average of 147.56, sug-
gesting even further slippage down global rankings (ITU, 2007).
• The World Economic Forum (WEF) ranks South Africa in 2006 at
45th out of 125 countries in terms of global competitiveness,
down from 40th in 2005 (WEF, 2006a).
• The WEF also ranks South Africa in 2005 at 37th out of 115
countries in terms of networked readiness, down from 34th in
2004 (WEF, 2006b).
• The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ranks
South Africa 84th out of 180 countries in terms of its ICT Diffu-
sion Index, down from 79th in 1997 (UNCTAD, 2006).
• The Economist’s Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranks South Africa at
32nd out of 68 countries in terms of its e-Readiness Index, un-
changed from 2004 (EIU, 2005).
• Arthur Goldstuck ranks South Africa at 34th worldwide (but 1st
in Africa by a considerable margin) in terms of internet hosts as
of July 2005, down from 25th in 2000 (Goldstuck, 2006, p. 97).
This slippage has been noted by a number of analysts. In their
recent review of the performance of the South African telecommuni-
cations sector, Esselaar and Gillwald (2007) point to a number of con-
tributory factors including increased state involvement in service pro-
vision, lack of effective competition in telephony services, high pric-
ing (both wholesale and retail, often at monopoly levels), and a lack of
effective regulation of interconnection.
ICT policy development: policy, legislation and institutions
South Africa has frequently been criticised for a lack of policy clar-
ity, coherence and integration (Gillwald, 2005). As far back as 1996,
the now-defunct National IT Forum (NITF), a national body bringing
together sector representation, including civil society and labour,
2 Percentage of inhabitants using the internet.
3 Percentage of inhabitants with TV sets.
4 Percentage of inhabitants with radio sets. The figure for South Africa appears far
too low and contradicts OMD (2006).
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had called for an overall national ICT policy framework at the highest
level. To date none exists.
Policy specific to the ICT sector, including telecommunications,
broadcasting and the internet, falls under the less than effectual Min-
istry of Communications. Other ministries, such as those of Science
and Technology, and Trade and Industry, also have an active interest
in the sector, leading to occasional disagreements. For example, the
2001 review of telecommunications policy saw government see-saw-
ing between introducing one or two additional fixed-line operators,
positions seen as being advocated by the Ministries of Communica-
tions and Trade and Industry respectively
Consequently the only policy framework governing the sector
has been the 1996 White Paper on Telecommunications Policy (RSA,
1996b).
Legislation
A number of disparate pieces of legislation, many of which have un-
dergone subsequent amendment, govern the sector, including:
• The Broadcasting Act (RSA, 1999), which deals with broadcast-
ing policy and regulation, as well as with the public broadcaster.
• The Telecommunications Act – recently repealed – which dealt
with policy and regulation for the telecommunications sector,
defined its market structure, and established a sector regulator
and a body to oversee universal service (RSA, 1996c).
• Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000;
• The IBA Act (RSA, 1993), which set up a constitutionally en-
trenched broadcasting regulator in the run-up to the country’s
first democratic election.
• The ICASA Act (RSA, 2000), which created a unified regulator
for both broadcasting and telecommunications.
• The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act (RSA,
2002a), which provided a legal framework for electronic trans-
actions, dealt with cryptography, cybercrime and the protection
of privacy, and provided for the development of a national e-
strategy, which has yet to see the light of day.
• The Interception and Monitoring Act (RSA, 2002b), which dealt
with the circumstances under which electronic surveillance and
interception are permitted, as well as related procedures and re-
sponsibilities.
The year 2006 saw the final promulgation of the Electronic Com-
munications Act (RSA, 2005b), along with amendments to the ICASA
Act (RSA, 2006), which are set to fundamentally realign both the regu-
lation and market structure of the ICT sector.
The process that culminated in this substantial revamp of the
sector first saw the light of day in a Convergence Colloquium called
by the Department of Communications in mid-2003, to which stake-
holders were invited, and which led to the publication of a Draft Con-
vergence Bill in late 2003 (RSA, 2003). Strong public criticism of the
poor quality of this draft led to the tabling of a revised Convergence
Bill (RSA, 2005a) early in 2005. This was conceptually very similar to
the draft bill, although with much of the poor drafting revised, and
with much of the constitutionally controversial changes to the regula-
tion of the sector removed.
The Bill was criticised on the grounds of both process and con-
tent. Despite the fundamental changes it proposed, specifically to the
licensing framework and hence by implication to the market struc-
ture, it was felt by some not to go far enough in embracing the phe-
nomenon of ICT convergence. At the same time the lack of a Green
and White Paper5  process of the kind that had preceded the 1996
Telecommunications Act, together with the behind-closed-doors na-
ture of the drafting, was seen to be a cardinal flaw in legislation with
the potential to fundamentally alter the landscape of the sector.
The final stages of the new legislation took place in parliament,
with submissions from stakeholders called for, and a series of public
hearings undertaken, during which the legislation was renamed the
Electronic Communications Act. Promulgation was held up when the
legal advisers to the state president pointed out that the accompany-
ing ICASA Amendment Act might well have been unconstitutional with
respect to the Chapter 9 protections (RSA, 1996a) afforded to the
regulation of broadcasting. Once a revised version of the latter had
been passed, both Acts were promulgated on 20 April 2006.
As pointed out above, the most fundamental impact of the new
Act is likely to be in the market structure of the sector (Esselaar and
Gillwald, 2007, p. 12), where the historical separation of operator li-
cences and spheres of operation into technology-specific compart-
ments is replaced by licensing on the basis of cross-cutting technol-
ogy-neutral layers of the kind identified in the analytical literature on
convergence, and adopted in jurisdictions such as Malaysia. This is
likely to promote increased competition in the sector and to stimulate
the provision of innovative new IP6 -enabled services such as mobile
television.
The new Act also provides for increased independence of the
regulator, whose authority is considerably less constrained except in
the licensing of infrastructure (electronic communications network
services), which remain subject to the issuance of policy directions
by the minister. On the other hand, the appointment process for the
governing council of the regulator is somewhat less subject to pub-
licly accountable checks and balances. Much of the impact of the new
legislation will depend on the regulatory capacity of ICASA, and on its
ability to stamp its policy imprint and authority on the sector, which is
seen by many commentators as dubious (Esselaar and Gillwald, 2007).
Institutions
A number of institutions are created by the above legislation to regu-
late or provide policy intervention in the sector.
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
(ICASA), as suggested, is the overall sector regulator, created to unify
the formerly separate regulation of broadcasting and telecommunica-
tions. It is tasked with regulating electronic communications “in the
public interest” and to “ensure fairness and a diversity of views” (RSA,
2000). Concerns have repeatedly been raised about its effectiveness
in doing this, given the degree to which it has historically been con-
strained by legislation. Questions have also been raised about the
calibre of both councillors and senior line management.
The recently renamed Universal Service and Access Agency of
South Africa (USAASA)7  is unique as a demonstration of national com-
mitment to redress historical racial disparities in the provision of com-
munications services. USAASA is tasked with promoting “universal
access and universal service” (RSA, 2006), along with administering a
Universal Service and Access Fund, through which a levy on the
5 In the Westminster parliamentary model, a Green Paper sets out policy options
relating to a major legislative revamp for public debate, while a White Paper sets
out the government’s final policy choice.
6 Internet protocol.
7 Formerly known as the Universal Service Agency (USA).
revenues of ICT sector licensees is aggregated and disbursed to sup-
port increased ICT access (including the under-serviced area licensees).
The track record of the Agency has unfortunately been poor, with
most funding having gone to telecentres, few of which have been able
to demonstrate any degree of sustainability. No funding has yet been
given to “needy persons”, who await a formally gazetted definition of
their status, and although the new under-serviced area licensees have
received subsidies, the lack of viability of these companies suggests
this will make little if any impact on the provision of communications
access to disadvantaged communities. A recent process of introspec-
tion and strategic planning at USAASA may, however, give some hope
for improved performance.
The management of the internet is undertaken by the .za Do-
main Name Authority, established under the 2002 ECT Act to “ad-
minister and manage the .za domain name space,” as well as the rel-
evant registrars and registries of domain names (RSA, 2002a). An
elected stakeholder body, it has recently undertaken a review of how
the .za domain is structured and administered.
A further government-established body with an interest in infor-
mation society policy is the Presidential National Commission on
the Information Society and Development (PNC on ISAD). The PNC
on ISAD was launched in 2002 as a South African counterpart to the
Presidential International Advisory Council, a high-profile body of in-
ternational IT experts invited to advise the president on ICT policy and
development matters. The Council consists of 31 individuals drawn
largely from government and business, with a smattering of academ-
ics and a lone NGO representative. It has an advisory mandate relat-
ing inter alia to “bridging the digital divide” and “overall government
policy framework on ICTs” (PNC on ISAD, 2007a).
However, the PNC on ISAD has little to show for this beyond
announcing the February 2007 Cabinet approval of its National Infor-
mation Society and Development Plan, which is based on ten
unsurprising information society pillars including: Policy and Regula-
tory Environment; ICT Infrastructure and Universal Access; Local
Content; Digital Inclusion and e-Awareness; Human Capital; and ICT
Capacity Development and R&D (PNC on ISAD, 2007a). Unfortunately
no copy of the plan is available for assessment. It does, however,
claim five priority focus areas which seem to mirror those from its
website: e-Government, e-Health, e-Education, SMMEs (small, me-
dium and micro enterprises), and Local Content (PNC on ISAD, 2007b).
The PNC on ISAD has made little contribution to ICT policy, and is
widely regarded as ineffectual.
Participation
In the absence of a coherent national ICT policy framework, and given
an ICT sector governed largely by fragmented legislation and with a
multiplicity of sometimes overlapping institutions, it is not surprising
then to find an NGO sector that is both vibrant and marginalised.
Some of the NGOs active in the sector include:
• SANGONeT,8  originally established as a civil society internet serv-
ice provider, is the local Association for Progressive Communi-
cations (APC) partner, and frequently the lead organisation in a
range of ICT initiatives.
• Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI),9  a freedom of speech
NGO of long standing, focused on “fighting for and defending
freedom of expression, opposing censorship, fighting for the right
of equal access to information and knowledge [and] proactively
developing policy to ensure the free flow of information…”.
• WomensNet,10  originally a SANGONeT project, but now a ro-
bust organisation in its own right, which sets out to “empower
South African women to use cyberspace as a tool for informa-
tion and mobilisation” (WomensNet, 2006).
• Media Monitoring Project (MMP)11  analyses and comments on
the media from a human rights perspective, and builds media
monitoring capacity among NGOs and other groups.
Less frequently, organisations such as COSATU and SANGOCO,
as well as a range of smaller NGOs, become involved in ICT policy
issues, but this is not their core work. Aside from the NGOs specifically
identified above, SANGONeT (n.d. a) notes that the “involvement of
NGOs in national ICT policy and advocacy processes” is “limited,” partly
because “many NGOs have very limited ICT capacity,” and partly be-
cause most are focused more on other development issues.
There are also a range of individually based consumer activist
websites, vibrant and crusading, that often target specific companies,
or are focused on specific ICT services. The better examples include
Hellkom (<www.hellkom.co.za>) and MyADSL (<www.myadsl.co.za>)
(Southwood et al, 2006).
The remainder of this section of the report will examine some of
the issues and policy areas in which civil society organisations have
intervened.
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)
The participation of South African NGOs and broader civil society in
both the lead-up to the November 2005 WSIS and its aftermath has
been somewhat erratic. SANGONeT led a civil society process, in-
cluding several Thetha discussion forums (see below), that culmi-
nated in the adoption of a South African Civil Society Statement
(SANGONeT, 2005) shortly before the Summit. This identified sixteen
critical areas of concern to civil society, including freedom of expres-
sion, telecommunications costs, open source and open content and
gender. The September 2005 Highway Africa conference of journal-
ists, held in Grahamstown, also issued a statement calling for the
WSIS to move from statements to action (APC, 2005).
From the government side, the PNC on ISAD ran a preparatory
process, which included workshops around gender, disability and
youth, and was tasked with driving a follow-up process which since
seems to have stalled. There were also a few Department of Commu-
nications events, including an International Women’s Mutingati12  on
the Information Society in August 2005.
Beyond this, the formal South African delegation, led by Director
General Lyndall Shope-Mafole, whose own participation was less than
effective, appears to have had little participation from civil society.
Only a few individuals from outside government were included in the
official delegation to Tunis (and none in the preparatory committees),
and only a small handful of NGOs were present at the Summit.
Consequently, despite a few attempts at interaction, there was
no consistent involvement of South African civil society in either the
8 <www.sangonet.org.za>.
9 <www.fxi.org.za>.
10 <www.womensnet.org.za>.
11 <www.mediamonitoring.org.za>.
12 The word Mutingati comes from the South African indigenous language of the
Tshivenda people and means “a joining of hands, minds and forces to solve
problems and improve the life situation of the community.” See:
<www.pnc.gov.za/content/view/43/44>.
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formulation of positions or in ensuring their adoption in the WSIS
Plan of Action. Civil society itself is partly to blame in this regard for
not being more insistent regarding its inclusion. Worse, no formal
assessment of civil society participation from a South African per-
spective, and the success of the civil society agenda, has been made.
Open source
The campaign to promote open source software and open access to
content is one that can claim considerably more success. With fund-
ing and impetus from billionaire astronaut Mark Shuttleworth, a Go
Open Source campaign ran from 2004 to 2006, which distributed open
source software on CD, ran a 13-part television series, and signed up
5,000 members to its Geek Freedom League. The campaign was well
supported by civil society organisations, for whom open source and
open access had long been important issues. In late 2006 SANGONeT
ran a workshop on the issue, culminating in a petition signed by over
50 NGOs, which was presented to the government (SANGONeT, 2006).
In late February 2007 the campaign was able to claim success
with the adoption by Cabinet of an open source policy and strategy
(Vecchiatto, 2007). While a breakthrough, its implementation needs
to be monitored by civil society.
ICTs and gender
WomensNet continues to engage around the issue of ICTs and gender.
Its core activity remains the provision of ICT training to women’s NGOs
and the promotion of ICT literacy and skills through a range of innova-
tive approaches, such as storytelling. WomensNet is also engaged in
content development, including a recent funky “Take Back the Tech”
campaign, and undertakes policy advocacy (WomensNet, 2006).
Raising awareness
SANGONeT runs a project under the title Thetha, an Nguni verb which
means to “talk, discuss, debate and share opinions” and which fo-
cuses on the “role and relevance of ICTs to the NGO sector” in South-
ern Africa (SANGONeT, n. d. b). Structured around a series of one-
day discussion forums, Thetha was initially based only in South Af-
rica, but later ran forums in two neighbouring countries, Namibia and
Swaziland, with further forums planned for Botswana, Lesotho and
Angola. A regular Thetha newsletter is issued, and the project has
commissioned a study into the state of ICTs in the NGO sector, due
for completion in 2007.13
Communications costs
The high pricing of both fixed and mobile telecommunications re-
mains a key issue for both NGOs and civil society. SANGONeT sees
pricing as one of its ICT advocacy issues, as does the FXI, which has
run workshops, made submissions to ICASA, and undertaken pickets
on the issue. Consumer activist websites such as Hellkom and MyADSL
have also given the issue high priority. Recently a group calling itself
the Telkom Action Group (TAG) launched a media campaign against
Telkom, blaming it for keeping access costs artificially high. A full-
page advert was paid for by hundreds of concerned consumers. ICASA
has also engaged in some sabre rattling, and the matter has even
made the annual presidential state of the nation address.
However, despite slight downward trends, possibly driven by the
public furore, communications prices remain high and inadequately
regulated (Esselaar and Gillwald, 2007), and therefore an issue that
civil society will have to continue to address.
Freedom of information
The FXI runs a number of programmes, including ones on anti-cen-
sorship, media and ICTs, and access to information, which have a
direct bearing on information society issues. It undertakes research,
comments frequently in the press, and is even able to fund legal bat-
tles. While many of its interventions involve public protests, it has
also supported a local newspaper’s (Mail & Guardian) right to protect
its sources in reporting on the Oilgate14  scandal, and intervened to
protect whistle-blowers. It has also been highly critical of the editorial
policies of the public broadcaster, for instance, by protesting against
its blacklisting of certain sources through media statements and pick-
ets. The FXI also opposed the axing of a late-night gay rights pro-
gramme.
Policy engagement
Few NGOs have had the resources to intervene directly in the policy
processes relating to the information society and ICTs. Apart from the
interventions discussed above, the FXI and the MMP are possibly the
only NGOs to have made regular submissions into formal policy proc-
esses. These include input into the Broadcasting Act and SABC li-
censing conditions, participation in local content hearings, support
for the independence of ICASA, opposition to the Monitoring and In-
terception Act, and activities in relation to the ECT Act.
In fairness, much of the current policy formulation environment
does not facilitate NGO intervention. Regulation is largely through
formal notice-and-comment procedures, and submissions to parlia-
ment on legislative processes require substantial resources. Open con-
sultative processes tend now to be something of a rarity. However,
NGOs could do considerably more to exploit the spaces available to
them, by monitoring opportunities more closely and by working to-
gether to exploit those that are available.
Conclusions
While South Africa represents a relatively advanced ICT environment
compared to many other developing countries, it is of concern that
the growth of infrastructure and capacity has been less than optimal.
The continued slide down so many of the global ICT indices, includ-
ing those that focus more on the softer, information society issues, is
of particular concern for the development of a inclusive, ICT-empow-
ered society.
While civil society and its ICT NGOs remain vibrant and active –
raising issues, mounting campaigns, building awareness – their lack
of concrete impact on either formal policy and legislation, or on South
Africa’s input into global information society processes such as the
WSIS, is something that needs to be addressed. Greater capacity and
greater cooperation will be necessary to achieve a more substantial
impact. 
13 Interview with David Barnard, CEO SANGONeT, 1 March 2007.
14 A petrol company was accused of paying ZAR 11 million (USD 1.5 million)
of state money to the ANC.
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Introduction
How can we make citizens’ rights effective in the information society?
Without a doubt, the answer is: with a wider and more direct participa-
tion by citizens. However, the development of the information society is
dominated by a commercial and technical perspective that tends to be
emphasised to the detriment of other perspectives that are much more
important but more difficult to measure. These include: the definition of
the rules of the game and the “social contract” (e.g. legal framework),
as well as indicators of indirect impact such as production of and ac-
cess to knowledge, changes in social relations and participation.
The first part of this report focuses on a review of statistics and
indicators at the level of the Spanish state. We then move progres-
sively towards citizens and their participation via the different territo-
rial spheres which make up the state. We offer a general perspective
of infrastructure needs, and an overview of the administration’s own
imperative to comply with its objectives of transparency and e-gov-
ernment, among others.
In the second part of the report we offer an analysis of the par-
ticipation of different information society actors in policies associ-
ated with information and communication technologies (ICTs). We
attempt to create an indicator for this participation on the basis of
information available in the database of activities2  of the World Sum-
mit on the Information Society (WSIS). The result obtained appears
to be a good reflection of what is happening in Spain, and of the great
imbalance in the participation of different actors in the construction
of the information society.
We have considered data, indicators and information provided
by the national state administration, the European Union (EU) and the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), among other relevant
sources. All of the information is accessible on the internet. We have
prioritised the most current data and information. All data, with the
exception of the WSIS database, was reviewed during October 2006.
The section on participation draws on data offered by the WSIS’s
own inventory, in the version updated as of 17 November 2006. On
the basis of this update we have considered 163 activities developed
by the government of Spain or Spanish entities (i.e. those that include
a Spanish partner or that develop their projects in partnership within
Spain).
In the analysis of participation, some estimates have been added
to make up for those that were left undefined in the WSIS database.
These, as well as any refinement of classifications, have been based
on complementary research.
Country situation
Most of the information society development indicators for Spain fall
below the EU’s average levels, except for the development of e-govern-
ment, which is above average. The indicators which are close to the EU
levels are: “use of the internet for health consultations”, “development
of electronic commerce between businesses or between businesses
and consumers”, “business and home security problems and their pre-
vention” and “broadband services for business and home users”. 3
Spain is ranked 31st in the UN Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment’s (UNCTAD) Digital Divide Report: ICT Diffusion Index 2005
(UNCTAD, 2006).4  It is classified as “middle income-best”, indicating
an information society development position (31st) which does not
correspond to its rankings in other spheres (8th in nominal GDP or
22nd in GDP per capita in the same year). The Diffusion Index also
shows that there has been little sustained improvement over the years:
the ranking ranged between 28th to 31st for the period 1997 to 2004.
According to the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce
(DGDSI, 2006):
Overall, Spain is at a disadvantage in Europe and in relation to
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in regards to information society development indices,
despite efforts made. This position does not correspond to its
economic situation, nor to the indices of convergence with neigh-
bouring economies.
The role of autonomous communities
Given the political and territorial organisation of the country, it is essen-
tial to consider the ICT take-up in autonomous communities5  and local
entities, since these are closest to citizens and provide many of the
public services for social well-being. According to the degree of politi-
cal freedom of the autonomous communities, we should consider the
existence of laws, regulations or specific directives, as well as diverse
objectives and focuses in the development of the information society.
Existing reports show an effort by autonomous administrations to
improve citizen access to ICTs and their services, including offering
training. Funding for these initiatives may come from the federal gov-
ernment, the autonomous communities themselves, or from the EU.
Indicators (such as those provided by CEPREDE, 2004) show
that the level of participation of these communities in the information
society is evolving positively, although with different highs and lows.
This can clearly be seen in the case of e-government roll-out. While
Spain fares well in relation to other EU member states,6  there are
1 <www.pangea.org>; Espai de dones (Women’s space): <www.pangea.org/dona>.
2 WSIS stocktaking database. Available at <www.itu.int/wsis/stocktaking/
index.html>.
3 The 2006 Information Society Indicators Report from the General Administration
for the Development of the Information Society (DGDSI, 2006) presents a
classification of information society indicators.
4 In general, the index is a function of a nation’s connectivity and the ability of its
people to have access and utilise it. The close relationship between the level of
development of ICTs in a country and its level of income is clear. With the
exception of Estonia and the Czech Republic, the 30 countries with a higher ICTDI
fall in the high income category of the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The 30 are classified as having a high level of human development,
using the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), which is based on income,
education and life expectancy (UNDP, 2004).
5 Spain’s fifty provinces are grouped into seventeen autonomous communities,
which have wide legislative and executive autonomy, with their own parliaments
and regional governments.
6 <observatorio.red.es/indicadores/europe/internet_jul2005/indicador_d1.html>.
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different levels of implementation across the autonomous communi-
ties, and the impact felt at the level of local entities is uneven.
Various autonomous communities participate in the Digital Cit-
ies programme7  through the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Com-
merce, which supports the development of the information society in
municipalities. Some autonomous communities, such as Extremadura,
are involved at an institutional level in the promotion of free and open
source software (FOSS), while others stand out in other aspects. For
example, Catalonia is a pioneer in the area of e-learning. Overall, ad-
vances in the Basque Country are very positive. It is not a coincidence
that it was the organiser of the Second World Summit of Cities and
Local Authorities on the Information Society (Bilbao 2005).8
While different levels of maturity exist among the communities,
the rural/urban divide is common to most. Indicators from Cantabria
and Catalonia show that the gender difference also continues to be
notable (although it has diminished in recent years).
Challenges to participation in the information society
The increase in the number of internet users in Spain is positive, and
according to the Telecommunications and Information Society Ob-
servatory (OTSI), the latest data show the number of users has in-
creased to 17.77 million, or 48.3% of the population (OTSI, 2006).
There has also been a significant increase in internet use by groups
traditionally more distanced from ICTs, such as people between 45
and 54 years of age, and homemakers.
Regarding the use of the internet at home, a divide can be seen
between different age groups and socio-cultural sectors. Reasons cited
for not using a computer in the home include a lack of interest, a
perception that it is not needed, and even a lack of time in single-
person households. There is also a proportion of businesses without
access to the internet because they do not feel it offers them much
value (Telefónica, 2005).
Overall, we still see low levels of participation in the information
society among the general population. This study has identified the
following reasons for the low level of participation:
a) The government’s difficulty in reconciling the interests of busi-
ness and citizens, and its lack of confidence in defending citi-
zens’ interests in the face of the lobbying power of big business
or specific groups
Organisations defending the rights of internet users9  are begin-
ning to work collectively to protect citizens’ interests. At the same
time, the government has introduced protective measures for affected
customers, though there have been few clear results.
There has also been a protest campaign against the introduction
of royalties (canon digital) through the reform of the intellectual prop-
erty law. Through this reform a royalty is charged on technological equip-
ment (such as recordable CDs, digital cameras, scanners, etc.) as com-
pensation for the user making digital copies of legally acquired content.
As it stands now, consumers always pay the royalty, even when they
copy content that they own or which is not subject to copyright.10
b) Weaknesses in local participation: lack of linguistic policies at a
state level
Spain’s linguistic diversity is not reflected in national official sta-
tistics and indicators, although it is reflected in some autonomous
communities. According to action line C8 of the WSIS Plan of Action
(ITU, 2003), “cultural and linguistic diversity, while stimulating re-
spect for cultural identity, traditions and religions, is essential to the
development of an information society based on the dialogue among
cultures and regional and international cooperation. It is an important
factor for sustainable development.”
This aspect is also not included in regulations issued by the Eu-
ropean Parliament, which simply considers territorial and regional
differences, without taking into account possible cultural and linguis-
tic differences. The World Bank (2006), on the other hand, considers
this to be an important dimension of the information society, and speci-
fies that when cultural indicators are included, often language differ-
ences are not taken into account and that the most developed coun-
tries are not used to considering these dimensions.
c) Limitations in the vision of women’s participation in the informa-
tion society
Women’s participation in the information society is low, though
it is considered a positive step that data have begun to be disaggregated
to show their gender component, in line with EU directives. Although
there are some studies and experiences that offer a cross-cutting gen-
der analysis (Castaño, 2003), the most common tendency is to con-
sider women as being affected by the “digital divide” in the same way
as men.
d) Weaknesses in the implementation of the spirit of WSIS
For the harmonious construction of the information society it is
essential to have the full participation of civil society in the concep-
tion, implementation and follow-up phases. Citizen participation is
crucial, and their buy-in is important. Citizens and communities should
not be invited to participate only after objectives have been deter-
mined, agreements made and activities planned.
e) Weaknesses in information regarding the active participation of
organised civil society and small business
The information offered by the e-government programme is in-
creasing. However, it focuses mainly on the public administration’s
own knowledge and procedures. Access to this information facilitates
transparency and the participation of civil society. Nevertheless, the
information available is descriptive of previous planning, with few docu-
ments regarding “best practices” or “lessons learned” from projects
already developed. This type of information must be incorporated,
along with the methodologies and tools used, to meet the challenge
of moving from diagnoses and speeches to action.
f) Weaknesses in the distribution of economic benefits generated
A balanced distribution of available economic resources among
different actors would serve as an incentive to participation in the
information society. Requests for proposals and competitions gener-
ally defined as large projects favour big business in the ICT sector,
and serve as disincentives for small businesses. ICT workers are also
affected by this, since the relocation of jobs to other countries is com-
mon practice in larger companies. This process reaches 54% in cases
of computer systems maintenance and 44% in customer service cen-
tres (Ricart and Agenese, 2006).
7 <www.mityc.es/ciudades>.
8 <www.it4all-bilbao.org>.
9 Such as the Asociation of Internauts (<www.internautas.org/gobiernoyleyes>),
Internet Users Association (<www.aui.es>) and the Commission of Liberties and
Informatics.
10 For more information see: <www.todoscontraelcanon.es>.
ICTs as tools for citizen empowerment
Resources such as computers and connectivity, capacity and the
mastery of the necessary tools is not enough to entrench democracy
in any information society. Legislative transparency, public debate,
and a significant share of citizens who are motivated and able to make
informed decisions on the process of constructing the information
society are also needed.
The information society should respond to human needs, and
people should participate actively in its construction, not merely as
consumers or spectators. One of the challenges is for participation
not to remain limited to “collaboration” with local administrations;
grassroots communities should rather take the lead in discussions
regarding policies and regulatory and legal frameworks for the infor-
mation society, which should be developed and implemented with
respect for human rights and basic freedoms.
Up until now the population has received little information re-
garding essential information society issues, such as legislation. This
legislation is generally based on laws established by the EU, and pro-
posals for legislation have come from limited circles of experts. They
remain unknown to the vast majority of people, who look upon them
somewhat askance. The legal framework becomes known primarily
through actions taken by some civil society organisations when prob-
lems arise from applying norms to the virtual world that do not take
its specificity into account.
The public administration’s priorities are the implementation of
electronic voting, electronic national identity documents, digital sig-
natures and the establishment of control measures. Although some
proposals for facilitating citizen participation by electronic means do
exist, the measures to empower citizens are modest.
Participation
The WSIS stocktaking database,11 maintained by the ITU, aims to pro-
vide information regarding action taken by governments and other in-
terested parties to implement the Geneva decisions (WSIS Declaration
of Principles and Plan of Action), as well as to take stock of progress
achieved. This database provides elements for analysing the participa-
tion of different actors in the implementation of the WSIS commitments.
The WSIS participants are classified, very generally, as govern-
ments, international organisations, civil society entities, business sec-
tor entities and miscellaneous. In this report we argue that for a better
understanding of the real complexity of the Spanish context, some of
the groups of participants should be subdivided or regrouped.
For example, the actions and decisions of the Spanish govern-
ment, at both the federal and autonomous community level, are very
fragmented among the different ministries and administrations with
their associated organs, institutions and various public entities. The
agreements reached at these different levels take on myriad forms
such as consortiums, foundations, or partnerships with businesses,
and are greatly influenced by the political and economic climate at
any given time.
Some of these entities, according to the criteria established by
the WSIS, end up being classified as international organisations or
civil society. While this is not correct, it should at the same time be
possible to differentiate local administrations, and see which among
them has the level of government that is closest to people, and which
play a crucial role in the education and mobilisation of citizens.
Civil society itself is not monolithic either. According to the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the following organi-
sations can be properly considered as civil society: social agents,
grassroots community organisations, local non-profit associations,
non-governmental organisations and religious communities. Never-
theless, these criteria do not coincide with the classification in the
WSIS database, and only 17% of the activities considered by the WSIS
as “civil society” would be considered as such according to the EESC.
It is worth highlighting the need to separate small and micro
businesses from other business entities,12  and to be able to see op-
portunities for their participation in building the information society.
Yet in the WSIS database these are included under the general head-
ing “business sector entities”, independent of their size. Spain has a
higher percentage of small businesses than many other European
countries, and it is important to motivate their participation in the
construction of the information society.
Analysis of the WSIS stocktaking database
We have analysed existing activities in the WSIS stocktaking database
according to the WSIS Plan of Action13  indicators for each activity. For
this purpose the original classification has been reorganised to reflect
the origin of funding for the activities and who manages them.14
The objective of this analysis is to see how the aims of each
group of organisations, according to the above criteria, influence the
orientation of their activities (according to the WSIS action lines), and
specifically how they are a protagonist in the construction of an infor-
mation society. We have considered activities developed in Spain and/
or involving Spanish actors.
The analysis of the WSIS participants and of the projects in the
database (Graph 1) shows a diversity and complexity which cannot
be ignored.
For this analysis, we have further differentiated the actors in-
cluded in the WSIS database to consider: general governmental enti-
ties (GOB); educational governmental entities (G-EDU); governmen-
tal international cooperation entities (G-COOP); governments of au-
tonomous communities (specifically Junta de Castilla y León and Junta
de Extremadura) alone or in diverse types of collaborations with vari-
ous entities (CCAA); international partnerships/entities (INT);15  busi-
ness entities (COM); foundations established by business entities
11 The database was established in October 2004. It can be consulted and updated
at <www.itu.int/wsis/stocktaking>.
12 Using the definitions of the European Commission Recommendations of 6 May
2003, small businesses are those with less than 50 employees and a business
volume no greater than EUR 10 million (USD 13 million), while micro businesses
are those with less than 10 employees and a business volume no greater than
EUR 2 million (USD 2.6 million).
13 The Geneva Plan of Action (ITU, 2003) sets out the following action lines: C1: The
role of governments and all stakeholders; C2: Information and communication
infrastructure; C3: Access to information and knowledge; C4: Capacity building;
C5: Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs; C6: Enabling
environment; C7: ICT applications; C8: Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic
diversity and local content; C9: Media; C10: Ethical dimensions of the information
society; C11: International and regional cooperation; Section B: Achievement of
WSIS goals and objectives; Section D: Digital solidarity programme; Section E:
Follow-up and evaluation; Section F: Towards WSIS phase 2 (Tunis).
14 This rather than reflecting the legal title of the organisations that carry them out,
or according to strict territorial criteria. The latter is incongruent and poorly
defined when activities are carried out over the internet, or are cooperative
activities that may have an international reach, or when organisations, though
they may be international, act within Spain or have Spanish partners.
15 INT includes not only activities developed by international intergovernmental
organisations, but also all those in which there are participants from several
countries, including Spain.
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(FUND-COM) and all the other entities classified in the WSIS database
as civil society (S-CIV). In total, there were 163 activities analysed.
As can be seen, there is a considerable difference between the
number of governmental activities included in the database and ac-
tivities led by other stakeholders.
 The interests of the different actors can vary greatly, as can be seen
in Graph 2 (several activities are included in more than one action line).
Proposed activities by action lines
Graph 3 shows the number of activities presented by the govern-
ment, including those presented by autonomous communities (alone
or in various collaborations). All activities in which autonomous com-
munities have decision-making power16  have been included in the
“government” section.
As can be seen, at the level of government there is little interest in
a number of the action lines, and C9, in particular, is practically ignored
by all of the decision-makers. This action line specifies that the media,
in its various forms and various ownership regimes, also plays an es-
sential role as an actor in the development of an information society,
and recognises as important its contribution to freedom of expression
and plurality of information. These are all very important aspects in the
democratic development of the information society.
Budgets assigned to proposals
The form for listing activities in the WSIS database does not facilitate
the systematic incorporation of information regarding the budgets of
each activity. Surely, if the budgets assigned to the different action
lines by the different actors could be included, the differences would
appear greater still, and would give us a better sense of the economic
and power distribution among these groups. It may also give us an
indication of their interest in participating in the WSIS process.
For those activities that refer to very broad plans, specifying how
the budget is assigned would offer clarity as to whether it is being
spent on social priorities, infrastructure priorities, administration and
management priorities, or others.
Differentiation of interests
In analysing the distribution of activities of non-governmental enti-
ties,17  presented in Graph 4, we found that although the number of
activities included is low for entities classified as civil society, these
tend to be distributed more evenly among the various action lines.
Supplementary information has been sought to analyse these actors
at a finer level, more apt for our aims.
This exploratory exercise, carried out with a limited number of
proposals, points to the necessity of considering the different inter-
ests involved in the development of the information society. These
interests do not necessarily coincide, are often weighted in a par-
ticular area, and show tendencies which must be analysed if we
want to foster active participation of the people, real civil society
and small businesses in the construction of the information society
in Spain.
Conclusions
It is important to highlight that to speak of broad-based, active citizen
participation in the information society really means to speak of the
opportunity for direct democratic participation in the construction of
the information society. This entails a society in which information
and democratic access to it are crucial to people, not merely as end-
receivers of information and services, but also as participants in in-
formed decision-making and deliberations.
Administrations are developing initiatives which are supposedly
citizen-oriented, and modifying administrative services and procedures
using the potential of ICTs for e-government, but it seems that they
are far from considering citizens as “actors”.
One condition necessary for people to feel more involved in the
construction of the information society is their participation as sub-
jects, not merely as objects of development measures. This participa-
tion goes beyond considering that people are participating merely
because they “attend” certain activities or “use” certain telecommu-
nications services or infrastructure. These conditions may be more
or less necessary; they may even be essential, but they are not enough.
Graph  1: Number of activities by type of agents
Source: ITU. WSIS stocktaking database (2006)
Graph  2: Number of activities by action line
Source: ITU. WSIS stocktaking database (2006)
16 The number of activities by the federal government and autonomous communities
(alone or in various collaborations) is 148 in total. Disaggregated data only exist
for the autonomous communities of Junta de Castilla y León and Junta de
Extremadura. In the case of education activities, those activities in which
autonomous communities participate along with the federal government have not
been differentiated.
17 It should be noted that the information obtained from the WSIS database is
“contaminated”, given the inclusion of projects by foundations created by
commercial entities in the telecom sector in the category of civil society entities.
We have differentiated these different actors in Graph 4, including the category
“business foundations” to refer to this particular stakeholder.
Graph  3: Number of activities by governments (federal and autonomous communities) by WSIS action lines
Source: ITU. WSIS stocktaking database (2006)
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Active participation requires specific knowledge and skills, and
digital literacy is only a first step. The concept of digital literacy can
be compared to reading and writing. It is a powerful idea, if it also
leads to understanding the “codes” and “keys” to the information
society; but it is limited if it is only practically oriented to the knowl-
edge and use of tools and devices. ICT education, training and ca-
pacity-building should be oriented around citizen empowerment
broadly understood.
Groups that have access to the resources to participate in deci-
sion-making forums can come to have a major influence in defining
actions and policies, given that a large number of citizens do not have
a means of expression, or simply do not have the necessary informa-
tion to decide.
This is why it is necessary to firmly develop citizen participation
through specific legislation. We need to deepen the democratic tracks
necessary for the information society to carve out a people-centred
vision; but also to move towards a more just and equal globalisation
that considers not only economic, technological or administrative fac-
tors, but also social, cultural, and legal dimensions, or any others that
shape the context of people’s lives. 
Graph  4: Number of activities of non-governmental entities by WSIS action lines
Source: ITU. WSIS stocktaking database (2006)
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Introduction
This report assesses whether or not Uganda is on track to meet the
information and communications technology (ICT) development ob-
jectives laid out in the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) Plan of Action. It provides an overview of the ICT status in the
country, and presents some of the rapid changes that have happened
within the country’s ICT sector. The report highlights the steps taken
by the government in realising the WSIS Plan of Action, but also sum-
marises the challenges the country faces. It finds that although the
policy and legislative framework is in place and the political will ex-
ists, ICT development is being constrained by a number of factors,
including the rural/urban divide, a lack of awareness about the advan-
tages of ICTs, and a low level of skills.
This report was compiled mainly through desk research, and in-
cluded the review of civil society and government documents. The
authors acknowledge I-Network, the Ministry of ICT, the National Plan-
ning Authority (NPA) and the Uganda Communications Commission
(UCC) for their input in the preparation of this report.
Country situation
The Ugandan government recognises ICTs as a tool for social and
economic development. This includes: reforming government serv-
ice delivery; achieving transparency, accountability and credibility;
providing effective access to information; broadening public partici-
pation and promoting democracy; facilitating research and develop-
ment; and enhancing competitiveness in the global economy (NRM,
2006). The government has a strong belief that ICTs will improve its
relationship with the country’s business sector and citizens, and with
its own employees (Uganda e-Government, 2006).
The political will behind ICT development in Uganda has been
manifested through numerous ICT-related government policies, pro-
grammes and laws since the 1990s. Recent reforms in the sector
include the licensing of mobile phone companies and the separation
of postal from communication services. Telecom markets have been
deregulated, ICT trade liberalised, and taxes on computers abolished.
The setting up of the Rural Communications Development Fund (RCDF)
under the UCC was another notable change. These measures have
promoted the proliferation of ICT usage in the country.
In 2004 the cabinet directed all government ministries to create
a budget line for ICTs. Although the amount being allocated by the
ministries is not substantial, it is a step in the right direction. In addi-
tion, in the 2006 presidential elections, President Yoweri Museveni
included ICTs as one of the key areas for consideration during his
new term in office (NRM Manifesto, 2006).
Steps taken in the realisation of WSIS targets
The WSIS Plan of Action provides a good global reference point for
setting targets to improve access to ICTs. The plan includes address-
ing the urban/rural divide, and connecting educational institutions,
health facilities, public libraries and cultural centres, among other
objectives. It has basic e-government targets (such as providing gov-
ernment departments with websites), and encourages countries to
adapt school and tertiary education curricula to meet the needs of the
information society. It also states that people should have access to
broadcast services and that content should be localised (WSIS, 2003).
Steps taken by the Ugandan government to promote access to
ICTs and information include legal, regulatory and policy development;
consolidating the political leadership of the country’s ICT strategy;
and developing infrastructure.
Legal, regulatory and policy environment for promoting ICT access
The national ICT policy development process was initiated in 1998 by
the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST). In
May 2002, the UNCST submitted a draft National ICT Policy Frame-
work to cabinet. It was approved in December 2003 (NPA, 2005).
Other ICT-related policies in place include the Rural Communications
Development Policy for Uganda (UCC, 2001), the National Broadcast-
ing Policy (WOUGNET, 2004), and the e-Government Strategy Frame-
work (Uganda e-Government, 2006).
The legal and regulatory framework for promoting ICTs in Uganda
includes the Electronic Media Act (Government of Uganda, 1996), the
Uganda Communications Commission Act (UCC, 2000), the Access
to Information Act (Government of Uganda, 2005), and the Copyright
and Neighbouring Rights Act (2006). Bills that are ready for debate in
parliament include the National Information Technology Authority-
Uganda (NITA-U) Bill (MFEP, 2004), the Communications Act Amend-
ment Bill (2005), the Electronic Transactions Bill (2004), the Elec-
tronic Signatures Bill (2004), and the Computer Misuse Bill (2004).2
A monopoly enjoyed by Uganda Telecom and MTN ended in July
2005. Opening up the telecoms market is expected to lead to increased
investment in the sector, increased penetration of services, and inno-
vation in the provision of services, such as the use of cost-effective
technologies.
ICT institutional framework
In June 2006, the government consolidated the leadership of its ICT
strategy to ensure that policy development, laws and regulations are
harmonised. The newly created Ministry of ICT will spearhead the
development of ICTs and address problems associated with the lack
of a lead agency to take the country’s ICT strategy forward. These
included delays in passing ICT-related bills, duplication and wastage
of scarce resources, and territorial silos, which result in uncoordi-
nated sectoral policy development and fragmented, non-integrated
ICT implementation. Agencies affiliated to the new ministry include
the UCC and Uganda Computer Services/National IT Authority-Uganda
(NITA-U). Plans are also underway to place broadcasting services
under the same ministry.
1 <www.wougnet.org>.
2 Other legal reforms are underway that could further provide a conducive legal
framework for ICT development, such as amending national laws to make them
compliant with the information era.
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Implementation
The implementation of the National ICT Policy in Uganda involves
various ministries, district and local authorities, development part-
ners and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as the pri-
vate sector (UCC, 2003). Progress has been made in a number of
areas, including developing a national backbone, rural access, educa-
tion, systems integration, and stimulating private sector investment.
It is government policy to develop ICT infrastructure that ena-
bles connectivity in schools, health centres, agricultural extension units
and administrative and commercial centres throughout the country.
As part of this responsibility, the government is currently conducting
an e-government and national backbone infrastructure study in part-
nership with the government of China. This will lead to the laying of a
fibre optic backbone that will extend high-speed connectivity across
the country. It is expected that the national backbone will enable the
setup of an integrated e-government system and extend the current
communications network to rural areas. Implementation is sched-
uled to start in 2007.
To facilitate rural access, subsidies have been granted to service
providers by the RCDF since 2003. These subsidies contribute to-
wards the provision of communications services in various parts of
the country (RCDF, 2006), including:
• ICT training centres and internet cafés. More than 54 ICT train-
ing centres and 50 internet cafés have been set up countrywide
through public-private partnerships. The target was to cover all
the districts of Uganda by June 2006. New districts have since
been created and will be catered for under the same arrange-
ment, but implementation will be in the financial year 2006/2007.
• Internet PoPs. In order to facilitate local internet access and re-
duce usage cost in the country, the UCC subsidised the installa-
tion of internet points of presence (PoPs) in 32 districts (out of
the then 56 districts – the number of districts has now been
increased to over 80).
• District information portals (DIPs). The UCC also facilitated the
development of information portals for all the districts to allow
information to be shared with local communities, development
partners and the outside world.
• Public payphones. The UCC has facilitated the installation of public
payphones in 316 selected sub-counties across the country since
2004. The government plans to provide access to a public tel-
ephone for every 1,200 people in the rural areas by the year 2010.
ICTs are being integrated in educational institutions at all levels.
Most universities and other tertiary institutions are currently offering
ICT-related courses. In addition, there are several initiatives and or-
ganisations promoting ICTs for development in schools in both urban
and rural areas. These include the Council for Economic Empower-
ment of Women in Africa (CEEWA-Uganda), I-Network, SchoolNet,
Uganda Connect (uConnect), and WOUGNET.
Some government departments are using ICTs to enhance service
delivery. Information systems developed include the Integrated Finan-
cial Management System (IFMS), the Local Government Information
Communication System (LoGICs), the Education Management Infor-
mation System (EMIS), the Health Management Information System
(HMIS), and the Parliamentary Communication and Management Infor-
mation System (PMIS). The government has also developed an Auto-
mated System for Customs Data (or ASYCUDA) – a system developed
in Geneva by UNCTAD, which is free for countries to use and customise.
Additional interventions planned by the government seek to ad-
dress privacy and security issues as well as to encourage the private
sector to invest in ICTs (NRM Manifesto, 2006). These include review-
ing and adjusting public investment policies in so far as they relate to
the promotion of ICTs by Ugandan firms and external investors.
There is also a move to resolve the cost and quality of connectiv-
ity within the existing licensing agreements in the telecommunica-
tions sector. For example, following the end of the duopoly agree-
ment in 2005, the new licensing structure will allow for institutions to
have their own gateways to allow them to access the internet directly
instead of going through the national operators. Such a move should
encourage the private sector to invest in outsourced services for data
entry and call centre enterprises by lowering their costs of operation,
and allowing them to improve the quality of their connectivity if they
are not satisfied with what is available through the national operators.
Impact and challenges
While the prevailing policy and legislative environment in Uganda sup-
ports ICT development, actual implementation is being hampered by
a number of challenges on the ground. A study conducted by Tusubira
et al (2005) concerning telecommunications and e-usage in Uganda
revealed that access to basic telephony services in rural areas is still
unacceptably low. At the same time, however, mobile teledensity is
improving at a very impressive rate. The study notes that mobile te-
lephony has the potential for the rapid achievement of nationwide
access if key barriers – such as the initial cost of the phones, the
absence of convenient ways of recharging, as well as the high excise
on airtime for prepaid phones – are addressed through public-private
partnerships supported by the RCDF.
The same study also revealed that access to the internet across
the entire country is far below what would be expected with the
often-praised policy and regulatory environment in Uganda. Key is-
sues such as supporting the generation and dissemination of rel-
evant content; developing the national fibre optic backbone and con-
necting Uganda to the global network; encouraging the local as-
sembly of computers to bring down costs; and integrating ICT skills
training at all levels of education, must be addressed by both gov-
ernment and the regulator. In addition, the study found that the higher
percentage of females in Uganda (the majority of citizens below fif-
teen years of age are female) provides a strategic opportunity for
emphasising the role of women in developing ICT skills and the use
of ICTs in the country.
These findings are confirmed by both the Telecommunications
Sector Policy Review (MWHC, 2005) and the e-Government Strategy
Framework. According to the Telecommunications Sector Policy Re-
view, only about 25% of the population in rural areas utilises payphone
services on a regular basis. Regular usage in urban areas is just over
60%, due to higher incomes, greater ease of access and awareness.
There is also no access to voice over internet protocol (VoIP) in rural
areas (it is still very limited in urban areas) and there is almost insig-
nificant access to and utilisation of computers and the internet in ar-
eas outside the major urban centres.
The e-Government Strategy Framework shows that most gov-
ernment offices do not have an internet connection, that bandwidth is
overpriced and concentrated in cities and a few major towns, and that
there is a general lack of awareness of ICTs in both the urban and
rural context. Furthermore, it says that Uganda has difficulty in at-
tracting, recruiting and retaining skilled ICT personnel (Uganda e-
Government, 2006).
Regarding gender, it is widely known that access to ICTs by
women is constrained by inadequate technological infrastructure in
rural areas, social and cultural bias, low levels of education and skills,
and the lack of disposable income to purchase technology and e-serv-
ices. The media’s limited understanding of gender issues and a lack
of data on gender and ICTs also play a role (WOUGNET, 2006).
Finally, the government has so far not developed adequate strat-
egies to integrate ICTs into national development plans, including the
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), a comprehensive poverty
eradication and development strategy. However, the National Plan-
ning Authority (NPA) has now taken the initiative to correct this.
Participation
Uganda is a democratic country and the development of national poli-
cies, laws and regulations are largely participatory. In the case of ICTs,
the National ICT Policy Framework was developed through a con-
sultative process involving civil society, students, government minis-
tries, agencies, and so on. Numerous interviews, focus group discus-
sions and stakeholder workshops were held. This process was coor-
dinated by a steering committee under the UNCST.
While the ICT policy was criticised for not including an imple-
mentation master plan and budget, and for not being widely circu-
lated and publicised upon completion, plans are now underway to
review the document so that it matches current national development
plans and systems.
Another area of participation that was promoted by the NPA is
the setting up of a National ICT/e-Government Inter-Agency Planning
Team. This team brings together personalities with different career
backgrounds from central and local governments, civil society,
academia, the private sector, and gender and other interest groups.
Some of the key outputs from this effort have been the development
of the draft of the e-Government Strategy Framework, advocacy for
the creation of the new Ministry of ICT, and integration of ICTs into
the PEAP.
Conclusions
From the above scenario, we can conclude that the required environ-
ment for the development of ICTs in Uganda is in place. This includes
policies, legal and regulatory frameworks, political will, and public
participation. However, implementation has been hampered by sev-
eral challenges. What is important is that these challenges are being
acknowledged.
Given the prevailing political will, a number of important projects
are expected to be implemented in 2007. These include the devel-
opment of the national fibre optic backbone and the expansion of
rural access programmes. These are positive signs that suggest
Uganda is keen to achieve the targets outlined in the WSIS Plan of
Action (WSIS, 2003).
It is important and indeed incumbent upon government that civil
society, the private sector and other stakeholders are able to fully
participate in the planning and rolling out of ICT for development
projects. In this way, the most effective and sustainable steps can be
taken to ensure that basic communications services of acceptable
quality are accessible at affordable prices and at reasonable distances
by all people in Uganda. 
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